THE FACULTY OF PERCEPTION IN THE EARLY NARRATIVES OF HARTMANN VON AUE : WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SECULAR MORALITY AND PENITENTIAL PRACTICE

Helen Galloway

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
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

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ABSTRACT

This thesis was conceived in response to the recent controversy in Hartmann scholarship concerning the existence of a psychological progression in Hartmann's characters. Whilst the majority of scholars argue that a progression does exist in these works, three scholars in particular, Rudolf Voß, Hubertus Fischer, and Otfrid Ehrismann, claim that Hartmann remains unconcerned with the inner world of his characters. Instead, they suggest that he depicts perfect protagonists who are affected by a visitation of objective sin (Voß), or who react primarily to the demands of secular honour (Fischer) or courtliness (Ehrismann). The present study attempts to re-examine the issue of ethical progression in Hartmann's three earliest narratives. This is achieved principally by considering the ability of the characters to perceive and to make ethical judgements on the basis of their mental deliberations. This evidence is considered in the light of the objections of the scholars mentioned above. In particular, their work has reminded scholarship that Hartmann's narratives cannot be interpreted in terms of modern individual morality. Similarly, their arguments lead one to surmise that an ethical dimension in these works would be likely to reflect Hartmann's status as a clerically-educated secular poet and the concerns of his secular audience, rather than specific theological developments relating to self-awareness. A moral dimension in these works would therefore be likely to be informed by lay ethical notions and a general awareness of theological concepts concerning perceptiveness, such as would be broadcast through the penitential system. The present study attempts therefore to set the evidence pertaining to perceptiveness and ethical behaviour in Hartmann's works within the context of the lay morality shared by this poet and his audience.

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The name Hartmann von Aue is counted amongst the four literary giants of the High Middle Ages in Germany. Alongside Wolfram von Eschenbach, Gottfried von Straßburg, and Walther von der Vogelweide, Hartmann was active as a poet during the final twenty years of the twelfth and the first decade of the thirteenth century, an age of rapid political change in the German empire, and of continued progress in the far-reaching theological, social, and cultural developments which had been taking place during the previous century and a half in western Europe. This age of renaissance and expansion found reflection in the literary world in terms of the creation of new genres and in the complexity of composition and content of works designed for noble audiences. The four poets named above were at the forefront of these developments.

The accomplishment of his works has attracted the close attention of literary scholars to Hartmann for the past hundred and fifty years. The resulting abundance of criticism suggests that every last detail of his output has been perused. Nevertheless, the sophistication of the works and the difficulty of interpretation caused by the centuries dividing Hartmann's age and this, has prevented a 'grand theory' from being established which might unlock Hartmann's texts completely. Furthermore, recent controversy in particular has resulted in the undermining of the relative stability of post-war Hartmann scholarship, and in the call for a reconsideration of the most basic tenets underlying Hartmann's works. The present study is conceived as a response to this challenge.

The recent controversy itself is focused on the question of psychological depth in Hartmann's characters. Prior to the appearance of the work of Rudolf Voß, Hubertus Fischer, and Otfrid Ehrismann in the 1980s, which initiated this debate,

Hartmann scholarship since the end of the 1920s had generally accepted Gustav Ehrismann's claim that Hartmann's protagonists undergo a psychological, ethical progression from egoism to altruism throughout the course of the narratives.[1] Such an interpretation assumes the existence of an inner life in the characters which allows them to experience moral failure and subsequent improvement. Furthermore, these scholars (e.g. Peter Wapnewski, Bernard Willson, Walter Ohly, David Duckworth) have tended to link this subjective dimension in Hartmann's work to the theological teaching of his day. Voß, Fischer, and Otfrid Ehrismann have challenged these claims by arguing that there is an absence of ethical failure and psychological progression in Hartmann's protagonists, an absence which they take to indicate the author's portrayal, not of a morality informed by specific theological notions, but one based on more objective principles which have been drawn from various sources of influence. Thus, Voß claims, for example, that Hartmann's works reflect the objective sinful state of humankind, and that the protagonists' failings are therefore morally inculpable. In contrast, Fischer and Otfrid Ehrismann perceive a framework in these narratives based exclusively on the ethic of secular honour and of courtliness respectively. Although the protagonists violate these codes, this is not perceived by these scholars as an ethical failing, but rather as evidence of objective miscalculation. In their various ways, therefore, these three scholars have sought to look beyond the consensus in scholarship by challenging the assumption that Hartmann portrays a psychological progression and moral improvement in his narratives which is informed by theological principles and which would demand an inner awareness of the self in his protagonists.

In response to this controversy, the present study intends to readdress the question of whether Hartmann's protagonists reveal evidence of an inner life, and whether this

psychological depth is used to portray a form of ethical progression. In addition, however, a broader assessment of the range of influences which might underlie any such subjective dimension will be undertaken in the light of the justifiable challenge of these three scholars. Their work has particularly drawn attention to the fact that Hartmann, as an educated ministerial, was in a position to be aware of theological developments, but nevertheless also inhabited the secular world of the court and the military aristocracy. He was not, therefore, a specialist theologian, nor was he composing for a specifically clerical audience. Consequently, one might speculate that his own and his audience's awareness of subjective, ethical notions would have been informed by general trends which had arisen from both the secular and theological traditions and had combined to create a form of secular morality which was relevant to this stratum of society. With regard to theological tradition, therefore, there is a case to be made for considering in particular the broader issues relating to the inner life which affected all Christians, such as the penitential system, rather than the specific influence of any one master or theory on Hartmann himself. Similarly, the contribution of social and cultural developments to the creation of a secular moral code and a more general awareness of the inner life and individuality must be evaluated.

This study will therefore seek to examine the evidence of psychological depth in the main protagonists and additional characters inhabiting Hartmann's works which can be considered a prerequisite of ethical progression. This will be achieved by focusing specifically on the ability of these characters to perceive and to be self-aware. In addition, this evidence will be placed in the broad context of secular and general clerical influences which might have informed such a portrayal of the inner life in these works of literature. *Perception* is defined in this study as the characters' ability to reflect and reason for themselves,

and to demonstrate, by means of this cognitive process, their awareness of the various facets of their identities, whether as Christians, knights, lords, or spouses, which they have a secular moral duty to fulfil. Therefore, any occurrences of basic thought processes in the characters and the manner in which they are portrayed will be taken into consideration. Similarly, the content of any thought processes will be investigated in order to determine in particular how and whether Hartmann's characters are able to analyse their situations and relationships or be aware of their own behaviour. By comparing the results of these findings, it should be possible to establish whether the main protagonists in particular reveal any progress in their ability to be aware of their surroundings and duties in this way. Intertextual comparisons will also be undertaken in order to highlight any similarities or differences of emphasis or portrayal in the inner lives of the characters within the various genres which Hartmann employed.

The initial chapter of this present study will constitute a detailed investigation of the work of Rudolf Voß, Hubertus Fischer, and Otfrid Ehrismann, which has so profoundly challenged Hartmann scholarship. In addition, the work of two scholars who acknowledge a subjective dimension to Hartmann's narratives will be considered as representatives of a contrasting interpretation. However, this chapter is not intended to represent an exhaustive survey of recent scholarship, but rather to reveal certain significant contributions to the issue which have been made over the last fifteen years. It is against this general scholarly background that the present study can subsequently be measured.

A general survey of the contemporary historical background to Hartmann's works will be undertaken in the second chapter. Here, the various ethical traditions, classical, clerical, and secular, will be explored which may have

informed a portrayal of the inner life in Hartmann's protagonists. In addition, the cultural and social conditions of Hartmann's age will be considered in order to establish their contribution to the issue of inner awareness at this time.

The final three chapters of this study will be devoted in turn to each of Hartmann's three earliest works, *Die Klage*, *Erec*, and *Gregorius*. These detailed textual analyses are intended to demonstrate the extent and nature of Hartmann's interest in a subjective dimension. However, such attention to detail prohibits the inclusion of Hartmann's later narratives in a study of this scale. Nevertheless, *Iwein* in particular receives considerable attention within the scope of the first chapter, and Hartmann's lyric poems are considered as part of the chapter concerning *Die Klage*. A restriction of focus to the earliest narratives can, in any case, be justified in various ways. Firstly, it allows greater attention to be paid to *Die Klage*, a work which has been accorded relatively minor importance in Hartmann scholarship. Consequently, it will be possible to establish whether Hartmann's concern with subjective elements is present at the beginning of his surviving output and how this concern developed throughout his later works. Furthermore, Hartmann's initial works represent examples of the full range of narrative genres employed by this author, namely the disputation, the Arthurian romance, and the religious narrative. Such a restriction of focus therefore still permits a broad analysis of Hartmann's use of genre. Finally, these three narratives also form a coherent group in terms of certain shared concerns, for example the issue of youthfulness, which set them apart from Hartmann's later works.

CHAPTER ONE

An Appraisal of Recent Scholarship Concerning the Ethical Dimension of Hartmann's Works

Rudolf Voß, *Die Artusepik Hartmanns von Aue. Untersuchungen zum Wirklichkeitsbegriff und zur Ästhetik eines literarischen Genres im Kräftefeld von soziokulturellen Normen und christlicher Anthropologie*

Voß initially insists that his approach will be of a broad nature. He puts the case in his introduction that it is possible to interpret the issue of guilt in Hartmann's Arthurian romances in the same terms as his religious works by claiming that Hartmann has applied aspects of Augustine's teaching to all of his narratives to investigate secular as well as religious issues (*Artusepik*, pp. 1f.). The complexity caused by such a combination of theological and secular concerns in the works is, according to Voß, as yet unappreciated by Hartmann scholarship. On closer inspection, however, the broad approach to the complexity which Voß advocates is in fact revealed to be based on a narrow focus owing to his disregard of certain textual elements.

Voß's main bone of contention with other scholars is that they are preoccupied with the existence of an ethical dimension and a psychological development in works of courtly literature (*Artusepik*, p. 84).[2] A development, by definition, requires evidence of an ethical lack or failure on the hero's part. Voß denies the existence of such a lack in Hartmann's protagonists, although he does not completely reject all evidence of an ethical dimension in these works. He maintains, however, that to recognize an ethical progression in a perfect hero is to cast doubt on the integrity of the work, and therefore takes issue with the general tendency in scholarship to equate Hartmann's works

with Christian concepts of morality to the exclusion of all else:

> Nun ist allerdings nicht zu leugnen, daß sich ethische Terminologie in Hartmanns Werk reich dokumentieren und sogar mit über dessen sozialen Rahmen hinaus gültigen Tugendwerten in Beziehung bringen läßt. Aber damit ist noch keineswegs die vielfach als selbstverständlich vorausgesetzte Meinung gedeckt, daß sich die ethische Konzeption der Artusepen nahtlos in das Kategoriensystem der stoisch-christlichen Ethik füge und deshalb auch von dorther erschlossen werden könne. (*Artusepik*, p. 49)

In Voß's opinion, the ethical dimension which Hartmann is portraying does not correspond exactly to Christian morality as his works also represent the lay ethics and interests of the military aristocracy. This complexity has resulted in a confusion which Voß seeks to clarify by proposing that Hartmann's Arthurian romances are works in which the social ethic is overlaid by the Christian ethic. In other words, these works follow a moral code which parallels Christian anthropological morality, but remain fundamentally secular; the salvation the main protagonists are seeking therefore, is perfection in this world, rather than entry into the next.

Voß proposes *Gregorius* as his main point of comparison with Hartmann's Arthurian romances. It is in this work that Voß observes the Christian moral code which he argues Hartmann uses as the model for his secular works. In consequence, Voß maintains that the main protagonists in all these works are depicted as initially perfect, but are thereafter afflicted by an objective visitation of sin and forced to strive to regain their status of perfection. There is no suggestion that the main protagonists succumb to failure as a result of a moral or psychological fault within themselves. In contrast to other scholars, Voß contends that objective sin was a prevalent theological concept in Hartmann's day in

view of the influence of the later teachings of Augustine (*Artusepik*, pp. 74-80). Throughout his life, Augustine wrestled with the relationship of guilt to free will and original sin. Voß traces the various developments undergone by Augustinian thought and underlines the main points of his later theories. According to Augustine, humankind was burdened with an inheritance of sin as the result of the Fall of Man. Thus, each human being is born with an inherent culpability for a sin which is not caused by a subjective failure, but rather exists on an objective or metaphysical plane. This sinful inheritance is manifested in a fundamental weakness in the will which causes it to respond to the forces of evil.

Although he concedes that steps were taken in the twelfth century toward acknowledging a subjective failure as the basis of sin, most notably by Abelard, Voß argues that the main body of theological opinion at this time regarded sin as objective and as linked with the inheritance of all humankind since the Fall. This opinion is specifically reflected in *Gregorius* (*Artusepik*, pp. 80-3). Thus, according to Voß, even though Gregorius' guilt lies outside his own personal responsibility, he is forced to acknowledge it as his inheritance from original sin (*Artusepik*, pp. 81f.). He proceeds to do penance as a means of confirming this acknowledgment and his experiences serve to represent Augustine's teaching on the frailty of the human condition and the transitory nature of this world. In this way, an ethically perfect individual is compromised by his guilty inheritance. Once he has acknowledged his objective guilt, he eventually regains and surpasses his former position. The required reaction to objective sin is therefore to strive through its onslaught in order to attain an ideal.

Voß's consideration of Christian anthropology with regard to Hartmann's narratives is useful in broad terms. However, his investigation of late Augustinian thought concerning

original sin does not take into account the manner in which these concepts were interpreted by twelfth-century theologians. Emphasis was given, particularly by masters such as Abelard and Hugh of St Victor, to the personal responsibility of each Christian to acknowledge his or her inherited guilt from the Fall. The failure to accept this responsibility, however, was regarded as culpable negligence, in other words, a subjective failing, such as Voß rejects in his interpretation.[3]

In order to illustrate his view, Voß engages in a detailed examination of the text of *Gregorius*, and identifies various occurrences of objective sin. Gregorius' father, for instance, is affected by a mixture of love, youth, beauty, and the power of the Devil (Gr 303ff., 323ff., 332ff.) (*Artusepik*, pp. 61f.). All of these forces lead him to commit a crime for which he cannot be considered responsible, as if he were the passive victim of these influences. The same notion is also evident in the second incest, in which Gregorius' mother appears to be affected by the forces of love, the Devil, and misfortune (Gr 2488ff., 2559ff., 2667). Likewise, Gregorius' own initial reaction to the discovery of his sin is to consider himself a victim of God's decision to guide him to his mother's land (Gr 2614-18). Voß concludes that:

> nach solcher durchgängig transsubjektiven Motivation der Geschehensabläufe kann kein Zweifel bestehen, daß das Thema der Schuld nicht auf moralischer oder psychologischer, sondern auf metaphysischer Ebene gestellt ist. (*Artusepik*, p. 73)

He strengthens his argument further by asserting that no evidence exists in the work to suggest a psychological defect in the main protagonist, a claim which he maintains by demonstrating how Gregorius is continually referred to as perfect, even from birth:

> Den äußeren Vorzügen, die schon den Neugeborenen (674, 679ff., 686, 708, 1033f.), später den Heranwachsenden (1238) und dann den Ritter (1877ff., 2117ff.; vgl. 2906ff.) auszeichnen, entspricht die intellektuelle und ethische Vollkommenheit. (*Artusepik*, pp. 63f.)

In addition, Voß argues that Gregorius commits no crime by leaving the monastery (*Artusepik*, p. 68), and considers his daily reading of the tablet to constitute sufficient penance (*Artusepik*, p. 63). Voß maintains that Gregorius demonstrates no moral lack or loss of control on these occasions. This is verified by the abbot's reaction to Gregorius' desire to leave the monastery, which contains no suggestion that he believes Gregorius to be committing a sin. Indeed, he even offers marriage as an alternative to Gregorius' desire for knighthood. Moreover, Gregorius' later reference to his own 'tumpheit' (Gr 1484-6) is seen by Voß as carrying little weight when compared with the overwhelming number of positive references to him in the narrative (*Artusepik*, p. 66). The contradiction which these opposing statements would otherwise create is too great to be credible in Voß's eyes. Instead, he argues that these self-criticisms typify the reaction of an heir to original sin towards his inheritance (*Artusepik*, p. 67).

Voß proceeds to draw a parallel between his interpretation of *Gregorius* and Hartmann's Arthurian romances, describing the latter as similarly reflecting the dictates of medieval theology regarding sin (*Artusepik*, pp. 83-90). As a result, the two main protagonists are represented as morally perfect from the start in order to highlight their later subjection to a sin for which they are not personally responsible. The main protagonists subsequently reveal the influences of their sinful inheritance, but prove their worth in the manner in which they take responsibility for their inherent culpability. Erec and Iwein, like Gregorius, are therefore guilty of a metaphysical sin, rather than an ethical failing. Within the parallel structure of these secular

works, sin is correspondingly depicted as an objective social disaster. In addition, Voß claims that the Christian concepts of penance, regret, and mercy likewise find reflection within this secular structure:

> Der Artusroman reproduziert demnach, obwohl er sich nicht primär von christlichen Inhalten geprägt zeigt, die Struktur des christlichen Schuldbegriffs und der damit zusammenhängenden Phänomene Reue, Buße, Vergebung (Gnade) und läßt so mit bemerkenswerter Souveränität im Freiheitsraum des ästhetischen Mediums die feudalhöfische Sphäre auf dem epochalen christlichen Fundament aufruhen, ohne ihre nicht durchweg mit christlichen Wertsetzungen zur Deckung zu bringenden normativen Eigenintentionen zu verflüchtigen. (*Artusepik*, p. 88).

On the basis of this claim, Voß contends that the protagonists strive for secular salvation in terms of fame, noble standing, and knightly success. They are likewise subjected in secular terms to the weakness caused by their human inheritance and the forces of objective sin, which act as a reminder that the path to achieving a social ideal is as fraught with unseen difficulties as attaining a place in Heaven. Voß thus interprets the Arthurian romances as works of social idealism, displaying the transitory nature of a life which is constantly at the mercy of objective forces, but also describing the means to withstand the inevitability of failure and reach the heights of social fame.

The crux of Voß's approach lies in his interpretation of the initial adventures of the two main protagonists before they succumb to failure, and the nature of that failure itself. Voß therefore asserts that Erec and Iwein, like Gregorius, are portrayed as morally perfect from the outset. Erec, despite his youthfulness, proves in the initial episode that he is full of ideal potential (*Artusepik*, pp. 5ff.). His success at Tulmein and the wedding tournament is confirmation of his status as a young and perfect knight. Erec is likewise described as an established member of

Arthur's court (Er 2f., 1510ff., 1611ff.). The lack of evidence denoting a psychological failing leads Voß to conclude that the initial episode is:

> eine Jugendgeschichte, die eigentlich gar keine ist, weil sie nicht den Prozeß einer inneren Veränderung aufzeigt, sondern den Protagonisten ausschließlich in seiner idealgemäßen Zielphase vorführt. (*Artusepik*, p. 18)

Voß's definition of Hartmann's emphasis on Erec's youth, however, is too narrow in its scope. Erec's youthfulness may indeed emphasize his extraordinary precociousness and early success, but may likewise suggest a period of incomplete learning and growing, which Voß ostensibly rejects.[4]

Voß likewise interprets this initial episode in accordance with the medieval concept of the individual. Erec is thus portrayed as an individual knight whose existence is fundamentally bound up with his society. Thus, the insult inflicted on him by Maliclisier is a slight on courtly society which Erec must avenge. Voß recognizes Erec only as a catalyst for the recovery of his society's honour from this slight. He considers Erec to respond entirely objectively to his situation, down to desiring Enite's hand merely in reaction to his objective need for a beautiful companion when confronting Iders. Voß surmises that Hartmann's narratives cannot be interpreted in terms of a modern definition of individual alienation in society as critics such as Köhler have maintained (*Artusepik*, pp. 7f.). Voß's interpretation is justified. Nevertheless, to refuse subsequently to acknowledge an additional ethical dimension to the whole of the narrative on the basis of this definition, as Voß does, suggests that he is unduly simplifying a more complex issue.

Voß supports his conclusions by emphasizing the narrator's references to the main protagonist. Their constantly

positive nature in this initial encounter is presented as further evidence of Erec's perfection (*Artusepik*, pp. 13f.). Voß's interpretation does not therefore allow for the possibility of irony or double-meaning behind the narrator's praise. Only by taking the narrator at his word is Voß able to draw such conclusions.

In Voß's opinion, therefore, Erec does not display any signs of an ethical lack or immaturity in this initial episode and, by extension, the rest of the narrative. Moreover, in keeping with the notion that the narrative reflects the tenets of a Christian anthropology, which the lack of a subjective failing confirms, Voß concludes that Erec's failure at Karnant must be the result of objective causality.

Similar conclusions are drawn in Voß's interpretation of *Iwein*. The main protagonist is likewise considered to be perfect from the outset, and to reveal no indication that his future failure may be subjectively motivated. Voß also considers Kalogrenant to be blameless in his behaviour. This he justifies by Arthur's and Iwein's decisions to repeat Kalogrenant's adventure themselves (*Artusepik*, p. 27). Voß makes no mention of a shallow appraisal of knighthood in Kalogrenant's explanation to the Wild Herdsman nor of any indication of subjective failure in Kalogrenant's statement of regret (Iw 635) (*Artusepik*, p. 26). According to Voß, Iwein's vengeance is exonerated by the narrator (Iw 945ff.), as is his pursuit of Askalon, which is described in an ethically neutral fashion as occurring 'âne zuht' and is therefore to be understood as an objective necessity of Iwein's circumstances (*Artusepik*, pp. 29-33). Furthermore, Voß claims that Iwein's marriage is the consequence of his objective superiority to Askalon and the similarly objective forces of love (Iw 2054ff.) (*Artusepik*, p. 41). Finally, his meeting with Lunete, the very person who would be disposed to save him, is seen by Voß as proof that Iwein's rescue was

virtually preordained in view of his moral perfection (Iw 1298ff.) (*Artusepik*, p. 34).

The initial episodes of Hartmann's Arthurian romances are thus interpreted by Voß as being focused on an objective transcendental plane, and this conclusion is subsequently extended to the remainder of the narratives. There is no room in his approach for evidence of such subjective issues as impetuosity or immaturity which are also implied in these initial episodes, but which emerge as aspects of consequence only in the course of the main protagonists' ensuing periods of failure. Voß considers these periods to be caused by the inability of the main protagonists to balance love and social obligations as a result of the influence of the forces of love and adventure (*Artusepik*, pp. 56ff.). According to Voß, Iwein in particular is portrayed as morally perfect throughout this onslaught. His initially genuine intentions to respect the deadline are proof of this, as is his realization that he has broken his promise before Lunete makes her accusation, which is similarly devoid of any reference to a personal failing. Voß declares that Iwein's moral integrity is thereby proven. However, these aspects could likewise be understood as indications of Iwein's future recovery from a lapse induced by a moral failure. From Voß's point of view, however, Iwein has merely encountered a period in which objective forces have caused him to lose his status temporarily. Likewise, Erec experiences a period of failure, but Voß again stresses that no causal subjective fault is evident. Both protagonists should therefore be considered, according to Voß, to be *guote sundære* in the same respect as Gregorius, afflicted by external forces owing to their human inheritance, and encountering disaster through no fault of their own.

Erec is subsequently portrayed by Voß as following a path of adventure along which he continually encounters objective forces. The basic motivation of his reactions to these

forces is similarly objective. He helps Cadoc and the widows at Brandigan, for example, because they are of noble status and their suffering offends Erec's noble sensibility (*Artusepik*, pp. 107-9). Any note of altruism on Erec's part is therefore considered by Voß to exist only within these exclusive parameters. Thus, Erec does not seek expressly to help others in order to rectify an earlier moral failure. He encounters these situations merely as a consequence of following the path of adventure to re-establish his own honour, and reacts to them purely in terms of their merit in helping him achieve this aim.

Erec's progress towards such achievement is highlighted by his opponents, who are similarly affected by the objective forces of love. Neither Galoain, Oringles nor Mabonagrin are portrayed as inherently evil, but, like Erec in the *verligen* episode, they are unable to defend themselves against the demands of love. Erec's victory over them thus serves to accentuate his superiority in taking responsibility for his inherent weakness.

In Voß's final reference to *Erec*, he observes that indications of progression regarding the main protagonist are apparent throughout the narrative, but only on a quantitative rather than a qualitative scale (*Artusepik*, pp. 112-4). In this way, the two horses Enite receives are distinct in the sense that the second is described in greater detail. However, both are referred to as the most desirable (Er 1423ff., 7279ff.). Lengthier descriptions, therefore, are no indication of an ethical progression on the part of the protagonists. This is also the case with the difference in the size of Erec's receptions at Karnant. Voß distinguishes between the informality of the first and the formality of the second owing to Erec's elevation in status. There is no suggestion that he has progressed in any ethical sense, however. In addition, Voß argues that the very timescale of the narrative prohibits an ethical development

because Erec's whole course of adventures after the *verligen* takes only one week. In Voß's opinion, this is insufficient time for such a profound change to have occurred (*Artusepik*, pp. 161-5). It is doubtful, however, whether it is justifiable to draw such conclusions by comparing two sets of possibilities from within and without the realm of fiction.

Voß's consideration of *Iwein* after the missing of the deadline embraces the same approach. He observes that, even in the midst of Iwein's madness, there are still references to his former perfection (Iw 3231ff.), and by recovering his wits and dressing as a knight, Iwein is declared by Voß to have returned instantly to his former perfect state. Voß therefore claims that, as with Erec, there are no indications of an identity crisis or an ethical failing (*Artusepik*, pp. 125f.). Voß considers this to be apparent in the adventure at Narison, in which Iwein displays the gratitude and willingness to help which were absent in his earlier treatment of Laudine and Lunete with regard to the deadline. This does not indicate, in Voß's opinion, that Iwein has improved in any moral sense from his previous failure, but rather that this earlier incident was merely a temporary aberration caused by the external effects of misfortune. At Narison, Iwein proves that this temporary problem has now been rectified (*Artusepik*, p. 127). He subsequently embarks upon a path of adventure on which he encounters objective forces which serve to prove his inherent worthiness, rather than constituting ascending levels of ethical progression.

Voß's emphasis on external factors is exemplified by Iwein's encounter with Lunete on the eve of her execution (*Artusepik*, pp. 128-30). On this occasion, Voß recognizes that both protagonists partly blame themselves for their behaviour (Iw 3966ff., 3999f., 4006ff., 4216ff., 4250ff.), as well as the objective effects of misfortune (Iw 3960ff.,

4031, 4067f., 4201). It appears as if a balance is created here between objective causes and subjective responsibility. However, Voß interprets Lunete's self-accusation as being due to her dismay at her impetuosity. Moreover, he claims that this fault is easily counterbalanced by her noble intentions in persuading her mistress to remarry. Any ethical aspects in her inner appraisal are thus rendered insignificant. Similarly, Voß interprets Iwein's self-accusation as reflecting the male lover of the courtly love tradition who identifies his unworthiness as the cause of his failure, and yet also acknowledges his mistreatment by Fortune. Voß therefore holds that this avowed unworthiness does not imply an ethical failing. However, Voß, in maintaining his objective interpretation, disregards the fact that Iwein's willingness to help Lunete constitutes a distinct change from his initial selfish reaction to her distress (Iw 4030f.). Only after hearing her story does he agree to repay her earlier kindness. During this episode, Iwein appears to take significant steps from a state of self-absorption to a stage where he can recognize and pity the misfortunes of others. This is an issue which Voß neglects to raise. In a similar instance, Voß stresses Lunete's continued support for Iwein, but fails to consider the disparaging remarks and accusations which she directs at him later in the conversation (Iw 4184f., 4199f.), despite also describing Iwein as blameless (Iw 4067). There are grounds, therefore, for acknowledging a more complex state of affairs involving subjective issues in this narrative than Voß is willing to recognize.

Voß's emphasis on external factors is further evident in the Harpin adventure in which Harpin, an objective source of misfortune in himself, provides Iwein with a dilemma regarding his second deadline. This dilemma encompasses two levels comprising Iwein's concern for his social reputation and his desire to prove his loyalty to Lunete. Voß rejects the interpretation that the repetition of the deadline is an

indication of ethical progress in Iwein by which he demonstrates a newly-evident altruism and awareness of responsibility. Instead, Voß considers the second deadline a distant objective consequence of the first, and therefore unsuitable as a comparison in light of the differing circumstances (*Artusepik*, p. 132).

Voß's reading of the text likewise leads him to interpret the kidnapping episode and the inheritance struggle between the two sisters as examples of the ability of objective forces to complicate the achievement of a social ideal. Voß focuses on Arthur's dilemma over Meljaganz' request which is caused by his concern to defend his image of ideal magnanimity. Similarly, Gawein's support for the older sister's dubious cause is the result of ideal expectations of knightly assistance (*Artusepik*, p. 141). Although these two episodes may appear to raise doubts about the pursuit of the ideal when it results in such adverse consequences, as Voß himself acknowledges, he nevertheless considers these isolated incidents to lose significance when compared with the wealth of positive examples of courtly idealism in the narrative. Despite conceding that these episodes suggest the existence of elements of discord within courtly society, Voß does not entertain the possibility that Hartmann is raising ethical questions regarding the restrictive nature of the courtly ideal. These questions are exemplified by Gawein's failure to recognize the evil intentions of the older sister, and the consequences of Arthur's impossible position created by the clash between his pursuit of ideal generosity and an extreme demand. One may even surmise that Hartmann is highlighting the constraints of ideal courtly behaviour which restrict the ability to recognize or respond to such vital ethical considerations. Whatever the case, Voß is unwilling to expand his theory to accommodate these levels of interpretation.

A significant tendency of Voß's approach is to disregard the change in circumstances and status experienced by Hartmann's main protagonists and their reactions to that change, such as are evident in the depiction of their inner thoughts. Voß fails to consider the protagonists' monologues which depict such awareness in the three texts he considers. It is upon these monologues and other aspects relating to the thoughts and motivations of the protagonists that the present study intends to focus in detail. Voß prefers to rely on the guidance of the narrator, which at times may provide a more ambiguous insight into events than the characters' own thoughts and words. The continued references to the worthiness of the main protagonists, which Voß regards as firm evidence of the absence of an ethical deficiency, may be interpreted as indications that their mistakes are only temporary, but do not exclude the possibility that they are nevertheless moral failings.

Voß's failure to compare Hartmann's narratives with their sources likewise enables him to draw such conclusions. Hartmann's additions to his sources reveal a tendency to incorporate new ethical dimensions into the issues portrayed. For example, in Hartmann's hands the mistakes of Erec and Iwein evolve from being problems of a love relationship to being problems of general attitude which undermine the status of the main protagonists.

The present study does not seek to attest that the ethical dimension excludes all others, an approach which Voß has condemned other scholars for adopting. On the contrary, there are aspects of social reality visible in these works, particularly with regard to knightly honour. However, in reaction to Voß's approach, it can be claimed that Hartmann's works are indeed imbued with a subjective dimension. Voß may be commended for highlighting the dangers of an excessive concentration on ethical evidence, but his own approach is guilty of similar limitations by ignoring

these aspects. In addition, Christoph Cormeau observes a further tendency in Voß's work:

> Die Arbeit unterschätzt die narrative Dynamik der Zentralfiguren und die Erkenntnisse der Erzählforschung.[5]

Likewise, Silvia Ranawake criticizes Voß's superficial approach:

> Eine derartig vereinfachende Sicht kann ... Hartmanns Werk, seiner Komplexität und seinen Spannungen, die auch seine literarische Qualität ausmachen, nicht gerecht werden.[6]

Voß's point of departure is therefore too restricted. His disregard of subjective aspects causes him to propound objective sin as the basic dynamic of Hartmann's works. By considering only the works of Augustine and not the broader range of twelfth-century theological works which Augustine inspired, Voß is rejecting the appreciation of such subjective issues as insight and motivation in Hartmann's day which find reflection in his Arthurian romances with regard to secular moral issues, and in *Gregorius* with regard to acknowledging the sinful inheritance of humankind. The dimension of subjective culpability within these parameters cannot therefore be ignored in a balanced appraisal of Hartmann's art.

Hubertus Fischer, *Ehre, Hof und Abenteuer in Hartmanns 'Iwein'. Vorarbeiten zu einer historischen Poetik des höfischen Epos*

Hubertus Fischer shares Voß's rejection of the majority tendency amongst scholars to acknowledge the existence of a psychological progression in Hartmann's works. Like Voß, he advocates that the protagonists' adventures are of an objective nature, and gives no support to the argument that

the protagonists precipitate a subjective failure which demands restitution. Despite the broad similarities between their conclusions, the approaches of Voß and Fischer are nevertheless based on differing theories. Whereas Voß contends that Hartmann's Arthurian romances represent a social ideal modelled on a Christian anthropological structure, Fischer repudiates all theological influence in these works. Instead, Fischer declares *Iwein* to be a portrayal and exploration of contemporary secular issues relating to the concept of knightly honour which would have been clearly identifiable and relevant to an audience drawn from the military aristocracy, but which have been overlooked or misinterpreted by modern scholars owing to their bourgeois moralistic mindset.

Fischer bases his rejection of theological aspects on the evidence of certain didactic works including the *Policraticus* of John of Salisbury and the writings of Peter of Blois (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 14-18). John of Salisbury regarded the pastimes of the military aristocracy, including listening to courtly romances, as excessive preoccupation with secular issues. Fischer contends that this was a widespread opinion amongst twelfth-century theologians. Even such positive elements in the romances as the portrayal of compassion or forgiveness were considered to be harmful, secular digressions from true Christian virtues.[7] This conclusion leads Fischer to reject the works of those scholars intent on recognizing a theological dimension in Hartmann's works:

> Wir meinen jene Versuche, der Artusepik einen religiösen Hintersinn zu entlocken und aus ihr mit Hilfe der christlichen Moraltheologie 'exempla' gottgefälligen Tuns zu machen. Zumal die christlichen Gebote der 'caritas' und 'misericordia' hat man ja immer wieder in diesen Werken verwirklicht sehen wollen. Sieht man die Sache aber näher an, dann fallen diese idealen Konstruktionen rasch in sich zusammen. (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 17)

Thus, Fischer claims that the didactic concerns of the courtly romances are distinct from Christian morality, and proceeds to illustrate this claim initially in his assessment of Kalogrenant's behaviour. Fischer considers Kalogrenant's *curiositas* to be an essential knightly quality in the eyes of the military aristocracy. From a theological viewpoint, however, as scholars such as H.B. Willson have maintained, this inclination to pursue adventure was regarded as the gateway to sin through its association with the temptation inherent in original sin (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 19f.). Fischer, however, argues that the curiosity experienced by Kalogrenant constitutes the very essence of a knight's active existence. This argument is also supported by the fact that the adventure at the spring takes place in the real world, despite parallels with Eden. According to Fischer, this indicates that the knights' aims in this work are secular and constitute the 'Selbstbestätigung und Selbstgenuß des Ritters in seinem gegenwärtigen Tun' (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 26). As such, these aims violate theological teaching on *curiositas* and place this work outside the concerns of clerical morality.

Fischer interprets the overtly secular interests portrayed in *Iwein* as the result of a developing social consciousness amongst the military aristocracy at this time, which incorporated an insight into their relationship with their natural environment, and which caused their 'religiöse Selbstentfremdung' (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 26). This emancipation likewise involved the pursuit of pleasure in listening to romances, which was condemned by theologians (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 28). Thus, the social consciousness of the military aristocracy, their desire for entertainment, their secular ethical principles, and their awareness of their relationship with the natural world are all considered by Fischer to be reflected in the secular bias of Hartmann's Arthurian romances.

Fischer's interpretation of the reaction of theologians to works of courtly literature should be placed in a broader perspective, however. Fischer is partly justified in drawing attention to the objections of a few theologians to the pursuit of self-glorification in these works, which echo their objections to the violence of the tournament. However, it is harder to justify Fischer's claim that the majority of theologians protested in this way and that this consequently implies a complete lack of theological influence in this genre. The objections of a small number of masters to the pleasure principle and to the discussion of virtues in courtly literature do not necessarily indicate that these works were not influenced by Christian morality to any degree. Although justified therefore in condemning the heavy emphasis on this dimension to the detriment of the secular aspects discussed, Fischer nevertheless goes directly to the other extreme of rejecting out of hand any connection between secular ethics and contemporary theological thought.

In addition to this repudiation of theological influences, Fischer accuses the many critics who have identified a psychological progression in the main protagonists of Hartmann's works of having succumbed to the bourgeois morality inherent in nineteenth and twentieth-century literature (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 37ff.). Many scholars, and Fischer accuses Peter Wapnewski in particular, have thus applied modern ethics to twelfth-century literary protagonists. The inconsistencies produced by this approach are demonstrated by Fischer in the case of Iwein's killing of Askalon. Fischer believes that the military aristocracy would have considered such an action completely justifiable because Iwein was avenging the dishonouring of a relative. This is supported by historians of the age, such as Karl Bosl (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 10, note 5). Iwein's actions are thus bound by the secular dictates of honour. As such, they may appear immoral to the modern reader, sensitized to bourgeois notions of morality, but they are completely acceptable

within the feuding mentality of the twelfth-century military aristocracy.

Fischer's alternative reading is further demonstrated in his interpretation of Kalogrenant's description of *aventiure* (Iw 528ff.). He maintains that Kalogrenant's words are to be understood literally, and perceives nothing superficial or morally inferior in Kalogrenant's comprehension of this issue (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 20-2). Kalogrenant is only aware of 'das reine Abenteuer der Selbsterfahrung' (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 176), which is an acceptable attitude in terms of the secular honour ethic. Fischer's interpretation prevents him from considering Kalogrenant's words in terms of a broader lay morality, however, although there is evidence that the narrative incorporates this wider perspective. Such an approach would conclude that Kalogrenant's appreciation of knighthood, which only includes physical prowess and personal glory, is essentially shallow, and that Hartmann is therefore presenting the concept of the honour ethic for discussion in broader terms.

Fischer's criticism of moral interpretations of Hartmann's narratives is focused primarily on Wapnewski's argument that the protagonists are individuals whose morality depends on the consciousness of their actions and the difference between right and wrong (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 37ff.). In contrast, Fischer has markedly different notions regarding knightly individuality in the twelfth century as mirrored in chivalric romances. His theory draws heavily on Hegel's interpretation of individuality in feudal society in the first volume of *Ästhetik*. On this basis, far from considering the morality of their actions, Fischer contends that knights in Hartmann's Arthurian romances are only concerned with the degree to which an action will increase their honourable standing. This is not as egotistical as it may appear to the modern reader, however, because the honour of an individual in the feudal era was entirely bound up

with the honour of his whole society, no distinction being made between the two. An individual's honour was not therefore held to be in conflict with the general interests of society. Consequently, the feudal individual did not suppress any natural inclinations. To act on instinct was encouraged because, unlike in bourgeois society, following impetuous, individual decisions was not considered to be acting in conflict with society's interests, but rather the contrary:

> denn das feudale Individuum hat seine gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen noch nicht in *der* Weise aus sich herausgesetzt und entwickelt, daß sie ihm als verselbständigte Macht gegenübertreten könnten, die ihm das abstrakt Allgemeine des Willens als festen, unverrückbaren Gegensatz zu seinem besonderen Willen in sein Bewußtsein brächten. (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 41)

The feudal individual had no conception therefore of existing as a separate being from society. In consequence, this mentality would be represented in courtly literature by a protagonist striving for honour in the interests of both himself and his society. Thus, he would display such virtues as compassion only as his pursuit of honour dictated. As Fischer says:

> der Held des höfischen Epos bleibt immer *bei sich selbst* in seinem Tun, besiegt nicht seinen besonderen Willen und seine Leidenschaften, seine Triebe, seine edlen Gefühle und Neigungen, sondern setzt sich mit ihnen als diese unmittelbare Individualität gewaltsam durch. Wenn er dabei schon allgemeinere Verhältnisse trägt, wie etwa solche der 'helfe', des 'dienstes', der 'triuwe' oder der 'erbermde', dann tut er auch dies stets unter Wahrung seiner individuellen Selbständigkeit, sieht darauf, ob es ihm gemäß sei, so zu handeln, und entschließt sich nach seiner 'Willkür' zur Tat, nicht aber indem er 'zu dieser Pflicht der Pflicht und ihrer Erfüllung wegen sich' entschließt. (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 41)

No thought is therefore spared for altruistic considerations. Instead, everything is subordinate to the knight's pursuit of individual honour of which the honour of society is an extension.

Fischer illustrates this claim by discussing the approach of scholars such as Günther Schweikle who apply moral principles to the initial episode of *Iwein*.[8] Iwein's behaviour at the spring appears egotistical and impetuous in these terms. Schweikle asserts that Iwein subsequently evolves into a compassionate and selfless being, who, by means of inner reflection, has realized and rejected his own selfishness. In Fischer's opinion, however, the processing of the hero's inner thoughts, for example on Iwein's awakening after his madness, merely signifies the necessary self-preoccupation of the individual knight which is instrumental in bringing honour to his society, rather than a developing altruism which would be anathema to him (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 107f.).

In Fischer's opinion, therefore, Iwein's inner thought processes and impulsive actions do not constitute evidence of a conflict between his individual interests and those of society. Such bourgeois moral considerations would be the death of the active knightly pursuit of honour and adventure. As Fischer says:

> die gewöhnliche Moral ... wäre für ihn ein tödliches Gift, denn in der Pflichtenethik erstirbt jedes selbständige Handeln. (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 57)
>
> Indessen fragt es sich, was aus dem Ritter wohl geworden wäre, wenn er tatsächlich seinen 'Aggressionstrieb' eingedämmt ... hätte; vielleicht ein nützliches Mitglied der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, ganz sicher aber nicht dieser ruhmbedeckte Held der Tafelrunde. (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 59)

Iwein's inner deliberations, however, are intended, not so much to prevent him from acting on his knightly impulses as Fischer accuses other scholars of claiming, but rather to weigh his actions first in terms of his social obligations. The knightly pursuit of honour is to be encouraged, but must be channelled appropriately. As such, the individual knight remains indistinct from his society, but is nevertheless required to be aware of his social responsibilities. This is particularly the case with regard to Iwein, owing to the radical expansion of his social obligations which his marriage to Laudine precipitates. Fischer is certainly justified in accentuating the idealization of honour as part of the secular reality which forms the background to this work. However, Fischer's association of subjectivity with bourgeois morality blinds him to the broader discussion of honour in terms of lay ethical issues which is particularly evident in the portrayal of inner awareness in Hartmann's work.

A major point of similarity between the approaches of Voß and Fischer is their reliance on the initial episodes of Hartmann's works to provide a blueprint for interpreting the whole narrative. Fischer contends that, far from revealing Iwein's lack of moral integrity, the adventure at the spring can be justified in terms of the honour ethic of the lay aristocracy. Iwein and Kalogrenant display an admirable desire to seek glory, and Iwein has a legitimate duty to avenge his kinsman's dishonour as a result of Askalon's condescension (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 33-6). Furthermore, Iwein has reason to fear the contempt of Keii. These justifications therefore exonerate Iwein's actions in striking Askalon from behind. Fischer rejects Wapnewski's interpretation that the narrator's 'âne zuht' comment implies moral inadequacy, claiming instead that, without proof of victory, Iwein may have been subjected to disbelief and scorn (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 29-31). Honour necessarily demands the acclaim of others, and this is the focus of Iwein's thoughts on seeing Askalon

escape and when he believes Lunete intends to help him flee before he has gained proof of his victory (Iw 1766ff.) (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 46f.). According to Fischer, who follows the example of Hegel in this respect, these thoughts are an expression of Iwein's personal autonomy. Fischer refers to the connection between thought processes and honour as the 'in sich reflektierte Selbständigkeit' of a knight (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 32). Thus, Iwein's thoughts indicate how his whole knightly identity is bound up with the attainment of honour. Once Iwein is stripped of his honour by Lunete's accusation, he loses his identity in his madness. Fischer subsequently asserts that Iwein's thoughts and behaviour after his madness are guided by the single aim of regaining that same honour-based identity.

The initial adventure at the spring thus provides Fischer with abundant and justifiable evidence to support his arguments. Great emphasis is laid in this episode on the issues of honour, vengeance, and the pursuit of adventure. Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that the issues depicted are more complex than Fischer's interpretation implies. Hartmann is describing an episode which involves acceptable behavioural patterns in terms of the honour ethic of the military aristocracy, but also appears to be attempting to provoke a wider debate concerning the pursuit of those honourable goals within a broader framework of secular morality. Iwein enters that framework on marrying Laudine and extending his obligations from the pursuit of personal honour to the far more onerous tasks of lordship. He is required to complement this broadening of obligations with an increase in awareness. In this sense, Iwein's failure to meet the deadline is indeed evidence of an ethical failing. Such a reading is supported by events after Iwein's madness, particularly his series of monologues, rather than by the opening episode of the work. However, Fischer, like Voß, only draws conclusions from the initial episode and applies them wholesale to the rest of the

narrative. By embracing a more holistic approach and considering the relationship between events occurring before and after Iwein's madness, both critics may have found their evidence still significant, but far more difficult to sustain as a key to unlocking Hartmann's work completely.

Fischer likewise concludes that Iwein's only crime is to miss the deadline. As evidence, he cites the fact that Askalon's death is never referred to as *mort* (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 47). Iwein's failure to keep his promise, however, contravenes a central tenet of feudal society. The unacceptable consequences of his laxity are to leave his land and wife unprotected for longer than agreed. The difficulty in attaining a balance between lordship and knighthood was a significant problem for the military aristocracy of this period. Fischer cites numerous sources as evidence, including the works of Andreas Capellanus, John of Salisbury, Konrad von Megenberg, and Reinmar von Zweter, Alan of Lille's *Summa de arte praedicatoria*, and *Der Winsbecke*. All refer, as does Gawein in his advice to Iwein, which corresponds closely to the *Epistola Bernardi de cura rei familiaris*, to the imperative need to balance these dual roles (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 78-91). A knight was required to maintain physical fitness and attend tournaments in order to prove and advance his reputation, but was also expected to nurture the material seat of his wealth. Fischer's plethora of references indicates that this problem indeed received wide discussion in the late twelfth century, and that Hartmann himself was duly contributing to this discussion in *Iwein*. However, Fischer's interpretation of the problem of combining lordship with knighthood is based on purely objective criteria. He claims that Iwein's failure is not caused by a moral failing as he merely sustains a loss of honour for breaking his promise, and must simply regain that degree of renown.

The predisposition to reject evidence of a subjective dimension in this work leads Fischer, like Voß, to deduce that events in the romances are governed by objective forces, and are not generated by any subjective fault in the hero (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 60f., and often). Consequently, Fischer concludes that Iwein's return to the tournament circuit and his subsequent missing of the deadline would have been interpreted by a contemporary audience as subjectively innocent actions despite the disastrous objective consequences. This is due to the fact that Iwein merely agrees to Gawein's proposed course of action. Gawein must therefore accept the greater share of responsibility. In addition, Fischer proposes that Iwein subsequently forgets his duties as a result of the workings of fate. In either case, Iwein is free of subjective blame.

The missing of a deadline and breaking of a promise are indeed serious breaches of knightly conduct. However, the narrative also emphasizes that these breaches result from Iwein's lack of consideration for the extended obligations he acquired on marrying Laudine. Iwein's subsequent adventures therefore serve not only to help him regain his knightly honour, as Fischer suggests, but also to develop in himself the awareness to prevent a repetition of his failure. This progression can be traced by comparing Iwein's initial monologue after his madness with his later monologues.

Nonetheless, Fischer disregards such ethical issues, and maintains that Iwein's madness, which was precipitated by the realization of his failure, has no bearing on his basic perfect state. Fischer supports his argument by highlighting the narrator's positive references. Thus, in contrast to other scholars, Fischer argues that Iwein remains true to himself despite temporarily losing his honour and his identity as a consequence of this mistake:

> Wie falsch ein solches Verfahren ist, zeigt sich auch daran, daß der treubrüchige Iwein trotz des Verrats die Identität seines vorbildhaften Seins bewahrt. Denn seiner 'inneren Natur' nach ist er sich unverbrüchlich treu; er besitzt noch in seinem tiefsten Fall 'sîn grôziu triuwe/sînes stæten muotes' (Vs. 3210f.). Es geht eben überhaupt nicht um ein inneres Werden des Subjekts, eine Charakterentwicklung des Helden, wie ständig gegen die Aussagen des Werks behauptet wird. (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 70)

In addition, in his account of Iwein's awakening, Fischer underlines the fact that Iwein's first thoughts are for his loss of honour and identity. Fischer concludes from this that honour is Iwein's first priority, and as such has precedence over any ethical considerations (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 104f.). However, one may argue that, as in the case of Kalogrenant's definition of adventure, Iwein's initial concerns serve to focus attention on the broader components which constitute honour, namely active knighthood employed in a responsible manner and with ample regard for additional obligations. The subsequent emphasis on such components becomes apparent in a comparison between this initial monologue and Iwein's later monologue at the spring.[9] In this way, Iwein's concept of honour undergoes a progression from the pursuit of individual glory, which he demonstrated before his marriage, to a broader comprehension of the issue which corresponds to his change in circumstances.

Fischer's conclusions are fuelled by his investigation into the manner in which feudal society, unlike bourgeois or classical Roman society, was not ruled by an ideology which constrained the individual. Rather, as Marx stated, the aristocratic individual was governed by the principle of his own independence and the opinion of others. In such a society, honour was considered the ideal expression of the principle of knightly independence:

> Denn da das adlige Individuum für sich selbständig ist und auf sich beruhen will, ohne einer von ihm

> unabhängigen sachlichen Beschränkung schon unterworfen zu sein, und es in einer bestimmten Situation wiederum nur auf andere selbständige Individuen trifft, stellt es vor sich und den anderen diese Selbständigkeit ideell in der Ehre vor und will dann so genommen und behandelt werden, daß niemand 'im an sîn êre' sprechen darf (Vs. 112, Vs. 167f., Vs. 1071). (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 143)

Each individual knight pursued honour, and was rewarded by recognition. The demands of honour and the fear of shame were often the cause of impetuous thoughts or violent actions (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 144). However, honour was considered to be a valid excuse for this disruption. Fischer points to the evidence of Hobbes who, even as an opponent of absolutism, understood why dangerous actions were still willingly undertaken in his day in the quest for honour, and were regarded as honourable whatever the outcome (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 145f.). Honour often had little in common with being sensible, and thus Fischer concludes that violence in the cause of renown did not constitute a moral issue for the military aristocracy:

> Wenn nun der entschiedene Verfechter des Absolutismus und geschworene Feind feudaler Ehrgesetze immerhin noch so viel Verständnis für die Unvernunft der Ehre aufbringt, daß er sie als angemessenen Ausdruck einer naturwüchsigen Gesellschaft begreift, um wieviel weniger Veranlassung haben wir dann, dem Dichter des Hochfeudalismus mit unseren vernünftigen und moralischen Ansichten ins Wort zu fallen! (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 145)

Thus, Iwein and Kalogrenant's actions at the spring, although they involve violence, are not indications of a moral failing. Fischer likewise concludes from his study of honour amongst the military aristocracy (which he bases on the work of Hegel) that to accept a dubious cause, as does Gawein in the inheritance struggle, or to grant an inappropriate request, as does Arthur to Meljaganz, is nevertheless to act honourably, or is acceptable as a way of

preserving one's honour. These examples portray how honour must be accorded prevalence at all costs, thereby making slaves of all individual knights:

> Die Ehre erweist sich so als eine selbständige Macht gegenüber den Individuen, die sie auch das Verwerflichste geschehen zu lassen zwingt. (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 141)

Recklessness, violence, and dubious decisions were thus accepted as the consequences of this all-pervading force.

It is the strength of this force which leads Fischer to adopt a non-ethical interpretation of *Iwein* to which even the characters' apparently ethical reflections are subject. They do not search their consciences to ascertain the morality of their actions. Instead, their thoughts relate to the attainment of renown. The hero's reflections on aiding other characters could, if considered in moral terms, be interpreted as indications of compassion or pity. However, according to Fischer, they reveal that the hero remains in pursuit of his goal of honour. In his opinion, any evidence of ethical considerations is merely a chance offshoot of the protagonist's single goal:

> Im ganzen dominierte der Ehrbegriff über all seinem Tun, so daß nicht 'dienest', 'reht', 'helfe', und 'erbermde' *an sich* den Ausschlag gaben, sondern erst ihre Beziehung auf die 'in sich reflektierte Selbständigkeit' des Helden. Selbst dort, wo die Nähe zum Religiös-Ethischen besonders groß war, blieb immer noch erkennbar, daß sich das 'ethische Substrat' der 'âventiure' zuletzt doch dem Selbstzweck des Helden unterordnete: seinem Glück und seinem Ansehen. (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 155)

The chance expression of pity in the narrative has no ethical significance, therefore. Instead, it is simply a by-product of the hero's search for honour, or else is inspired by the influence of courtliness. References to Iwein's

courtliness, and to the uncourtliness of other characters, constitute further clear signals for Fischer that the issue at stake in *Iwein* is not of an ethical nature (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 156-8). The guidelines of courtliness were developed, in Fischer's opinion, by clerics in France to create stability in an age of anarchy (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 156). As such, they particularly emphasize the attainment of closer social relationships, and, as a result, such apparently ethical actions as defending the weak are revealed to be the chance consequences of the main pursuit of courtly individuals, that of increasing the power base of the military aristocracy. Iwein's decisions are therefore ruled by the few basic tenets of this courtly mentality which was focused on power and stability. He does not need to assess his situation in terms beyond this sphere, which constitutes the core of noble power. Fischer's definition of courtliness as an attempt to introduce stability and encourage the activities of the military aristocracy is justified. However, as with his definition of honour, the manner in which that stability is obtained and utilized in terms of secular moral obligations is not considered. Courtliness as a process for promoting a lay moral code for the military aristocracy is overlooked, leaving Fischer to propound a definition which, despite its justifications, does not fully embrace the complexity inherent in Hartmann's narratives.

This is likewise the case with regard to Fischer's discussion of virtue in the courtly romances. The historical background of twelfth-century society provides Fischer with evidence that virtue was associated with physical power:

> In einer solchen Epoche, die den Anfängen der sich neu ausbildenden Formen von Staatlichkeit auf der Grundlage der Territorien voraufgeht, mochte dann auch die Bedeutung von 'Tugend' identisch sein mit der willkürlichen, rohen Gewalttätigkeit selbst. (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 175)

On this basis, Fischer identifies virtue in the courtly romances as denoting the physical prowess to which the term *tugent* originally referred. According to Fischer, this concept of virtue, namely prowess, is in itself an ethically neutral force which can be used for good or evil. The knight and his enemies therefore utilize the same physical means to achieve different ends:

> Der unaufgelöste und unauflösbare Widerspruch ist dieser: Das Gute, das der tugendhafte Ritter vollbringt, hat nur durch seine individuelle Tat Wirklichkeit. Insofern existiert es auch nur in dem Gewaltvermögen des Einzelnen, in seiner Fähigkeit, vollendet zu kämpfen, in seiner Kraft, das im Gegner ebenso nur als Fähigkeit und Kraft vorhandene Schlechte zu bezwingen. Ist die Tugend nun zwar nicht im Bewußtsein des Helden, aber in ihrer Realität immer nur diese ritterliche Tüchtigkeit selbst, dann heißt das, daß sie auch zu ihrem Gegenteil werden kann. Als die personale Gewalt der Individualität, wodurch das Gute erst in Existenz tritt, ist diese Tugend eine gegenüber 'Gut' und 'Schlecht' indifferente Potenz. (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 170)

Thus, the knight's defence of his independent lifestyle is by definition a promotion of virtue. Furthermore, Fischer contends that virtuous intentions are meaningless unless coupled with action, which may well be violent. This constitutes the paradox of the knightly lifestyle. It is vital that a knight remains active and independent so that he may achieve good by violent means (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 175). Fischer's accentuation of the need for action can again be justified, but reveals certain limitations. In this assessment, Fischer gives no credence to the role of an ethically-inspired conscience used in combination with physical actions, a role which is portrayed in Iwein's inner considerations prior to taking action, and which constitutes significant evidence that Hartmann's concerns lie in the lay moral sphere, rather than within the bounds of the honour ethic.

Fischer's interpretation that secular honour is the underlying issue in this narrative is subsequently applied to Iwein's adventures following his madness. According to Fischer, all of these episodes are pervaded by the notion that honour is synonymous with identity and consciousness. For example, Iwein almost faints on his second arrival at the spring. As Fischer states:

> hat der Ritter vor allem in der Ehre das nächste affirmative Bewußtsein seiner selbst, dann muß ihm die Erkenntnis, daß er bar jeder Ehre ist, auch das Bewußtsein wieder infirmieren. (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 107)

Iwein's subsequent attempt at suicide denotes his revenge on the body which led him astray. Once Iwein's honour has withstood the ultimate test, however, in his combat against Gawein, he is able to reveal his identity (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 133-9). Up until this point, Iwein disguises himself with a pseudonym, not as an indication of evolving altruism, but rather of diminished honour. (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 119).

By excluding ethical motivation, Iwein's willingness to aid others is attributed by Fischer solely to his concern for honour. By practising knighthood in this way, Iwein reconfirms his capabilities as an active knight, as is apparent in the episode with the Lady of Narison (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 105f.), or else takes responsibility for the objective consequences for his earlier actions, as in his defence of Lunete (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 110-2). In Fischer's opinion, Iwein is not ruled by compassion or an awareness of subjective guilt for Lunete's predicament. Instead, he is simply refusing to delegate responsibility for the unintentional consequences of his actions. Fischer comments that this acceptance of objective guilt by the heroic individual is likewise evident in other works of this genre:

> Weder wußte Parzival, wessen er sich schuldig machen würde, als er die sogenannte Mitleidsfrage

> unterließ, noch lag es in dem Vorsatz Erecs, sich zu 'verligen', oder Iweins, einen Eidbruch zu begehen, doch werden alle schuldig. Und Iwein mißt sich ausdrücklich den ohne Schuld des Willens zustande gekommenen 'verrât' also nur *seine* Schuld zu, die auch allein auf ihn zurückfällt. (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 110)

It can be claimed, however, that each of these main protagonists fails as a result of an inadequate awareness of their obligations. Nevertheless, Fischer rejects what he terms the bourgeois concept of subjectivity in his consideration of Iwein's guilt, and gives no credence to the evidence that this issue was similarly of great import in terms of secular morality in Hartmann's age.

Fischer considers Iwein to have regained his honourable status before he reaches Pesme Avanture. This episode therefore stands apart in the sense that Iwein acts independently against external forces, rather than seeking to rebuild his shattered reputation by aiding those who have a claim on his assistance (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 125-32). He is not pursuing honour in this case because the actions of his antagonists negate any advantage to be gained in defeating them. Instead, this is a separate episode in an epic structure which portrays the end of Iwein's journey to regain his honour. He has demonstrated his readiness to re-enter his own society.

The fact that compassion does not motivate Iwein's actions is further proven, according to both Fischer and Voß, by the noble status of the recipients of Iwein's help. This is the case with Gawein's sister's family, whose identity he establishes before offering his aid (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 112-4), with his agreement to help the count's younger daughter (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 123f.), and even with the Pesme Avanture episode in which Iwein's concern for the captive maidens is based on their noble birth, rather than their suffering (*Ehre, Hof*, pp. 126f.). Similarly, Iwein agrees to fight

Harpin because he has acted dishonourably, and has caused pain to noble people. The high social status of the recipients of Iwein's aid is a prerequisite for his accumulation of honour, even though from a modern ethical point of view, his motivation in imposing such conditions appears decidedly dubious. On this issue, Fischer makes a particularly valid point which serves to recentre the tendency in Hartmann scholarship to accord only the Christian notion of altruism to Iwein. The restricted nature of Iwein's aid supports the interpretation that Hartmann is concerned with portraying the secular morality of the military aristocracy. Such a socially-exclusive moral code does not incorporate a level of compassion which is unrestricted by status and class. However, for Fischer to draw the conclusion that such an accentuation of social status excludes any other ethical dimension is again to demonstrate only a limited perspective.

Fischer's major piece of evidence in highlighting Iwein's singular concern for his reputation lies in the episode in which he is bound by two deadlines. On realizing his predicament, his initial thoughts centre on the possibility that he will be considered cowardly for not defending Lunete, rather than on the danger to Lunete herself (Iw 4830-4) (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 115). He is therefore reacting in an apparently egoistical fashion, but one which is acceptable in the eyes of the military aristocracy. Iwein's predicament therefore lies in the inability to see a clear way to both preserving his honour and helping those relying on him. Fischer identifies this incident as a prime opportunity for Hartmann to have emphasized a moral dilemma. By not doing so, Hartmann, in Fischer's opinion, must be disregarding moral issues (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 117). As further confirmation of the objective nature of this incident, Iwein is released from his dilemma by the workings of fate when Harpin appears at the last possible moment. Fischer, however, overlooks the fact that the equal demands placed on Iwein here do indeed

constitute a moral dilemma. His claim that Hartmann does not introduce an ethical aspect to Iwein's predicament does not take into account Iwein's stated desire to act justly in overcoming this crisis by aiding those relying on him as well as by proving himself (Iw 4892, 4898).[10]

It is also apparent that Fischer disregards textual evidence in this way on other occasions in order to arrive at his anti-moralistic interpretation. The two episodes which provide this evidence in particular abundance are Iwein's encounter with the lion and the dragon, and his initial reaction to Lunete on his return to the spring. It is indeed stated, as Fischer maintains, that Iwein decides to help the noble beast (Iw 3848f.). However, Fischer does not consider the reasoning behind Iwein's decision. It is stated that Iwein in fact undergoes agonies of indecision over whom he should help:

> hern Îwein tete der zwîvel wê
> wederm er helfen solde,
> und bedâhte sich daz er wolde
> helfen dem edelen tiere. (Iw 3846-9)

This is the result of the fact that the precise intentions of both parties are unclear (Iw 3850-60). It cannot be denied that Fischer is justified in demonstrating Iwein's concern with nobility in this incident, but he extracts this point from a context which reveals Hartmann's concern with broader lay moral issues. Fischer consequently misinterprets this fundamental passage in the text. Furthermore, he brusquely rejects the opinion of Hansjürgen Linke that the struggle between the lion and the dragon symbolizes the ethical struggle within the main protagonist, and that this episode constitutes the moment at which Iwein's concerns turn from egoism to altruism.[11] Fischer observes no indication from the narrator that this episode has symbolic depth, and concludes that:

> das eifrige Bemühen, im Löwenabenteuer den Durchbruch des moralischen Charakters zu zeigen, führt zu dem denkwürdigen Ergebnis, daß Hartmann entweder unfähig gewesen sein muß, zu sagen, was er eigentlich meinte, oder ein sehr raffinierter Autor, der den Sinn seiner Rede so kunstvoll zu verschlüsseln wußte, daß er sich nur dem gewiegtesten Kenner erschließen konnte. (*Ehre, Hof*, p. 64)

Fischer appears to have overlooked the significance of Iwein's reflection and vacillation at this juncture. Linke, however, recognizes this significance and is thus not discouraged by the lack of narrator's comment. The evolution in Iwein's perception to a greater awareness of the motivations of others, which has been caused by his missing of the deadline, needs no further clarification if one is prepared to recognize the significance of his thoughts. Hartmann is indeed a sophisticated author, but his meaning is not veiled in such complex terms as to render it almost invisible, as Fischer suggests. Instead, Hartmann uses various methods to reveal the meaning behind his narratives as will be examined later.

The second episode in which the limitations of Fischer's interpretation are demonstrated is Iwein's encounter with Lunete at the spring. After hearing Lunete's cry, Iwein responds to her lament by claiming that he himself has a greater right to feel sorrowful (Iw 4028-31). Iwein's subsequent discovery of her identity and his involvement in her predicament, however, provoke a thoughtfulness which allows him to experience compassion for her, as well as to increase his honour and repay his debt to her, as Fischer has stated. Iwein's initial self-preoccupation therefore highlights his transformation in this episode. In addition, this passage offers a further piece of evidence which Fischer ignores. Iwein states that he will defend Lunete as repayment for helping him to his position of lord:

'Ez ist reht daz ich iu lône
der êrbæren krône
die ich von iuwern schulden truoc.
ich hete êren genuoc:
waz half mich daz ich golt vant?
ez ist eht vil unbewant
zuo dem tôren des goldes vunt:
er wirfet ez doch hin zestunt.
swie ich zuo mir selben habe getân,
ir sult iedoch gewis hân,
ichn lâze iuch niht under wegen.
wan dô ich tôt wære gelegen,
dô hulfet ir mir von sorgen:
alsô tuon ich iu morgen.' (Iw 4247-60)

Iwein therefore makes a valid insight into the nature of honour here. He recognizes his failure to cherish it and to appreciate the part others played in its acquisition. Elements relating to Iwein's increasing awareness and appreciation of honour may be traced throughout the text. Fischer's observations are valid in as much as honour is vital to the hero. However, the definition of honour in terms of knighthood and lordship is at issue in this work. The pursuit of honour does not serve Iwein well after his marriage because he fails to appreciate it within a broader context than the individual quest for glory. Only through the course of his adventures does he relearn the meaning of honour, as is apparent in his monologues. According to Fischer, however, Iwein simply returns to his earlier honourable status after re-establishing himself in his adventures. By acknowledging subjective issues, however, it is possible to trace Iwein's progress from an appreciation of honour with regard to action and renown, to an appreciation of how that prowess must be used to fulfil his new obligations and for the good of all noble people.

Otfrid Ehrismann, 'Höfisches Leben und Individualität - Hartmanns *Erec*'

The repudiation of the existence of psychological progression in Hartmann's work by Voß and Fischer is

supported by Otfrid Ehrismann in his consideration of *Erec*. Ehrismann presents a different angle of interpretation, however, by maintaining that Hartmann's main protagonists in *Erec* are essentially de-individualized, exemplary representations of courtly culture, and that the text consequently should not be considered in subjective terms. Instead, he claims that 'es ist die Logik des courtoisen Erzählens, in die der Interpret schlüpfen muß, nicht die der Seele' ('Höfisches Leben', p. 114).

According to Ehrismann, Erec and Enite, as the ideal courtly couple, are required to undertake a journey owing to their pursuit of individual desires at the expense of the well-being of their society. By means of this journey, they must demonstrate a superior approach to courtly life, namely one in which the desires of the individual are not accorded uppermost importance. It is therefore a journey towards reintegration into courtly society which does not entail a psychological progression towards greater self-knowledge:

> Daß der Held am Ende und im Rückblick ein einmaliger Typ ist oder zu sein scheint, verdankt er seiner Geschichte und gerade nicht seinem Werden, bei dem er nicht zu sich selbst, sondern zum Hof gekommen ist. ('Höfisches Leben', p. 121)

In the light of this emphasis on courtly life, individualistic actions, such as those demonstrated by Erec and Enite after their wedding, are condemned as socially detrimental. As Ehrismann states:

> die Darstellung mittelalterlicher Heldenwege dient der Zurücknahme von (als kollektiv bedrohlich empfundener) Individualität. ('Höfisches Leben', p. 102)

Like Voß and Fischer, Ehrismann bases his interpretation on the distinction between the modern and medieval concepts of individuality, claiming that the modern notion of the unique

individual alienated from society is inapplicable to Hartmann's work. In quoting Horst Wenzel, he states that:

> das einheitsstiftende Prinzip des dargestellten Lebens ist noch nicht die kausalpsychologisch rekonstruierte Entwicklung eines Ich in Auseinandersetzung mit der Welt, sondern die Demonstration personaler Identität als Nachvollzug und Einlösung von überindividuellen, dem Einzelnen äußerlich (von Gott) vorgegebener [*sic*] Lebensmuster.[12]

Despite this valid distinction, however, Ehrismann proceeds to reject the possibility that Hartmann is demonstrating how individual actions, primed by an awareness of obligations, are an essential element in the functioning of feudal society, and also underlie contemporary religious practice. A comparison between this literature and theological concepts concerning self-awareness is not appropriate in Ehrismann's opinion. Indeed, he claims that Hartmann, by presenting a work in which courtly issues are portrayed as superior to psychological progression, has specifically chosen not to reflect contemporary theological thought regarding individuality:

> Er desavouiert durch die höfische Aktion das Hineinhorchen des Menschen in sich selbst, zu dem er, denken wir an die augustinischen *confessiones* oder die zeitgenössische Mystik, die wie er eine 'Vernichtung' des Ich betreibt, durchaus fähig wäre. Es sieht in der Tat so aus, als ob er könnte, aber nicht wollte. ('Höfisches Leben', p. 120)

Furthermore, Ehrismann contends that any comparison of Hartmann's works with theological concepts is futile owing to the fact that individuality in literature is an aspect of genre and therefore distinct from religious doctrine:

> Die salvatorische Klausel des Literarhistorikers gegen die Realität bedeutet weiterhin, die Dichtung nicht unbesehen in Anlehnung an zeitgenössische theologische Konzepte zu

> interpretieren bzw. der Dichtung die Realisierungsabsicht dieser Konzepte zu unterstellen. ('Höfisches Leben', p. 102)

Ehrismann's approach, like that of Voß and Fischer, is based upon a detailed consideration of events before the *verligen* episode. Conclusions drawn from these events are thereafter applied to the remainder of the narrative. In his analysis of the initial episode of *Erec*, Ehrismann argues that Hartmann is concerned with representing aspects of courtly culture and moral issues over and above his source. In this sense, he greatly expands the description of the wedding and preparations for the tournament, and employs imagery from the courtly love tradition ('Höfisches Leben', pp. 109-13). These additions to the source do not comprise elements relating to individuality. Instead, Ehrismann maintains that they are partly the result of a desire to present unfamiliar concepts of courtliness to the German audience, as Huby has suggested, but are also caused by Hartmann's conscious toning down of aspects concerning individuality in his source ('Höfisches Leben', pp. 117f.). Ehrismann concludes from this initial episode therefore that Hartmann is portraying courtly issues as superior to individual actions.

These conclusions are subsequently applied to the remainder of the narrative. However, Ehrismann's preoccupation with Hartmann's descriptions of courtly life and morality leads him, like Voß and Fischer, to disregard Erec's inner monologues and other signs of psychological awareness both before and after the *verligen*. These monologues reveal a significantly different approach to Hartmann's source, and suggest that, far from trying to reject individual actions as detrimental to society, Hartmann was concerned with portraying the essential nature of appropriate individual awareness and behaviour for the good and basic functioning of aristocratic society. By focusing exclusively on the episode prior to the *verligen*, Ehrismann presumes that Hartmann's greater emphasis on courtly behaviour over and

above any psychological depth in his characters, represents his whole approach. In fact, by taking the entire narrative into account, and particularly the depth of inner awareness of the main protagonists directly after the *verligen*, it is possible to detect a contrast by which post-*verligen* psychological depth in the protagonists may be measured. Too much emphasis on pre-*verligen* events deprives Ehrismann of the opportunity of making such a contrast. Ehrismann's disregard of this evidence of psychological depth leads him to claim instead that Erec and Enite fail to reach clear decisions or display clear motives in the course of their adventures ('Höfisches Leben', pp. 106f.). Any evidence of psychological awareness in the narrative is fragmentary and, according to Ehrismann, cannot even be proven to be intentional on the author's part ('Höfisches Leben', p. 102, pp. 115-18). In Ehrismann's estimation, it occupies a position of secondary importance to courtliness.

Courtly behaviour is indeed central to Hartmann's work. However, this is not due to the restrictions of the Arthurian romance tradition, as Ehrismann suggests ('Höfisches Leben', pp. 121f.), or to Hartmann's lack of originality in his adaptation ('Höfisches Leben', p. 99). Neither is it the case that Hartmann's representation of the ideal courtly couple involves a rejection of socially-damaging individual concerns. Rather, Hartmann's narrative provides a framework for a discussion of the relationship between the courtly individual and his society, one based on duty and courtly morality to which the key is self-awareness. The ideal courtly couple must possess this key in order to balance their obligations to God, to one another, and to their society.

A Comparison of Voß, Fischer, and Ehrismann

In denying the existence of an ethical dimension to Hartmann's works, these three scholars share certain

similarities in their otherwise distinct approaches. Of essential significance is their contention that the initial episodes of the narratives act as blueprints which may be applied to the whole text as a guide to interpretation. However, a more holistic approach, incorporating at least the circumstances and immediate aftermath of the periods of failure encountered by the main protagonists, reveals an exclusive concentration on the initial episodes to be ultimately restrictive. Events directly following these failures reveal an emphasis on the inner awareness of the protagonists. The remainder of the narratives depicts similar evidence of the author's preoccupation with this aspect within the protagonists' considerations of their options, responsibilities, and previous actions. The initial episodes therefore lay the foundations for these psychological aspects to be revealed in the wake of the protagonists' failures. This is not to claim that in these initial episodes the protagonists are overtly inferior in any ethical sense. Nonetheless, they have yet to undergo a fundamentally important change in circumstances which will make extensive demands on their powers of self-awareness. Furthermore, there are covert indications of progress to be made or issues to be discussed, as revealed in the references to Erec's youthfulness and the definition of adventure in *Iwein*. Such covertness, coupled with Hartmann's tendency to allow his protagonists to represent his approach in their monologues, rather than his narrator, stresses that these works function as vehicles for the discussion of the lay moral concerns of the military aristocracy.

Such an interest in the protagonists' self-awareness also places Hartmann's works within the framework of the exploration of the subjective nature of sin by twelfth-century masters. Nevertheless, the focus of these works is not entirely religious. It is on this point that these three scholars make their most valuable contribution to scholarship. The depiction of individual morality in these

works cannot be defined entirely by twelfth-century theological or by modern ethical standards. The basis of Hartmann's approach is much broader than this. As such, the concern of the protagonists for their honour cannot be dismissed as unethical, nor can the individual knight be considered alienated from his society. Within the context of a secular aristocratic morality, however, a knight must attempt to balance a variety of roles and obligations to his status, his society, and his God. The means to achieve this balance and to fulfil all these roles, however, is through self-awareness.

In order to balance the approach of this present study, it is also necessary to address the work of recent scholars who acknowledge the existence of an ethical progression in Hartmann's works. The work of Rüdiger Schnell will be closely considered as an example of a similar but more specific approach than the present study. In addition to Schnell's evidence of the influence of twelfth-century developments concerning the subjective nature of sin on Hartmann's works, one further study, by Susan Clark, which traces the subjective dimension in a close, text-based appraisal of Hartmann's narratives, will be briefly considered.

Susan Clark, *Hartmann von Aue: Landscapes of Mind*

The title of Clark's work immediately reveals the focus of her interpretation, namely that Hartmann was seeking to examine the manner in which his characters' minds work. As she states in her introduction:

> Hartmann takes as his abiding and overriding concern the workings of the *mind* - and by mind shall be understood cerebral functions as well as the emotive and perceptual functions tied to mind - and translates mind into terms individual to each of his poems. Hartmann, more so than

> Gottfried or Wolfram, is occupied constantly with how characters think, how their minds and therefore their lives change, and how what they think they know is continually called into question. (*Landscapes*, pp. 3f.)

Subsequently, Clark maintains that this authorial interest in perception has a co-ordinating function in the narrative as Hartmann's 'fascination with the mind ... forms the glue that binds his longer poems together' (*Landscapes*, p. 3).

By recognizing the existence and significance of thought processes in Hartmann's works in this way, Clark is applying a distinctly different approach to the objective stances of Voß, Fischer, and Ehrismann. This is not only the case in her insistence on the importance of a psychological dimension in the narratives, but also in her consideration of the works outwith their historical context:

> I will spend little time on sources that may have contributed to Hartmann's understanding of mind, since they are poorly established and our knowledge about them is speculative. To focus on them detracts from the focus on Hartmann's *own* parameters of mind as well as those faculties he sees as related to mind. My intent is to suggest readings that are true to the individual poems as well as to the coherent concern of the body of Hartmann's work. (*Landscapes*, p. 6)

The speculation which concerns Clark relates to Hartmann's biographical details and his knowledge of early scholastic psychology. Clark thus elects to avoid the approach of critics who claim that Hartmann was influenced by specific theological sources. With regard to these approaches, Clark argues that:

> while we must consider how a "medieval" frame of mind received medieval texts, I feel that many critics who speak with certainty about what that frame of mind was are merely consciously or subconsciously echoing the constant medieval reliance on *auctoritas*. Often a modern reader's

> response to the text is overwhelmed by references to the *Patrologia latina* or Augustine or Bernard of Clairvaux and standard reference works. I find delight in these sources, but a middle ground approach seems better, not only because we cannot say with certainty what those "mislîchen buochen" ... were upon which Hartmann based his works or who wrote them, but also because my approach to Hartmann does not demand the "antecedent model" favored by many medievalists today. (*Landscapes*, p. 6)

Clark's reluctance to associate Hartmann with any particular source of influence in the light of such unreliable evidence is partially justified. However, whilst evidence pertaining to specific influences on Hartmann can indeed only be speculative, Clark's choice of a 'middle way' does not take account of an alternative option, namely that of placing Hartmann's works against a general historical background. Such a context can be created by considering how the concerns of specific early scholastic theologians regarding self-awareness filtered down by means of sermons, confessional guides, and the penitential system, to achieve a widespread influence on the lives of ordinary Christians. Similarly, there is general evidence to suggest that economic and social factors contributed from the late eleventh century in western Europe to the creation of a broad awareness of individual choice and obligations which demanded the guidance of self-knowledge. Such general concerns provide a more justifiable context for informing Hartmann's interest in the mind and presumably the awareness of such concerns in his audience. Thus, even though Clark's approach allows her to achieve detailed insight into Hartmann's works, her disregard of their historical context is not entirely justified by her argument. As a result, her subsequent conclusions occasionally lack the guidance which a historical context would provide.

In spite of its restrictions, Clark's text-based approach nevertheless allows her to reveal detailed evidence of

thought processes in Hartmann's works. In particular, she considers interior monologues and speech, losses of consciousness, and descriptions of a character's knowledge and ignorance (*Landscapes*, p. 4). In addition, she takes into account references to actual thought processes, or 'mind terms', for example words denoting the mental activity of thinking, imagining, knowing, and evaluating (*Landscapes*, p. 5). These terms are subsequently analyzed with regard to frequency and position in the text to highlight areas of high or low incidence of thought processes. Clark proceeds to compare the interior mental state of the protagonists with their changing exterior surroundings, and in addition extends her investigation to include Hartmann's thematic narrative technique. This she interprets as challenging the audience to respond to the text by employing the same mental processing that the protagonists themselves demonstrate (*Landscapes*, pp. 4f.). In this way, the reader is asked to reflect constantly on the narrative by being alert to similarities and contrasts in the plot structure.

Clark's text-based approach, despite its lack of context, is nevertheless particularly welcome for revealing the progression of Hartmann's interest in perception throughout his output. A brief account of Clark's interpretation of Hartmann's narratives will be sufficient to demonstrate the advantages of her detailed investigation, and the disadvantages of its isolation from its historical background.

According to Clark, *Die Klage* constitutes a direct portrayal of a person in conflict, in which the two protagonists, the heart and body, represent the forces of reason and of capriciousness within that person. Their debate serves to illustrate the need for co-operation between these forces in order for the decision-making process to work and for justifiable action to be achieved. As Clark states:

> [*Die Klage*] sets out an anatomy of the functions of a mind as the seat of both reason and emotion, and as an entity capable of reflection, imagination, and problem-solving. (*Landscapes*, p. 44)

The body, representing the force of physical desire and irrationality, is eventually forced to acknowledge the heart's superior judgement as the power of reason. In addition, the body learns to appreciate the need for these two disparate forces to establish a state of harmony in order that a love relationship may be successfully pursued. Furthermore, it is by these same means that God's favour is likewise to be gained. Clark therefore defines this work as Hartmann's initial investigation of the inner conflict between desire and perception which emerges in the protagonists of his later narratives. However, her valid conclusions are not complemented by the setting of the role of rationality and its relationship with desire in this work into the context of classical philosophy. Neither does Clark consider the twelfth-century theological debate concerning free will and the roles of action and thought in the achievement of virtue and remission of sin which was influenced by this tradition. In light of the fact that this debate affected penitential practice in Hartmann's age, it can reasonably be claimed that it also found resonance in this narrative and amongst Hartmann's audience.

Clark links *Die Klage* closely with *Erec* by discerning a repetition of the heart/body rift in the conflict within Erec and Enite's marriage. Both partnerships suffer from a lack of communication, and both the body and Erec, representing the force of irrationality, are required to accept the guidance of reason in the guise of Enite and the heart. Clark's scrutiny of terms referring to mental processing and her consideration of monologues serve to elucidate Erec's journey from perceptive knight to imperceptive husband and lord, and finally to a life of

altruism and considerate knightly activity. In a reflection of the initially dysfunctional relationship between the heart and body, Erec and Enite represent the forces of imperception and perception in the wake of the *verligen* episode. Thus, in Clark's estimation, Enite inherits Erec's earlier perceptive qualities, whilst Erec retreats into a state of blank imperception (*Landscapes*, pp. 60f.). This transformation is most apparent in Enite's capacity to speak, whilst Erec, in a demonstration of his non-reflection, is silent, and attempts to impose a similar silence on his wife. Clark concludes that Enite's speech represents moderate and discerning action which is guided by the perception she demonstrates in her inner monologues. This perceptive judgement is particularly visible in her repeated justifications to her husband of her disobedience. In contrast, Erec's disorientation is revealed in his unfair treatment of his wife. Erec subsequently undergoes a gradual recovery of his perceptive qualities, however, until he finally reveals his renewed ability to judge situations in the Cadoc episode by asking questions and acting promptly on his conclusions (*Landscapes*, pp. 75f.). His achievements are finally confirmed in his thoughtful and careful actions in the *Joie de la curt* episode in which he overcomes his former anti-social self in the figure of Mabonagrin (*Landscapes*, pp. 85f.).

Clark's emphasis on aspects in the text which highlight the perception of the main protagonists, for example, speech, monologues, and the contrasting perceptive qualities of opponents, is thoroughly demonstrated with reference to *Erec*. Nevertheless, certain details in her conclusions must be called into question, for example, her claim that Enite only pretends to believe that Erec is asleep on making her complaint at Karnant (*Landscapes*, p. 61), or else her argument that Enite's lament in the forest demonstrates a loss of perception to rival Erec's earlier failure (*Landscapes*, pp. 77f.). These are points which will be

discussed in Chapter 3 of the present study. Such aspects mar Clark's broader, justifiable conclusions relating to the depiction of perception in this work.

In the case of *Iwein*, Clark likewise traces a progression in the main protagonist from his egoism in impetuously killing Askalon to the altruism he acquires by learning to think and judge before he acts. She concludes that Iwein's attitude before his failure is the result of a lack of perceptive control. This failing is initially manifested in Kalogrenant's rendition of his own adventure, which Clark interprets as a conscious attempt on Kalogrenant's part to warn his fellow knights of the dangers of impetuosity (*Landscapes*, pp. 171f.), and in the figure of the Wild Herdsman whom Clark contrasts, as a figure controlling disparate forces, with Iwein's own lack of control (*Landscapes*, p. 173). A similar impetuosity underlies the union between Iwein and Laudine which is based solely on desire (*Landscapes*, p. 184). Iwein's wish to pursue his knightly activities constitutes a continuation of this lack of control, and his year on the tournament circuit reveals no evidence of his awareness of his other obligations. Only once he has regained his senses after his madness does he gradually exhibit in the progression of his monologues the acquisition of the capacity to guide his actions by his thoughts and so engage in knightly pursuits for the sake of others (*Landscapes*, pp. 188f.). The co-ordination and harmony of thought and action is thus presented by Clark as the key objective for the heroes of Hartmann's Arthurian romances.

Clark's focus on perception in Hartmann's narratives continues in her analysis of *Gregorius*. However, her conclusions from the narratives previously discussed, in terms of the need for perception to be combined with action, are no longer apparent here, despite their relevance. Clark interprets *Gregorius* as a work revealing the difficulties

inherent in handing down knowledge of the experience of sin through the generations (*Landscapes*, pp. 94f.). Thus, Gregorius inherits incomplete information regarding his origins from the tablet, and this lack of information directly causes his own sin in the second incest. However, through the actual experience of sin, Gregorius ultimately achieves true wisdom. Clark concludes that without this experience, humankind, as represented by Gregorius, only has access to imperfect knowledge and a flawed capacity to reason, rather than to true wisdom (*Landscapes*, pp. 94f., p. 104, p. 118).

The concept of incomplete knowledge is not only apparent in the message on the tablet, but also in the theme of concealing knowledge throughout the narrative, for example, the hiding of Gregorius with foster parents, and of the tablet by the abbot and Gregorius himself. Likewise, Clark argues that Hartmann employs irony and concealment strategies in his narrative techniques to recreate the deficiency in his protagonist's knowledge amongst his audience. Clark furthermore emphasizes the use of terms relating to sight in the maid, who acts as a figure of perception in this work, and whose inquisitiveness contrasts with the partial knowledge and imperception of Gregorius and his mother.

Clark's demonstration of imperception in the characters is again thorough and partially justified, but nevertheless suffers from a serious flaw. She bases her assumption that the characters' knowledge of the nature of sin is incomplete on the tablet's limited information. Gregorius does indeed initially find himself in a state of ignorance, but it can be argued that his tablet nevertheless provides him with sufficient knowledge about his inheritance to permit him a full insight into his sinful state. In this sense, therefore, his self-knowledge is already complete after he reads the tablet at the monastery. Gregorius' later readings

of the tablet after his marriage, which Clark accepts as demonstrating sufficient penance (*Landscapes*, p. 106), therefore reinforce the fact that he has access to the essential details of his sinful inheritance, but that he subsequently fails to acknowledge this information fully by continuing his search for his parents. The ignorance of the characters does not therefore symbolize the problem of handing down knowledge, and the manner in which that incomplete knowledge leads to sin, as Clark maintains. Rather, it represents the inherited sinfulness of humankind as a result of original sin which has to be overcome by active recognition and acceptance. This is indicated in twelfth-century teaching regarding the consequences of the Fall. Although Gregorius is initially ignorant of his inheritance, therefore, his tablet provides him with all the necessary information. However, it is information which he does not fully accept, and his inaction regarding his vow to find his parents leads him ultimately into a state of personal sin. It is therefore not the case that Gregorius has to experience sin as a result of his flawed perception in order to gain wisdom, but rather that he has to accept his knowledge of his inheritance in a meaningful and active manner.[13] In fact, Clark's conclusions from her assessment of Hartmann's Arthurian romances are highly relevant to *Gregorius* as the placing of this narrative in the historical context would have indicated.

Finally, Clark's investigation of *Der arme Heinrich* focuses on further evidence of Hartmann's use of terms relating to speech and sensory faculties as indications of perception. This is apparent in the maiden's absolute determination to express her plans and her parents' unwillingness to listen to her proposal (*Landscapes*, pp. 143f.). In addition, Clark highlights the presence of terms referring to sight and hearing at Heinrich's conversion. She maintains that his sensory perception thus symbolizes his breakthrough into self-knowledge (*Landscapes*, p. 155). Clark reveals evidence

of inner awareness in Heinrich and the maiden before this point which demonstrates their desire to govern their own destinies. Heinrich's mind is described as having been consistently turned away from God, thus revealing the source of his troubles, and indeed the solution. He demonstrates the progression of his self-insight after several years with the peasants by revealing his awareness of the true cause of his leprosy. However, his insight does not yet extend to recognizing the power of God's forgiveness as a solution (*Landscapes*, pp. 136f.). Similarly, the maiden seeks to engineer her own salvation by offering herself as a virgin sacrifice. Her extreme reaction to Heinrich's intervention ultimately reveals the essential self-interest behind her offer despite her demonstrated reflective capacity. Both main characters thus ultimately achieve full insight as Heinrich realizes the need to be mindful of God and to trust in his mercy, and the maiden similarly accepts God's role in her destiny.

For exhibiting the mechanics of Hartmann's interest in perception, Clark's analysis of his narratives is extremely useful and rich in detail. On this evidence, it is difficult to agree with Voß, Fischer, and Ehrismann that Hartmann's characters display no evidence of psychological progression. However, Clark's lack of an historical basis to her approach means that Hartmann's interest cannot be interpreted within the context of his age. Clark's conclusions are therefore necessarily reduced to being speculation about Hartmann's personal interest in perception. In this, Clark's approach is unusual in scholarship. Consequently, an analysis of a recent study of perception in Hartmann's works which involves a more traditional appraisal of the historical context will be considered.

Rüdiger Schnell, 'Abaelards Gesinnungsethik und die Rechtsthematik in Hartmanns *Iwein*'

Schnell's interpretation of *Iwein* is sensitive to the existence of subjective elements in Hartmann's narratives, but, unlike Clark, he firmly attributes these elements to justifiable historical influences. Schnell thereby also presents an alternative to the objective interpretation which he views as prevalent in *Iwein* scholarship ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 15, p. 25), and maintains that the diversity of approaches to this text is due to the lack of clarity existing over the appropriate value system to be employed in its appraisal. Scholarship is thus divided, in Schnell's opinion, over whether the text should be viewed in the light of social responsibilities, Christian virtues, or secular judicial norms. Schnell responds to this complex state of affairs by arguing that Hartmann's main concern is to portray the ethical significance of his protagonists' intentions. He points as evidence for his claim to the widespread discussion of sin and the developing emphasis on private penance and confession in the twelfth century ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 16-18). This discussion was particularly inspired by the work of Abelard and his disciples, but also by the Schools of Laon and St Victor. Schnell argues that their influence was far-reaching, and even pervaded the secular judicial system. Thus, he interprets *Iwein* as Hartmann's vehicle for the exploration of intentions as prompted by these theological developments, and examines their effect on the military aristocracy, particularly in terms of judicial matters.

Schnell supports his claim by analysing Abelard's teaching in depth. This centred on the basic notion that sin is a subjective issue, existing in the decision to act against the conscience, rather than in the objective action:

> Was die Sünde eigentlich ausmacht, ist die Zustimmung zum Bösen, der *consensus mali*. Nur die Einwilligung in das, was man für unrecht hält, sei Sünde, während der bloß äußere Akt sittlich indifferent sei. ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 19)

Abelard thus considered the sinner's intention, along with the ability to reflect and thereby inform that intention, to be of paramount importance. Guilt and sin therefore only exist in the realm of subjectivity, and are the results of inadequate self-awareness and sinful intent. A similar mode of thought, according to Schnell, had already been evident in penitential literature since the seventh century and in canonical collections since the tenth ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 21). These works promoted the notion of self-enquiry which was adjudged to be a prerequisite, not only of good intentions, but also of virtue and true regret. Evidence to suggest that the issue of subjective guilt was debated in the twelfth century is apparent in the widespread influence of Abelard's ideas ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 21-3). Schnell reveals that manuscripts of Abelard's works and those of his pupils were to be found over an extensive part of the southern German empire, as well as being reflected in the highly-influential *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. Even if it appears tenuous to link any direct influence on Hartmann to Abelard, Schnell is confident that the debate on the nature of sin and the importance of self-enquiry was of such interest to many twelfth-century masters, that it is not necessary to prove any single influence of one master. Most certainly, it appears to Schnell, Hartmann was affected by the general scholarly debate at this time which centred on these issues. Schnell therefore contends that, by virtue of being composed against this background, *Iwein* offers itself for investigation along ethical lines, particularly in terms of intention and the nature of sin.

In applying this approach, Schnell identifies two distinct narrative levels, namely those of outward action and inner

motivation, and argues that they correspond to the two halves of the plot which are separated by the missing of the deadline ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 29). Both levels have to be taken into account in order for the textual complexity to be fully appreciated. This can be achieved principally by analysing the monologues of the main protagonist. Schnell observes a distinct progression in Iwein's awareness of his inner motivation after he has recovered from his madness. Schnell's acknowledgment of the emergence of such a psychological dimension at this stage in the narrative subsequently leads him to argue that Iwein shows signs of a limited reflective capacity and a tendency towards impetuosity prior to missing the deadline. Thus, he maintains that in the initial episode Iwein does not reflect before he acts, does not wait to challenge Askalon, and does not hesitate to pursue him ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 33ff.). On this first point, Schnell is not quite accurate, however, as there is indeed evidence of Iwein reflecting after he has heard Kalogrenant's story (Iw 911-44). Thus, the issue is not so straightforwardly divided between non-reflection and reflection in the two narrative halves as Schnell implies. Instead, a finer distinction between the manner in which Iwein reflects before and after the missing of the deadline is called for. However, Schnell's observation concerning impetuosity is more justified. This tendency is evident in Iwein's immediate acceptance of Gawein's proposal to return to the tournament circuit. As Schnell remarks:

> ohne darüber nachzudenken, daß seine eigenen Lebensbedingungen durch die Übernahme der Landesherrschaft und durch die Heirat sich entscheidend geändert haben, wendet er sich *zehant* (V. 2913) an Laudine, um ihre Zustimmung für die Turnierfahrt zu erbitten. ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 34)

Schnell thereby locates Iwein's failure in the subjective sphere, owing to his inadequate reflection on his obligations:

> Iweins Versagen gründet nicht so sehr im Verstoß gegen Außennormen (Askalon-Totschlag; Terminversäumnis und Eidbruch), sondern in der mangelnden Bewußtheit, in der unreflektierten Zielrichtung seines Handelns, kurz, in einer fehlerhaften *intentio*. ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 39)

Iwein thus fails to consider the consequences of his actions in advance. Objectively speaking, he is blameless because he makes no conscious decision to sin, but his failure to recognize his responsibilities implies subjective guilt because his lack of reflection renders him incapable of forming good intentions. The narrator's silence regarding any failure on Iwein's part is likewise interpreted by Schnell as proof of the absence of objective guilt ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 38). However, this lack of recrimination by the narrator also prompts Schnell to claim that Hartmann is following Abelard's teaching on the maturity of conscience in this portrayal of his main protagonist ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 37f.). As subjective guilt requires the perpetrator to reject the advice of the conscience or to fail to reflect adequately, it follows that if that conscience is too immature to be aware of the necessity of reflection, that person is incapable of making such a decision. Schnell claims that this is the case with Iwein. He has not yet learned to reflect, and his shortcomings therefore lie in the subjective field, but do not qualify fully as subjective sin. However, Schnell's conclusion does not give enough credence to the emphasis which Hartmann is also placing on the severe objective consequences which Iwein's lack of self-awareness has for his court.

Schnell proceeds to trace the evolution of Iwein's awareness. His awakening from madness marks a new level of insight, as his first monologue portrays his new-found capacity to question his identity ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 35). This insight subsequently leads Iwein to acquire new ethical qualities throughout the second cycle of adventures,

namely the ability to feel compassion and recognize his own guilt. These qualities in turn allow him to reclaim his former position as a superior knight and lord, capable of avoiding the same mistakes. He gains the ability, for example, to blame his *muot* for losing Laudine's love (Iw 8135) ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 30). Similarly, he learns to question his motives before aiding the lion (Iw 3846-53), and also to feel sympathy for Lunete's plight (Iw 4075-9) ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 35f.). Schnell likewise underlines the fact that in each case Iwein carefully deliberates on the intentions of the other party before acting. This point is re-emphasized by Gawein's agreement to defend the older sister's inheritance claim, an occasion on which his failure to consider her motives results in his fighting for a dubious cause. In contrast, Iwein's new-found awareness of his own intentions and those of others permits him to recognize his responsibilities, to feel compassion for others, and to support purely worthy causes. These are the moral insights he has gained, as Schnell acknowledges:

> das Reflektieren über sich, über die anderen, über die an ihn herangetragenen Forderungen und über die eingegangenen Verpflichtungen befähigt den Protagonisten zu einem neuen verantwortungsvollen Verhalten. ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 36)

Schnell likewise traces inner motivation and subjective guilt on the part of other characters. As in Iwein's case, many display initial signs of a lack of awareness particularly regarding the intentions of others. Laudine represents a distinct example of this tendency by misunderstanding Iwein's reasons for marrying her ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 43f.). She is only aware of his outer actions, namely his killing of Askalon and his esteemed membership of Arthur's court. Similarly, Iwein is unaware of Laudine's purpose in marrying him. Her own monologue reveals a desire for a faithful protector (Iw 2058-72). As Lunete discloses in her verbal attack on Iwein, Laudine expected

him to be grateful for her benevolence and to show her love and faithfulness (Iw 3164ff.) ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 41f.). Thus, the main protagonists commence their relationship with scant regard for each other's inner motivation. Iwein's demand for Laudine to grant him a wish, and her acquiescence whilst still in ignorance of the nature of his request, thereby represent a microcosm of their lack of understanding. This point is confirmed, in Schnell's opinion, in the final scene, as Laudine forgives her husband once she realizes the hardships he has suffered on her behalf ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 42). Her falling at his feet and begging his forgiveness thus demonstrate her own newly-awakened awareness of his inner resolve. However, this scene only exists in three of the surviving manuscripts.[14] Its employment by Schnell to confirm his interpretation must therefore be seen within this context.

A major focus on the ability to be aware of the intentions of others is provided by Lunete. In her accusation of Iwein before Arthur's court, she outlines the dichotomy between Iwein's outer appearance and his inner motivation which has deceived her (Iw 3118ff.) ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 44-6). Later, at the spring, Lunete re-emphasizes this issue, describing her premature trust in and support for Iwein which had such adverse consequences (Iw 4191-5). In this way, her own failure to see beyond Iwein's outer actions to his inner mind highlights the problem existing between Iwein and Laudine.

Intention also plays a major role in the episode describing Guinever's kidnapping. Schnell contends that Arthur's knights display insufficient regard for the ambitions of the stranger knight, Meljaganz ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 39f.). They consider his outer courtly appearance to be proof of his moral integrity, and are likewise excessively concerned with the outward reputation of their court. This short-sightedness underlies their recommendation to Arthur that he

grant the knight his unspecified request, as a result of which the queen is taken from court by the stranger. This episode forms part of a sequence in which certain characters act without thinking as a result of their haughtiness (*übermuot*) or arrogance (*hôchvart*), thereby contrasting with Iwein's own subjective progression ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 31). These characters include Kalogrenant (Iw 715), Aliers (Iw 3409), the young lord of the Jungfraueninsel (Iw 6328-30), Harpin (Iw 4963), and the count's elder daughter (Iw 5661, 7657). All display arrogant tendencies which obscure their insight into their own and other people's intentions with disastrous results.

Schnell proceeds to cite two specific episodes in which the issue of intention is explicitly discussed. Firstly, when the maiden anoints Iwein with all the magic salve in defiance of her mistress, the narrator clearly states that her disobedience is forgivable because it is motivated by her desire to ensure Iwein's recovery (Iw 3475-86) ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 28). However, in the second example, Iwein's horse is well cared for by the stablehand at the castle of Pesme Avanture for the explicit reason that he expects to own it himself before very long. The narrator thus highlights the selfish intentions motivating this seemingly generous behaviour (Iw 6654-75) ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 26-8). These episodes may be of relatively small importance to the plot, but Schnell nevertheless employs them to illustrate this issue. In his opinion, they act as indicators to guide the audience's awareness of this subjective level in the narrative. Confirmation of Hartmann's portrayal of the need for a greater appreciation of intentions is found in the narrator's comment in the final combat scene between Gawein and Iwein. Here the narrator describes how it is preferable to be unintentionally hurt by an honest man than to be exposed to a person of bad intent, even if no physical harm is suffered (Iw 7358-68) ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 25f.). This preferable

alternative is represented by Iwein and Gawein in the combat. Despite the suffering they inflict upon one another, their actions are devoid of evil intent. Schnell surmises from this comment that Hartmann is supporting the notion that knights should not expressly seek to kill their opponents in combat, a conclusion which causes him to question retrospectively, and somewhat tenuously, Iwein's subjective guilt in killing Askalon ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 26). However, in doing this, Schnell overlooks the fact that Iwein's killing of Askalon is legitimate in terms of the secular honour ethic, as Fischer maintains. Instead, Schnell only evaluates the episode from a subjective viewpoint without giving credence to the question of honour which it also raises.

The final section of Schnell's essay concerns a perspective which he claims to have been overlooked by *Iwein* scholarship ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 53). Concentrating primarily on the inheritance dispute between the count's two daughters and the resulting combat between Gawein and Iwein, Schnell extends his illustration of the concept of subjective guilt to incorporate the judicial practices of the twelfth-century German empire ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 48ff.). Schnell concludes that, despite the tradition in Roman law of taking intention into account, clerical and secular judicial practice in the twelfth century was primarily focused on the objective results of an action, although this is not to presume that intention was entirely disregarded. Schnell argues that there was widespread discussion of such concerns as crimes committed in ignorance, the repentance of criminals, or the practical difficulties in ascertaining criminal intentions. Thus, despite the problems of using intentions as reliable evidence, there was nevertheless an awareness of the importance of assessing the subjective guilt of the perpetrator of a crime by considering his or her inner motives. The advantage of this approach lay in its

encouragement of compromise and arbitration, such as Schnell observes in *Iwein*.

Schnell supports his claim by comparing Hartmann's depiction of this final scene with that of his French source. In his opinion, Arthur's extra attempts at appeasing the older sister in Hartmann's version indicate a greater emphasis on this point than appears in the French text (Iw 6918-28, 7282-90; Yv 6379-87) ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 55). Thus, this scene constitutes evidence of Hartmann's support for the judicial practice of *minne* or *Schiedsgerichtbarkeit*, that is, the practice of agreed settlements, rather than the pursuit of one's rights to the bitter end (*reht* or *iusticia*). Schnell admits that historical evidence of such compromises is somewhat sketchy ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 57f.). Records of judicial arbitration only appear in the Church from 1158, but sources suggest that the concept was popular in eleventh-century France and even Germanic times. The idea was promoted by the Church after the mid-twelfth century, however, and the practice reached its height between the thirteenth and the fifteenth centuries. The concept appears to have developed from two separate strands ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 60). The first was connected to the secular idea of *suone* or reconciliation, and the second to the clerical notion of *misericordia* or mercy. *Suone*'s etymology reveals that it was used already in Germanic and early medieval times to indicate the avoidance of a feud by means of a private settlement between clans.[15] Ultimately, this practice became incorporated into the peace legislation which was drawn up from the late eleventh century in the German empire to promote compromise. The second strand, that of *misericordia* or the mercy shown to a repentant sinner, was hotly debated in twelfth-century clerical circles with regard to its preferability to justice or *iusticia* ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 61f.). The establishment of the purity of repentance was a paramount consideration in these cases. This concept subsequently appears to have spread via

the works of Isidor of Seville and Gratian to influence secular justice in the twelfth-century German empire. Thus, the issue of motivation was relevant to both secular and clerical judicial practice in Hartmann's age in the promotion of agreed settlements and reconciliation.

Consequently, Schnell argues that Hartmann is reflecting this concern for arbitration by exploring the manner in which the rigid pursuit of justice may be motivated by selfish intentions and may often prevent a less damaging settlement which can be achieved by a desire for compromise and a concern for others. These two alternatives are symbolized by the count's two daughters ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 49-53). According to Schnell:

> der Opposition zweier Rechtsverfahren entspricht die Opposition der zwei Rechtsparteien: der hartnäckigen, verstockten, beharrlich auf das formalistische Beweisverfahren vertrauenden älteren Grafentochter steht die jüngere gegenüber mit ihrer Versöhnungsbereitschaft, ihrer Sorge um das Leben der Kampfvertreter, ihrem Appell zu *minne*. ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 55)

The older sister refuses to relinquish her rights to a judicial combat despite Arthur's best attempts at persuasion, and even after her sister, who reveals her willingness to compromise long before this point (Iw 5729-36), has abandoned her claim out of concern for the knights (Iw 7296-7320). This positive portrayal of compromise based on selfless motivation is further supported by the crowd's desire for conciliation and Gawein's and Iwein's own willingness to set aside their claims of victory ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 55f.). Ultimately, Arthur is able to settle the issue without an outcome in the combat by considering the intentions of the two sisters and giving his support to the younger sister whose concern for the knights outweighs her concern for her inheritance. In contrast, the older sister's selfishness and *herter muot* lose her Arthur's

favour, and are accentuated by her need to be tricked into a confession and threatened with the loss of her inheritance before she will relinquish her claim. In this way, Hartmann demonstrates the possibility of a damaging and unjust outcome if formal justice is pursued at all costs. Likewise, he reveals that the key to settling a dispute by arbitration lies in the assessment of the motivations of the various parties.

Schnell proceeds to highlight earlier evidence of arbitration in *Iwein*. This is apparent in the character of Keii, Lunete's trial, and Laudine's reconciliation with her husband. Keii is considered by the queen and Kalogrenant to be undeserving of forgiveness because his infamous bad nature rules out any possibility that his repentance is genuine ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 62f.). This initial scene thus forms an early introduction to the issue of inner motivation in the work. Later, Lunete is accused of falsehood by the steward and his brothers. However, her good intentions in advising her mistress are emphasized and confirmed by her supporters' conviction of her innocence which they base on her inherent good nature ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 65-7). In contrast, the steward and his brothers are blinded by their own evil ambition and pursue their cause to the bitter end, an approach which results in their ultimate defeat. Likewise, in the final scene of the narrative, Hartmann further portrays the rigid desire for justice as Laudine initially hesitates to forgive Iwein ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 63-5). Only when she is convinced of Iwein's good intentions does she do so, and in turn asks his forgiveness for her stubbornness. As stated earlier, however, the doubtful authorship of this episode places a question mark beside Schnell's otherwise plausible interpretation.

Schnell concludes his investigation by maintaining that his express aim is not to draw direct comparisons with judicial

practices in the twelfth century in Germany as other scholars have attempted. Instead, he is concerned with focusing simply on the portrayal of intention in *Iwein*, an issue which incorporates a range of others in the narrative, including self-recognition, virtue, arbitration, justice, guilt, and reconciliation. Schnell's approach highlights in particular the monologues and other signs of self-awareness in the characters which were not taken into account by Voß, Fischer, and Ehrismann. By comparing these subjective elements with Hartmann's source and by monitoring their employment throughout the narrative, Schnell concludes that inner awareness and motivation were of paramount interest to Hartmann when he was composing *Iwein*, and are therefore crucial to an interpretation of this work. In the course of this approach, Schnell compares both halves of the narrative of *Iwein* to reveal a psychological progression in the main protagonist after the missing of the deadline. Unlike Voß, Fischer, and Ehrismann, therefore, Schnell takes a more holistic view of the narrative, rather than drawing his basic conclusions from the initial episode. Furthermore, and in contrast to Clark, Schnell firmly places Hartmann's interest in motivation in the context of the influential theological debate regarding the nature of sin in the twelfth century and the concern for motivation which was inherent in the penitential and judicial systems of this age. In so doing, Schnell illustrates those aspects influencing secular morality which were neglected by Voß, Fischer, and Ehrismann. However, Schnell elects to concentrate more fully on the issue of intention in his main protagonist, rather than the general concern with reflection and its association with action which was likewise of great import in the theological discussions pertaining to the remission of sins in the penitential system. Hartmann's protagonists are required to be aware of and respond to their obligations, and, should they fail to do so, to realize and act to rectify their mistakes. However, this aspect of Hartmann's work is more clearly defined in his

earlier narratives as will be demonstrated in the course of this study.

Despite avoiding the disadvantages of an exclusively objective approach, Schnell's interpretation of the initial episode as a period of non-reflection for Iwein has its own limitations as it does not take sufficient account of the justifiable concern for the redress of honour which Iwein also displays. Iwein does indeed act with greater impetuosity in the first adventure, but nevertheless also reveals his powers of insight in his awareness of his legitimate obligation to pursue renown by going on adventure, defending the honour of his kinsman, and chasing Askalon. The pursuit of honour when guided by insight is thus presented in positive terms. Problems only arise when his awareness fails to match the expansion of his obligations on marrying Laudine, leaving him dangerously short-sighted in a position which calls for a clear overview of a range of duties. Iwein is subsequently required to gain an awareness of his broader obligations in the second part of the narrative, a process which is revealed, as Schnell states, in his monologues and his improved perception of the intentions of others.

Schnell therefore provides evidence of the remaining threads combining to form the concept of secular morality which Hartmann appears to be discussing in his work. Whereas Fischer points to the influence of the secular honour ethic, Schnell proposes the twelfth-century theological debate on self-awareness and the nature of sin as an influence on Hartmann. However, by not taking the aspect of honour and the serious social consequences of Iwein's failure into account, Schnell is perhaps relying too heavily on clerical rather than secular concepts of morality. Schnell reveals his belief that subjective issues are of greater relevance in this genre by stating:

> daß die höfischen Romane und der Minnesang der inneren Einstellung, der Ausrichtung des Handelns an "Innennormen" (*triuwe, stæte, güete, kiusche, minne, erbermde* u.a.) den Vorrang vor der Einhaltung von äußeren Konventionen, von "Außennormen" (Sitte und Brauch, Rechtsnormen) einräumen, ist unverkennbar. ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 23)

However, it is perhaps dangerous to conclude in this way that objective issues are of little significance. The missing of the deadline, for example, does indeed suggest that Laudine and Iwein have misunderstood one another's intentions, but such a failure has important social implications also. It is a blatant breach of trust on Iwein's part, undermining the feudal bond and leaving his dependants helpless. Iwein's inability to consider his obligations thus has far-reaching social consequences, an aspect to which Schnell does not give enough weight. This is the result of not taking into account the fact that the emphasis on self-awareness reflected in Hartmann's works stems both from theological debate and also from economic and social factors affecting twelfth-century society in the German empire.

All of the scholars discussed above have found ample evidence in the texts to support their different conclusions, and their attempts to provide a single interpretation are therefore only made possible by disregarding other relevant issues. The justifiability of all these points of view suggests that Hartmann was concerned with portraying a broad range of issues. Central to this approach is Hartmann's concern for the inner lives and thoughts of his protagonists in their attempts to respond to a variety of obligations, both secular and religious. One may therefore speculate as to the degree to which Hartmann might hereby be reflecting a general concern of his age for individual awareness which stems from theological developments and Christian religious practice,

and also from economic and social demands. Similarly, one might consider how Hartmann presents these issues in terms relevant to an audience drawn from the military aristocracy. This present study will therefore attempt to analyse these different sources of influence and apply them to Hartmann's earlier works with particular regard for his depiction of the inner reflective capacity of his characters.

CHAPTER TWO

The Social and Theological Background to Hartmann's Works

The background against which the perceptive powers of Hartmann's protagonists are to be measured incorporates social, religious, and philosophical factors. These factors will provide an image of the mentality of Hartmann's age and the role of self-awareness within it. The history of mentality has received much recent discussion in scholarship, particularly regarding its definition. One alternative has been ventured by Peter Dinzelbacher:

> Mentalität ist das Ensemble der Denk- und Empfindungsweisen und -inhalte, von denen ein bestimmtes Kollektiv in einer bestimmten Zeit geprägt ist. Mentalität manifestiert sich in Äußerungen und im Verhalten.[16]

More specifically, Charles Radding proposes assessing the categories of legal and penitential codes, monastic practices, and literature in order to create a mental history of the military aristocracy in the twelfth century.[17] Radding's approach therefore matches this present study in its own consideration of the evolution of private penance, the thought and influence of scholastic and monastic theologians of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, and also social and economic developments. All of these factors will provide a broad insight into the mentality of the age and create a context for the burgeoning self-consciousness within the military aristocracy which Hartmann reflects and discusses in the fictional framework of his narratives.[18]

First of all, however, brief mention should be made of other cultural changes which influenced the notion of individuality in the twelfth century. Colin Morris maintains that it is possible to detect an increased self-awareness in this age in the wake of a cultural and intellectual flowering

which engendered a revival of humanist principles.[19] The intellectual renaissance in the twelfth century was principally the result of increasingly peaceful travelling conditions which created opportunities for study and an exchange of ideas. The revival of ancient learning, particularly the reading of Cicero and Seneca, reintroduced humanist ideas, as did the development in Christian thought of the doctrine of salvation by which each Christian became responsible for his or her own deliverance, rather than playing a more passive role in the struggle between Good and Evil. As a result of this evolution in thought, each Christian gained a new responsibility and a new value. Likewise, this approach stressed the humanity of God through his experience of human suffering, thereby provoking a reaction of human compassion towards God in the Christian believer. It is by means of this compassion that redemption is achieved.[20] This new development found tangible representation in the form of crucifixes which from this period began to portray the figure of Christ as a suffering and dying human, rather than a stylized, expressionless, or triumphant figure. Similarly, in carvings and paintings, the infant Christ was increasingly depicted as a human baby and the Virgin as a human mother.[21] A new emphasis on the individual, which stems both from this development in theology and from other sources, is similarly visible in the evolution at this time of a natural realism in secular forms of art, for example in portraits or tomb effigies.[22] In addition, the importance of the individual is reflected in the rise of vernacular literature and the expansion of a Latin literary culture.[23] Furthermore, it is evident in the focus of histories, chronicles, and biographies on the deeds of humankind, rather than on the Divine order,[24] and in the greater tendency for the author to present himself as a real person, or for the artist or architect to have a personal style or leave an individual mark on their work.[25] There is much evidence to suggest, therefore, that a new sense of

worth was being attributed to humankind as a result of the renaissance of thought in this age.

Caroline Walker Bynum observes the burgeoning self-awareness in the individual in the twelfth century particularly in terms of the spiritual life.[26] Whereas to the modern individual the concept of individuality incorporates not only the inner self, but also the unique self in the sense of personality, to the medieval mind individuality was a spiritual process of drawing closer to God. By searching for the soul or the inner person made in the image of God, the medieval individual hoped to become more like God. However, it is also possible to perceive in the twelfth century the tentative beginnings of the social and political concept of individuality, which dominate the modern definition of the term. This social strand played a substantial role in shaping the new awareness of individuality in the twelfth century, and will form the initial point of discussion in this chapter.

Social developments

On a social level, the worth and responsibility of the individual had long been established as inherent components in the structure of the feudal system. As Walter Ullmann describes, despite the enduring theoretical notion of descending government based on Christian principles in which the ruler embodied the law and his subjects relied on his favour rather than any rights of citizenship, and in which the common weal was accorded greater importance than the good of the individual,[27] in practice the personal relationship between a lord and vassal caused the obligations of each party to be considered vital.[28] This feudal bond was thus a reciprocal agreement between two individuals. Moreover, the obligation to hold to this agreement was as strong on the side of the lord as the

vassal. The breakdown of these relations through laxity or faithlessness on the part of either side constituted a breakdown in the very fabric of society. Even amongst the peasantry and urban craftsmen, the co-operation of individuals to form a community or, in the craftsmen's case, a guild, which functioned by means of mutual obligation, was the pattern of social order. It is from this basic pattern of citizenship that constitutions based on customary law and the notion of civil liberty eventually developed in western Europe.[29] In the upper reaches of society, the position of the ruler was therefore a paradox. On the one hand, he was invested with power by God, but on the other hand, he was still a feudal lord with obligations to his vassals. Furthermore, such obligations demanded the recognition of personal responsibility on the part of both individuals if they were to be fulfilled. As Ullmann states:

> one thing seems clear, and that is that the feudal arrangement, at whatever level it was practiced, of necessity presupposed the responsibility of the individual. It was not just a matter of receiving a command or a law, but it was necessary to employ one's own critical faculties. Facts, situations, circumstances, ways of means, and so forth - all had to be weighed and assessed properly if lord and vassal were to co-operate, if, in other words, the system were to work at all.[30]

The focus on the individual caused by the personal responsibility inherent in the feudal structure therefore 'fostered individual liberty'.[31]

Obligations amongst the military aristocracy likewise extended to the essential matter of kinship ties which continued to be of great import in the twelfth century. The notion of equal affront to all members of a kinship group caused by the grievance of one member sharpened the awareness of duty towards one's kin. In spite of measures to discourage the blood feud, this practice nevertheless remained an important method by which reciprocal aid and

restitution functioned across a broad social network.[32] Both on the level of feudal and of familial obligation, each member of society was thus required to be aware of his or her position and the demands imposed on it.

In addition to the basic functioning of feudal society, the economic and social changes which were taking place in western Europe from the mid-eleventh century played a role in underlining the role of the individual.[33] Despite the political unrest of the German empire, trade flourished and towns expanded at this time. As a result, both the rural and urban populations were faced with new opportunities in life, such as learning a different trade or escaping from the land and moving to a town. Possibilities for change likewise became available in administration, scholarship, and the Church. Life thus became a more complex system of choices which caused the medieval individual to take one small step along the road to modern individuality. Furthermore, the development of a monetary economy contributed to the greater scope for individual enterprise throughout society, as did the great expansion eastward and land clearances which were prompted by a population boom throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries. All of these factors thus permitted members of different social strata to reappraise and even transform their lot in life.

The changing times which created the opportunity for individual enterprise also accounted for the pressure placed on the older and lesser families of the military aristocracy in the German empire.[34] Several factors contributed to the threat of extinction faced by these families, including the consolidation of hereditary lands by the greatest nobles and the creation of the ranks of the *Reichsfürsten* by Frederick Barbarossa in 1184. Other factors included the rise in influence of the ministerials, the obligation for nobles to assist with the emperor's foreign campaigns, and the rising costs of maintaining a knightly lifestyle against the

background of the development of a money-based economy. Furthermore, pressure also arose from the practice of primogeniture amongst noble families. Although primogeniture was not universally practised in the German empire in Hartmann's day, it was nevertheless on the increase, and was pursued in an attempt to avoid the breakup of family lands through the marriage of daughters and younger sons.[35] Likewise, evidence suggests that, even within the imperial dynasty, the marriage of the eldest son was delayed for as long as possible, as such an event would result in the establishment of a separate household. Thus, both the threat to the lesser or older sections of the military aristocracy at one end of the scale, and the consolidation of power and territory by families at the other end, resulted in an emphasis on familial identity at this time. Evidence of this development is apparent in the increased use of heraldic devices and surnames.[36]

In the light of all of this evidence, it can therefore be claimed that the individual awareness demanded by feudal status and duty, combined with a strong familial tie, was of paramount importance for the functioning of society in this age. Furthermore, the increased opportunities made available to the various social strata by social and economic changes in the eleventh and twelfth centuries on the one hand, and on the other hand the pressure to which particularly the older and lesser noble families were subjected drew attention to the issue of self-awareness.

Secular ethics

An increased sense of the inner life also arose from attempts to promote a recognized form of secular morality amongst the military aristocracy in the twelfth century. A need existed for a means of ethical control within this social stratum to combat problems of endemic violence. Such

aggression was the consequence of the revenge mentality and sensitive honour ethic inherent in this level of society, which demanded the retention of the warrior retinues whose existence had been perpetuated by the anarchic conditions of the latter half of the eleventh century.[37] However, the solution to the threat of disturbance posed by these groups in less anarchic times was not straightforward, as violence was not merely arbitrary or vicious in all cases, but also a recognized form of legal redress. Furthermore, a traditional attitude of independence existed amongst the nobility in the German empire which had been given extra impetus by the troubles of Henry IV's reign. Subsequent German emperors were thus faced with particularly acute logistical problems in ruling without any established form of centralized bureaucracy.[38] Such noble independence inevitably encouraged the pursuit of private feuds and therefore also necessitated the cultivation of particularly large retinues.

The problems caused by the presence of so many trained warriors were compounded by attempts to avoid the division of a family's patrimony. The exclusion of younger sons from marriage and lordship as a result of these practices inevitably left these young men with little useful purpose in society. Efforts were made to alleviate this problem in order to avoid tension within families and provide an outlet for youthful exuberance. For example, noble sons were sent to be educated and provide service in the households of other families, or else encouraged to follow tournament circuits.[39] Nevertheless, despite these efforts, the restrictions imposed upon this section of the population, which contrasted starkly with its training in arms, presented considerable problems in terms of discipline.

In addition to this threat within its ranks, the social and economic changes which were occurring in this period caused the military aristocracy to become increasingly threatened

by its own traditional feuding lifestyle. The disruption caused by feuding was particularly damaging to the peasantry, but as the wealth of the nobility became tied to the land, feuds gradually began to present a serious threat even to their perpetrators. As a result, the military aristocracy lent its support to imperial and clerical efforts to contain feuding and engender peace. These efforts centred on the clerical edicts known as the Truce and Peace of God which were first issued in the German empire in 1082, but more particularly around the secular peace laws or *Landfrieden*, which were based on the French model and issued across the empire from 1103.[40] These secular laws were principally utilized by Frederick Barbarossa, who depended on them to keep the peace in his many absences. Despite these legal efforts, however, evidence suggests that the traditional feuding lifestyle was only minimally influenced by such moves to promote self-control.[41] Violence and self-assertion were too deeply engrained in the independent and military traditions of the ruling aristocracy. Nevertheless, the support which these efforts received demonstrates an awareness amongst this class of the essential role which self-control had to play in reducing the violence of their lifestyle. In addition, the involvement of the military aristocracy in the moves for peace points to a desire to discuss and establish grounds for the acceptable use of violence. These issues in particular form an important part of the background to Hartmann's portrayal of self-knowledge and restraint in his works of literature.

The behaviour of the military aristocracy was influenced by an additional source to the legal efforts of the emperor and Church. As the status of knighthood increasingly became the hereditary privilege of the various levels of the aristocracy in the later part of the twelfth century owing to rising costs, it began to be associated with aristocratic ethical principles.[42] As a result of this process, the practice of knighthood became party to the age-old

discussion concerning the definition of nobility which existed in the classical and patristic traditions. This discussion centred on the question of whether nobility was inherent in birth (*nobilitas carnis*) or in virtue (*nobilitas morum*).[43] The promotion of the nobility of virtue in the literature of the twelfth-century German empire corresponds to the attempts of the ministerials to establish themselves in society and compensate for their lack of lineage. However, these definitions of nobility were also part of a broader and much older debate concerning all levels of the military aristocracy, as Wilhelm Störmer argues:

> Man hat diese Höherbewertung der *nobilitas mentis*, die in den Dichtungen der Zeit öfter begegnet, in Zusammenhang mit dem Aufstieg der Ministerialen gebracht, die auf ihre Leistung, auf ihre *virtus* pochten. Dies ist sicherlich nicht ganz falsch. Aber es kann andererseits nicht übersehen werden, daß diese Höherbewertung des 'Tugendadels' in engem Zusammenhang mit den kirchlichen Reformtendenzen des 11. Jahrhunderts stand, daß sie aber auch nicht ein grundsätzlich neues 'Programm' dieser Zeit war, sondern bereits auf spätantike Adelsvorstellungen zurückgeht und auch in frühmittelalterlichen Heiligenviten durchaus bisweilen ihren Niederschlag fand.[44]

The notion that nobility lies in virtue and that all virtuous men are equally noble found particular reflection in works of literature, for example Thomasin's *Der Welsche Gast*.[45] However, nobility bestowed by birth was never fully discredited.[46] Indeed, it appears that the transformation of knighthood into a hereditary estate in fact gave new support to the concept. These two conflicting views were widely discussed throughout the Middle Ages and beyond. However, a compromise was ventured which maintained that the ethical qualities associated with nobility were indeed hereditary, but nevertheless still had to be proven by good deeds. Such a notion corresponded to the Christian concept that virtue relies on the active execution of good intentions, and to the secular concept that each new

generation is required to perpetuate the honour of its ancestors by following their example.[47] This compromise between the two notions of nobility received widespread expression in secular literature at this time, including the works of Hartmann.[48]

The Church had a complex attitude towards the use of violence. On the one hand, it condemned force, but on the other hand, recognized its own reliance on the military aristocracy for protection and to provide crusading armies. Thus, the Church sought to promote the military function of the aristocracy, but, at the same time, to limit its destructive capacity by means of the crusading and Christian knightly ideal.[49] As a result of the successful implementation of this ideal, knighthood became imbued with ethical connotations particularly in the course of the twelfth century.[50] In addition, the duty of the sovereign to dispense justice and keep the peace gradually came to be associated with the nobility, as may be seen in the *Fürstenspiegel* in which the most common lordly virtues described include justice, mercy, wisdom, generosity, and keeping the peace.[51] This judicial duty, coupled with the obligation to defend the Christian faith, caused formerly secular knightly values and virtues to become linked with Christian virtues. In consequence, a military lifestyle, otherwise associated with violence and disruption, became promoted as a path to salvation.[52]

The source of this notion of secular morality was not entirely Christian, however, despite the Church's involvement in its promotion. This subject has been the focus of fierce scholarly conjecture, specifically within the 'Ritterliches Tugendsystem' debate which emerged in German scholarship. This centred on the work of Gustav Ehrismann and concerned the existence of a lay code of ethics based on the classical tripartite system of *summum bonum*, *honestum*, and *utile*, which had survived into the

twelfth century in Cicero's *De officiis*.[53] The basis for accepting the existence and influence of such a system in the Middle Ages appears less than secure, however, and scholarship has perhaps been overeager to accept Ehrismann's ideas. The lack of research into the traditions underpinning lay moral didacticism in the Middle Ages which looks beyond the 'Ritterliches Tugendsystem' debate allows one to speculate that the influences on Hartmann regarding this issue may have been diverse. His notions of virtue and inner perception may ultimately be traced to classical as well as Christian sources, but would most likely have reached him through clerical channels. For the purposes of this investigation, it is sufficient to conclude from this debate that the sources of these generally-accepted moral guidelines were probably both clerical and secular, and were not formulated into any kind of clearly-defined code.[54]

A major influence on the development of a secular morality was the court, at which the military aristocracy came into closer contact than ever before with clerics and clerically-educated courtiers and their ideas. The more stable social climate of the twelfth century contributed to the establishment of these administrative centres which were staffed by educated clerks. It was in this arena that a melting pot of ideas, clerical, martial, and noble, was created and came to define the notion of courtly behaviour. The courts therefore acted as restraining forces upon the excesses of the nobility, providing institutions in which acceptable courtly behaviour could be manifested as the knightly ideal.[55] The growth in the number of aristocratic courts, which in France were modelled on the courts of the great vassals, and in the German empire particularly on the imperial court, thus brought together the forces of violence and the forces of civilization under one roof. The resulting cross-fertilization of influences established the courts as focal points for the development of the courtly behavioural ethic.

Ethical guidelines for the lay nobility are further reflected in all forms of clerical and secular literature from the tenth century onwards. Here the ideal combination of an honourable secular existence and acceptable Christian behaviour found representation. The Church reformers produced such guides to behaviour as Odo of Cluny's *Vita sancti Geraldi* and the *Livre des manières* composed in the vernacular by the Bishop of Lisieux, Étienne de Fougères, in the 1170s.[56] Similarly, William of Conches' adaptation of Cicero's *De officiis* known as the *Moralium dogma philosophorum*, and the *Policraticus*, written by William's pupil, John of Salisbury, drew on antique notions of lordship but combined them with the ideal and duties of the *militia christi*.

Such examples reveal that Hartmann was working within a broad tradition of didactic Latin literature which was aimed at the military aristocracy. In addition, many of the vernacular texts which survive reveal on the part of the authors a knowledge of and positive attitude towards the values of the secular nobility. Examples include the fragmentary *Rittersitte* of circa 1150 which extols the merits of attending Church, but also provides advice regarding the correct armour for hunting, which verbal insults to avenge, and how a young knight should respectably behave towards a noble lady.[57] In addition, it is posited that riches granted by God should be wisely and properly used, and that wealth gained by the undeserving is sinful. This point is reminiscent of the teaching of the heart regarding virtue in *Die Klage*. Similarly, the *Herger-Spruch*[58] of 1150-80 advocates pleasing both God and secular society, and in the *Büchlein vom Heimlichen Boten of 1170-80*, the notion that virtuous behaviour will lead to success in love is expressed. The first part of the *Heimlicher Bote* advises that men should be less concerned with their appearance and athleticism than with living virtuously in order to merit the love of a lady:

den wol minnenden man
den kan ih wol irkennen,
wande uns Phaset saget ein buch
von guoter minnen gnuoc.
iz sprichet: swer so gutliche lebe
und wize wol alle phade,
der sol den frouwen wesen liep. (HB 47-53)[59]

In a work dated slightly later than Hartmann's narratives known as *Der Winsbecke* (1210-20), such sentiments are again expressed as a father instructs his son on the ethical merits to be gained from courtly love service and the need for self-control. These works thus provide a parallel to the didactic aims of the *Fürstenspiegel*, or of dynastic histories which incorporate elements of the *Fürstenspiegel* such as the *Historia Welforum*, and find direct reflection in scenes in which moral guidance is offered within works of courtly narrative themselves, for example the advice given by the old duke to his son in *Gregorius* (Gr 243-65), and by Gurnemanz to Parzival (P 170,7ff.).

Secular treatises written in the vernacular and devised for the instruction of knights which combine practical and moral teaching are more visible from the end of the thirteenth century, for example in the works of Ramon Lull and later Geoffrey de Charny.[60] One example which was nearly contemporary to Hartmann was the *Ordene de chevalerie*, which has been dated at pre-1250. However, biographical accounts of the lives of Arnold of Ardres and William Marshal from the late twelfth century provide evidence of works contemporary to Hartmann and relating to knighthood which promoted the ethics of chivalry.

All the works of literature mentioned above are of a more or less didactic nature. This didacticism, rooted in the concern to promote greater self-awareness and restraint amongst the military aristocracy, is likewise visible in the courtly love tradition. The courtly love lyric acts as a form of inner debate in itself, depicting a search for the

self and exploration of morality which is provoked by the conflicting demands of love and secular duty. Similarly, this is true of the courtly narrative and its depiction of a series of lone adventures representing a process of burgeoning self-awareness which has been prompted by a crisis of love. It has been argued that the didactic note in courtly literature is aimed for the most part at solving the problems caused by the *iuvenes*, a particularly disruptive section of the secular aristocracy,[61] or else that these young nobles were themselves the patrons of courtly literature.[62] Whatever the specific aims of this genre may have been, the didactic element in the tradition is evident in its promotion of courtly virtues. In addition, love is frequently presented as a process which can lead to moral improvement.[63]

The influence of ideals portrayed in literature in general on the defining of a lay code of morality is difficult to ascertain directly. On the whole, it appears as if literature, in the form of the courtly love lyric, the crusading lyric, and the courtly narrative, as well as more purely didactic works, was a major contributor to the spread of the ideals of behaviour which were directed at the military aristocracy and drawn from a variety of sources - clerical, classical, social, political - as it offered itself as an arena for the discussion and promotion of these ideals. The success of these works of literature was probably also due to the fact that they were rooted in the factual experience of knights, as well as depicting an ideal deriving from various influences and sources to which they should aspire.[64]

Hartmann was thus working within a literary tradition which already emphasized inner awareness in the context of the assessment of feelings and loyalties as a result of falling in love. Nevertheless, Hartmann's particular concern with this concept calls for a broader consideration of the forces

which influenced him. In addition to social change and the promotion of secular moral guidelines, Hartmann also appears to have been profoundly affected by the contemporary theological debate concerning ethics and penitential practice. R.W. Southern takes a similar view in considering the narratives of Chrétien to be a response to the same internalization which was promoted by the Cistercians, and describing these works as 'the secular counterpart to the piety of Cîteaux'[65]. However, Southern does not consider Chrétien's narratives to be religious works in themselves. Instead, he claims that the inner tribulations of the heart in Chrétien's works are only an indirect reflection of the increasing emphasis on personal piety in this age:

> Chrétien probes the heart, but it is the enamelled heart of the twelfth-century secular world, not yet made tender by the penetration of strong religious feeling.[66]

Southern therefore claims that there is no religious treatise to be found in Chrétien's narratives. However, Hartmann's augmentation of the subjective elements of his source secures a closer link with developments in personal piety than Southern is able to detect in Chrétien's works. These developments in theology and religious practice hence merit more detailed investigation.

Personal piety

As mentioned previously, the twelfth century was the age of re-acquaintance with the works of the ancients and the Church Fathers which promoted the practice of seeking God in the self by means of contemplation, but which also encouraged the adoption of logic and thereby lent this form of personal piety a more systemized and authoritative basis. Before analysing this development, the relevance of such an approach merits discussion.

The social, cultural, and economic changes described earlier in this chapter affected all levels of society. One could argue that the intellectual disputes of a small handful of theologians could not have achieved this breadth of influence, as indeed several Hartmann scholars have maintained. These scholars claim that Hartmann's education would probably have acquainted him with the work of Peter Lombard, but no specific connections between Hartmann and any of the great clerical thinkers of the twelfth century can be securely identified.[67] This cannot be denied, however, it is possible to avoid such specific connections and yet still to draw relatively solid conclusions pertaining to the influence of the major theologians on Hartmann by arguing that Hartmann was basing his interest in self-analysis on the vulgarized versions of theological developments which were to be found in vernacular sermons.[68] The increased use of vernacular sermons from the mid-eleventh century was partly a response to the threat of the heretical movements, but also a result of the evangelical dynamism of the new monastic orders.[69] This wave of preaching informed all levels of society of new theological developments to some degree.[70] Pastoral literature was produced, which was designed to be used by the clergy in their sermons. This literature included miracle stories and saints' lives which were collected into such works as Gregory of Tours' *Book of Miracles* and Caesarius of Heisterbach's early thirteenth-century *Dialogue on Miracles*.[71] A further means of disseminating new ideas came in the form of the catechism, such as the enormously popular twelfth-century *Elucidarium* of Honorius of Autun, which presented dialogues between a priest and pupil on a wide variety of points of faith.[72] Each of these forms of pastoral literature enabled new theological concepts to infiltrate the consciousness of all levels of lay society. As Aron Gurevich says:

> In these types of literature, the reader will not find sophisticated theology, comparable to the treatises of John the Scot, Anselm of Canterbury, Abelard or Thomas Aquinas, but a general, simplified or extremely condensed version of it. ... We find here an impressive attempt to transform Christian doctrine from the learned heritage of the ecclesiastical élite into the world-view of the broadest strata of the population.[73]
>
> ...
>
> The authors of the many kinds of pastoral literature were often highly educated people, famous theologians and writers, preachers and members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Yet, when they composed sermons or saints' lives, formulated questions for the penitentials or described visions of the elect, they had in mind that audience to which the parish priests and monks were to read or paraphrase their work.[74]

In addition to pastoral literature, the clergy was provided with guidance for the administration of penance. The evolution of the penitential system at this time encouraged a greater degree of self-analysis. Although penance was not the only means by which ordinary Christians became aware of the importance of personal piety, nevertheless the universal influence of the penitential system over all of western Christendom set it apart from other means of implementing theological developments. It is possible, therefore, to assume an awareness of these innovations on behalf of Hartmann and his audience. Moreover, in the light of the contention that Hartmann received a clerical education, it is justifiable to claim a more specific awareness on his part.

In addition, the arena of the court as a world in which the clerical and lay communities mixed with unprecedented freedom would have provided a further opportunity for Hartmann and other members of his class to be influenced by clerical thought. Such influences would also have resulted from the close connections which existed between the lay founders and patrons of local monasteries, many of which had

been affected by the monastic reform movement. The desire for reform had originally been instigated in the late tenth century in reaction to the excessive control of the local nobility over the monasteries. However, from the second half of the eleventh century, these reforms, which had been spearheaded by the Cluniac movement, and which had encouraged a close adherence to the original Benedictine Rule, were themselves subject to reform in some circles. This was due to an increasing discontent with the rigidity of the Benedictine Rule and its emphasis on order and obedience, which left little room for personal experience or growth. Such discontent, coupled with a lack of faith in secular society which was shared by elements in the lay community, led to an increased number of people adopting the hermitical lifestyle, or else joining hermitical orders such as the Carthusians. The drive for reform likewise resulted in the establishment of new monastic orders, notably the highly-influential Cistercians, which were based on variations of the Rule but which placed greater emphasis on personal piety and pastoral care, rather than communal perfection.[75]

Southern describes the ties between the lay community and the monasteries in general as involving vassals as well as the lord founder or patron. The reform monasteries of the late eleventh century in particular tended to be very local in their focus, and similarly the lay population, itself demanding more personal forms of devotion at this time, looked particularly to the monasteries for religious guidance. As a result, lay forms of private devotions based on monastic practices, such as the penitential, psalter and the Book of Hours, were produced in response to these demands, and enjoyed great popularity amongst the literate laity of the twelfth century.[76]

In the light of this demonstration of the means by which general theological developments affected lay society, a

closer scrutiny of the changes involving the concept of self-knowledge is now called for.

Self-knowledge

The pursuit of knowledge by the dialectical method, and a concern with ignorance and self-awareness in the twelfth century can be traced to the influence of Socrates. By the method of question and answer, as a result of which an individual could be brought to doubt his or her opinions, Socrates sought to destroy a false opinion and suggest, but not enforce, a preferred opinion. In particular, such a method could persuade an individual to become aware of his or her ignorance or ill-founded knowledge. In Socrates' view, the awareness of ignorance formed the basis of wisdom and virtue. His equation of the human soul with human knowledge likewise prompted the conclusion that knowledge is goodness or a means to virtue. This is reflected in his principle that 'virtue is knowledge; vice is ignorance'. The oracle at Delphi, whose two basic commands were to know oneself and to practise moderation, stated that no one surpassed Socrates for wisdom. In this way, the oracle confirmed Socrates' emphasis on self-awareness.

Such fundamental principles mark the thought of Plato, a pupil of Socrates, and influenced the twelfth century primarily through the works of Augustine, whose thought was dominated by the Neoplatonists.[77] Plato incorporated the principle of self-knowledge into his doctrine of Form in which each individual soul exists only as a reflection of its Form which dwells in the realm of reality.[78] The soul is imprisoned within a mortal body in a state of discord, and its existence is governed by a yearning to be in harmony with its ultimate self, namely its Form. This harmony is only achieved by pursuing a moral ideal. The soul engages in this pursuit by utilizing its immortal potency of reason, which is situated in the brain. Plato's thought received

further expansion from Plotinus in the third century A.D. in his notion that the immortal part of the soul is united with the Divine Being after death. According to Plotinus, however, this union occurs beyond the cognitive progress initiated by the reasoning powers of the soul.[79]

Augustine inherited the thought of Plato through the works of Plotinus and other Neoplatonists.[80] Augustine's combination of Neoplatonist and Christian principles prompted him to equate the Christian God with the Platonic Supreme Being. Consequently, he considered human souls to be reflections of God which yearn to be united with their Maker. The pursuit of self-knowledge by utilization of the soul's powers of intellect is thus represented in Augustine's thought as a means of finding God. Self-awareness reveals the truth of God reflected in the soul. Augustine described the fundamental nature of this approach in his comments relating to his personal search for the inner self:

> I desire to have knowledge of God and the soul. Of nothing else? No, of nothing else whatsoever.[81]
>
> O God, always one and the same, if I know myself, I shall know Thee.[82]

Augustine further investigated the potencies of the soul which permit this process, basing his thought once again on Neoplatonist principles.[83] The two characteristics of the soul were described by Augustine as the *anima vitae* or life potency, and the *anima rationalis* or *mens*, which comprised the capacities of *memoria*, *voluntas*, and *intellectus*.[84] The characteristic of *mens*, however, was ascribed by Augustine to the heart, rather than to the brain, as was claimed by the ancient philosophers. In this, Augustine was following the example of the Bible. Thus, the heart, the *iudex ratio*, acts as a voice of conscience which enables humankind to distinguish good from evil.[85] As such it has a duty to

overcome its innate proneness to evil, which exists as a result of original sin, by cleansing itself and devoting itself entirely to God (Prov. 2.3-6; Exod. 31.6).[86] In addition, Augustine not only adopted the Bible's definition of the heart as the seat of the rational faculty, but also as representing a point of connection with God by means of which God can enter and illuminate a person (Mark 4.15; 2.Cor. 1.22; Gal. 4.6; Rom. 5.5).[87] Thus, the prerequisite for receiving divine illumination is the purification of the heart achieved by rational thought. Unlike Aristotle's theory of abstraction, Augustine saw no essential role for empirical sensory information. Instead, the rational force in the heart alone renders a person capable of receiving illumination from God. As Wolf Gewehr comments:

> Während nun gemäß der aristotelisch-thomistischen Abstraktionstheorie die Sinneserkenntnis unabdingbare Voraussetzung für die Intellektualerkenntnis bildet, ist es bei der augustinischen Illuminationslehre so, daß die Seele aufgrund ihres rationalen Vermögens erleuchtungsfähig ist und dadurch erst erkenntnisfähig wird.[88]

The heart in its role as the centre of the intellect and the point of contact with God is a fundamental component of Augustine's theory of epistemology even to the extent that he considered the heart to represent the whole person.[89] These threads of learning were ultimately revived in the cultural and intellectual renaissance in the twelfth century in which works of classical and patristic learning were revisited and reformulated. Augustine's teaching on inner enquiry as a means to achieving true faith had enormous influence on twelfth-century thought. In addition, however, Aristotle's theory of rationality, based on Socrates' dialectical method, also found resonance at this time. Thus, the revitalized concept that the ultimate truth was to be found by turning inward was accompanied by a revival in interest in the methods involved in questioning and

investigating, such as those proposed by Socrates. This dialectical methodology survived in Boethius' translation of parts of Aristotle's works in his *Consolation of Philosophy*. Larger sections of Aristotle's thought emerged only in the thirteenth century. However, Boethius' work, which applied logic to theological problems, formed the basis of the methodology of enquiry in the twelfth century.[90] This century therefore saw an increasing emphasis on the use of reason to attain self-knowledge and to find God's presence in the soul. Moreover, reason was similarly lauded as the essential component in the dialectical approach to systematizing and clarifying, but not ultimately challenging, theological and classical texts.[91] The first major exponent of dialectic in the Middle Ages, Berengar of Tours, caused huge controversy by claiming that reason was superior even to the authority of the Scriptures, because it was by employing reason that Man most closely resembled God.[92] The majority of theologians, however, regarded reason as a useful tool to be employed in faith, but one which could not ultimately explain its mysteries.

Just as the thought of St Augustine combined the classical tradition of self-enquiry with the Christian notion of embracing God's truth by an inner search, the figure of St Anselm stands at the threshold of the twelfth century as the major force in the unification of classical and Christian notions of self-awareness. Anselm employed the rationalist notions bequeathed by Boethius for the clarification of theological texts, as is evident in his work *Cur Deus Homo?*. These rational principles augmented theories of humankind's role in its own salvation. From the end of the eleventh century, the redemptive interpretation of humankind as helpless bystanders in the struggle between Good and Evil became increasingly overtaken by a more humanist approach. Anselm himself was instrumental in this development, rejecting the older view and interpreting God's entry into the world in human form as a divine gift to humanity,

providing it with the means to redeem its original sinful act in voluntarily obeying the Devil. He taught that in order to attain the salvation offered by this opportunity, a combination of faith and introspection was necessary. Anselm insisted that faith was necessary to provide the correct conditions for reason to be employed. Faith was a prerequisite for understanding, or, as he stated, *credo ut intelligam*. Although Anselm's logical approach was considered too timid by the following generation of scholars, he acted as a stepping-stone to the more confident and widespread employment of logic in the appraisal of theological texts in the future.

Anselm's use of logic thus clarified the means to attain greater personal piety and, ultimately, salvation. In an attempt to encourage a personal search for God rather than an unthinking obedience to the law of the Benedictine Rule, Anselm underlined the importance of the mind in the inner pursuit of truth. Firstly, the mind has to be freed from dullness to allow a process of self-examination to begin:

> *Excita mentem tuam*, he wrote, "stir up your torpid mind, dispel the shadows which sin has cast on it... chew over in thought, taste in understanding, swallow in longing and rejoicing". It was in the innermost recesses of the conscious and awakened soul that God was to be found: "Flee awhile your occupations, hide yourself a little from your tumultuous thoughts, throw off your burdensome cares and postpone your laborious distractions; enter into the chamber of your mind and exclude all else but God and those things which help you in finding Him; close the door and seek Him".[93]

As a result of this search, it is possible to gain an insight into one's true sinful nature. Subsequently, Anselm taught that one is able to escape from this sinful state by means of contrition and by loving God, and ultimately by the gift of grace.[94]

Anselm was instrumental in generating a movement towards greater personal piety by producing prayers and meditations for both secular and clerical audiences which were based on meditative monastic prayer, such as the *Proslogion* quoted above. In this way, Anselm was responding to a widespread demand from lay members of society for prayer books that enabled them to achieve a greater intimacy of prayer. He himself sent such works to both monks and educated laity, for example to the court of Mathilda of Tuscany and to Princess Adelaide, the daughter of William the Conqueror. The popularity of these works contributed to the extension of Anselm's influence well into the next centuries.[95]

Anselm's influence also took an additional route. He was responsible for creating a series of seven steps to humility, which were based on the twelve steps of the Benedictine Rule, but which were imbued with Anselm's own emphasis on self-awareness and contemplation. The seven steps are:

> self-knowledge, grief, confession, persuasion of guilt, acquiescence in judgement, suffering of punishment, love of the punishment.[96]

Anselm's ideas were adopted and accorded greater impact by the Cistercian movement. In particular, Bernard of Clairvaux followed Anselm's example by further reworking the Benedictine twelve steps into a more logical progression, thereby creating a system which encouraged even greater intimate spirituality.[97] He wrote that self-knowledge leads to the truth by means of three steps, of which the seven steps to humility constitute the first. The second is achieved by compassion and the third by contemplation. Beyond these steps the ultimate heights of human knowledge are to be found when the soul leaves the body in ecstasy and achieves union with God. The driving force behind this journey towards union is love. As humankind was created as an act of Divine Love, all human beings can align their will

with the will of God by loving themselves as God loves them. Ecstasy occurs when these two wills unite. According to Bernard, therefore, the journey of self-awareness can ultimately lead to a mystical union with God.

Anselm and Bernard based their systems of thought on logical principles despite the personal and contemplative nature of their ideas. This approach has since been termed *spiritual psychology* or even *clinical theology*, denoting the study of 'the Godward movement of the soul'[98]. Such a study involves the application of logic to the Rule and the encouragement of a personal search for the ultimate truth. Anselm and Bernard thus adapted existing ideas relating to a search for God in the self to create a logical programme. Southern notes that:

> this logical habit gave them a formidable tool for investigating the internal movements of the soul. They are more interested in analysing states of mind and in distinguishing the motions of the will than any writers since St Augustine.[99]

Furthermore, through the spiritual literature created in particular by the Cistercians, the ideas of these two thinkers had extensive influence on the spiritual and lay communities in western Christendom.

As has been stated, for the majority of twelfth-century thinkers, logic was only to be employed in the wake of faith. Thus, it was faith which provided the scope for greater understanding. Logic was not a means to achieve or understand such belief. One scholar in particular disagreed with this view. Nevertheless, despite his controversial ideas, Peter Abelard's work had lasting influence. However, before considering his ideas more closely, a consideration of two of the leading and most influential scholars of the school of thought closer to Anselm, namely William of St Thierry and Hugh of St Victor, will be undertaken in order

to gain a broader view of the influence of the new psychology.

A fellow Cistercian and close acquaintance of St Bernard,[100] William of St Thierry broadcast the principles of the Cistercian programme, namely the seeking of truth through self-knowledge, in his hugely popular works, the *Epistola ad fratres de monte dei* (the *Golden Epistle)*, and *De natura corporis et animae*. In *De natura*, William demonstrated the classical and Christian tradition of the practice of self-examination:

> The answer of the Delphic Apollo was famous among the Greeks: "Man know yourself". The same thing was said by Solomon, or rather Christ in the Song of Songs: "If you do not know yourself, go forth".[101]

In each of these major works, William revealed the three stages of self-knowledge which correspond to the Body (an ignorant love of the self), the Reason (a limited love for God guided by the intellect), and the Spirit (pure and limitless union with God made possible by the gifts bestowed by the Holy Spirit). These three stages alone lead to true wisdom:

> For this is the uniting of man with God, or his likeness to God; in so far as he cometh nigh to God, in so far he conformeth his lower part unto himself, and his lowest part unto that; so that spirit and mind and body being ordered after their right manner, disposed in their own places and reckoned after their just deserts, may also be thought of according to their own properties; that a man may begin perfectly to know himself, and through knowing of himself to advance and ascend unto the knowledge of God.[102]

Thus, by utilizing reason to control the will, one obeys one's moral duty and becomes a candidate for an infusion of God's grace through the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, one is

obliged to establish this ordered relationship between the powers of reason and will, as William illustrates:

> it belongeth to the man ever to make his heart ready, by freeing the will from strange affections, the reason and understanding from all manner of care, the memory from idle, and busy, and sometimes also from necessary occupations; that in the good day of the Lord and in the hour of His pleasure, when he heareth the voice of the Spirit that breatheth, those things that make thought may lightly run unto each other and work together for good, preparing as it were a feast together unto the joy of him that thinketh; the will bringing a pure affection unto the joy of the Lord; the memory, a faithful matter; the understanding, the sweetness of experience.[103]

Human reason is thus held to be an essential component in the inner search for truth, but cannot itself achieve full understanding without the gift of grace. However, reason can create the suitable conditions necessary for grace to be bestowed:

> And when reason advancing ascendeth upward unto love, to him that loveth and desireth, grace condescendeth.[104]

Similarly, William pronounces the correct implementation of the will and the power of reason to be the means, not only to receive grace, but also to attain virtue:

> What is virtue? The daughter of reason, but more of grace. ... Virtue is an evenness of life, in all things agreeing with reason. Virtue is a using of free will according to the judgment of reason. Virtue is a humility. Virtue is a patience. Virtue is an obedience. The virtues are prudence, temperance, fortitude, justice and many others; in all of which virtue is nothing else than the using of free will according to the judgment of reason.[105]

All of the major points described by William concerning the inner search for God by means of the intellect were commonly

found throughout Cistercian literature. They were represented, for example, as David Duckworth has illustrated, in the anonymous *De spiritu* and Isaac of Stella's *Epistola de anima*.[106]

The preoccupation with inwardness and the search for the self also found reflection in the works of the theologians known as the mystics. Hugh of St Victor in particular enjoyed great contemporary fame and influence, being described as the 'new Augustine'[107]. The term *mystical* is misleading in that it does not describe a practice in itself, but rather an existing component of Christianity which appeared in the thought of Augustine and those influenced by him and which concerned the ultimate union of the human soul with God in a state of heightened consciousness. Introspection may contribute to this attainment of ecstasy, but, according to the mystics, it is not a direct route to this state which lies beyond the control of conscious thought.[108] Apart from this distinction relating to the achievement of union with God, the thought of the Victorine school was in fact very close to other Cistercian scholars. Hugh's approach is evidence of this:

> [he] accepted dialectical theology as part of a progressive schema of knowledge. According to this, intellectual apprehension of eternal truths, attained under the guidance of faith, culminates by divine grace in direct experience.[109]

Hugh rejected Abelard's tenet that reasoning alone could unlock the mysteries of faith. Instead, he ventured that reasoning follows in the wake of faith, and, at a certain point beyond human intellectual powers, the truth of the mysteries of faith is revealed by God's grace. Reasoning in this scheme nevertheless remains an essential component and companion to faith. As Hugh's disciple, Richard, noted:

> It ought to be insufficient for us ... to hold on faith the truths of eternal realities, unless it be given to us also to establish by the witness of reason that which is held on faith. And let not that knowledge of eternal truths which is by faith only be sufficient for us, unless we may grasp also that knowledge which is by understanding, even if we are not yet capable of that which is by experience.[110]

The pursuit of divine truth as a means to virtue was also a fundamental concept in Hugh's teaching. He considered the rational mind of man to be restricted by the physical body, and consequently excluded from the liberation afforded by the pursuit of wisdom.[111] However, the path of virtue demands the co-operation of the body in acting to complete the instructions of the powers of reason. Without this co-operation, virtue is not attainable, no matter how pure the thoughts of the intellect may be. As Hugh states:

> Truly a work of justice is in the movement of the rational mind which advances according to God, arising from a conception of the heart and proceeding outside even to the completion of the corporeal act. ... The sound man operates; operating he is remunerated.[112]

Such emphasis on the combination of good intentions with actions likewise formed an essential component of the penitential code as will shortly be demonstrated.

The work of Peter Abelard provided a further contribution to the analysis of introspection in the twelfth century.[113] Although the distribution of his own works was limited, Abelard caused a great and lasting impact in theological circles and left a legacy in his wide network of followers.[114] Abelard was an expert dialectician and sought, despite his controversial methods, to clarify traditional Church doctrine rather than rebel against it. Unlike St Anselm and the Cistercians, Abelard insisted that understanding was a prerequisite to faith, and declared that faith without reason was merely an opinion.

By his application of dialectic, Abelard lent new emphasis to established notions of spiritual psychology by defining sin and virtue as stemming solely from good or bad intentions. Abelard based his notion of intent on Augustine's theory, mentioned above, that the faculty of reason has the capacity to distinguish good from evil as it is itself informed by divine law. Consequently, Abelard concluded that virtue is only present in the consent to abide by the reasoning powers of the conscience and to act on its guidance. Conversely, he argued that sin is a voluntary rejection of the same guidance. Thus, sin lies in the consent to act against conscience. As a result of this conclusion, Abelard claimed that those of immature reasoning powers, for example children, are not capable of sinning.[115] However, the controversy surrounding Abelard's thought stemmed in particular from his consequent assertion that actions in themselves are morally neutral. He therefore postulated that a crime committed unintentionally is not a sin, and similarly an act of goodness has no moral value if it likewise occurs without intent. Abelard thus concluded that an act is only virtuous if it arises from a good intention, in other words, from an actual consenting to good. Likewise, a criminal act is not sinful in itself, rather the sin lies in the evil intent. It therefore follows that an absence of evil intent denotes the absence of sin. Abelard proceeded to explain his approach at length in the *Ethica*:

> The will itself or the desire to do what is unlawful is by no means to be called sin, but rather, as we have stated, the consent itself. The time when we consent to what is unlawful is in fact when we in no way draw back from its accomplishment and are inwardly ready, if given the chance, to do it. Anyone who is found in this disposition incurs the fullness of guilt; the addition of the performance of the deed adds nothing to increase the sin. On the contrary, before God the man who to the extent of his power endeavours to achieve this is as guilty as the man who as far as he is able does achieve it - just as

> if, so the blessed Augustine reminds us, he too had also been caught in the act.[116]

Abelard found greatest notoriety and fame by declaring that the persecutors of Christ did not commit a sin because they were unaware that they were displeasing God and did not therefore actually consent to evil.[117] However, Abelard's definition of sin likewise caused great controversy as a result of its implications for cases of civil law and the question of penance. As Michael Haren comments:

> the thesis that the actual execution of an intention is morally indifferent ran counter to a well established penitential tradition, the spiritual counterpart of the old Germanic laws governing redress of injuries, which required minute examination of the external content of the sinful act.[118]

Nevertheless, despite the continued greater significance of exterior actions, the consideration of interior disposition was not unknown in civil law.[119] The same was true of the penitential system, as will presently be demonstrated. In this system, the clarifying work of the scholastic and monastic thinkers in the twelfth century, including Abelard, caused the notion of contrition, i.e. the true, inner sorrow experienced by a sinner, to be more clearly defined and to increase greatly in significance.

The works of Hugh and Abelard found representation and widespread influence principally in the hugely popular *Liber quattuor sententiarum* of Peter Lombard which appeared between 1150 and 1157 and which came to form the basic text for theological instruction into the sixteenth century and beyond.[120] This work was an immediate success throughout the West as it catalogued all aspects of theology, including the varying opinions on the definition of sin and the importance of inner piety. However, the ideas of these masters achieved extensive influence in another way. As

mentioned above, the revived interest in self-awareness amongst twelfth-century intellectuals gave a greater impulse to developments in the penitential system which had been taking place since the sixth century. Whereas the external elements of penitential practice were already established by the twelfth century, the internal, subjective elements had yet to be systematized. In this respect, the penitential system received substantial input from the work already undertaken by theologians regarding the role of intropection in sin and virtue. Thus, the evolution of the penitential system, the most universal method by which the concept of self-awareness affected all Christians at this time, now demands investigation.

Penance

The development of the penitential system throughout the twelfth century culminated in the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 that all Christians were required to take confession at least once a year. The Council was attended by bishops from every country in Latin Christendom as well as the representatives of numerous princes. Its decree demanded that:

> every Christian of either sex, after attaining years of discretion, shall faithfully confess all his sins to his own priest at least once a year, and shall endeavor according to his ability to fulfill the penance enjoined him, reverently receiving the sacrament of the Eucharist at least at Easter, unless perchance, on the advice of his own priest, for some reasonable cause, he determines to abstain for a time from receiving it. Otherwise he shall both be withheld from entrance to the church while he lives and be deprived of Christian burial when he dies. Wherefore this salutary enactment shall be frequently published in the churches lest anyone assume a veil of excuse in the blindness of ignorance.[121]

As Morris comments, the decree of the Lateran Council:

> was an attempt to introduce the idea of self-examination throughout society; at this point, at least, the pursuit of an interior religion did not remain the property of a small *élite*, but entered every castle and every hovel in western Europe.[122]

This ruling therefore marks a vital step in the evolution of the penitential system on the continent of Europe. However, the importance of inner reflection in confession had already been established and was already influential throughout society long before this legislation was enforced. The reformers of the twelfth century whose theories informed this decree thus based their thought on the theology of introspection, but also drew on the concept of heartfelt contrition which had been evident in the penitential system from its inception. Furthermore, the eleventh and twelfth centuries also saw a greater emphasis on the interior aspects of penance as a result of gradual external changes to the penitential system which had been evolving since the birth of Christianity itself. From the practice in the first centuries A.D. of public confession and penance which could be undertaken only once in a lifetime, penance and confession evolved into a private, obligatory and repeatable undertaking. The decree of 1215 was therefore the legal confirmation of a system which had already been steadily developing, but which had seen particular change in the previous century.

Before tracing the evolution of penitential practice, it is worth underlining the fact that contrition had always been a component of penance. The teachings of Christ and the Apostles abound with statements relating to the need for true penitence to merit forgiveness.[123] The early Church fathers took their cue from this guidance. St Clement, for example, calls for 'repentance from an upright heart'[124], and Hermas insists that God can distinguish between those

who undertake penance as a result of true contrition and those who do not:

> To those, whose heart He saw about to become pure ... to them He gave repentance; but those whose craftiness and wickedness He saw, who intend to repent in hypocrisy, to them He gave not repentance.[125]

Origen even claimed that all sins are forgivable except where repentance is lacking,[126] anticipating Abelard's later theories, he stated that repentance is of greater significance than the nature of the actual sin.[127] Augustine's teaching embraces the public nature of penance of his age, but nevertheless maintains that penitence is an essential component, in claiming that 'it is not the length of time but the depth of sorrow that has to be measured'[128].

Penitence was thus recognized in the first centuries of Christianity as an inherent part of the procedure of penance. Nevertheless, as penance occurred only once in a lifetime, penitence was prevented from becoming a regular feature of life, apart from in the case of minor sins (*peccata venialia*) which could be remitted through daily prayer or alms-giving (*paenitentia quotidiana*). Otherwise, the single, unrepeatable procedure of penance was of an overwhelmingly exterior and public nature. Although sins were confessed in both public and private, satisfaction consisted of stern public acts which were not to be undertaken lightly. They included being excommunicated for a certain period, usually for Lent, being forbidden to marry if the sinner was single, or to have sexual relations if they were married, and being barred from entering military service or the priesthood. Remission was ultimately granted by a bishop.[129] As may be expected, apart from cases of grievous crime, such a serious undertaking with such far-reaching consequences was generally avoided until forgiveness was finally sought on the deathbed. By the sixth

century, this practice of deferral had become commonplace, and penance for the healthy occurred in only a very few cases.[130] Penance had therefore become far removed from the lives of ordinary Christians. As Bernard Poschmann concludes:

> these excessive demands, more than anything else, were the shoals on which the system of canonical penance would inevitably be wrecked. How could average worldly Christians be persuaded to renounce forever, not only sin, but life in the world, in itself permissible, in exchange for a kind of monastic life? ... As a result of such impracticable requirements, ecclesiastical penance gradually ceases to have any part in the ordinary course of life, and becomes merely a means of preparing for death.[131]

The unrepeatable nature of public penance in these early years of Christianity appears to indicate a greater concern with severity of punishment than with contrition. In fact, it is evident from the writings of Hermas that this system resulted from the definition that penance necessitates a sincere change of heart. To allow a repetition of the procedure would be to imply that such a change of heart was not so significant.[132] Despite this theoretical emphasis on penitence, in reality the consequences of such a severe and unrepeatable mode of satisfaction made it a practice only for the dying. The repetition of penance had to become acceptable for this impasse to change.

Until the sixth century therefore no alternative to the act of public penance in the form of repeatable private penance appears to have existed. However, an isolated call for inner contrition to be held in greater esteem than external acts of penance did occur in the latter half of the fourth century in the work of St John Chrysostom.[133] St Chrysostom's support of repeatable, private penance and reconciliation, and his emphasis on inner contrition make him a precursor of a later age. He even took the step of creating his own system of penance in which confession,

contrition, humility, or alms-giving could in themselves wipe away sin.[134] As a result of these theories and his insistence on repeatable penance, St Chrysostom was heavily criticized and eventually deposed from his position as bishop.

In one area of Europe, however, namely in Britain and Ireland, the practice of penance had evolved into the virtual mirror-image of the continental style. As a result of geographical isolation, public penance was rare in these countries, and instead private confession and repeatable private penance were the norm. This practice is demonstrated in surviving examples of penitential handbooks which were produced for the guidance of a priest in imposing penance. The most famous examples are the Penitential of Finnian (circa A.D. 550) and that of Cummean (circa A.D. 650). It is believed that this practice originated from the monastic system of electing a spiritual adviser (Irish *anmchara*, Welsh *beriglour*) to each monk, to whom regular confession of faults was made and who imposed a penance. This system subsequently spread to the lay community which looked as a result of its isolation to the influential abbeys for spiritual guidance.[135] The penances prescribed in these works were based on the practice of like curing like, so that the punishment aided the process of moral restructuring. They also took serious account of the circumstances of the sin and the intent of the sinner. This latter point is evident, for example, in the penitential of Cummean:

> But this is to be carefully observed in all penance: the length of time anyone remains in his faults; with what learning he is instructed; with what passion he is assailed; with what courage he stands; with what tearfulness he seems to be afflicted; and with what oppression he is driven to sin.[136]

In addition, the element of contrition is emphasized, as is evident in the penitential of Columbanus, which incorporated that of Finnian:

> But it is commanded to make confessions very diligently, chiefly regarding the motions of the mind, before one goes to mass, lest perchance one approach the altar unworthily, that is, if he has not a pure heart. For it is better to wait until the heart is whole and a stranger to vexation and envy than boldly to come to the judgment of the tribunal; for the altar of Christ is the tribunal, and his body thereon judges with blood those who approach it unworthily. Therefore, just as one must avoid the capital sins before taking communion, so also must one abstain from and wash away the indeterminate vices and fevers of the sick mind before the conjunction of true peace and the covenant of eternal salvation.[137]

However, the Celtic penitential system also incorporated a means of commuting long penances to alternative shorter forms of satisfaction such as alms-giving, prayer, or even money payments. Such commutations laid the whole penitential system open to abuse, particularly in the manner in which they diminished the emphasis on confessional and contritional elements.[138]

The Celtic penitential system spread to the continent through missionary activity, particularly the missions of St Columbanus at the end of the sixth century.[139] The penitentials of Columbanus, Cummean, and the Anglo-Saxon Theodore appear to have enjoyed the most profound influence. These works themselves provided the basis for penitentials produced on the continent itself in the eighth and ninth centuries, for example the works known as the Frankish penitentials. The popularity of these works and their message of private penance had enormous resonance on the continent where the practice of repeatable, private penance came to be pursued alongside the public version. John MacNeill and Helena Gamer acknowledge the huge impact of this new system:

> That the penitentials exercised a wide influence upon church discipline and social morality can hardly be seriously denied. They furnished the basis for the practice of the confessional in the West. Without their convenient help it is difficult to see how the local priest could have carried on his task of personal guidance. Defective as they are when viewed from the standpoint of modern ideals, a sound historical judgment will ascribe to them a civilizing and humanizing rôle of no small importance.[140]

This alternative practice answered a need amongst the continental clergy for a practical method of providing continuous spiritual guidance.[141] Initially, the Celtic system was also warmly welcomed by the Church authorities, as is apparent in descriptions of the Council of Chalon in circa 640.[142] Further indications suggest, however, that eventually a long struggle ensued between the popular embracing of the concept of private penance, and the Church's attempts to ban the use of penitentials. The Church was persuaded to modify its original acceptance of the penitentials based on the Celtic system because of the confusion created by their number and variety and their indiscriminate use. Their condemnation appears, for example, in the ruling of the Councils of Chalon (813), and of Paris (829), which referred to the penitentials as 'erroneous booklets'.[143] Attempts were therefore made, notably by Halitgar of Cambrai and Hrabanus Maurus in the ninth century, to systematize the penitentials and imbue them with biblical and patristic authority. These initial efforts at systematization foreshadow the incorporation of penitential teaching into works of canon law, most famously in the influential *Decretum* of Burchard of Worms in the eleventh century and Gratian's *Decretum* in the twelfth. By the mid-tenth century, the private system of penance had substantially overtaken the public form throughout western Europe apart from the Italian peninsula.[144] In the eleventh century, Burchard took this practice for granted in his consideration of penance in the influential nineteenth book of his *Decretum*, known as the *Corrector*.[145] The public form

did not die out entirely, however, and by the thirteenth century, the three strands of solemn, public, and private penance had emerged to exist side by side in the penitential system as a whole. As Payer observes:

> solemn penance was, in effect, similar to the ancient public penance and carried with it the harsh disabilities of the latter. Public penance (nonsolemn) referred to the openness of the penance, such as going on pilgrimage, and could be imposed by an ordinary priest at any time. Private penance was the penance that took place in private before the priest - what in more recent times is generally called confession.[146]

The Celtic missionaries had brought to the continent the concept of obligatory and frequent penance. This notion subsequently received further emphasis as a result of the existing concern that communion was being taken by those who had not sought remission of their sins. Attempts to combat this undesirable state of affairs promoted the practice of compulsory penance. The earliest recorded example of such efforts is from 760 when Chrodegang of Metz required his canons to confess at least twice a year. This practice became widespread even before the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council[147], as is demonstrated by the evidence of the *Synodical Constitutions* of Odo, bishop of Paris of 1197,[148] and the Provision of the Council of London of 1200.[149] Both of these texts reveal that the process of obligatory private penance was already in general and regulated use by this time.

The fact that satisfaction was conducted in private under the Celtic system had two major consequences for the older practice. The immediate reconciliation of the sinner became the norm on the continent by the eleventh century because the original significance of receiving the penitent sinner back into the Church after the completion of public works of satisfaction had been lost. Likewise, the progression from a public to a private style of satisfaction caused a greater

role to be ascribed to confession. This was a result of the fact that confession was the only remaining external expression made by the penitent in the procedure. There were no other signs by which to ascertain the genuineness of contrition. The significance of confession increased to the extent that it eventually became equated with penance per se. As Poschmann argues:

> when public humiliation ceased to be practised [confession] is seen as the concrete expression of the sinner's penance in the sight of the Church. Here we have the explanation of a change in linguistic usage which is discernible from the eighth century. From that time onward *confessio* was used to designate not only acknowledgement of sin to a priest, but also with increasing frequency ecclesiastical penance as a whole.[150]

The procedure of repeatable private penance thus eventually resulted in confession, the imposition of satisfaction, and reconciliation becoming fused into one single act, the act of confession, which became the sole outward expression of contrition. The self-enquiry which confession entails and which had long been taken for granted in the penitential system also thereby gained a heightened significance.

This was the stage of evolution which had been reached in penitential practice before it was inherited and subsequently given greater impetus by the intellectuals of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Although the external elements which still constitute modern-day practice were already in place, i.e. confession, the imposition of satisfaction, and reconciliation all functioning as a single, unified process, the subjective elements of the procedure had yet to be clarified. The work of the theologians of the twelfth century in particular in systematizing the diverse and confusing sources of learning which they had inherited allowed certain major aspects of theological thought, including penance, to be approached and investigated with greater thoroughness and precision, and as

a result to be implemented more effectively. A comparison between theological works written in the eleventh and twelfth centuries reveals the extent of the progress made in the latter. The majority of eleventh-century theological tracts concerning penance merely list the tariffs which are to be found in earlier penitentials. The twelfth-century theologians, however, had the benefit of being able to draw on canonical works, such as those compiled by Burchard of Worms, which had already established a tentative system for the discussion of penance, and which included material from ancient penitentials and collections of pastoral questions.[151] These works, and in particular the anonymous work *De vera et falsa poenitentia* of the mid-eleventh century,[152] bridged the gap between the older material and the twelfth-century thinkers as the interior aspects of penance and their relationship with the exterior elements were already present in these works.[153] *De vera et falsa poenitentia* in particular stressed the importance of the attitude of the sinner on confessing his or her sins in its fifth chapter. This work had extensive influence on later theologians owing to the fact that it was ascribed to Augustine until the fifteenth century. In this fortuitous manner, it paved the way for those works, for example those by Abelard, which became the most influential treatments of the issue of penance in the twelfth century.

A particular spur to the revision of penance in this age arose from the numerous heretical groups which criticized the doctrine of the sacraments. The Cathar and Waldensian movements, for example, rejected the necessity of confession to a priest acting as a mediator between the sinner and God. Such polemic encouraged orthodox theologians to defend themselves by developing more systematic and authoritative works regarding penance in direct response to their heretical critics.[154]

As stated previously, the external changes which had already taken place in the penitential system created new areas of subjective focus which received clarification in the twelfth century. The major result of these external changes was the focusing of forgiveness on the contrition or sorrow of the penitent, rather than on the completion of external works of satisfaction. Poschmann notes that:

> after the bringing together of confession and reconciliation it was no longer possible to represent the penitential works (which still had to be done) as the cause of the forgiveness of sins expressed by reconciliation. The only cause of forgiveness which came into consideration was antecedent and concomitant repentance or sorrow.[155]

As a result of the universal acknowledgment that the source of forgiveness lay in contrition, even the necessity of undertaking confession and satisfaction came into question, as did the role of the priest in the whole proceedings. These were the essential questions which concerned the theologians of the twelfth century.

The most influential amongst the group of thinkers concerned with the issue of contrition was Abelard. Despite his controversial approach, Abelard did not desire to overthrow the existing penitential system, nor did he offer a direct challenge to it. Rather, he aimed to provide greater clarification and to lend support to a system which already emphasized the inner disposition of the penitent.[156] As indicated earlier in this chapter, Abelard considered that the essential element of sin or virtue lies in the intent of the sinner. As a logical consequence of this emphasis on subjective aspects, he concluded that God responds in his forgiveness to the contrition of the sinner in the penitential process, i.e. to the belated choice made by the sinner to accept the advice of the conscience. Forgiveness is therefore not achieved by any act of confession or satisfaction.[157] Abelard thus defined true

contrition as a step beyond the fear of punishment, comprising instead a response to God's love, and to the hatred of one's sin:

> And this indeed is truly fruitful repentance for sin, since this sorrow and contrition of mind proceeds from love of God, whom we consider to be so kind, rather than from fear of punishments. Moreover, with this sigh and contrition of heart which we call true repentance sin does not remain, that is, the contempt of God or consent to evil, because the charity of God which inspires this sigh does not put up with fault. In this sigh we are instantly reconciled to God and we gain pardon for the preceding sin.[158]

Thus, contrition is identified in Abelard's thought as the element which prompts God's forgiveness, rather than the outward actions of confession and satisfaction. Abelard still accorded these actions an important role in the reconciliation of the sinner with the Church, but not in the remission of sins. Nevertheless, he conceded that the shame experienced by a sinner in confession is conducive to sincere repentance, and that the process likewise allows a priest to establish whether true contrition is present so that he may decide upon an appropriate means of satisfaction:

> In the humility of confession a large part of satisfaction is performed. ... Priests, to whom have been committed the souls of those who confess, have to impose satisfactions of penance upon them, so that those who have used their judgement wrongly and proudly by showing contempt of God may be corrected by the judgement of another power.[159]

Despite this recognition of the role of confession, Abelard nevertheless only regarded this process as a complement to the remission of sins achieved by contrition in that it allowed a sinner to be reconciled with the Church. He did not, however, regard it as an intrinsic part of that remission.[160] As a result, Abelard proceeded to conclude

that confession to a bad priest does not prohibit forgiveness, as forgiveness is dependent on the contrition of the sinner only:

> The error of prelates does not damn their subjects, nor does their vice reproach them. ... Repentance had already beforehand ... reconciled them to God, that is, before they came to confession or got their satisfaction determined.[161]

Abelard's views regarding the role of confession in the remission of sins encountered particular opposition from the Victorine scholars. Hugh of St Victor claimed that confession to a priest is essential, not only for the imposition of a suitable means of satisfaction and for reconciliation with the Church, as Abelard maintained, but also for the actual remission of sins. Despite agreeing that a contrite heart is required to perform confession appropriately, Hugh did not consider contrition to be the single, fundamental prerequisite of forgiveness, as Abelard asserted. Hugh reveals his argument thus:

> The salvation of the sinner begins then when he truly grieves for his sins, which salvation, however, is fully accomplished at the time when he also confesses by mouth what he grieves. Likewise what is said: "While still you speak, I shall say, Here I am," (Isaias 58, 9), can be accepted fittingly thus: that God is present first through grace to sting the heart to repentance; then that He is present to assign the forgiveness of sins to him who confesses.[162]

Hugh's argument was based on the understanding that pride is the basis of all sin. As pride is negated by the humiliation inherent in confession, this process is fundamental in attaining God's forgiveness:

> Since ... every sin is committed through pride, it is necessary for all repentance to be tempered through humility, in order that obedience may crush disobedience and the devotion of humility suppress the swelling of elation. Therefore, it is

> very fitting that we who have been insolent to God by sinning be suppliants also to the servants of God by repenting to men.[163]

Furthermore, in contrast to Abelard's view, Hugh claimed that priests are given full powers to remit sins at ordination. As evidence, Hugh cited the words of Christ in the Bible when he granted the apostles the power to forgive sins:

> Hear what He says to all the Apostles and thereby to all the successors of the Apostles and to those who function in place of the Apostles. He says: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; whose sins you shall retain, they are retained," (John 20, 22, and 23).[164]

As a consequence, Hugh concluded that if confession to a priest does not actually occur, in spite of feelings of penitence, full remission cannot be granted.

The divergence of views on this issue arose out of a lack of biblical guidance pertaining to the need for confession. On the one hand, the Bible presents the example of Peter receiving forgiveness for denying Christ without undertaking any form of confession. This was frequently cited as evidence that confession was not essential.[165] On the other hand, however, Hugh countered this argument by claiming that confession should essentially be undertaken voluntarily. He therefore argued that its stipulation by Christ in his teachings was unnecessary.[166]

Both schools of thought were ultimately combined in the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, the fourth book of which recorded and systematized passages of scripture and patristic writings concerning the sacraments, as well as the attitudes of various theologians. This book in particular had the most profound influence on the development of the issue of penance in the latter half of the twelfth

century.[167] The Master of the Sentences presented his understanding of the role of confession and satisfaction thus:

> For some say that without confession of the mouth and satisfaction of act no one is cleansed from sin, if he have time to effect these things. But others say that before the confession of the mouth and satisfaction, sin is forgiven by God on the contrition of the heart; if, however, the person have the desire to confess.[168]

He subsequently concluded from this that:

> the penitent ought to confess his sins if he have time: and yet, before the confession is in his mouth, if the intention be in his heart, forgiveness is accorded him.[169]

Thus, the *willingness* and *intent* to confess and perform satisfaction if adequate time is available indicates sufficient contrition, rather than the actual confession itself. This intention therefore constitutes the essential element in the remission of sin. By this conclusion, Peter Lombard supported Abelard's insistence that contrition is essential for the remission of sins, but also emphasized that the intent to confess should be actively fulfilled. In this sense, he also included Hugh's notion of obligatory confession in his definition.

Peter Lombard's compromise, however, did not answer questions concerning the role of the priest in the remission of sins. Furthermore, from the mid-twelfth century onwards, greater emphasis was placed on the definition of penance as a sacrament in which the deeds of satisfaction act as external signs of true contrition.[170] The role of the priest thus needed urgent clarification. In response, Peter Lombard offered a further compromise between the opposing views of Abelard and Hugh by claiming that God and his priests collaborate in the remission of sins. In this way,

the priest confirms the pardon which has been accorded by God in response to true repentance on behalf of the sinner. The priest thus acts as an interpreter between God and the Church, enabling the Church to recognize that the sinner has been converted and forgiven. The priest's role is therefore secondary, but essential for the imposition of the appropriate means of satisfaction on those sinners whom he discerned to be truly penitent, and for the full reconciliation of the sinner into the Church.[171]

The theologians of the latter half of the twelfth century embraced Peter Lombard's thought wholeheartedly, and the issue of penance continued to enjoy prominence in theological debate. These masters made their contribution by confirming and making minor clarifications to the Lombard's basic formula, underlining the practical application of these ideas, and considering specific questions raised by them. Consequently, they bequeathed the methods and results of a highly-systematized investigation into the issue of penance to the thinkers of the thirteenth century. The influence of these late twelfth-century masters is therefore not to be underestimated. Peter the Chanter in his *Summa de sacramentis*, and his disciple, Robert of Courçon in his *Summa theologie moralis*, were both instrumental in the widespread application of the Lombard's work. All of these late twelfth-century masters accepted as given that contrition is a prerequisite of forgiveness. As a result, they concerned themselves with issues arising from this basic tenet. In particular, they debated the conditions necessary for true contrition, establishing that the intensity of penitence depends on the presence of God's love, the sorrow of the penitent, and the severity of the sin, and discussing the relationship between these three elements.[172]

One important aspect relating to interior penance which evolved in the latter half of the twelfth century was the

distinction between contrition and attrition. It is first accredited to Simon of Tournai who claimed in his *Summa* that true contrition consists of three elements, namely heartfelt sorrow, the intention to confess, and the determination to avoid repetition of the sin. Attrition is the existence of only the first of these requirements, and is not engendered by God's grace. As a result, attrition alone cannot gain the remission of sins, even though it possesses its own degree of sincerity which can reduce the severity of the sin. Consequently, all three elements are required in order to attain true repentance.[173] Simon's definition found resonance in the works of Alan of Lille, Godfrey of Poitiers, and Raoul of Ardent. Alan of Lille's celebrated *Liber poenitentialis* reveals the extent of the emphasis which was being placed on repentance as the prerequisite for forgiveness by this stage, rather than on outward acts of satisfaction. In this work, Alan claimed that confession should be undertaken even if one is unaware of having committed any sin:

> And although in a general confession secret sins are remitted, yet it is our counsel that he betake himself to the priest that he may not seem to set aside a rule of ecclesiastical institution, saying to the priest that he is conscious with himself of no sin, but inasmuch as in many things we offend all and the just man falls seven times a day, let him call himself miserable and a sinner, demanding from the priest the imposition of some satisfaction, by which his sins, if there be any hidden ones, may be purged, though none are manifest.[174]

The evolution undergone by the penitential process towards frequent confession based on inner repentance is expressly apparent in Alan's words.

The role of the priest was likewise more closely defined by these masters. By building once again on the basis provided by the Lombard, the priest's role was described as essential in confirming the forgiveness accorded by God, but also in imposing a special dispensation on the truly repentant

sinner for time in purgatory. The priest, as claimed particularly by Peter the Chanter, therefore had the power to alleviate temporal punishment to a partial extent.[175]

The influence of the late twelfth-century masters percolated down to the lower ranks of the clergy particularly by means of confessional guides or *Summae confessorum*. Spurred on by the threat of heresy and the need for systematization, works such as the *Liber penitentialis* of Robert of Flamesbury (ca. 1208-15), the *Penitentiale* of Bartholomew of Exeter (ca. 1150-70), and the anonymous *Summa of Bamberg* (1180-5) were produced, all of which were intended to provide priests with guidance in the matter of penance and to emphasize the importance and obligatory nature of confession. Despite their practical nature, these works were based on the major theological developments of the age. All of them therefore placed the element of contrition at the forefront of penitential procedure. The influence of these works was also widespread, and they continued to be copied frequently throughout the Middle Ages.[176]

Furthermore, the sermons of the great masters of theology provided an alternative route by which these ideas and developments reached the ordinary clergy and lay society. Although they were conducted in Latin, these sermons were frequently adapted into a vernacular form, as Paul Anciaux comments:

> Ces sermons cependant n'étaient pas sans contact avec la vie religieuse du peuple; les prêtres y puisaient les matériaux de leur prédication en langue vulgaire, plus spécialement dirigée au peuple chrétien.[177]

The subject matter of such sermons towards the end of the twelfth century emphasized in particular the interior aspects of penance and the need for this procedure to be performed regularly. As a result, the theories of the great theologians and canonists became increasingly widely

available and understood, and proceeded to influence the religious practice of ordinary Christians at this time.[178]

In addition, reference should be made to the *Bamberger Beichte*, a model confession in the German vernacular from the twelfth century or possibly earlier.[179] This work is considered to be exceptional amongst its kind for its expansiveness, which has prompted speculation that it was used as an exemplary text for priests, or as a special prayer to be used by a religious community on specific days, and for its emphasis on personal belief and regret.[180] As an exemplary text, this prayer appears to be reflecting and therefore dispersing the developments in the theological thought of this age. Such a claim may be supported by evidence from the text which speaks frequently of true repentance (BB 1.97 'wâre riuwa', 1.72 'rehte riuwa', l. 76, 86 'rehto riuonte', l. 105 'rehte riuwiga') and pleas from the heart (BB 1.99f., 107 'bitte vone herzan'). The final lines of the prayer are worth quoting in full in order to demonstrate the emphasis on the inner contrition of the penitent, crying tears of regret:

> Nu ruof ih, vile gnâdige got, mit allemo herzan zi dir, daz du durch dîna guoti unde durh die dige der frouwun sanctae Marîun und aller dîner trûte mir gistungide gilâzzist, daz ich inniglîcho biweinon joh biwuoffin joh bisûfton muge unde mitten reinen trahinen nu gitoufan muge die unreinesten mîna giwizzide von allen mînen sundon unde von aller der bewôllinheite der sêla joh des lîchamen, unde gilâ mir, du vile gnâdige got, daz ich rehte riuonte vone dir enphâhe giwissen unde vollen den dînen tiuren antlâz unde den vurder stâten willen des unsundônnis unde die tiurun stâtmuoti iemêrrehtwerchis unde alles guoten lebennes. Amen.[181]

Self-Awareness in Hartmann's Works

By drawing together the various strands of social and economic change, developments in theology, and in the

penitential system, a mental history of Hartmann's age emerges which is marked by a greater awareness of the individual in both the secular and spiritual spheres. The economic and social changes which brought new opportunities for altering one's role in life, pressure on the older and lesser military aristocracy, increased influence for the greater families, and extended demands for restraint and the establishment of a secular ethic amongst the noble classes, all serve to demonstrate this. In addition, it can be claimed that Hartmann and his audience were likewise aware of theological developments which prompted greater personal piety thanks to various means of dissemination. The production and use of pastoral literature to inform vernacular sermons, literature for personal devotion, and, most importantly, confessional guides and penitentials all support the conclusion that not only Hartmann as a clerically-educated knight, but also his audience, whether educated or not, would have encountered the call for increased self-awareness. This may have come from the pulpit, the confessional, or from the moves aimed specifically at the military aristocracy to promote greater restraint and more responsible behaviour which appeared in didactic and other forms of literature. However, the extent to which such a *Mentalitätsgeschichte* is discernible in Hartmann's own works still remains to be seen. It is to these works that this investigation will therefore now turn.

In terms of an introduction to the analysis of perception and self-awareness in Hartmann's works, however, a prior consideration of the influential work of Thomasin von Zerklaere will be undertaken. Despite Thomasin's clerical background and the dating of his work to shortly after Hartmann's active years, *Der Welsche Gast* particularly demonstrates a keen emphasis on the acquisition of perception by the knights he seeks to instruct. This is likewise the case in the second half of the *Heimlicher Bote*, which is written in a different hand to the first half, and

is concerned with outlining to an audience drawn from the nobility how virtue, and especially the Christian virtue of humility, can be gained through reflection (*sin*). Such virtue is presented as a means to achieve increased social standing, even in the face of economic disadvantage. Likewise, the pursuit of virtue is described as a means of protection against the false rumours of rivals.[182] This emphasis on perception is shared by both Thomasin and Hartmann, who appear to be aiming to promote self-awareness with regard to a combination of spiritual and secular factors as a means of achieving both worldly and heavenly reward. Their shared emphasis on self-awareness as the basis of virtue suggests the influence on both authors of the penitential movement, the theological developments, and the social factors mentioned above.

Insight and virtue are described by Thomasin as the only distinctions between humans and animals. Furthermore, the human intellect guides the body and the will in order to keep them on the right path:

> der man der sol sinne han,
> wan daz vihe ist sinnes an.
> anders ist niht zwischen in
> niwan tuogene unde sin. (WG 1339-42)
>
> dem viehe dunchet niht ze vil
> ze tuone, swaz ez tuon wil,
> wan es des sinnes niht enhat,
> der im ze rehte gebe rat.
> mit sinne man sines willen phlege,
> daz man niht trete uz dem wege. (WG 1355-60)[183]

The use of the intellect is likewise described as the means to achieve virtue, both in secular and spiritual terms. Thomasin thus claims that the faculty of reason provides the flag for virtue's army against sin:

> den vanen sol dir geben der Sin,
> daz duo diner tugende her
> leiten chunnes wol ze wer. (WG 8110-2)

He also reminds the audience of the active nature of a knight's struggle against sin:

> warumbe sit ir ritter worden?
> durh slaffen, weiz got, irn sit.
> da von, daz ein man gern lit,
> solde er dar umbe ritter wesen? (WG 8422-5)

This corresponds to Hugh of St Victor's premise described earlier in this chapter that intellect has to be accompanied by action in order to achieve virtue. Furthermore, Thomasin cautions against allowing one's thoughts and deeds to be focused primarily on the goal of love or lust. The direction of one's thoughts is of vital importance:

> vor dem sol er sich bewarn,
> wa man hin welle varn
> mit gedanchen und mit getat:
> daz ist wiser liute rat. (WG 4777-50)

This point is further highlighted in Thomasin's advice that prayer has to be accompanied by the intention to act:

> wil immer bitten ein man
> und wil denne tuon niht,
> sin gebet ist enwiht.
> so ist daz gebet guot,
> swenne man dar nach rehte tuot. (WG 10904-8)

Both of these points likewise correspond to the definition of true contrition as it appears in the work of the Master of the Sentences, i.e. incorporating regret and at the same time the intent to confess and perform satisfaction.

In addition, Thomasin addresses the notion of *nobilitas morum* by stating that the nobility of birth has to be accompanied by noble acts in order for true nobility to be proven:

> niemen ist edel denn der man,
> der sin herce und sin gemuote

hat gecheret an rehte guote.
Ist ein man wol geborn
und hat sines muotes adel verloren,
ich chan iu sagen wol fuer war,
in schendet sin gebuorte gar,
wan swer wol geborn ist,
sin gebuort gert zaller frist
daz er wol und reht tuo. (WG 4496-4505)

The failure to achieve true nobility is also specifically described by Thomasin as a consequence of the inadequate powers of *sin*:

hie bi moeht ir merchen wol,
das niemen edel heizzen sol,
niwan der, der rehte tuot.
swer aber hat unrehten muot,
der muoz ane tuogende leben
und hat sin edeltuom gegeben
durh der untuogende minne.
daz chuomt von chranchem sinne. (WG 4537-44)

Thomasin's work thus provides an introduction to the association of virtue with the power of the intellect and the willingness to take action which are similarly reflected in Hartmann's works. It is these works themselves that this study will now address.

CHAPTER THREE

Die Klage

Widely accepted as the earliest of Hartmann's narrative works, *Die Klage* has not been accorded the same degree of attention in scholarship as his later narratives, nor has it been widely considered to be a work against which the later narratives might usefully be measured. The difference in genre is no doubt the major cause of such disregard. However, as will be demonstrated in the course of this chapter, *Die Klage* is highly pertinent to the present investigation into Hartmann's interest in the issue of perception owing to the fact that it portrays the relationship between the powers of perception and the physical body in the debate held by its two protagonists. The entire work is concerned with the mechanics and rewards of such a relationship and the dangers presented by its failure to function properly. *Die Klage* may thus be regarded as Hartmann's initial statement on the subject of perception, and a useful guide by which to judge this aspect of his later narratives. The role of this narrative as a comparative work has indeed been recognized by Hedwig Groß:

> In dieser Minnelehre [ist] schon die ganze Weltanschauung des späteren Hartmann teils als fertiges Programm, teils im Keim enthalten.[184]

This initial narrative will therefore constitute the first stage of the present investigation into the portrayal of perception in Hartmann's works. In addition, in the course of this chapter, the concept of perception in the lyric poetry of Hartmann and other twelfth-century poets will be examined in order to provide a further insight into the portrayal of this concept within another genre employed by this author.

The Protagonists and their Characteristics

The protagonists in this work represent the intellect (the heart) and the physical body of an unsuccessful lover. Throughout the course of their debate, the attributes of both protagonists, their relationship, and their aims, become evident. The features and role of each protagonist will be considered in turn.

The characteristics which the heart ascribes to itself denote it as the organ of intellectual capacity. Its foremost function is to advise the physical body, using the information provided by the body's sensory organs to select the most appropriate lady to woo.[185] In the performance of this task, the heart utilizes its special powers of *sin* or intellectual processing. This ability is so fundamental to this organ that the heart is described as being synonymous with this capacity in the body's address 'Owe, herze unde sin' (DK 33). The terms *sin* and *sinne* act therefore as beacons in an investigation of this nature as they signify the faculty of inner deliberation.[186] In *Die Klage*, the term *sin* is also used with reference to the body, but only in the sense that the body has the capacity to be aware of its relationship with the heart, rather than denoting it as an organ of similar intelligence (DK 171, 348, 1086). When referring to the heart, the term *sin* describes this protagonist's major function as the seat of reason and its corresponding abilities, namely the capacity to provide good advice and to realize the need to work hard and avoid sloth. Each of these properties will now be examined in greater detail.

The heart's power of perception is frequently qualified as 'guoter sin'/'guote sinne' (DK 852, 894), or 'schoener sin'/'schoene sinne' (DK 558, 608, 949, 1292). These adjectives identify the power of the intellect as a positive force, a claim which the heart emphasizes by protesting that

its advice is always well-intentioned and sensitive, as befits its guiding role in the pursuit of virtue. Leslie Seiffert fittingly translates 'schoener sin' as 'fair sensibility'[187], a term which reveals the element of refinement in this potency. The heart's capacity of *sin* thus renders it superior to the body in their relationship. It also refers to itself specifically as 'ratgebe' on two occasions (DK 923, 1253), and advice is mentioned in a positive sense frequently throughout this work.[188] Such an emphasis on the heart's provision of singularly good advice is not to deny that this protagonist is also accused of being a bad and unintelligent adviser. However, this is only the case in the initial exchanges during which the body makes unenlightened accusations (DK 77, 245). Repeatedly, in its reply to the body, the heart refers to the fact that it has always had their best interests in mind:

> ze guoten dingen ich dir riet,
> von allem valsche ich dich schiet:
> dar umbe dulde ich dinen haz.
> doch wil ich gerne liden daz
> swaz mir da von geschehen sol:
> ichne rat dir nimmer niht wan wol. (DK 565-570)[189]

Despite the heart's powers of awareness, however, it is physically unable to put its ideas or intentions into practice because it does not directly control the body. Instead, it is forced to rely on co-operation from the body in carrying out its directions (DK 913-19, 960-2). If the body elects to disobey the superior organ, then the heart remains as weak and ineffectual, in its own words, as a flower struggling under the snow (DK 821-36). Acting alone, therefore, the heart is powerless, despite its best efforts and perceptive abilities (DK 852-8). The capacity of *sin*, however, endows the heart with an understanding of the mechanics of its relationship with the body which enables it to reveal to the body the importance of their co-operation as the true means to achieve success in love. Thus, the two protagonists exist in a hierarchy which depends entirely for

its proper functioning on the body's recognition of its inferior role. When the body listens to reason in the form of the heart's advice, the heart is able to execute its ideas and to reverse their lack of success. Such a relationship, in which the body acts as the servant or instrument of the heart or soul, is well catalogued in twelfth-century scholastic and monastic writing, as is the emphasis on co-operation within such a relationship. Frequent images used to describe this partnership are those relating to the mutuality of friendship, marriage, or alliance, or the relationship between the protector (the body) and the protected (the heart), for example the walls of a house, clothing, or in Hartmann's own image, a nutshell (DK 445-50).[190]

The heart's role as adviser is combined with a commitment to strenuous effort, which, as it reminds the body, is a vital ingredient in a successful love suit:

> swer ahte hat uf minne,
> der darf wol schoener sinne
> und swer ir lere rehte wil phlegen
> der muoz lazen under wegen
> swaz anders heizet denne guot
> und minnen rehtes mannes muot.
> da gehoeret arbeit zuo
> beide spate unde fruo
> und daz man vil gedenke an si.
> minne machet niemen fri
> ze grozem gemache. (DK 607-17)

Unlike the body, therefore, with its varied pursuits and sleep to provide distraction and rest, the heart is ceaseless in its quest to attain success (DK 673-701). Thus, the heart frequently makes the body aware of its own past exertions, and emphasizes the need to strive in order to achieve success (DK 662-7, 712-18, 869-71). Furthermore, it illustrates its advice with the observation that those men who achieve success with no endeavour on their own part, but who prefer to rely on their connections and material wealth, are to be pitied rather than envied:

Swem iz anders niht gefüeget
(des manegen doch genüeget)
wan friundes hilfe und sin guot,
wil er da von sin wol gemuot,
des gan ich im vil sere,
ez ist ein betrogen ere
unde ein kintlicher wan.
als ich nu gesprochen han,
so kan ich dir bescheiden wol
wes ein man geniezen sol:
tugende unde sinne,
so sint ez reine minne. (DK 769-80)

In this manner, the heart emphasizes the fact that it is only by striving to become virtuous that requited love is achieved. Consequently, it claims that their own lack of success has been caused by the body's failure to recognize and fulfil its role as the provider of sensory information and to obey and act on the heart's superior judgements. Unless the body rectifies this situation, they will remain perpetually at odds. As the heart stresses:

mine sinne sint so guot,
vil bezzer danne din.
du muost mir gehorsam sin:
swenne du daz niht tuost,
so wizze daz du haben muost
manege müeliche zit:
ez wirt ein ewiger strit. (DK 894-900)

The body's initial complaint to the heart provides an insight into the consequences of such an unbalanced relationship. Apart from its obvious lack of success with the chosen lady, the body additionally displays symptoms of laziness, egocentricity, and an inability to comprehend its own intentions and those of others. Thus, as a result of ignoring the heart's reminders of their shared need to struggle to attain their goal, the body has fallen into a state of idleness or *gemach* which is anathema to the heart and prohibits their pursuit of virtue. As the heart complains:

niwan ze gemache stet din muot,
des ich dir harte sere erban.
sit ich an dir niht kan
deheine tugende vinden
noch mit lere überwinden,
sone wær mir niht so wæge
so daz ouch ich verphlæge
aller eren alse du:
so lebete ich mit gemache nu.
wan ich an ganzem sinne
doch niht me gewinne
wan not unde ungemach. (DK 860-71)

The body has no inherent concept of the need to strive. The actual achievement of virtue thus depends totally on the body's acceptance of the heart's reminders of its responsibilities. In addition, the body reveals the egotism which is generated by its lack of insight. Thus, it believes that it could have won the lady's favour by means of the simple assurance that she is the single target of its affections. To the body's consternation, the lady's reaction is contrary to its expectations:

'ich wande mich ir næhte
swenn ich si innen bræhte
daz ich uz al der werlt ein wip
ze frowen über minen lip
für si hæte niht erkorn:
da mite han ich si verlorn.' (DK 105-110)

The body's lack of comprehension in this final line is almost palpable and is echoed by its reaction when the heart later accuses it directly of arrogance:

lip, du gevellst dir selbe wol.
'niht me danne ich ze rehte sol.'
des einen habentz die toren guot.
'wes?' da dünkent si sich selbe fruot.
'herze, daz meinest du an mich.'
entriwen, lip, ja ich. (DK 1239-44)

The vice of egocentricity is accorded particular gravity by the inclusion of its antithesis, 'diemuot', or humility, in the group of God-given virtues which the protagonists in

this work must seek to attain (DK 1303). As is evident from medieval Trees of Virtue diagrams, this particular virtue forms the root from which all others grow.[191] The body's egocentricity, caused by its disregard of the heart's advice, is therefore a major obstacle to the attainment of the virtue which will bring them success. The lady appears to have recognized the body's high opinion of itself, and to have reacted accordingly by refusing its service. The heart's choice of lady is therefore vindicated, as this reaction suggests that she possesses the powers of reflection necessary to evaluate the intentions of others. The body, in contrast, demonstrates a deluded estimation of other people's motivations by concluding that the lady is acting out of stubborn spite and is intent on seeing the body suffer:

> 'sit si rehte wart gewar
> daz min freude also gar
> an ir einer gnade stet,
> sit enruocht si wiez mir get:
> daz ist ein starker wibes muot.
> ichne weiz wes si mir niht ist guot.' (DK 93-8)[192]

It even proceeds to project its own inability to judge intentions onto her:

> 'Noch ist si weiz got also guot,
> erkante si rehte minen muot,
> und ob ich wære ein heiden
> von der kristenheit gescheiden,
> daz si durch niemens ræte
> so sere missetæte,
> swenne si bekante daz
> daz ich ir noch nie vergaz
> eines halben tages lanc,
> si sagte mirs etlichen danc.' (DK 207-16)

The body's belief that the lady should be grateful for the rather unremarkable constancy of its attentions reveals a note of irony on the part of the author aimed at demonstrating the body's unbalanced view of the situation. This point underlines both the body's inability to exert itself

to any significant extent in its wooing and also its limited comprehension of its own culpability in its failure. In addition, the body misunderstands the heart's role in their relationship. Its inability to reason causes it to become possessed of a persecution complex, believing, in its state of paranoia, that the heart is withholding advice in order to turn it into an object of ridicule or torture:

> 'sit ouch du mir niht rates gist
> so grife ich dicke da du list
> und kæme dir es gerne ze klage:
> so ist als guot daz ichz verdage,
> wan so verest du dar inne
> (daz heize ich unminne)
> vor freuden als ein vogellin.
> wie möhtest du ungetriwer sin?
> wan ich solt zuo dir haben fluht,
> und wære ez niht ein unzuht,
> ich schrire "wafen" über dich.
> nu warumbe toetest du mich?' (DK 319-330)[193]

This suggests a complete incomprehension on the body's part of its own role in their failure. Furthermore, the body's demonstration of its misguidedness devalues its reference to the heart's bad advice and consequently confirms the heart's earlier claim of being only a good adviser (DK 77, 243-5).

The heart retaliates against this attack by accusing the body of making false accusations and by suggesting that the body is utilizing the ploy of a guilty man to conceal his own culpability (DK 501-16). In direct response to the body's claims, the heart states unequivocally that its own superior capacity of reflection will prevent the body from persuading or tricking it into following evil:

> du maht ez uz dem muote lan
> daz dehein din meisterschaft
> an mir neme die kraft
> daz ich durch valschen rat
> gein deheiner missetat
> gewinne ie deheinen muot.
> mine sinne sint so guot,
> vil bezzer danne din. (DK 888-95)

The body's initial response to the heart is based on its conviction that the heart's accusations are unjust. However, the body is eventually persuaded to accept the heart's teaching with regard to their different roles and their need for co-operation. For example, the body demonstrates its acceptance of the heart's role as adviser:

> 'herze, dar nach rat mir
> wie du wellest daz ich tuo,
> und verleite mich niht dar zuo,
> da von wir verloren sin:
> wan min dinc ist daz din.' (DK 1056-60)

Similarly, as a result of the heart's guidance, the body comes to appreciate its own responsibility to prove itself by means of its actions, thereby rejecting its earlier inertia and inability to recognize its role in their partnership (DK 1061-8, 1095-8). This insight is subsequently surpassed by the body's acknowledgement of the fact that it may never gain reward for its service, but that its endeavours will nevertheless earn it the praise and renown of society:

> 'enphahe ichs nimmer lon von ir,
> dannoch frümet ez mir
> daz mirz diu werlt ze guote verstat
> und mich deste gerner hat.' (DK 1099-1102)[194]

The body likewise proceeds to accept the heart's choice of lover and to refute its earlier paranoia which had been directed against both the heart and the lady (DK 1485-1502). Thus, the body gains the ability to analyse and criticize its own previous behaviour, thereby demonstrating that, with the heart's assistance, it has now achieved an awareness of its role in the partnership and an appreciation of its partner and the lady:

> 'Owe waz han ich getan!
> ja wæne ich mich vergahet han
> daz ich so nahen sprechen sol;
> si gunde mirs danne wol,

wær ich ie solhes heiles wert
des doch min gemüete gert.
min rede wær ir von rehte zorn.' (DK 1457-63)

The successful reconciliation of the heart and body allows a solution to the problem of displaying honest motives within the confines of a properly conducted love relationship to be ventured. If pursued with constancy, the reflection of the heart combined with action by the body will lead the lady eventually to recognize their loyalty (DK 1542-66). As the heart recommends, they should be as constant as a drop of water on a stone, and will in time wear the stone, or the lady's doubts, away (DK 1613-32).

The body's achievement of the required measure of insight into its role allows it finally to address the lady as the representative of its partnership with the heart and to confirm the progress it has made. For example, it is able to externalize its virtuous modesty and its intention of pursuing constancy:

'ich wæne e wazzer unde walt
und diu erde verbrinne,
(deist zuo dem suontage gezalt)
und uns der tage zerinne,
möhte ich werden also alt,
e ich von dir die sinne
benim: swie lützel ez noch galt,
ich diene umb dine minne.' (DK 1831-8)

The body's awareness of the need for reflection is likewise underlined in its entreaty to the lady to consider its words and to realize that its feelings of loyalty are genuine (DK 1845-8). The teachings of the heart have been successful, therefore, even to the extent that the body recommends them to the lady. Perception is thus proposed as an essential prerequisite for both parties in a love relationship.

The potencies of the two protagonists and their situation as sketched above provide ample evidence of the author's

interest in the essential roles played by the intellect and the physical self in the attainment of the virtues which lead to success in love. The heart's powers of insight are described as superior to the body's physical attributes, but the need for these two potencies to combine their respective talents and the undesirable consequences of their failure to do so are likewise emphasized and portrayed in detail. The heart's superiority and ceaseless pursuit of success corresponds closely with the notion in the teaching of Plato and those influenced by him of the strenuous and constant journey undertaken by the soul in striving to attain union with its Form. This is preserved in the thought of Augustine and the twelfth-century masters in the concept of achieving union with God's truth by the process of inner searching, either by contemplation or questioning. The intellect is therefore traditionally engaged in a relentless pursuit of its goal. In its relationship with the physical potency, it acts as the spur to counter the body's inherent idleness. In its depiction of the faculties and the nature of the relationship between the heart and the body, *Die Klage* appears to reflect in particular the teaching of twelfth-century thinkers such as Hugh of St Victor regarding the acquisition of virtue. The same criteria also apply to the notion of true contrition which was encouraged in penitential practice in the twelfth century under the guidance of scholastic and monastic masters. As mentioned previously, Hugh's concept of true contrition as a combination of sincere repentance and acts of penitence passed into the mainstream of penitential practice by means of its inclusion and modification in the influential *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. In the case of both virtue and true contrition, the co-operation of both perceptive and active faculties as reflected in *Die Klage* was required.

Another important indication of a connection between *Die Klage* and twelfth-century thought appears in the prologue. Here it is stated that the heart and body in the debate

belong to a young man (DK 7), thus bringing into play in this work the issue of mature conscience which found such resonance in the thought of Abelard. This allows the imbalance of reflective and active faculties depicted here to be ascribed to the young man's inexperience, rather than any innate wickedness. Conversely, maturity is equated in this work with a balanced relationship between perception and action. This is subsequently restated towards the end of *Die Klage* once the heart and body have resolved their differences. The body is aware that it has not reached the age at which it will join the ranks of those people in tune with their powers of 'fair sensibility'. Thus, the body still has time to develop its harmonious relationship with the heart before it reaches the point at which such maturity would be expected, such as the age of consent for penitents stipulated by the Fourth Lateran Council. However, the body's determination to achieve this status is now explicit:

> 'ich han den willen und den muot,
> ob mir got des günnen wil,
> daz ichz noch bringe uf daz zil
> daz mir die liute beginnen jehen
> mir sül von rehte wol geschehen,
> und des ich noch niht wert bin;
> ganze tugent und wisen sin
> den vordert mir noch nieman zuo,
> wan daz wær mir noch al ze fruo;
> sine sint von minen jaren niht
> den man der grozen sinne giht.' (DK 1474-84)

Also inherent in this statement is the suggestion that, through its experience of failure, the body has progressed towards that very level of maturity which was initially lacking. Thus, a young man has achieved an insight into the prerequisites of mature behaviour during the course of this dialogue. In addition to the concern of the theologians with maturity in establishing culpability, this issue is also of consequence in the light of the sociological problems caused by the *iuvenes*, as discussed in the previous chapter. The portrayal of such an issue in this work suggests that Hartmann is attempting to promote a discussion amongst these

members of aristocratic society or to educate them. This point is also of major consequence in the consideration of each of Hartmann's later texts which depict the experiences of successful young men who encounter periods of failure as they enter situations which demand a certain degree of mature responsibility. *Die Klage* therefore provides a general introduction to the relationship between perception and maturity in Hartmann's whole output.

The Symbolism of the Heart

Having thus established by means of the preceding appraisal of textual evidence that the heart in *Die Klage* is cast in the role of rational entity, it still remains necessary to consider the influences behind this choice of organ. Such an investigation is pertinent in view of the fact that the ancient and modern tendency is to locate the capacity for perception in the brain, as discussed in the previous chapter. Possible sources of influence from twelfth-century thought and literature will therefore be considered in an attempt to explain Hartmann's choice.

Comparisons between works of literature which are near contemporaries of *Die Klage* have given rise to speculation that Hartmann was in fact mistaken in associating the heart with the power of reflection. Disputations between the body and soul were more common in literature at this time, a fact which has caused Gustav Ehrismann to postulate that Hartmann's substitution of the heart for the soul indicates the creation in *Die Klage* of a secular treatise on human love rather than a spiritual thesis. Ehrismann supported this interpretation by claiming that the heart represented the seat of passion in early scholastic psychology which had been influenced by the thought of Augustine. Consequently, Ehrismann ventured the conclusion that Hartmann's use of the heart as the organ of intellect demonstrated his amateurish

grasp of scholastic psychology.[195] Later Hartmann scholars, such as Wolf Gewehr, have revised Ehrismann's hypothesis, however, and established that Hartmann's substitution of the heart for the soul as the organ of reason in fact reveals Hartmann to be extremely aware of and well-schooled in the thought of a wide range of twelfth-century scholastic masters.[196]

As discussed in the previous chapter, the main body of influence for this definition of the heart's function came from the works of Augustine which drew heavily on the Bible. These sources described the heart as the place of contact between a person and God, and as the location of the potency of the soul known as *mens* or reason, which is capable of gaining divine illumination. Although the heart is described in the Bible as possessing the ability to deliver bad advice if it uses its free will to choose to follow a course of evil (Mark 3.5; Eph. 4.18), the particular depiction in *Die Klage* of the heart as the dispenser of singularly good advice denotes an emphasis in this work on the heart's function as a point of connection with divine truth.

Augustine likewise influenced twelfth-century thought concerning the relationship between the body and the soul. Unlike Plato, Augustine was of the opinion that these two entities existed in a harmonious dualistic relationship, rather than one based on antagonism. Often this relationship was compared by those twelfth-century scholars influenced by Augustine to that existing between a lord and servant, a musician and an instrument, or in a marriage arrangement.[197] This concept may be directly related to the heart's teaching in *Die Klage* regarding the need for both the active, sensory capacity and the rational, spiritual capacity of the lover to co-operate within their hierarchical arrangement. However, Hartmann does not use the term *sêle* to describe the body's partner in the disputation. *Sêle* is mentioned on only one occasion in this work. This takes

place at a central point in the poem as the body realizes the fundamental need for co-operation with the heart in order for them to care for the soul and to advance their quest for salvation (DK 1029-60). *Sêle* is thus portrayed in this work as a separate entity which incorporates the essential life source of the lover. Hartmann therefore appears to be making the same distinction as Augustine between the *anima vitae* and the *anima rationalis*.[198] Hartmann's *sêle* may thus be said to correspond to the highest potency of the soul, whereas the heart in *Die Klage* represents the rational potency. By focusing on the rational potency of the soul which is present in the heart, rather than on the soul in general as represented in the body/soul debates, Hartmann is thus creating a psychological rather than a theological focus in his disputation. His interest therefore lies in the need for the intellect and the body to act in harmony in order to care for and save the immortal part of their soul. Salvation is thus their joint responsibility, and the *sêle* provides them with a common aim and need for harmony. Ultimately, it acts as the unifying element in their confrontation. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that *Die Klage* echoes the Augustinian definition of the potencies of the soul and their relationship with the body which found resonance in twelfth-century thought. Even though the terminology is notoriously lacking in uniformity, many twelfth-century masters distinguished between the notion of reason (usually termed *cor*), which existed in a state of intimate contact with God, and the immortal dimension of the soul (usually termed *anima*).[199] Gewehr concludes that the attributes of the protagonists in *Die Klage* demonstrate Hartmann's adherence to these principles:

> Hartmann hätte nur dann gegen die herrschenden Anschauungen der frühscholastischen Psychologie verstoßen, wenn er die verschiedenen Seelenpotenzen der *sêle* zugeschrieben hätte und diese zum Gesprächspartner des Leibes gewählt hätte.[200]

Thus, the evidence cited suggests that Hartmann is reflecting the tendency to distinguish between the rational potency and the eternal life force of the soul which was already established in twelfth-century thought, and is emphasizing the role of the former. However, it is also necessary to establish the extent to which Hartmann might be drawing on contemporary literary sources in his adoption of this psychologizing imagery in *Die Klage*.

Hartmann's Symbolism in the Literary Context and in his Lyric Poetry

In the literary context, the unusual mixture of elements in *Die Klage* compared with earlier and contemporary examples of the disputation genre such as the *salut d'amour*, and body/soul debates like the *Visio Fulberti*, causes Hartmann's work to appear somewhat experimental.[201] However, the depiction of the heart and body and their respective potencies in *Die Klage* reflects an already established, broader literary tradition, even though Hartmann's use of these elements in a disputation is undeniably unusual. From the middle of the twelfth century, there is evidence of the depiction of the heart/body relationship in the German empire in vernacular religious literature and in the genre of secular love poetry. An example of the heart as counsellor in the *Schwabenspiegel* in fact causes Roswitha Wisniewski to conclude that the relationship between the heart and body was common in medieval psychology as may be seen from its broad manifestation in religious, secular, and judicial literature.[202] *Die Klage* reveals a close kinship with these works in the additional sense that it is concerned with the prospect of success in love and the attainment of salvation, rather than with portraying the post-mortem apportioning of blame to be found in the traditional body/soul debates.[203] The works of vernacular religious literature and love lyric thus provide a more suitable context against which to measure *Die Klage*. In the

case of early vernacular religious literature, there is a reluctance to confirm that God actually dwells in the heart. However, the notion of the heart as the organ of inner reflection is well represented. These early works include the *Bücher Mosis*[204] (ca.1130-40), which describes the heart as an inner altar on which to lay personal offerings to God. Similar images are present in Frau Ava's *Leben Jesu*[205] and *Das jüngste Gericht*[206] (ca.1130). The continued acceptance of the heart as the organ of inner reflection is evident in later works. This is visible particularly in Armer Hartmann's *Rede vom Glauben*[207] (ca.1150), in which there is also the suggestion that God actually dwells in the heart in the guise of the Holy Ghost, and in Heinrich von Melk's *Von des todes gehugde* (ca. 1180), which describes an unenlightened heart as lost and to be redeemed by penance.[208]

The use of the heart image in this way to represent the intellect is likewise attested in secular love poetry and crusading songs, for example in the works of Dietmar von Eist (MF 32,2; MF 33,12), Albrecht von Johannsdorf (MF 88,29; MF 86,4), and Heinrich von Veldeke (MF 56,7; MF 57,26). Similarly, the distinction between the functions of the heart and body in *Die Klage* finds forerunners in the image of the departing lover leaving his heart in his lady's keeping. This is evident, for example, in the work of Friedrich von Hausen (MF 47,9; MF 51,29-30), Reinmar von Hagenau (MF 159,19), and in Hartmann's own love lyrics and crusading songs (XIII,2 = MF 215,30; V = MF 209,25).[209]

In this lyrical genre, the heart's frequent representation as the organ of intellect and thought resembles that of *Die Klage*. However, the heart also acts as the representative of the force of love as a result of the influence of Ovid and Virgil on this genre. The work of these ancient poets portrayed the heart as the organ in which love, joy, sorrow, hatred, and other emotions are experienced.[210] In consequence, the heart is also identified in secular love

lyric poetry with dubious, love-blinded advice as a result of its association with this ancient tradition. Such a negative image of the heart in this genre may also possibly result from the influence of the biblical concept of the heart as the place in which free will is exercised in choosing between good and evil.[211] Whatever the case, the heart is nevertheless associated in the genre of the secular love lyric and crusading songs with the process of introspection, whether as a result of the forces of love in the heart and the emotional experience of the lover in the Ovidian tradition, or through the heart's innate intellectual powers and its role as the point of contact with God reflected in the Augustinian tradition. A certain degree of fusion between these two streams of influence resulted in the association of secular love with improved moral behaviour, particularly in the secular love lyric tradition of the German empire.[212] In this way, the love of the lady in the heart inspires introspection in the lover just as the love of God in Augustine's teaching is portrayed as inspiring the inner awareness which will lead to virtue. The lover's insight therefore engenders a greater appreciation of the moral benefits of love service and its preferability to a capitulation to sensual desire. In this sense, the association of the heart image in *Die Klage* as the instrument of thought and of love with the attainment of moral improvement is in keeping with the secular love lyric genre.

In an example from Hartmann's own secular love lyrics, and in a poem which closely matches the Provençal style, the lover celebrates his love with the insight that it will enable him to improve his awareness of his responsibilities towards God and society:

> wol mich, daz ich den muot ie dar bewande!
> Daz schat ir niht und ist mir iemer mêre guot,
> wand ich ze gote und ze der welte den muot

deste baz dur ir willen kêre.
sus dinge ich, daz sich mîn vröide noch gemêre.
(XIII,1,4-8 = MF 215,17-21)

Conversely, in 'Sît ich den sumer truoc', the lover is able to reflect on his failure to pursue the service of his lady faithfully owing to his lack of insight. Thus, the virtue of constancy is directly connected with perception in this poem:

Mîn vrowe gert mîn niht: diu schulde ist mîn.
sît sinne machent sældehaften man,
und unsin stæte sælde nie gewan,
ob ich mit sinnen niht gedienen kan,
dâ bin ich alterseine schuldic an.
(I,2,5-9 = MF 205,14-18)

In 'Ob man mit lügen', a lady realizes the need for members of her own sex to display 'schoener sin' in order to attract a constant lover (IX = MF 212,37). At first, this particular lady blames her heart for its betrayal in making an apparently unsuitable choice (IX,1,7f. = MF 213,5f.; IX,2,1-4 = MF 213,9-12). In the final stanza, however, in an echo of the body's own change of insight in *Die Klage*, she associates success in love with the powers of perception (IX,3,5-8 = MF 213,23-6).

Hartmann's crusading songs transcend the association of secular love service with the attainment of moral improvement. 'Ich var mit iuweren hulden' (XVII = MF 218,5), for example, depicts the rejection of the pursuit of such secular love, and reveals that the love of God, rather than the love of the lady, is the reason for undertaking the crusade. The circumstances of the crusade demand the sole allegiance of the crusader to God. The superiority of such focused love is demonstrated by its relationship with action and reciprocity in this poem, in contrast to the inaction and the vain hopes of the courtly lovers (XVII,2,1f. = MF 218,13f.; XVII,3 = MF 218,21-8). In particular, the association of love with action implies the influence on

this poem of penitential practice and the theory which shaped it. As action is described according to this theory as a prerequisite of virtue, Hartmann appears to be disassociating secular love service from the acquisition of virtue in this particular poem in order to emphasize the superior calling and reward of the crusader's service to God.

The focus of Hartmann's remaining crusading songs is placed primarily on the pure intentions and powers of perception which are demanded of any true crusading knight and his lady. 'Dem kriuze zimet wol', for example, emphasizes that the outward show of the crusader's cross has no bearing upon success if it is not accompanied by the honest intentions of the heart:

> waz touget ez ûf der wât,
> der sîn an dem herzen niene hât?
> (V,1,11f. = MF 209,35f.)

If accompanied by appropriate behaviour, however, inner awareness is proposed in this poem as a means to achieve secular and heavenly virtue:

> Dem kriuze zimet wol reiner muot
> und kiusche site,
> sô mac man sælde und allez guot
> erwerben dâ mite.
> (V,1,1-4 = MF 209,25-8)

The crusading enterprise is likewise described as the spur for any young or foolish man who lacks the required powers of insight to achieve such a balance of faculties (V,1,5-8 = MF 209,29-32).

A similar call is made in 'Swelch vrowe sendet ir lieben man' (VI = MF 211,20) for the lady of the crusading knight to cultivate the same pure and honest intentions based on insight. In this way, she will play her part and share in

the reward even though she remains behind. The crusade is thus portrayed as a situation in which the participants in a love relationship, if they act with purity of heart, can both achieve a measure of reward. The reciprocity which is not forthcoming in a secular love relationship is thus achievable in these particular and superior circumstances.

Such an extension of the normal boundaries of a love relationship is nevertheless surpassed in 'Ich var mit iuweren hulden' by the rejection of unreciprocated secular love, a notion which is likewise evident in 'Dem kriuze zimet wol'. In the latter, the attractions and concerns of the world are condemned in comparison with the more deserving need of the crusade (V,2,5-8 = MF 209,41-4; V,3 = MF 210,11; V,6 = MF 211,8).

The crusading songs therefore lay great emphasis on the heavenly rewards awaiting knights with pure hearts who are willing to participate in the action of the crusade. Such prizes transcend the reward of the lover in a love relationship. Despite the emphasis on the moral superiority of the crusade, however, the call for perception and application remains equally strong in all Hartmann's lyric poems, whether in order for a lover to achieve the virtues which will earn reward for his love service or for a knight to undertake his crusading service. Both goals, if pursued in this way, will ultimately attain the virtue which will secure the praise and reward of both God and secular society.

Die Klage as a Discussion of Lay Morality

The prerequisites for virtue and success which are portrayed in Hartmann's lyric poetry are likewise evident in *Die Klage*, in a genre which permits a more detailed investigation of the ethical value of secular love. This

work describes a love relationship, but, as is the case in many of the lyric poems, love is not depicted as an end in itself.[213] In fact, following the description in the prologue of love's great power (DK 1-13), the pursuit of love becomes gradually less significant in the course of the narrative. Eventually, the notion of love in the Ovidian sense as an overwhelmingly powerful force is abandoned. Furthermore, the achievement of success in love becomes overshadowed in this work by the recognition that the virtues required for such success will attract both heavenly and social reward.[214] In addition, the means to attain such virtue in order to achieve these ends are described as a combination of the power of perception and action. Consequently, a love relationship is accorded ethical significance, a notion which is emphasized in *Die Klage* by the heart's teaching. The pursuit of love is presented, therefore, as a means of improving one's morals as the two goals represent stations on the same path.[215] Thus, desire, if used in conjunction with sense and sensitivity, can be transformed into an ethical force. This point is emphasized by the body when it eventually expresses its intention to continue to serve the lady, even for no reward, because of the moral gains it will achieve in doing so:

'Ist daz ez mir ab so ergat
daz mich daz unheil bestat
und mir da niht gelingen sol,
dannoch tuot mir daz vil wol
daz ich diensthaft belibe
einem also schoenem wibe.
ich lebe ir gerne miniu jar:
ja troestet mich baz deiswar,
ein vil ungewisser wan
den ich zuo ir minne han
danne ein also swachez heil
des ich ze maze wurde geil.
ouch gewinne ich me dar an:
swaz ich mac oder kan,
daz ich mich durch si vlizen sol
ze tuon rehte unde wol
und valsches durch si ane bin.' (DK 1069-85)

In an initial insight into its subsequent observations regarding virtue, the heart prompts the body to aspire to attain 'triuwe', 'milte', and 'manheit' as a means of gaining favour amongst the ladies (DK 621-34). It likewise describes secular privilege and salvation as elusive goals which require active and strenuous pursuit (DK 742-54). At a later stage in the work, the relationship between the quest for love and the attainment of virtue is expanded. As a result of pursuing love and virtue by the means described by the heart, a lover becomes eligible to acquire certain other virtues. These are described as magical herbs which are only bestowed by God's grace:

> ez ist dar umbe so getan,
> swer in ze rehte sol began,
> der muoz haben driu krut,
> diu tuont in liep unde trut.
> derne darft du aber niht warten
> in deheines mannes garten,
> ouchne vindet si niemen veile.
> ezne ste an sinem heile
> daz er si gewinne
> von dem mit schoenem sinne
> der si in sinem gewalte hat,
> sone hilfet in dehein rat,
> er wæn ir iemer enbære.
> got ist der würzære,
> der phliget ir alters eine.
> sin kamer diu ist reine:
> dar uz git er si swem er wil:
> der hat ouch immer heiles vil.
> Diu krut sint dir unerkant;
> also sint si genant:
> milte, zuht, diemuot. (DK 1283-1303)

These three herbs therefore are only granted to those people in possession of 'schoener sin', who are capable of positively using their reflective faculties. Furthermore, the magic of these three herbs requires the acquisition of additional virtues to achieve full potency. These virtues are listed as 'triuwe unde stæte', 'kiuscheit unde schame', and 'gewislîchiu manheit'. Furthermore, all of these virtues are required to be gathered in a heart free of hate, as the heart explains:

ouch hoerent ander würze derzuo
e daz man im rehte tuo:
triwe unde stæte.
swer die dar zuo niht hæte,
so müese der list beliben;
ouch muost du dar zuo triben
beide kiuscheit unde schame.
dannoch ist ein krutes name
gewislichiu manheit.
so ist daz zouber gar gereit.
und swem also gelinget
daz er si zesamen bringet,
der sol si schütten in ein vaz:
daz ist ein herze ane haz.
da sol er si inne tragen,
so wil ich dir daz zeware sagen
daz im diu sælde ist gereit
unz er si bi im treit. (DK 1309-26)

In this way, the heart stresses its function in the acquisition of virtue and as a place of contact with God. Thus, the use of balanced reason and action in the pursuit of love is described as the means to attain the virtues of God's grace which will inevitably attract the favour of ladies and secular praise in general:

wan sol dir von wibe
immer rehte wol ergan,
so muost du ditz zouber han.
ouch ist ez eines dinges guot,
daz man ez ane laster tuot
und ane groze sünde.
wol in der ir hat künde!
daz ist zer werlte ein sælekeit
und ist gote niene leit,
ez ist bedenthalp ein gwin,
got und diu werlt minnet in;
swer den selben zouberlist kan,
der ist zer werlt ein sælec man. (DK 1336-48)

It is significant that the virtues listed in this work do not correspond directly with Christian or cardinal virtues. Instead, they may be termed a list of courtly virtues which, on the one hand, incorporate certain aspects which are mutually acceptable to both the Church and the military aristocracy, for example loyalty, and, on the other hand, purely secular virtues such as 'gewislîchiu manheit'. Such

a combination of secular and clerical virtues implies that Hartmann's aim was to create a lay analysis of virtue in this work, which places the respected characteristics of a knight or courtly lover within a theological framework based on Augustine's notion of *sola gratia Dei*, according to which God alone dispenses the three Christian virtues of faith, hope, and charity. The fact that these three virtues are not openly identified in *Die Klage* implies that Hartmann is not attempting to portray the ethical guidelines prescribed by the Church directly. Nevertheless, the parallel between Augustine's teaching and Hartmann's description in this work of God's discretionary powers in the apportioning of certain superior virtues suggests that neither is Hartmann seeking to contradict the Church's teaching entirely. Instead, he presents a treatise on secular virtue which is lent theological weight by its similarity to the means prescribed in the teaching of the Church to achieve divinely-granted virtue. As Volker Mertens states:

> diese inhaltlich laikale Tugenddidaxe wird mit Hilfe der gelehrten kirchlichen Gnadenlehre entfaltet, indem die transzendente Seite unverändert belassen wird.[216]

Thus, Hartmann may be advocating broadly secular virtues, but he nevertheless portrays the manner in which they are achieved as being identical to that of Christian virtues. Indeed, it can be argued that just such a combination of courtly and Christian virtues would be most fitting for the work of a clerically-trained secular poet with the interests of his audience in mind. *Die Klage* therefore represents a didactic moral treatise which reflects the lay concerns of the military aristocracy. Thus, the portrayal of virtue in this work does not have a wholly theological basis and is mostly restricted to the secular realm. However, these secular virtues are nevertheless accorded strong moral overtones by being presented as a means of pleasing God

owing to the fact that they are achieved in the same way as strictly Christian virtues.

The relationship between the secular and the theological dimensions has been interpreted in different ways in Hartmann scholarship. Antonín Hrubý, for example, maintains that Hartmann apparently implies in this work that secular virtues contain moral value in themselves, a notion which contravenes the definition accepted by the majority of twelfth-century theologians that virtue is only attained by the divine acknowledgement of an action. Secular virtues are therefore incapable of earning such God-given approval. As Hrubý states:

> es ist nur allzu begreiflich, daß die absolute Mehrzahl mittelalterlicher Theologen den Tugenden nur dann moralischen Wert zuschrieb, wenn ihnen durch göttliche Gnade übernatürliches Verdienst verliehen wurde. Somit sind aber die sogenannten politischen Tugenden der heidnischen Philosophen wie auch die natürlichen oder erworbenen Tugenden der Christen, die für die weltlichen Sittenlehren der höfischen Dichter in Betracht kämen, aus der mittelalterlichen Moral im strikten Sinne ausgeschlossen.[217]

Hrubý acknowledges that Hartmann is aware of the procedure for receiving virtue from God, but also that he substitutes secular for heavenly virtues. By investigating both *Die Klage* and *Erec*, Hrubý observes the function of the heart as the organ of intellect and its role in guiding the body to achieving success in love. According to Hrubý, Hartmann emphasizes the manner in which the striving of the heart and body towards this goal inevitably results in the acquisition of additional virtues.[218] Thus, the struggle to achieve worldly goals is a potential means of earning God's grace, even if it is not a causal means. The potential nevertheless contains an element of moral gain in itself. Such an interest in the depiction of a *Gesinnungsmoral* in which the powers of perception and the intentions of the protagonists are of paramount importance, causes Hrubý to link Hartmann's

works with the teaching of twelfth-century scholastic thought,[219] a view shared by Schnell and this present study. However, Hrubý proceeds to draw the further conclusion on the basis of this evidence that Hartmann was ahead of his age in bestowing moral worth on worldly virtues in this way. Consequently, Hrubý relates Hartmann's thought more closely to Aquinas' thirteenth-century theory that political virtues contain an element of morality.[220] However, such speculation can be avoided by taking into account the fact that Hartmann's work is not a purely theological treatise, but instead represents the moral values of the secular aristocracy set against a clerical background. The combination of these issues is explicable within the context of twelfth-century values, and does not need a forward reference to Aquinas' later system.

Hartmann's creation of a fine balance between the lay and clerical spheres has also provoked attempts to identify the source of greatest influence on his lay moral philosophy. Mertens, for example, observes a secular model for *Die Klage* in the *Moralis philosophia* of William of Conches which was influenced by Cicero's *De officiis* and may have been known to Hartmann through Wernher of Elmendorf's translation.[221] In the *Moralis,* there is no mention of Christian virtues, nor of God's part in their distribution. Mertens' reason for suggesting this model is based on the fact that these three Christian virtues are similarly absent in *Die Klage,* although he acknowledges that some of the virtues listed by Hartmann have religious overtones and that religious themes are integrated. In essence, Mertens concludes that Hartmann's education permits him to draw on antique sources and the contemporary secular love lyric genre to create in *Die Klage* a code of ethics for the military aristocracy which is based broadly on secular rather than on clerical influences.

Wolf Gewehr, however, rejects the possibility that the *Moralis philosophia* provided a model for *Die Klage* for precisely the same reason that Mertens accepts it, in other words because Christian virtues and God's involvement are not mentioned.[222] Gewehr supports his claim by highlighting Hartmann's superimposition of heavy religious overtones on the secular virtues mentioned in *Die Klage*, and perceiving evidence of a clerical bias to this work in this emphasis. Furthermore, Gewehr underlines Hartmann's virtual equation of certain secular virtues with the three Christian virtues in terms of the exclusive manner in which they are dispensed by God. Similarly, Gewehr highlights the significant inclusion of humility as the single unequivocally Christian virtue in the heart's teaching. Humility occupies a role of central importance in Christian morality as it forms the root of all virtues. The inclusion of this virtue in this work, combined with evidence to suggest that Hartmann was influenced by Augustine's teaching regarding the acquisition of virtues, leads Gewehr to conclude that the secular courtly virtues listed by the heart are equated by Hartmann with Christian courtly virtues. Unlike Mertens, therefore, Gewehr is of the opinion that *Die Klage* constitutes a fundamentally religious work which discusses secular virtues from this basic Christian standpoint.

Both Mertens and Gewehr acknowledge the combination of secular and religious notions in *Die Klage*, but attempt to attach greater significance to one sphere of influence at the expense of the other. In Mertens' case, *Die Klage* is cast as a secular work with religious overtones, and, in Gewehr's case, it becomes a religious work with secular overtones. However, such emphasis on one sphere of influence detracts from the fact that this work is a skilful and appropriate combination of both spheres by a clerically-educated secular author. The framework for this exposition on the acquisition of virtue is based on theological influences. However, the lack of any direct reference to the

three Christian virtues in *Die Klage* implies, quite appropriately for a work directed at a secular audience, that Hartmann's aim was not to create a purely theological treatise. Such a combination of the clerical and secular instead creates an emphasis on the means to achieve virtue, which is based on the teaching of Augustine, but which Hartmann relates to a secular context. In this manner, the portrayal of the acquisition of virtue in this work can be interpreted in terms of achieving success in love and secular honour, as well as encouraging a recognition of the advantages of adhering to the social hierarchy of the feudal system.[223]

The format of *Die Klage* permits a clear and detailed account of the issue of perception and its value in both a love relationship and in terms of secular renown and heavenly salvation. The clarity of presentation likewise aids an evaluation of the sources of influence underlying the didactic principles in the narrative. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to support the existence of a direct source for the narrative itself. The extent of Hartmann's own interest in subjective issues in this work can only therefore be assessed with the hindsight gained from a consideration of his later narratives.

In *Die Klage*, the breakdown of the partnership between the heart, representing rational powers, and the body, representing physical action and desire, provides abundant scope for the function and duties of each protagonist to be revealed, as well as the consequences of their lack of co-operation. Their debate ultimately serves to describe the need to establish a balance between rational thought and appropriate action in order to achieve both secular and clerical virtues and by extension to be rewarded in a love relationship and in heaven. One may contend therefore, on the basis of this evidence, that this work demonstrates the influence of the teaching of the early scholastic and

monastic masters, particularly regarding penitential practice, as described in the previous chapter. Although it is not a theological treatise employing the corresponding terminology, the detail of the relationship between the protagonists in this work nevertheless reveals clerical influence. In addition, this is suggested by the employment of the heart image in contrast to the soul in the literary tradition of body/soul disputations. The preference for the heart may be linked to the biblical notion of the heart containing the potency of the intellect, a concept which was transported into the works of twelfth-century masters via Augustine. Nevertheless, despite the evidence for clerical influence on Hartmann's portrayal of the function of perception, he creates a secular background for this depiction, thereby drawing lay notions of morality and the importance of introspection into this framework.

Hartmann's own status and education hold the key to placing this work in its most appropriate context. The influence of twelfth-century thought concerning the role of perception and the willingness to act as the means to achieve true contrition and virtue is visible in the roles played by the heart and body. The appropriateness of these means for the acquisition of secular virtues is likewise emphasized in the heart's teaching. A secular love relationship is thus posited as an opportunity to attain moral improvement. Hartmann therefore reveals his interest in the role of perception in lay morality in this initial work. Indeed, the experimental nature of *Die Klage* as a modification of the disputation genre into which Hartmann has introduced established imagery denoting inner awareness implies an effort to create an arena in which to express such interest. The diverse elements constituting lay moral thought demand the creation of a hybrid genre such as this. In addition, the disputation genre offers Hartmann the means to devote himself entirely and in great detail to the question of achieving virtue and success in love. The issues discussed

in this work remain of essential importance in the underlying ethic of his later narratives. In these later works, an imbalance of the perceptive and the physical faculties occurs in certain aspects of the protagonists' lives, either with regard to secular or spiritual responsibilities. The situations may change between Hartmann's works, therefore, but the mechanics of ethical behaviour remain the same. *Die Klage* thus acts as an introduction to this philosophy. As Seiffert states, with regard to this disputation:

> [Hartmann] must have been helping to form the critical sensibilities of an audience that will also have occasion to observe his epic heroes - Erec, Iwein, even Gregorius - in their self-conscious moments as they encounter the career-making stages of their passage through life.[224]

It is these 'self-conscious moments', therefore, which will form the focus of the present study's consideration of *Erec* and *Gregorius*.

CHAPTER FOUR

Erec

In terms of genre, *Erec* differs from *Die Klage* in that it is a fictional narrative which is free from the restrictions of the disputation. The opportunity for a continued investigation into inner awareness in a broader context therefore presents itself to Hartmann. Although Erec, like Hartmann's fictional self in *Die Klage*, is cast in the role of youthful lover, he is subject to a range of responsibilities beyond this role in a variety of different environments. This work therefore offers a more expansive portrayal than *Die Klage* of the specific ways in which a lover can serve both secular society and God. In addition, the existence of a direct source in the form of Chrétien's *Erec et Enide* enables an investigation of the depiction and significance of the perceptive faculty in this work to detect Hartmann's own particular concerns in the form of his adjustments to his source.

The change in genre likewise offers Hartmann the opportunity to employ different methods of depicting inner perception. In *Die Klage*, the heart enjoyed this role. However, the heart image in *Erec* is not accorded the same specific capacity. It is predominantly described as a vessel of emotion, or of such knightly virtues as courage. There is no overriding sense of the heart as the organ of intelligence or as the connecting point with God. Only on three occasions does the heart appear to represent the organ of intelligence (Er 4364, 5804, 6129). Nevertheless, references are also made to the heart's foolish or inadequate advice (Er 1224, 8480). Special attention will be paid to these references in the course of this chapter. However, the different genre allows the depiction of reflection in *Erec* to move beyond the use of this image. The additional methods employed to this end will become evident in the course of this investigation.

The Pre-*verligen* Episode

In the events prior to the *verligen* episode, there is ample evidence that Erec is in possession of a sound capacity for inner awareness and the ability to respond promptly to his thoughts. He displays this astuteness by assessing situations and reacting accordingly to them. This assessment is signified by references to his thought processes (*denken, muot, sin, erkennen*), and the indirect or direct portrayal of his train of thought. These references and interior monologues form the basic vehicles for expressing inner awareness in this work. Their significance to Hartmann becomes particularly apparent when they are compared with Chrétien's version. In the initial episode, for example, Hartmann's Erec acts decisively on the basis of his own judgement of Maliclisier's brutal treatment of the queen's maiden. Thus, in the German version, Erec requires no prompting from the queen to demand an explanation from the dwarf. Instead, his own powers of perception lead him to take action:

> Êrec dô ahten began,
> der ritter wære dehein vrum man,
> daz er ez vor im vertruoc
> daz sîn getwerc die maget sluoc.
> er sprach: 'ich wil rîten dar,
> daz ich iu diu mære ervar.'
> diu vrouwe sprach: 'nû rîtet enwec.' (Er 66-72)

Likewise, Erec undertakes an inner analysis of his chances of retrieving his armour in time to pursue Iders. This process is introduced by a term describing thought, followed by an indirect depiction of those thoughts and the actions they engender:

> ouch gedâhte der juncherre,
> im wære daz ze verre,
> ob er zen selben zîten
> hin wider wolde rîten
> dâ er sînen harnasch hâte,
> und daz er alsô drâte

in nimmer genæme,
swie schiere er wider kæme,
sô wæren si im entriten gar,
und îlte in nâch alsô bar. (Er 150-9)

It is worth noting that this description of Erec's thoughts is portrayed in speech in the French source. Hartmann therefore appears to be focusing on the inner life of his main protagonist from an early stage of the narrative. However, this is not to claim that Chrétien lacks interest in this issue. On many occasions, Hartmann reproduces instances of deliberation which appear in his source. However, it is often the case that Hartmann accentuates these instances of perception in some way, either by transforming them into inner monologues in direct speech, rearranging their position in a scene, or extending them considerably. Further such comparisons with Hartmann's source will be made throughout this chapter.

To return to the pre-*verligen* episode, Erec's sharp powers of perception are likewise apparent in the cunning he displays against Iders. He is able, for example, to conceal himself whilst pursuing the knight to Tulmein (Er 165f., 225-7). However, these relatively minor instances of shrewdness are overshadowed by Erec's subsequent devising of a plan which will not only restore his own honour and that of Koralus' family, but which will also win him a wife. His perceptiveness further manifests itself in his willingness to reveal his plan to Koralus. Thus, Erec explains his needs, intentions, and his impeccable credentials as a husband, in a long, fluent speech (Er 474ff.). This outpouring of ideas and information reveals the astuteness and energy of Erec's mind, as does his curiosity regarding the situation of Koralus' family, the town, and Iders, which is manifested in his relentless questioning (Er 447, 457, 470f.).

A comparison with Hartmann's source reveals the different emphases of the two authors on Erec's perceptiveness here. The corresponding information in Chrétien's scene is depicted in a more balanced conversation with the *vavasour* (EeE 501ff.). Chrétien's arrangement, with its steady supply of answers from Erec's host, does not therefore create the same impression of quick-mindedness as the rapid and uninterrupted flow of ideas emanating from Hartmann's main protagonist. Similarly, Hartmann's Erec is markedly forthcoming earlier in this episode in his demands for information from Maliclisier (Er 76-82). The dwarf provides a sullen contrast to this attitude by his unwillingness to communicate and his mockery of Erec's demands (Er 83-94). Furthermore, a comparison with Hartmann's source on this point is again telling as neither Erec nor the queen's maiden address the dwarf in the French version (EeE 159-220). An increased emphasis on communication is therefore already being developed in Hartmann's adaptation, particularly with regard to the main protagonist. These acts of enquiry are all prompted by an alertness and inquisitiveness which characterize Erec's behaviour at this stage in the text.

Erec's execution of his plan provides further evidence of his powers of thought. For example, he is able to make skilful compensation for his inferior strength and arms in the combat against Iders (Er 790-7). Similarly, the focus of his thoughts is revealed during the combat, thereby highlighting the motivation of shame and his desire for Enite which eventually guide him to victory (Er 930-9). Both of these points are apparent in Chrétien's narrative also (EeE 910-24). However, a contrast between the two versions is evident in the tournament scene after the wedding. Here Hartmann's Erec displays exemplary insight by keeping himself apart from the other knights in the knowledge that he is not yet a proven and established equal (Er 2381-90). It is his self-awareness that enables him to act with such

sensitivity. Furthermore, Erec is shown to be fully aware of the importance of deporting himself well in his debut tournament for the sake of his later reputation. He is described as deep in thought before the tournament (Er 2248-58), and during the action he is intent on winning renown, rather than booty (Er 2613-22). Although he displays great physical dexterity, Erec's mental alertness also enables him to become aware of and to judge the dangerous situation of his team (Er 2638-2707). His immediate actions, prompted by this perceptiveness, lead to his ultimate success and the acclaim of his peers. His exemplary powers of insight are therefore depicted as the primary forces which allow him to act responsibly and appropriately as a knight in this situation.

Inner awareness is likewise portrayed in this initial episode as a prerequisite for experiencing pity and concern for others. In this sense, *Erec* portrays the same formula for the acquisition of such virtues as *Die Klage*. For example, Erec is sufficiently sensitive to Koralus' situation to refuse Imain's hospitality after his defeat of Iders, in order to avoid offending his proud but impoverished host (Er 1341-55). Similarly, Erec remembers in the midst of his joyful reception at Arthur's court that he has promised to release Koralus from his poverty (Er 1806-10). His concerns, even in the midst of his triumph, are for others. In this way, Erec reveals his ability to achieve *caritas*, the topmost branch of the Tree of Virtue, the associate virtues of which include pity, compassion, and gratefulness.[225] All of these virtues are demonstrated by the perceptive hero in the initial episode of this work.

It is worthy of note, with regard to this last point, that Hartmann is following his source quite closely. Chrétien's Erec is also depicted remembering his promise to the *vavasour* (EeE 1845-50). Nevertheless, Hartmann displays an emphasis on concern for others over and above his source in

an earlier scene, namely when the queen's concern for Erec prompts her to ask Arthur to postpone claiming his kiss until they hear news of the young knight:

> 'gedingen unde sorgen
> hân ich umbe den jungelinc,
> wie nû stên sîniu dinc.
> ich enmohte in nie erwenden.
> got welle in uns senden.
> geselle, nû bite ich dich
> durch sîne liebe und durch mich
> daz dû dîns rehtes niht nemest
> ê daz dû danne vernemest
> wie im sîn dinc ergangen sî.' (Er 1137-46)

By contrast, in Chrétien's version, the queen's request occurs earlier and is not based on her fears for Erec (EeE 321-41). Hartmann's delaying of this scene until after the depiction of Erec's victory emphasizes his queen's long-lasting concern which stems from her initial attempts to dissuade Erec from following Iders (Er 144-9 compared with EeE 272-4). Furthermore, on seeing Iders approach Arthur's court, Hartmann's queen herself expresses her fear that Erec has been defeated and her fervent hope that he has survived (Er 1171-93). In Chrétien's version, by contrast, the question of Erec's fate is expressed mainly by Gauvain, despite the queen stating her interest in the outcome (EeE 1145-70). Hartmann's adjustments to this initial episode therefore underline the virtue of caring perceptiveness through the characters of both the queen and the main protagonist. This constitutes another early indication that Hartmann's adaptation is powered by the desire to highlight and extend his source's depiction of such subjective aspects.[226]

A further dimension to Erec's powers of thought which is evident in this initial episode is apparent in his ability to perceive the intentions of others. This aspect of Abelard's theory of sin, which was discussed in relation to *Iwein* by Rüdiger Schnell,[227] and in the previous chapter of

this present study regarding *Die Klage*, receives similar expression in *Erec*. For example, when Iders defends himself in defeat by stating that Erec could have expected mercy if their roles had been reversed, Erec is swift to remind his adversary of his actual earlier intentions:

> 'und gedenke dar an
> daz ich dir, tugenthafter man,
> selh herzenleit niht hân getân:
> dû maht mich wol bî lîbe lân.'
> des antwurte im Êrec dô.
> er sprach: 'wie redet ir nû sô?
> ir spottet mîn âne nôt.
> jâ woldet ir niuwan mînen tôt:
> sô stüende iuch ze ringe
> iuwer vürgedinge
> und iuwer grôzer übermuot.
> jâne næmet ir dehein guot
> an disem strîte vür mîn leben.' (Er 960-72)
>
> Êrec erbarmde sich dô.
> zuo dem ritter sprach er sô:
> 'nû wil ich iuch leben lân:
> des enhetet ir mir niht getân.' (Er 1010-3)

In addition, Erec uses his perceptive cunning to deal justly with Iders and his dwarf, after having established their evil motivation. He thus disguises his own intentions by pretending to be on the verge of punishing his opponents harshly, thereby frightening them into submission and regret (Er 951-5, 1052-63). Although Erec appears to be acting in a manner at odds with the expected conduct of a victorious knight in combat, he does not demonstrate signs of any real malevolence. Instead, Erec is merely intent on frightening his opponents by skilfully concealing his motives.

This initial episode thus provides extensive evidence of Erec's reasoning powers and their role in his endeavour to clear his name, his concern for others, his just punishment of miscreants, and his promotion of his knightly reputation. He proves himself to be an astute and virtuous knight in all respects.

Further examination of the fruits of inner awareness can be made with regard to the figure of the repentant Iders. Hartmann has again added his own emphasis to his source by greatly altering Iders' arrival scene at Arthur's court (Er 1214ff.). Thus, Chrétien's Yder presents himself to the queen as her prisoner and informs her of events at Tulmein:

> Et dist: 'Dame! an vostre prison
> M'anvoie ci uns jantis hon,
> Uns chevaliers vaillanz et preuz,
> Cil cui fist ier santir les neuz
> Mes nains de la corgiee el vis;
> Outré m'a d'armes et conquis.
> Dame, le nain vos amain ci:
> Venuz est a vostre merci.
> Moi et ma pucele et mon nain
> An vostre prison vos amain
> Por feire tot quanque vos plest.' (EeE 1187-97)

(He said: 'My lady, I'm sent here as your prisoner by a noble man, a valiant and gallant knight, the one who yesterday felt the knots of my dwarf's scourge across his face. He has overcome and vanquished me in armed combat. Here, my lady, I bring you the dwarf, come to throw himself on your mercy. I bring and surrender to you myself, my maiden and my dwarf, for you to do with us whatever you please.')[228]

Yder's factual account does not include any indication of regret. Indeed, Yder appears to hold his dwarf accountable for his own behaviour, despite the fact that Erec drew Yder's attention to his responsibility for the dwarf directly after their combat (EeE 1013ff.). Hartmann's Iders, in contrast, emphasizes that he himself as the dwarf's master is guilty of the crime:

> 'ich wil mich schuldic ergeben:
> iu ist von mir geschehen leit.
> ich binz der iu widerreit
> gester ûf der heide.
> daz ist mir komen ze leide
> daz ich die unzuht vertruoc
> daz mîn getwerc die maget sluoc.
> der unvuore umbe den geiselslac
> hât mich Êrec fil de roi Lac
> wol ze buoze gesat,
> als in mîn wâriu schulde bat.' (Er 1237-47)

Similarly, these differences are revealed in the two versions of the earlier conversation between the knights following the combat at Tulmein. Hartmann's version emphasizes Iders' guilt in failing to prevent his dwarf's maliciousness and in thereby causing the queen great distress (Er 1022-55). As a result, Iders is required to realize his fault and make reparation to the queen for his shameful behaviour. In the French source, however, no mention is made of reparation or regret. Yder is simply required to throw himself on the queen's mercy (EeE 1028-37).

Hartmann's contrasting emphasis on Iders' insight into his own behaviour and his expression of remorse is further evident in his address to the queen. Whereas Chrétien's Yder simply states the facts of his defeat (EeE 1187-1213), Hartmann's Iders undertakes an extensive evaluation of his behaviour (Er 1213-59). For example, Iders maintains that the motivation for his behaviour was his own malice and the advice of his foolish heart:

> 'wider iuch vergâhete ich mich:
> des entwanc mich dehein nôt,
> wan daz mirz mîn schalcheit gebôt.
> des sol ich iu ze buoze stân:
> wan ich dar an gevolget hân
> tumbes herzen râte.' (Er 1219-24)

The image of the foolish heart, as discussed in the previous chapter, appears here to represent humankind's capacity for free will. Although the term 'tump' is somewhat ambiguous,[229] in this instance there is no notion of inexperience or youthfulness which might vindicate Iders. Iders' heart has instead elected to take the path of wrongdoing, thereby responding to its natural inclination for evil.

Iders' confession to the queen reveals that his defeat has precipitated an insight into his own culpability. This

speech is particularly significant as it constitutes one of three comparable points in the text at which characters consider their behaviour in an external monologue. The other two occasions are Keii's plea after being defeated by Erec and his subsequent relating of the incident to Arthur's court (Er 4756ff.), and Erec's own monologue after his second encounter with Guivreiz (Er 7007ff.). These three occurrences are not of equal significance, however. The direct speech and terminology of Erec's monologue link it more closely with that of Iders', whereas Keii's discussion with Erec and his indirect speech to the court create a less emphatic depiction of regret. The external monologue serves to reveal the characters' insight into themselves, and therefore constitutes highly significant evidence in a study of this nature.

It is apparent from Iders' speech that he has gained the necessary perceptiveness to accuse himself of arrogance. He regrets, however, that he only achieved it after this vice almost caused his death:

> 'ez ist eht als man dâ seit,
> daz unrehter hôchmuot
> dem manne lîhte schaden tuot.
> des hân ich mich enstanden
> nâch grôzen mînen schanden
> und bin es an ein ende komen:
> wan er hât mir nâch benomen
> zuo den êren daz leben.' (Er 1229-36)

There are distinct echoes here of penitential practice. Iders' brush with death can be interpreted in theological terms as indicating the need for penance before the death of the body in order to avoid the death of the soul. Iders has had a narrow escape, and his new powers of inner awareness allow him to comprehend this. His speech essentially acts as an exposition on the need to pursue self-knowledge in order to avoid vice, in this case arrogant behaviour. Iders now accepts that he was responsible for his dwarf's actions, and that he was motivated by wrongful intentions which have been

justly punished by Erec. Iders thus reveals that his new-found awareness allows him to feel remorse and to acknowledge his faults. He is likewise ready to present himself for punishment. In the course of this address, therefore, Iders effectively demonstrates pure contrition, which is only achieved by means of a clear insight into his motives, and confesses his faults to the court. The detailed steps of penance, i.e. contrition, confession, and the intent to perform satisfaction, are all evident in Iders' address. Significantly, however, Iders does not make confession to a priest. Hartmann's investigation of these issues does not therefore extend to following the Church's instruction on confession to the letter. Nevertheless, his exploration of the underlying causes of Iders' wrongdoing, and his demonstration of the importance and nature of contrition in his adaptation of Iders' speech suggest the influence of the developing emphasis on private penance which permeated his age and which is here applied to a secular, knightly sphere.

Furthermore, the terminology used by Iders is significant. The term *buoze* must be viewed with caution because of its secular connotations regarding reparation.[230] However, its use in this context of insight, confession, and regret would suggest that it denotes the desire to make reparation based on heartfelt inner repentance. Hartmann's use of the term is very selective. Of its seven occurrences in the narrative, five are used with reference to Iders. Thus, after the combat, Iders protests his innocence, but offers to repair any wrong he may have caused Erec (Er 1005), which Erec demands that he should do (Er 1029). In addition, Iders uses the term twice in his address to the queen (Er 1222, 1246), and the queen herself employs this term to describe the mild punishment she will inflict upon him (Er 1279). The corresponding section in the French source makes no mention of regret or punishment, and Chrétien's queen again uses the language of chivalrous etiquette in releasing the knight

from his vow (EeE 1234f.). The other two occasions on which *buoze* appears are both in Erec's monologue after his defeat by Guivreiz (Er 7020, 7023). These constitute two occasions in Hartmann's text, therefore, on which *buoze* denotes a character's regret in an appraisal of his past behaviour. This point will receive further attention in the course of this chapter.

A similar emphasis on regret is revealed in a comparison of the term *riuwe* in Iders' speech with its use in the rest of the narrative. Iders states:

> 'nû riuwetz mich ze spâte.
> jâ warne ich mich ze unzît
> sam der hase sô er in dem netze lît:
> des ist mîn riuwe worden breit.' (Er 1225-8)

On the one hand, this term is used to denote general sorrow and grief, such as in the case of the eighty widows.[231] However, on the other hand, it is used on specific occasions in combination with evidence of a character's inner awareness to denote contrition. In Iders' case, his employment of this term occurs amidst an outpouring of regret and an admission of guilt. The term is likewise applied to Enite's insights in the *verligen* episode and to her decision to warn Erec about the robbers' attacks (Er 3002, 3142, 3366), as well as to Keii after his defeat by Erec (Er 4639). Its appearance on these occasions alongside indications of the characters' inner awareness thus suggests a connection between both *riuwe* and *buoze* in this secular context and the depiction of true contrition to be found in the twelfth-century works which shaped the subjective aspects of penitential practice.[232]

The interpretation of *riuwe* as denoting inner contrition, and as therefore containing an ethical value, can be placed in a wider perspective in order to reveal Hartmann's interest in secular morality. This is achieved by comparing

the use of *riuwe* with that of *schame* and its relation *schande* in Hartmann's works. David Yeandle maintains that for the most part Hartmann's use of *schame/schande* in *Erec* remains within the bounds of secular honour.[233] Thus, there is no spiritual dimension attached to these terms unlike in Wolfram's *Parzival* in which there is a greater emphasis on shame being internalized and used to promote spiritual good. Yeandle argues that Hartmann's employment of these terms only suggests courtly, knightly, or erotic shame in front of others. Examples cited by Yeandle include Erec's humiliation by Maliclisier, Enite's modesty on being presented to Arthur's court, and Keii's uncourtly behaviour. As Yeandle concludes:

> it can be confidently stated that Hartmann's romances operate with few exceptions within the confines of the (Arthurian) shame culture, where reputation and honour are paramount and where shame leads to alienation from that society, requiring restoration of êre.[234]

Parzival, by contrast, straddles the gap between shame and guilt cultures. Yeandle's conclusions, like those of Fischer and Voß, are timely reminders of the importance in the text of secular honour. However, by taking into account the use of *riuwe* in combination with inner deliberation in *Erec*, it is apparent that Hartmann nevertheless demonstrates a substantial interest in contrition which also extends to his employment of *schame*. Thus, although there are indeed instances of shame denoting modesty or concern for reputation in *Erec*, this term is also used on occasions on which elements of broader secular moral standards and a call for inner deliberation are portrayed. This is apparent, for example, when Erec judges that Iders (Er 990), Galoain (Er 4203), and the giants (Er 5469) should feel ashamed of themselves with the implication that they should revise their behaviour in moral terms and not only in terms of the honour ethic. In the light of this evidence, it seems

inappropriate to consider Hartmann to be completely unconcerned with the ethical dimension of shame.

An investigation into the perceptive qualities of the characters in this work must also take account of the frequent references to Erec's youthfulness which occur in this initial episode. Erec's tender years are mentioned, or he is described as *der junge man* or with derivatives of *junc*, on fourteen occasions before his *verligen*.[235] In addition, the queen's concern for Erec and her initial reluctance to let him seek his revenge focus on his inexperience.[236] Such numerous references to Erec's youthfulness in Hartmann's work may be compared with the single reference in the initial episode of Chrétien's version which emphasizes that, despite his young years, Erec is an established and successful knight (EeE 89-92). Hartmann's additions therefore imply considerable emphasis on this issue in his adaptation.

Erec's youthfulness is further suggested in Hartmann's work by Iders' false impression that he is about to join combat with a mere child (Er 763-5). His mistake reveals the manner in which his arrogance interferes with his perceptive faculties, but also reinforces the fact that Erec is still a youth. The use of *kint* as opposed to *junc* is significant. This is the only occasion on which *kint* is used to refer to Erec in order to indicate his present age, rather than his childhood. Elsewhere, it is a term used only to refer to Enite and Mabonagrin's lady.[237] This gender-specific use appears to stem from the fact that whereas *junc* suggests undeveloped potential, *kint* denotes a more dependent person who is still far from maturity. Its employment with reference to these two female characters therefore indicates the author's estimation of their status. Hence, its use by Iders with reference to Erec appears all the more condescending and misguided.

As Silvia Ranawake indicates, however, youthfulness is an ambiguous issue. It can indicate potential and energy, as is evident at the wedding tournament which Hartmann's Erec approaches with an eager determination to prove himself, but it can also imply harmful inexperience and immaturity.[238] Erec may thus be considered exceptional for his years, but the frequent references to his youthfulness can also be interpreted as highlighting a certain lack of maturity on his part. It appears as if Hartmann is creating, on the one hand, an image of a young man who has enjoyed remarkable success, but on the other hand, he is indicating that Erec's youthfulness nevertheless implies an incomplete process of maturity.

There are indeed notes of ambiguity regarding Erec's behaviour in this initial episode which have led certain scholars to conclude that Erec's youthfulness is portrayed in a negative light. They argue that he displays brashness, impetuosity, and a blinkered single-mindedness in gaining revenge.[239] However, the proposals of these scholars are based on a heavily ironic reading of the narrator's positive comments regarding the main protagonist, as well as on interpreting Erec's own behaviour as devious. Nevertheless, there is further evidence to suggest a degree of ambiguity in Erec's behaviour in this initial episode. Erec's presentation of his plan to Koralus, for example, hints at a certain immature lack of judgment. Koralus misunderstands Erec's motivation in asking for his help, and thereby invites the speculation that Erec has impetuously miscalculated the effect his words might have on a man in Koralus' impoverished position (Er 525-63). Another example of such ambiguity is evident in Erec's initial perception of Enite. His refusal to provide her with finer clothes may indicate an ignorance of her personal worth, and a concentration on her physical beauty.[240] However, Erec's reply to Imain's offer of clothes may also be interpreted as revealing his *awareness* of her inner worth, which is

symbolized by her person, rather than her outward appearance. A final note of ambiguity occurs when Erec enters Koralus' ruined house and mistakenly believes it to be uninhabited (Er 260-2). This may indicate that his powers of perception are as yet inadequate. Indeed, Clark proceeds to draw this conclusion, and makes a connection with Erec's false impression of his wife:

> Erec ... makes what will be for him a characteristic misperception. Just as he will later not recognize the full value of his wife, ... so he here is unaware of the presence of inhabitants in what he takes to be an abandoned house; in each instance he takes control of, or occupies, a space/enclosure/woman before he has information on the nature of the person he comes to love or the house he enters.[241]

However, this point is of relatively slight significance in the initial episode as a whole. A clearer assessment of Erec's behaviour is reflected in his comparison with certain figures from the Old Testament and classical antiquity who represent positive attributes such as wisdom, beauty, and honour, but who were all brought low by the love of women and who therefore represent the transience of earthly glory (Er 2815-21).[242] This comparison provides a firm indication that troubled times await Erec, but likewise confirms his previously exceptional behaviour. One may conclude, therefore, that any hints of harmful immaturity before his *verligen* are to be considered relatively insignificant, but that his inexperience will nevertheless have a role to play in his future downfall.

The *verligen* episode

Until Erec returns to Karnant, he is only required to prove himself as a knight. Certainly, Erec attains an extraordinary degree of success in this field by drawing on his

already well-developed powers of insight. These faculties enable him to demonstrate a high level of prowess, as well as the virtues of humility and a concern for others. However, on marrying Enite and succeeding his father, Erec's social position undergoes radical change. In social terms, Erec leaves the class of knights known as *iuvenes* and enters the realm of lordship with all the responsibilities this entails.[243] Consequently, after the wedding tournament, all references to Erec's youthfulness cease, reflecting the new maturity of his position. However, this advancement is not matched by a new level of maturity in his perceptiveness. Although Erec's youthfulness may protect him from any accusation of subjective guilt in theological terms, this is not the focus of Hartmann's depiction. Erec's inner awareness which previously appeared to be mature beyond his years during his first exploit as a knight, proves to be incapable of accommodating the extra dimensions of responsibility which he acquires as lord. There is no evident rebalancing of his perceptive faculties to match his changing identity and duties. Therefore, despite the fact that Erec's failure is not the result of any deep-seated ethical flaw which was evident in the initial episode, his inability to take into account his extended obligations has dire consequences in secular, social terms. He is required to be aware not only of the responsibilities of his search for personal success as a knight, but also of the honour and basic functioning of his court.[244] Only by taking the wider range of his identity as lord into consideration can Erec act in the interests of all his dependants. In this way, emphasis is placed on the awareness of obligations which is an essential prerequisite for the functioning of a feudally-structured society.[245] Hartmann thus appears to be highlighting the pitfalls in achieving success and acquiring responsibilities at an age at which one is too young to appreciate them, and the disastrous effect this can have on a society which relies on individuals to acknowledge and fulfil their obligations.

One may speculate on the possible background to Hartmann's emphasis on youthfulness in his male protagonist. The depiction of Erec's youthful energy and desire for success may reflect a certain autobiographical wistfulness on the author's part. Likewise, Hartmann's highlighting of the impact of immaturity on social responsibilities may demonstrate a preoccupation amongst the nobility with heirs being aware of their new obligations when they undergo the transition to lord.[246] This particular emphasis on lordly duties may also be seen against the broader background of concern over the undesirable behaviour of unmarried noble sons which was described in Chapter 2.

In *Erec*, the protagonist's problems begin with his taking a wife:

> Êrec was biderbe unde guot,
> ritterlîche stuont sîn muot
> ê er wîp genæme
> und hin heim kæme:
> nû sô er heim komen ist,
> dô kêrte er allen sînen list
> an vrouwen Ênîten minne.
> sich vlizzen sîne sinne
> wie er alle sîne sache
> wante zuo gemache. (Er 2924-33)

This passage contains an explicit explanation of the changes in Erec's perception at this stage. Previously, Erec's thoughts were focused on the pursuit of knighthood, and his perception was broad enough to enable him to be successful. Once he takes a wife, however, his thoughts turn only to loving her and to *gemach*, a familiar term from *Die Klage*. The employment of terms in this passage which specify the rational mind ('sinne', 'muot') in conjunction with the terms 'kêren' and 'wenden' reveal that this alteration is essentially a change of mental outlook. The previously astute Erec, whose newly-acquired status demands that he expand his powers of perception to accommodate these additional aspects of his identity, now only knows himself

as the lover of Enite. As Ursula Schulze indicates, Hartmann emphasizes Enite's erotic attractiveness far more than Chrétien, thereby implying that her beauty is the specific cause of Erec's distraction.[247] However, it is also significant that Erec's transformation is not ascribed specifically to the objective influences of love which might have deflected blame from him. Rather, the objective consequences of Erec's restricted awareness are of such import that the interfering role of love, like that of youthfulness, cannot be fully exculpatory. This question receives further discussion in the Galoain episode. Significantly, evidence of Erec's inner awareness ceases completely, if only temporarily, after his *verligen*. One may conclude therefore that Erec's desire for Enite obscures his awareness of his responsibilities. A comparison with *Die Klage*, in which the love-sick body ignores the advice of the heart, also supports this assumption. Without this perceptive guidance, both Erec and the body lapse into the pursuit of pleasure and comfortable living, and pay no attention to their obligations.

Hartmann emphasizes the overall effect on Erec of such a lack of inner awareness, for example on his personal and social relationships, and on his status as a Christian and a knight. All of these aspects of Erec's identity suffer when the balance between his powers of reasoning and his physical desires is lost. His crisis is therefore existential in nature.[248] In addition, the term *verligen* implies a particularly moral failing which reflects Erec's disastrously lax attitude towards his court. This stands in contrast to the French source in which Erec's failure to find a balance of love in marriage in particular, and his neglecting to pursue martial prowess, are emphasized, but his change in attitude is not accorded such significance. Similarly, particular blame is laid in Chrétien's version at Enide's door as a result of her dubious accusations of her husband of 'recréantise' (EeE 2555), which suggest cowardice

as well as laziness.[249] Her guilt is also implied by her own self-accusations of pride (EeE 2606-9).[250] Although Hartmann's Enite is implicated in Erec's *verligen* for her inadequate awareness of her responsibilities as a wife, the fault lies in a shared neglect of duties as a married couple. Enide's pride receives a large percentage of the blame in Chrétien's version to create an onus in their ensuing adventures on her rather than her husband's improvement.

The existence of a moral failing on Erec's part in the *verligen* episode has long been a bone of scholarly contention. Certain scholars, as mentioned earlier, claim that Erec acts impetuously and arrogantly already in the pre-*verligen* episode, and that his failure at Karnant therefore derives from subjective causes. The portrayal of Erec's reasoning powers in this initial episode, however, suggests that he is a virtuous and perceptive knight. This has provoked a further interpretation of the events surrounding the *verligen* episode, as represented in the work of Silvia Ranawake, Rudolf Voß (as discussed in Chapter 1), and Hugo Kuhn, who consider Erec's predicament to be the result of a visitation of objective sin on a perfect, representative individual. Each of these scholars argues that the medieval mind regarded sin primarily as humankind's inheritance from the Fall. As a result, sin affects even the most perfect individual.[251] In the light of this interpretation, Erec cannot have committed a moral transgression. As Kuhn sums up, regarding Erec's guilt:

> Gibt es darum aber ... hier ... keine Entwicklung? Es gibt sie sicherlich ... aber nicht im Sinne moderner psychologischer Subjektivität - sondern als Seinsverwirklichung in mittelalterlichen 'Universalien'. Das ist der Hintergrund dieses Schematismus. Die Schuld Erecs ist objektiv: sie wird ihm nicht psychologisch zugerechnet - sie 'geschieht' ihm.[252]

Ranawake likewise maintains that Erec reveals perfect potential in the initial episode. He subsequently undergoes a sudden transformation which may be attributed to the effects of the sinful human condition. There is no possibility of a moral failing as Erec is aware of the dangers of sloth, to which he ultimately submits, already at the wedding tournament. According to Ranawake, moreover, his lapse is followed by immediate restitution. There is, therefore, no sign of psychological development as a result of Erec's *verligen*, even though the hero is elevated in a spiritual sense by his experiences.[253]

The theory of inherited sin did indeed play a role in the medieval understanding of the subject, as these scholars argue.[254] However, as will be demonstrated, a consideration of the issue of perception as it occurs not only before, but also during and after the *verligen* episode suggests that Hartmann is creating a focus on the role of perception in sin in terms of a secular morality. The crucial role of personal inner awareness in the fulfilment of secular and Christian obligations thus determines Erec's failing as one of subjective responsibility.

The focus of Erec's perceptive faculty before and at the start of the *verligen* episode has already been considered. During this episode, a reversal between the reflective capacities of the two main protagonists takes place. However, the gradual nature of this process suggests that Erec's loss of insight is only temporary. Perceptiveness is signified predominantly in this reversal by the powers of sight, speech, and hearing. Erec's earlier insistence on speaking in the face of Maliclisier's rejection of speech, and in his persistent questioning of Koralus, has already been identified as denoting an active perceptive faculty.[255] The use of the senses as indications of inner awareness now continues in the *verligen* episode. Thus, Erec is still able to hear Enite's expression of anguish (Er

3033), although it is Enite who hears the complaints of the court (Er 2999-3002). It is also apparent that Enite does not mean to be overheard in her lament, as she believes Erec to be asleep. Her speaking out in this first instance does not qualify as a significant example of her perceptiveness therefore. Thus, Enite articulates her fear of losing Erec, but only in an ambiguous fashion. Both her initial silence on hearing the court's complaints and her murmured lament are based on this selfish fear.[256] Similarly, as Erec plies her with questions, thereby echoing his previous sharp awareness, Enite demonstrates a reluctance to repeat her words (Er 3034-49). It appears at this stage that Erec is indeed justified in his subsequent punishment of his wife for her failure to fulfil her obligation to warn him of the unease at court. However, despite Erec's ability to perceive in this scene, his powers are intermittent. For example, he hears Enite's words, but there is no evidence of his considering their pertinence in terms of his own behaviour.[257] Instead, he appears to focus on Enite's criticism only. A connection can be made here with Kalogrenant's comment in *Iwein* on how to listen:[258]

> 'maneger biutet diu ôren dar:
> ern nemes ouch mit dem herzen war,
> sone wirt im niht wan der dôz,
> und ist der schade alze grôz:
> wan si verliesent beide ir arbeit,
> der dâ hoeret und der dâ seit.' (Iw 251-6)

The true functioning of the sensory organs is therefore linked to the power of perception in the heart. Erec's hearing is not accompanied by any indication of thought processes and may therefore be interpreted as a merely physical function which does not lead to his acknowledgement of his own guilt. Nevertheless, glimmers of inner awareness remain evident in Erec's cunning departure from Karnant (Er 3064-92) and indeed in his active response to the situation. However, once he has left the court, he no longer displays any signs of perceptiveness until well into his course of

adventures, when the re-emergence of these indications suggests his awakening powers of reflection.

Erec's behaviour in the robbers episodes confirms that he does not retain the powers of perception which would make possible an immediate restitution of his failure at Karnant. Instead, his complete loss of inner perception is emphasized by his rejection of his wife's perceptive faculties as they set out from court:

> [er] gebôt ir dâ zestunt
> daz ze sprechenne ir munt
> zer reise iht ûf kæme,
> swaz si vernæme
> oder swaz si gesæhe. (Er 3098-3102)

This implies that Erec is effectively spurning any kind of reflective process or insight. In addition, his lack of awareness in the wake of the *verligen* episode is indicated by an unwillingness to communicate, an absence of thought processes or monologues, and a state of disorientation resembling the madness experienced by Iwein.

Some scholars deny, however, that Erec undergoes a complete shutdown of his perceptive faculties. Ranawake, as mentioned earlier, bases her assumption that Erec is affected by objective sin on his awareness of his actions after his *verligen* and on his ability to take measured decisions. Kuhn likewise concludes that Erec *voluntarily* jeopardizes everything he has gained by electing to pursue a journey on which his marriage relationship might be tested.[259] Such an argument again assumes a level of consciousness on Erec's part which is conspicuously lacking at this juncture of the text. In addition, Christoph Cormeau claims that, although Erec's powers of thought are not evident at this point, his later actions reveal that he was in fact responding on leaving Karnant to his own self-criticism:

> Erec reagiert abrupt, ohne Erklärung und Reflexion in einem Handlungsentschluß. Der steht zunächst nur dafür, daß Erec die Berechtigung der allgemeinen Vorwürfe nicht von sich weist; was an selbstkritischer Einsicht hier angestoßen wird, wird erst am späteren Verhalten ablesbar.[260]

Similarly, Roy Boggs concludes that Erec's treatment of Enite on their departure disguises his actual trust in her, a trust which again presupposes a certain level of cognitive ability on Erec's part:

> That Erec might entertain some thoughts about any possible misconduct on Enite's part is understandable because Enite has told him of the court's charges against her. But although Erec takes no punitive action at this point to correct the court's unrest and discontent, it is safe to assume that he doubts the justice of the charges.[261]

It is difficult, however, to support such safe assumptions with evidence from the text, as will shortly be demonstrated.

In contrast, other scholars, including Rodney Fisher, argue that Erec experiences a change at this juncture, particularly with regard to his powers of inner awareness:

> Als Erec in Karnant seine Schande vor Augen geführt wird, ist seine erste Reaktion alles andere als eine Erkenntnis der Schuld oder der Verantwortlichkeit.[262]

Fisher returns to this point in a later article:

> Das Sprechverbot stellt also keine Treueprobe dar, sondern einen verwirrten Versuch, die Realität der tadelnden Stimmen zu verdrängen. Im Gegensatz zu Chrétiens Held, der die Kritik zu akzeptieren scheint (2572: *Dame, fet il, droit an eüstes, et cil qui m'an blasment ont droit*), handelt Hartmanns Erec abrupt, ohne jegliche Erklärung zu geben (geben zu können?). Der Dialog, soweit man ihn so nennen darf, wird abgebrochen. Es folgt

> dann das Sprechverbot selbst, das sofort durch die beiden Räuberepisoden in Frage gestellt wird.[263]

As Fisher indicates, by considering Erec's reaction to Enite's words in the *verligen* episode to be based on solid powers of reasoning, one is to forced to conclude that his subsequent treatment of her is completely intentional. He would therefore be guilty of cruelty in the light of Enite's display of loyal motivations in the robbers episodes, despite her initial lapse at Karnant. Unlike the French source, however, in which Enide's guilt is portrayed with less ambivalence and Erec's punitive measures are therefore more justified, no reason is offered in Hartmann's narrative to explain Erec's inappropriate treatment of his wife apart from his sudden loss of perceptiveness.

Fisher's comments concerning Erec's lost powers of perception are expanded upon by Thomas Heine in his investigation into the parallels between the narrative perspective of the work and Erec's own self-knowledge.[264] Prior to the *verligen* episode, the narrator frequently comments on Erec's thoughts, thereby drawing attention to his inner awareness as well as his external behaviour. However, just as Erec lapses into silence, these comments abruptly cease. From this point onwards:

> the narrator demonstrates a striking reluctance to penetrate Erec's silence or to explain Erec's enigmatic statements: ... [he] reports Erec's actions and conversations, but he never reveals what Erec thinks.[265]

This shift in narrative strategy is made all the more remarkable by its contrast with the narrator's earlier informativeness. The reader is now given no greater insight into Erec's sudden aloofness than his companions and adversaries. Instead, the dearth of narrator's comments contributes to the thematic nature of this work in the sense

that it prompts an aware audience into resolving the unclarities for themselves.

Erec's refusal to communicate, which signifies his loss of inner awareness, is rapidly discredited in the robbers episodes. The theory underlying his punishment of his wife is based on the sound penitential principles of 'contraria contrariis sanantur' or like curing like.[266] However, as was demonstrated in Chapter 2, particular emphasis was placed on the motivation and contrition of sinners in penitential practice in the twelfth century. As Erec displays no evidence of taking Enite's real motivations into account, his punishment is soon revealed to be inappropriate. Furthermore, the similarities between Erec's demand for silence and that of the uncourtly Maliclisier in response to the questions of the queen's maiden highlight the undesirable change in Erec's insight.

In contrast to Erec's loss of perceptiveness, the *verligen* episode reveals Enite in a startlingly new light. Whereas she was previously depicted as a lust object, who was virtually silent and who displayed no thoughts of her own,[267] her speaking out at Karnant marks the beginning of a transition to a role in which she reveals powers of perception to rival Erec's former abilities. This transformation corresponds with Erec's loss of awareness, therefore creating the impression of an exchange between the two main protagonists. As Clark maintains:

> the several and related functions of perception, thought, speech, and action are parcelled out variously to each member of the couple and shift over the course of the romance.[268]

Thus, unlike Erec, Enite hears the voices of criticism at court and realizes the import of the vassals' grievances (Er 2999-3006), which she proceeds to express (Er 3029-32). The significance of the physical senses as indications of inner

awareness, which was mentioned earlier with regard to Erec, is now revealed in relation to his wife. Furthermore, at this juncture, several references to Enite's thought processes occur in quick succession, for example 'muot' (Er 3002), 'gedâhte' (Er 3004), 'erkennen' (Er 3007) and 'denken' (Er 3024), all of which denote her as a reasoning being. This sudden emergence of Enite's reflective qualities may be contrasted with Chrétien's early description of Enide as 'sage' (EeE 537-40). Hartmann therefore emphasizes the issue of inner awareness by creating a more marked contrast between Enite's pre- and post-*verligen* powers of insight.

This demonstration of Enite's reasoning powers has implications for assessing the nature and degree of her guilt in the *verligen* episode. The issue has long been a point of disagreement in scholarship. Enite's supporters and opponents fall into three main categories: those who regard Enite as essentially guilty, either as a direct result of her gender which casts her in the role of temptress,[269] or on the basis of her self-analysis in her later lament;[270] those who see Enite as perfectly innocent and undeserving of Erec's punishment;[271] and finally, those who consider Enite to share the blame for their *verligen* with her husband. This third grouping includes Schnell, who maintains that Enite displays an excessive fear of losing her husband, as well as Kathryn Smits and Ursula Schulze, who argue that the whole work concerns the fortunes of a married couple attempting to establish a harmony between their personal relationship and their social obligations.[272] Likewise, Wendy Sterba recognizes Enite's shared guilt for their *verligen*, even though only Erec is clearly blamed in the narrative.[273]

By considering the situation in terms of perception, this last body of opinion receives the greatest support from the text. Erec is not mindful of the obligations of lordship. However, Enite fails to warn Erec of his lapses, even though she is aware of them herself, owing to her underlying fear

of losing him. In this way, Enite can be accused of failing to fulfil her role as a wife. As Frank Tobin asks:

> does not her position as Queen of Karnant demand that she be aware from the beginning of the effect of her marital love on the kingdom? This is of course a lot to expect from someone of such limited experience, but the fact remains that she gives much evidence of not being equal to her role.[274]

The neglect of the obligations arising from a new social position therefore constitutes the basis of both the hero's and the heroine's failure. The series of adventures upon which they subsequently embark thus serves to test both main protagonists.

Erec's imposition of silence on his wife as a punishment serves to introduce the ideal of the silent woman into the narrative. As Sterba argues, Erec's punishment of Enite, which initially appears quite appropriate, would in fact have directly caused his death if she had obeyed him:

> It is ... evident that Enite learning to hold her tongue would not lead to happier circumstances for our duo. Quite the contrary, Enite's voice saves them from an untimely death three times during the first half of the story and the episode that follows sheds light on the entire matter, especially in view of recent feminist criticism which finds the feminine locus of power situated in the female voice.[275]

There appears, therefore, to be an implicit criticism in Hartmann's text of the ideal of the silent and obedient woman. As will be demonstrated, Enite's inner deliberations in the robbers episodes allow her immediately to rectify her earlier mistake by being aware of her obligations. The same criteria are thus being investigated with regard to Enite's role as a woman and wife, as to Erec's role as husband, knight, and lord, namely that speech or any kind of action should be based on reason, and expressed or undertaken at a

suitable time.[276] Consequently, a note of criticism of the ideal of the silent woman becomes apparent as Enite is required to disobey her husband in order to implement the conclusions she reaches in her inner monologues. Patrick McConeghy makes a similar observation:

> In these inner monologues she is torn between traditional values, which demand her unquestioning obedience, and new, higher values of love and companionship, which demand self-confidence and self-sacrifice.[277]

Enite concludes in these monologues that her love for Erec is more important than her conforming to an ideal. She therefore learns to transcend the restrictions placed upon her and to speak up on the right occasion by employing her powers of inner deliberation. Erec eventually comes to appreciate her motivation, and to accept her voice as an instrument of inner awareness. Once this occurs, Enite's display of reasoning promptly disappears from the narrative. From this, McConeghy concludes:

> Hartmann is only mildly progressive in assessing the role of women in courtly society. Although he shows that women's speech is indispensable if a knight is to live and to live honorably, he does not give Enite a voice again after the couple has returned to the courtly arena. Here, Enite has the responsibilities of a good queen: to be beautiful and to comfort women in need but apparently not to speak. The muted role of women within the public sphere seems to be reaffirmed.[278]

However, Enite has already fulfilled her role in the sense that she has demonstrated the indispensable nature of a wife's powers of perception in a marriage. Although she remains essentially inferior within the tradition of sex polarity, as her return to a passive role in the narrative suggests, Enite nevertheless demonstrates by her inner deliberations that both partners contribute diverse but essential powers of self-knowledge and wisdom to the marriage partnership. Consequently, both partners have

different obligations within their relationship which require insight in order to be fulfilled and which should not be restricted by traditional sexual stereotypes.

Such notions of sex complementarity in terms of perceptive faculties are visible in the teachings of certain twelfth-century thinkers such as Anselm, Abelard, Hildegard of Bingen, and Hugh of St Victor who appear to draw on both Christian and classical notions of woman's essential role in man's moral and intellectual well-being.[279] Hugh of St Victor, for example, emphasizes Eve's status as an equal companion to Adam and her important contribution to his moral development.[280] Similarly, a popular image from the Song of Solomon depicts marriage as symbolizing the relationship between God and the Church. The Church playing the role of bride is therefore a female symbol used to represent humankind. Such examples of sex complementarity also appear in the works of classical and medieval allegory which traditionally depict the figure of wisdom as female and identify the female with virtue and the higher parts of human nature. Enite's perceptive powers and the parameters within which she is required to demonstrate them as the partner of her husband, appear to reflect these notions. Hartmann is not representing a wholly patriarchal viewpoint on this specific issue, therefore. Indeed, his concern with the power of perception leads him to discredit the misogynistic ideal of the silent and obedient woman. However, against a broader background, Enite remains essentially subordinate to her husband, despite Hartmann's acknowledgement of her important role as a perceptive wife.

The Robbers Episodes

A close examination of the issue of inner awareness in the robbers episodes is necessary at this juncture. These initial encounters reveal further consequences of Erec's

loss of insight to add to his failure as lord. His inability to protect his wife in these episodes, or to survive himself without her help, is evidence of how vital perception also is for his fulfilment of his knightly role. Erec now becomes totally reliant on Enite whose perceptive abilities are represented by her voice.

Enite's insight is depicted partly in terms of sensory awareness. Thus, she spies their enemies (Er 3123, 3297f.), whilst Erec remains completely unaware of their presence until she calls on him, significantly, to look up and see them (Er 3132, 3180-2, 3348, 3378-81). Her powers of intellect also lead her to attempt to signal cunningly to Erec in order to warn him without disobeying his orders. Unfortunately, the absence of any reasoning power in her husband renders her clever tactics ineffectual (Er 3129-31). The robbers themselves further highlight Erec's loss of perceptiveness by displaying signs of sharp awareness in terms of sight (Er 3193f., 3197f., 3211, 3312f., 3320, 3332f.), or the ability to reflect upon the status and vulnerability of their intended victims (Er 3200f., 3318-30). It is also significant that Chrétien's narrative includes fewer references to perception than Hartmann's version at this juncture. Although Chrétien's second robbers episode contains some such references (EeE 2925-54), Hartmann employs examples in both episodes, thus creating a continuous focus on Erec's lack of awareness, particularly when contrasted with the abilities of his social inferiors. In addition, Chrétien does not describe Erec as totally imperceptive in the robbers episodes. Enide is merely afraid that he will be taken unawares by the first band of robbers approaching from behind (EeE 2838f.), and in Chrétien's second robbers episode, Erec himself spots the robbers before Enide (EeE 2961-5). In contrast, Hartmann's Erec remains totally unaware of his surroundings in an emphatic depiction of his loss of perceptiveness.

In addition to Enite's display of sensory awareness and cunning, these initial episodes reveal her powers of insight in detail in a series of inner monologues. Moreover, a comparison with the corresponding monologues in Chrétien's version reveals a further emphasis on the issue of insight in the German narrative. For example, Enite's first monologue has been relocated by Hartmann from its position after the debate between the robbers. Its new position before this debate serves to highlight Enite's concerns rather than the robbers' deliberations. A comparison between the nature of these monologues in Hartmann's and Chrétien's versions is likewise revealing. Even though both heroines are shown to be thinking (Er 3023f., EeE 2480-2) and speaking out at Karnant (Er 3029-32, EeE 2496-2508), Hartmann extends Enide's monologues in the robbers episodes, thereby highlighting the essential role of intellectual deliberation in overcoming such a difficult situation, and also detailing Enite's motives for warning her husband. In addition, Hartmann stresses the inwardness of Enite's debate by the use of terms denoting thought processes (*muot, gedanc*), rather than having her speak her thoughts aloud like Enide in an exterior monologue.

Both heroines find themselves in a position in which their lives and those of their husbands depend on their taking appropriate action despite the restrictions imposed on them. Robert Hanning has used the Greek term *kairoi* to denote such times of critical reflection at which a character is forced to select a course of action which will have far-reaching consequences.[281] Such depictions of the inner thoughts of a character in secular literature were still very unusual in Hartmann's day. Dinzelbacher notes the adaptation by Benoit de Seinte-Maure of his sources for the *Roman de Troie* as involving an increase in the use of inner monologues, which Dinzelbacher relates to the trend towards more personal forms of piety in the latter half of the twelfth century.[282] The rarity of this technique is likewise noted

by Diane Stielstra. However, Stielstra differentiates between predominantly rhetorical inner monologues which portray a lament, the making of a relatively straightforward decision, or the expression of strong emotions, such as in Ovid's love poetry, and those which are more psychological, involving the internalization of a situation or conflict in emotions, such as are to be found in Augustine's *Confessions*.[283] Stielstra argues that Enide's deliberations in the robbers episodes constitute practical decision-making rather than any real psychological dilemma.[284] Although Stielstra does not consider Hartmann's adaptation, it could be argued that a comparison between the contents of these two pairs of inner monologues reveals a move towards a more psychological exploration in Hartmann's heroine in terms of the extended and detailed depiction of her dilemma and her stating of the motivation behind her decision. The portrayal of Enite's thoughts as a complex inner process is thus more fully described by Hartmann.

The content of these monologues will now be considered in detail. In her first deliberation, Chrétien's heroine considers the possible outcome of a confrontation with the robbers:

> 'Deus!', fet ele, 'que porrai dire?
> Or iert ja morz ou pris mes sire;
> Que cil sont troi, et il est seus.
> N'est pas a droit partiz li jeus
> D'un chevalier ancontre trois.
> Cil le ferra ja par detrois;
> Que mes sire ne s'an prant garde.
> Deus! serai je donc si coarde
> Que dire ne li oserai?
> Ja si coarde ne serai:
> Je li dirai, nel leirai pas.' (EeE 2833-43)

('God,' she says, 'what can I say? Now my lord will be killed or captured, for there are three of them, and he's alone. One knight against three isn't fair odds. That one's going to strike him from behind, taking my husband unawares. God, shall I then be such a coward as not to dare tell him? I'll never be so cowardly! I'll tell him straight away!')

Thus, Enide demonstrates concern about the danger into which Erec is about to stumble unwittingly, and also about her own cowardice. Furthermore, her decision to disobey her husband is swiftly taken. Hartmann's heroine is similarly concerned about the threat to Erec and calls on God to aid her (Er 3149-66). Her interior monologue also resembles her French counterpart's as an example of reasoning out a course of action and the various consequences which may ensue (Er 3149ff.). However, Enite's monologue is almost twice as long as Enide's, thereby highlighting the difficulty of the dilemma and her consequent hesitation. In addition, Hartmann's Enite displays no preoccupation with cowardice. Instead, she reveals that she is motivated to disobey her husband by feelings of humility and loyalty:

> nû kam der muot in ir gedanc:
> 'bezzer ist verlorn mîn lîp,
> ein als unklagebære wîp,
> dan ein alsô vorder man,
> wan dâ verlür maneger an.
> erst edel unde rîche:
> wir wegen ungelîche.
> vür in wil ich sterben
> ê ich in sihe verderben,
> ez ergê mir swie got welle.' (Er 3167-76)

Enite's deliberations prompt her to embark on the course of action which will cause least regret to others. It is also apparent that her disobedience is based on virtuous motives supported by a solid consideration of her options. The detail of her thoughts in this monologue provides an insight into how awareness and deliberation constitute the essential components of good intentions and virtuous actions. All of these factors are likewise evident in her subsequent monologue in the second robbers episode (Er 3353-77).

Erec, however, fails to appreciate Enite's break from traditional obedience. After defeating each band of robbers, Erec reveals his inability to comprehend Enite's motives for warning him by blaming and punishing her (Er 3238-76, 3403-

39). In addition, his lack of insight is made apparent in his tirade against women in general and likewise by Enite's repeated explanation of her disobedience. In these statements, Enite clearly demonstrates her motivation of loyalty and her insight into the consequences of failing to act:

> si sprach: 'herre, hæte ichz niht getân
> durch iuwers lîbes gewarheit,
> ich enhætez iu nie geseit.
> ich tetez durch mîne triuwe.' (Er 3259-62)
>
> 'genâde, herre!' sprach daz wîp.
> 'ir sult mich des geniezen lân
> daz ichz durch triuwe hân getân.
> noch dulde ich baz iuwern zorn
> dan iuwer lîp wære verlorn,
> swaz mir nû von iu geschiht.' (Er 3413-18)

Erec's imperceptive state only renders him capable, however, of seeing Enite's objective guilt, that is her disobedience, rather than the subjective innocence which is evident in her virtuous motivation.

This exchange is also accorded a particularly dramatic emphasis in the German narrative by its appearance as a dialogue in direct speech.[285] Although Chrétien's Erec chastises Enide in direct speech before attacking the robbers (EeE 2849-56, 2997-3010), their exchange after the combat is far less extensive, appears predominantly in indirect speech, and includes no statements of accusation and justification (EeE 2916-24, 3079-85). The virtuous motives which underlie Enite's disobedience and Erec's incomprehension of them do not therefore receive the same degree of emphasis in the French source.

Thus, this initial pair of adventures illustrates the ways in which Hartmann has highlighted the elements of inner awareness existing in Chrétien's narrative. This is achieved by means of extra references to sensory perception, the rearrangement of the sequence of events, and the varied use

of monologue and indirect and direct speech. Hartmann likewise extends Enite's monologues and places great emphasis on her motives which she expresses here and in her later justifications to her husband. These insights into her thoughts reveal that the part she played in their failure at Karnant is immediately atoned for. Likewise, Erec's continued blind punishment of his wife is discredited in this way. The addition of these exchanges therefore points in particular to Hartmann's desire to emphasize the intentions of his characters, and also the part played by perception in the formation and the appreciation of those intentions.

Hartmann's emphasis on inner awareness continues in the couple's subsequent meeting with the count's squire. The squire is exceptionally astute and able to draw the correct conclusions about the situation. For example, he assumes that Erec has been in a fight (Er 3510-4). In addressing the couple, he also repeats the phrase 'mich dunket' three times (Er 3520, 3523, 3532), thereby emphasizing the thought processes which inform his assumptions. In addition, he reveals the good intentions behind his questions (Er 3519), and demonstrates a concern for Enite's struggles with the horses which echoes Erec's own earlier concern at Tulmein. The contrast between that earlier occasion and Erec's determination here to make Enite suffer in this manner because of his mistaken comprehension of her motives, clearly reveals the decline in his perceptive faculties (Er 3576-9). Although Hartmann inherits an already astute squire from his source, his own version departs from Chrétien's narrative in its continued depiction of the limited awareness of the main protagonist at this juncture. Despite courteously thanking the squire, Erec's unwillingness to communicate on the subject of his wife's punishment contributes to the portrayal of the main protagonist as a man out of touch with himself (Er 3590). The sagacity of the squire in the German narrative therefore creates a more

pronounced contrast with Erec's lack of perception than in the French source. The figure of the squire may therefore be counted amongst the series of characters encountered by Erec who provide a contrast with his own lack of insight. Even though the powers of thought displayed by these characters may be restricted in some way, they nevertheless serve to highlight a particular aspect of perception which is lacking in Erec himself.

Galoain

The episode with the count named Galoain by Chrétien[286] provides a further opportunity for Enite to demonstrate her loyalty and cunning. In addition, the count himself, like Oringles to a greater degree later, reveals the manner in which love can affect a person's capacity for thought, and the consequences of this power. This situation is therefore essentially a repetition of the imbalance which Erec experienced as a result of his earlier desire for Enite. Enite's ability to comprehend and rectify the situation again demonstrates the means which Erec himself lacks. The root of the overall problem and the seeds of its solution are thus depicted in the microcosm of this episode.

It is significant that Hartmann's narrator stresses that the count is not intrinsically evil, merely a man overwhelmed by feelings of desire (Er 3684-721). Hartmann is therefore adapting the figure whom he inherits from his source and who is depicted there as vain from the outset (EeE 3226-54). The German version points only to Enite's beauty as the cause of the count's distraction (Er 3620-2, 3673). However, the count's actions are not entirely excused by love's influence as is made evident in a short appraisal of the powers of love. In this discussion, the exceptional strength of love and its effect on the mind of the afflicted lover are acknowledged, but love is not regarded as an excuse for

unacceptable behaviour or for any undesirable objective consequences:

> nû enhât aber niemen selhe kraft,
> und ergrîfet in ir meisterschaft,
> er enmüeze ir entwîchen.
> swer aber ir gewislîchen
> ze rehte kunde gephlegen,
> den enlieze si niht under wegen,
> im enwære der lôn von ir bereit
> daz in sîn arbeit
> niht dorfte riuwen,
> huote er sîner triuwen
> baz dan der grâve tæte.
> der enwas dar an niht stæte,
> wan in vrou Minne betwanc
> ûf einen valschen gedanc,
> daz er dem vil biderben man
> sîn wîp ze nemenne muot gewan. (Er 3706-21)

Such a consideration of the relationship between love and subjective guilt may be used to appraise not only the count's behaviour in this episode, but also Erec's transgression at Karnant. Both men may therefore be said to share a degree of guilt as a result of their actions under the influence of love. The emphasis on a lover's subjective responsibility in this work may represent contemporary concerns regarding the far-reaching social repercussions of love's influence, or else may reflect the growing focus on the subjective nature of sin in the twelfth century. In either case, love is not depicted in this narrative as an objective force which renders the lover inculpable in matters of sin.

Love's influence on the count's inner awareness receives particular emphasis from Hartmann. For example, the scene in which the count meets Erec and Enide has been adjusted to include Galoain's telling inner monologue. Although the French source refers indirectly to the effect of Enide's beauty on the count's thoughts (EeE 3287-91), Hartmann highlights the change taking place in the count's attitude:

nû begunde den grâven riuwen,
und gedâhte wider sînen triuwen,
daz er die vrouwen verliez,
daz er si im niht nemen hiez.
manecvalt wart sîn gedanc,
als in der vrouwen schoene twanc,
wie er si möhte gewinnen.
untriuwe riet sînen sinnen
daz er dar sô kæme
daz er si im benæme. (Er 3668-77)

dô tete im untriuwe kunt
diu kreftige minne
und benam im rehte sinne. (Er 3691-3)

Thus, the count's perceptive capacities become affected and channelled towards claiming Enite for himself. This constitutes an alteration in attitude which is not evident in Chrétien's count whose self-interest is apparent from the start. Instead, the shortened conversation between Galoain and his squire before Erec and Enite arrive removes any indication in the German version that Galoain may be an essentially unsavoury character. Thus, the suddenness and profundity of the effect of love on his thoughts receives particular emphasis. Galoain's desire likewise results in a lack of loyalty and a falseness as a host, as is repeatedly stressed (e.g. Er 3669, 3691, 3709-16, 3734, 3841). Just as love caused Erec to ignore his own lordly duties, so Galoain fails to protect his guests and keep the peace on his land. Instead, his lust drives him to break that peace himself, thereby underlining the destructive influence of love on social obligations.[287]

The effect of love on Galoain's insight likewise extends to his assessment of his motives. He claims to be acting in Enite's best interests (Er 3792-6), but his narrow perception prevents him from acknowledging that her desires differ from his own. Furthermore, the pity Galoain claims to feel for Enite's suffering proves to be meaningless as it stems from his own selfish desires. This is apparent when he comments:

'mir erbarmte nie sô sêre
weder man noch wîp
als iuwer wætlîcher lîp.' (Er 3757-9)

His reference to her person, which may be interpreted in this context as her physical body, echoes an earlier comment (Er 3738-42) and reveals his actual lascivious intentions. His lust and self-interest are additionally evident in his threat to kidnap Enite himself after she has rejected his proposal despite his earlier sympathetic response to her account of her kidnapping (Er 3826-37). This contrasts with his threat to kill Erec in the French source (EeE 3357-9). Hartmann appears therefore to be highlighting the hypocrisy of Galoain's pity for Enite, rather than his danger as an opponent for Erec.

Erec's total blindness in terms of the count's attraction to his wife and his persistent uncommunicativeness further reveal his incapacity to reflect (Er 3727-9, 3744-51). Here a contrast with the French source in which Erec chatters politely to Galoain is evident (EeE 3274-6, 3283). In Hartmann's text, Erec keeps conversation to an absolute minimum, refusing to explain his treatment of his wife to Galoain, as he did to his squire. Enite, however, maintains her earlier perceptiveness and loyalty in contrast to her husband's loss of awareness. Thus, she alone is able to assess the count's motives accurately. In addition, her capacity for cunning receives greater scope for expression here. Thus, once she realizes the count's intent, she proceeds to conceal her own:

als si sînen ernest sach
und daz erz von herzen sprach,
vil güetlîchen sach si in an,
den vil ungetriuwen man,
und lachete durch schoenen list. (Er 3838-42)

The narrator proceeds to draw further attention to Enite's cunning (Er 3907, 3940), and her conversation with the count

is measurably altered from the French source in terms of her utilization of fine, psychological tactics. Instead of deceiving the count by claiming that she sought to test his love (EeE 3368-71), Enite displays exemplary ingenuity by pretending that she originally misunderstood the count's intentions (Er 3843-53). Her account of her kidnapping also provides him with a valid excuse for his designs (Er 3865-84). In addition, the fact that she was kidnapped as a child echoes the references to her *kintheit* prior to the *verligen* episode. Her implied defencelessness bolsters the count's sense of self-justification. Her child-like exterior also implies that she is incapable of the mature powers of thought necessary for deception, and this provides her with the means to outwit the count (Er 3873, 3876). Furthermore, the truthful elements in her tale regarding Erec's cruel treatment (Er 3885f.), and her cliché concerning the need for women to beware the wiles of men (Er 3848-55), similarly encourage the count to accept her story. Her advice on capturing Erec completes her disguise of her real intent. By telling the count what he wants to hear, Enite re-enforces his own delusion that he is freeing her from Erec's tyranny. The count, like Erec previously, is unable to recognize Enite's mental powers as a result of his blinded perceptive faculties. This is suggested by his delighted reaction to her story:

> der rede was der grâve vrô.
> lachende antwurte er ir sô:
> 'ir enmuget iuch des niht erwern,
> wan ich wil iu stæte swern.' (Er 3896-9)

His laughter reveals his supreme confidence in his victory and his total acceptance of Enite's tale. In fact, his offer to swear loyalty to her confirms the blindness caused by his desire and seemingly easy conquest in a point of dramatic irony for an audience acquainted with Enite's thoughts.

Enite's own loyalty to Erec is restated directly after her deception of the count (Er 3943), thus creating the impression that the narrator is afraid that Enite's brilliant trickery will have duped the audience. Furthermore, Enite repeats her earlier soul-searching in an inner monologue before she warns her husband (Er 3972ff.). Her hesitation to speak out and her detailed deliberation again emphasize the need for speech to have a basis in solid perception. This monologue also reveals that Enite continues to take Erec's threat seriously (Er 3983f.). Likewise, her loyalty and devotion to him are restated (Er 3974-8), as is her humility:

> 'waz aber von diu, wirde ich erslagen
> unde nimt er mir den lîp?
> dannoch lebet manec vrum wîp.
> ich enbin ouch niht sô klagelîch:
> sô ist er edel unde rîch,
> mîn lieber herre.
> ê im iht gewerre,
> sô wil ich kiesen den tôt.'
> ir triuwe ir daz gebôt
> daz si ze sînem bette gie
> und bôt sich vür in an ir knie
> und sagete im die rede gar.
> von vorhten wart si missevar. (Er 3985-97)

Enite's inner reasoning and its depiction by Hartmann in direct speech reflect the earlier emphasis on her monologues in the robbers episodes. Erec's reaction to her warning is likewise identical to their previous adventures. Although he responds immediately and successfully to the situation, he later displays his persistent misunderstanding of Enite's intentions in his repeated threats of punishment (Er 4122-32). As before, Enite clearly states her motivation and describes the actual consequences if she had obeyed him, but to no avail (Er 4133-38). The whole process is subsequently repeated in her warning of their pursuit (Er 4139-49) and in Erec's later chastisement (Er 4258-67). The lack of communication between the two protagonists thus appears to remain entrenched at this point.

As regards their pursuer, Galoain's meagre retinue and his ignominious defeat by Erec portray him as an ineffectual figure in contrast to his counterpart in Chrétien's version. His confusion on awakening and his petty exchange with the innkeeper again reveal his reduced powers of awareness (Er 4028-39, 4059ff.). A further echo of Erec's situation is revealed, however, in the count's self-accusation of having overslept:

> er sprach:'swer sîne sache
> wendet gar ze gemache,
> als ich hînaht hân getân,
> dem sol êre abe gân
> unde schande sîn bereit.
> wer gewan ie vrumen âne arbeit?
> mir ist geschehen vil rehte.' (Er 4096-102)

The count is thus still capable of a glimmer of insight into his actions, providing a comment on Erec's behaviour at Karnant. However, Galoain's lust drives him on and ultimately blinds him to his own motives, as is exemplified by his claim that he intends to deliver Enite back to her parents (Er 4194). This self-deception remains complete in the German version. Unlike his source, Hartmann does not allow his character an insight into his own failure (EeE 3632-56). His creeping home and the shamed silence of his men are confirmation of his foolish and uncourtly behaviour and his downfall (Er 4243-57).

The Galoain episode thus re-emphasizes the issues of the *verligen* scene through the behaviour of the count. His ignominious defeat also constitutes a warning of the continued disaster which awaits Erec if he persists in his unenlightened state. Nevertheless, concealed in an episode which appears to portray Erec at his least perceptive are indications of change. Their barely perceptible presence makes their validity appear doubtful, but this very fact could confirm their importance in a work which demands such a high degree of thematic response from its audience. For

example, on this occasion Enite fails to complete her warning of the count's approach (Er 4166f.), whilst Erec is not only aware that they will be pursued (Er 4119), but also that the count's subjects may take revenge, a fear which he expresses in a prayer to God (Er 4232-8). These contrasts to the robbers episodes may indicate that the division of perceptive faculties between the two main protagonists is again shifting. It is likewise significant that Erec does not actually punish Enite on this occasion despite railing at her supposed disobedience (Er 4258-67). In a study of inner awareness, such observations are significant. However, they are nonetheless countered by the fact that Erec fails to hear the approach of their pursuit, which implies that his powers of awareness remain essentially compromised despite this glimmer of improvement. An aside by the narrator re-enforces this point by revealing that Erec's senses were restricted by his helmet:

> nû endarf niemen sprechen daz,
> von wanne kæme daz diu vrouwe baz
> beide gehôrte und gesach.
> ich sage iu von wiu daz geschach.
> diu vrouwe reit gewæfens bar:
> dâ was er gewâfent gar,
> als ein guot ritter sol.
> des gehôrte er noch gesach sô wol
> ûz der îsenwæte
> als er blôzer tæte. (Er 4150-9)

Erec is thus incapacitated by the very equipment which accords him his identity as a knight. The contrast with his earlier defeat of Iders using inferior armour thus re-emphasizes the point that Erec has lost the perceptiveness which brought him such knightly success. The implication in the narrator's ironic comment is that Erec's true knightly identity is housed in his awareness and his attitude, rather than simply in the armour he wears. This is a point which is likewise significant in the subsequent encounter with Guivreiz.

The First Encounter with Guivreiz

Erec's first contact with Guivreiz reveals further indications of a change in his awareness. However, these glimmers of progress are still interspersed with signs of continued inner blindness, thus giving the impression of a gradual and uneven process. One less ambiguous example of perceptiveness, however, is apparent in Erec's powers of sight and hearing on Guivreiz' approach:

> nû sâhen si alsô drâte
> in dort zuo rîten.
> nû gruozte er vrouwen Ênîten.
> als er Êrecke sô nâhen kam
> daz er sîniu wort vernam,
> er sprach: 'willekomen, herre.' (Er 4321-6)

Erec is likewise able in this episode to recognize Enite's loyalty (Er 4319), realize that combat is unavoidable (Er 4378f.), calm Enite's fears, and confirm his own loyalty to her (Er 4425-31). Thus, his appreciation of his wife, when compared to his previous rejection, shows signs of re-emerging at this juncture. Likewise, Enite reconfirms her own insight and loyalty in this episode. Although the textual lacuna blurs the issue (Er 4317), one can argue that it is justifiable in the light of Hartmann's previous alteration of Enide's monologues to expect that Enite undergoes a further inner deliberation and confirmation of her loyalty at this stage.

Guivreiz' equal status to Erec suggests the possibility of the main protagonist's rehabilitation into the courtly world. His reputation as a king who is nevertheless diligent in his pursuit of knightly deeds represents the ideal combination of duties which Erec failed to achieve at Karnant (Er 4314-8). As a result, Erec has much to learn from this character, and the inclusion of the ethic of knightly honour and activity in Hartmann's portrayal of secular morality in this work is thus evident. Guivreiz is

described in terms of physical strength, bravery, and readiness to engage in combat, but also most importantly with regard to the greatness of his heart and his 'rîchen muot' (Er 4304-18). In other words, he possesses the correct mental attitude required for the active pursuit of adventure by a knight. His diminutive stature, which would otherwise act as a hindrance, serves to reinforce the importance of such mental alertness in a knight. This forms a contrast with the well-equipped but unaware Erec of the past three episodes. Erec's encounter with Guivreiz therefore represents a test of his 'psychological fitness for combat'[288].

Guivreiz' mental alertness nevertheless lacks a necessary degree of restraint. Like Erec's earlier adversaries, Guivreiz is perceptive on a certain level. He clearly states his challenge and motives, both before and after their discussion prior to the combat (Er 4326ff.), and is depicted considering the situation and his opponent (Er 4366-77). However, Guivreiz' initial reaction is to start fighting almost immediately (Er 4347). Likewise, he is only able to interpret Erec's enigmatic behaviour in terms of cowardice (Er 4407-20).[289] His motives in initiating combat are therefore called into question. As such, he resembles the love-blinded Galoain in that he is perceptive only in terms of the aspect of Erec which he is designed to highlight. Guivreiz is altogether a more noble and positive character than the count, both in terms of status and in the aspect of Erec which he represents, but this does not imply that this character's motivation is left unquestioned. Guivreiz' awareness is restricted to one level, that of seeking combat and acting bravely. In itself, this is a valid approach for a knight, but, as his defeat by Erec suggests, it needs to be balanced by a broader perspective.

The question of the correct procedure for joining combat, which is discussed in this episode and which is not evident

in the French source, may be connected with specifically German legislation and ethical concerns in this period. As W.H. Jackson maintains, this episode reflects:

> an intensified concern of the German military aristocracy in the 1180s to preserve, and ethically regulate and legitimize, its right of carrying arms, a concern of social history which informs Hartmann's chivalric poetry and the imperial legislation of the day on specific common points of substance and terminology.[290]

Between them, Guivreiz and Erec represent the different aspects of this debate on military ethics, namely the need for a knight to be brave and to remain active in justified pursuits, and the equal need to avoid violence without good cause and without giving thought to the proper procedures involved. Both characters display a degree of perception and non-perception, and both may be lauded and criticized for their attitudes which are represented in a discussion introduced by Hartmann before the combat. This specific context thus reveals further evidence of Erec's reawakening perception as he advises Guivreiz on the suitable circumstances for joining combat (Er 4348ff.). The uneven nature of Erec's recovery, however, is suggested by the ill-founded mockery with which he also addresses his opponent (Er 4348). No ultimate solution to this complex debate is offered by Hartmann, and the equal justification of these characters' actions is evident in the outcome in which Erec as victor is wounded as a result of his cowardice.

In particular, the motivations of both protagonists are being questioned here. Guivreiz bases his desire to join combat on Erec's cowardice and armed appearance (Er 4326-47). His approach therefore borders on the belligerent as he appears determined to fight without justifiable cause. Similarly, although Erec is able to discern Guivreiz' shortcomings, the reasons underlying his avoidance of combat and his loss of control whilst fighting are dubious. In the

first case, he pleads tiredness and a desire to be left in peace (Er 4359-65). This has overtones of his idleness at Karnant, particularly in the use of the terms 'arbeit' and 'gemach'. In the second case, he is overwhelmed by a fear of death and shame (Er 4407f.), and makes as if to strike the defeated Guivreiz (Er 4439-41). This reaction is reminiscent of his earlier trick on Iders, but there is no evidence here that Erec is again feigning his attack. His mental attitude towards combat thus leaves much to be desired. Erec therefore represents the argument in this debate that combat should only be pursued with good cause, but also demonstrates the negative reasons for avoiding combat, namely a desire for ease, and a fear of dying or being shamed. Hartmann's introduction of the debate before the combat and the possible motives of fear, shame, and laziness underlying Erec's refusals to fight reveal the focus of his adaptation. In addition, Erec's attempt to strike Guivreiz is accorded an ambiguity in Hartmann's narrative in terms of his motivation. This is in contrast to Chrétien's explanation that Erec is intent on frightening Guivret as a punishment (EeE 3855-61). The introduction of these aspects therefore suggests a questioning of the attitudes and actions of both combatants which is entirely absent in the French source.

On surrendering, Guivreiz comments on the nobility which Erec has demonstrated by his prowess (Er 4457-9), a remark which introduces the concept of the nobility of virtue or achievement.[291] However, this must be interpreted in combination with Guivreiz' additional hopes that his opponent is of noble stock (Er 4514-34), and his joy at hearing Erec's confirmation of his status (Er 4541ff.). It is notable, therefore, that both components of the debate concerning nobility find representation here. Erec's behaviour suggests an inherent nobility to Guivreiz which is later confirmed by his admission of noble blood. Although the notion of the nobility of virtue is touched upon at this

juncture, therefore, the discussion here concludes with an affirmation of inherited nobility.

In the aftermath of the combat, Erec reveals communicative skills which have been rarely apparent since leaving Karnant. He is also willing to rest temporarily and to reveal his identity (Er 4535-40). Despite still being far from his goal of rehabilitation, Erec undergoes an important breakthrough in terms of perception here, as he demonstrates a greater awareness of others and his own knightly obligations than has been apparent since the *verligen* episode. Martin Jones describes the effect of this encounter thus:

> In the first confrontation with Guivreiz, embodiment of the ethos of active knighthood, Erec is purged of the disabling psychological consequences of his *verligen*, and there is reinstated in him the knightly frame of mind which is a precondition of his accomplishing the tasks which lie ahead of him, leading ultimately to his assumption of the throne in Karnant.[292]

Moreover, the issue is complicated by the additional discussion of the conditions under which a 'knightly frame of mind' justifies violent action. The implication is that the pursuit of active combat is essential to the knightly lifestyle and is an accoutrement of nobility, but should nevertheless be subject to an awareness of the need for restraint in the light of wider responsibilities.

Keii and Gawein

Hartmann's emphasis on subjective issues in his adaptation of his source continues in Erec's encounter with knights from Arthur's court. Chrétien's Keu is depicted as the evilly-motivated sneak and coward familiar from many Arthurian romances, not least Hartmann's own *Iwein*. In *Erec*,

however, Hartmann's Keii possesses perceptive abilities which reveal a new angle on his role. In keeping with the depiction of Erec's other opponents, Keii is capable of a measure of perception and intellectual deliberation. Thus, he sees Erec, recognizes his wounded state (Er 4629.30-.35), and devises a plan to capture him which he cunningly conceals behind his welcome (Er 4629.36-.39). His real motivation is likewise explicitly stated, namely to bring Erec to court and claim to have defeated him in combat (Er 4629.56-4632). However, Hartmann also includes a direct insight into Keii's heart, his organ of intellect, in order to demonstrate that Keii is not only capable of evil thoughts. His heart is described as divided on itself (Er 4636ff.), an image which suggests the free will granted to humankind to choose between good and evil. As with Iders, Keii's attempt to win false glory is caused by his following the malicious section of his heart. In Keii, Hartmann is thus demonstrating the manner in which egoistical motivation restricts the scope of inner awareness to the extent that it causes a disproportionate sense of one's abilities and an underestimation of the perceptive capacity of others. Keii's immodesty, for example, fuels his belief that he can deceive Erec (Er 4694-700), in the same way that Galoain's lust rendered him vulnerable to Enite's plan. Keii's cunning therefore indicates a degree of perception, but the interference of his false motives ultimately leads to his failure.

Keii's ineptness in combat and his modest relation of his story make him an altogether more benign figure than Chrétien's Keu, possibly as an attempt to deflect blame from a member of Arthur's court, or else to highlight a further aspect of perception. Keii's realization and free admission of his faults after his defeat are significant as examples of self-appraisal and the acknowledgement of guilt:

> 'mich hât ûf selhe schande
> hie brâht mîn zageheit

daz doch mir ein herzeleit
von den dingen muoz geschehen,
sol ich iu mînes namen jehen,
wan ich hân wol garnet iuwern spot.' (Er 4763-8)[293]

His demonstration of modesty is subsequently rewarded by the forgiveness of Arthur's court. This humility and insight in Hartmann's Keii are accorded a greater significance by Hartmann's exclusion of Galoain's self-accusation at the end of the previous episode. Keii's achievement and demonstration of self-knowledge thus stands alone at this juncture of the text. A connection may be drawn instead with Iders' address to the queen. Like Keii, Iders demonstrates an awareness of his faulty motives, and the confession which this insight permits results in a reward and the acceptance of others, rather than in punishment. Keii's statement thus acts as a bridge between Iders' confession and Erec's later speech after his defeat by Guivreiz, both of which portray the rewards to be gained from an insight into and admission of one's faults.

In addition, the episode with the 'refreshingly brash'[294] Keii is distinguished by a mood of light relief. Rather than the comedy being an end in itself, however, it serves to create a sense of consolidation in the narrative.[295] The humorous dimension highlights in particular Erec's progress in terms of perception at this juncture, but also his lingering limitations. For the first time since Karnant, for example, he is able to recognize the deceitful intentions of an opponent for himself (Er 4665f.). Despite the lacuna in the Wolfenbüttel fragment which bridges this absent section of the Ambraser manuscript, one can surmise that Erec's angry reaction to Keii's trickery is caused by his perception of his opponent's dubious motives (Er 4629.44). Furthermore, Erec pretends to ride away with Gawein's horse (Er 4770-7), which is reminiscent of his trick on Iders and Maliclisier at Tulmein. This earlier episode finds a further echo in Erec's feigned attempt to cut off Keii's hand (Er

4707-11), which is a notable addition to the French source. The narrator expresses his approval of this punishment, and the connection with Erec's legitimate trick on Maliclisier implies that he is dealing perceptively with this opponent in contrast to his dubious move to strike Guivreiz in the previous episode.

A further point of comparison with his encounter with Guivreiz is provided by Erec's demonstration of a more correct approach to combat in this episode. Thus, he ascertains Keii's motives, and only engages in combat when Keii's provocation gives him sufficient cause (Er 4687-704). After his victory, Erec proceeds to re-emphasize his growing awareness by listening to Keii, asking for his identity and that of the horse's owner, and commiserating with him on his defeat:

> dô kêrte der guote
> mit lachendem muote
> und vernam sîne klage.
> er sprach: 'ritter, nû sage,
> wie bistû genant?
> unde tuo mir erkant
> dises rosses herren.
> ez enmac dir niht gewerren:
> ich wil wizzen dînen namen.
> dû endarft dich niht sô sêre schamen.
> ez ist geschehen manegem man
> der doch nie zagen muot gewan.' (Er 4744-55)

This speech reveals the first sign on Erec's part of the concern for others which was so evident before his *verligen*, but which has been strikingly absent since. This aspect of perception now reappears and receives repeated emphasis in subsequent episodes. It is also the first occasion on which Erec is depicted laughing. A connection between laughter and perception was evident in Enite's conversation with Galoain. On that occasion, she laughs in order to disguise her cunning (Er 3842), thereby encouraging the count to believe in her, but also suggesting Enite's confidence in her abilities. The count's answering laughter indicates his own

expectation of success (Er 3897). Thus, laughter appears to signify a confidence in one's perceptive abilities, however ill-founded this may be. Erec's laughter in combination with signs of perceptiveness at this stage may thus be interpreted as a significant indication of his expanding awareness.

A further alteration to Chrétien's version of this episode involves recognition and the revelation of identity. In both versions of the first Guivreiz episode, Erec asks his opponent's name and offers his own on request (Er 4468-73, 4535-40; EeE 3864-83). Erec's relatively sociable actions here indicate an advance in Hartmann's version from his earlier refusal to name himself to Galoain. In the encounter with Keii and Gawein, a further step is taken with regard to this issue, and the German narrative again reveals a marked departure from its source. Paul Salmon, in his investigation of Hartmann's *Iwein* and Wolfram's *Parzival*, notes how both German authors adapt their sources to make the lack of identification between characters an element of dramatic irony.[296] Such audience stimulation is similarly apparent in *Erec*. However, this issue is also closely connected to awareness as the ability to identify others and reveal one's own identity requires a degree of self-knowledge. The issue of revealing identity is explored in four stages prior to Erec's sojourn with Arthur's court:

1) the failure to enquire about identity/unwillingness to provide one's own identity (Maliclisier, Erec with Galoain);
2) providing one's own identity on request (Erec with Guivreiz);
3) asking others for their identities (Erec with Guivreiz and Keii);
4) providing one's name without being asked/recognizing and naming others (Keii, Gawein, Erec with Iders).

The fourth stage implies that the character is confident in his self-knowledge, which enables him to initiate contact with and readily identify other members of his society. This is a goal which Erec has yet to achieve, and an issue which Hartmann emphasizes in his protagonist's encounter with Keii and Gawein by altering his source with regard to this issue. Whereas Chrétien's Erec is able to recognize both Keu and Gauvain whilst they are oblivious to his identity, Hartmann's Erec remains ignorant of his opponents' identities, whilst even Keii is able to guess who Erec is (Er 4856f.).[297] Keii's conclusions are subsequently echoed by Arthur's court, and confirmed by Gawein who demonstrates the fourth stage of awareness by recognizing and naming Erec (Er 4905-9). This also constitutes a complete reversal of Chrétien's version in which Gauvain remains ignorant of Erec's identity and Erec names himself first (EeE 4087-90, 4149-57). These alterations serve to demonstrate that this episode is a stage in Erec's recovery of his inner awareness by associating identity with perception and by comparing Erec with these more perceptive figures. Thus, as well as revealing the remaining deficiency in Erec's perceptiveness, this episode confirms Erec's ability to enquire after his opponent's identity which he demonstrated against Guivreiz, even though he does not recognize Keii. In addition, Erec's subsequent refusal to name himself at Keii's request suggests a conscious withholding of identity from a disgraced opponent rather than a sign of uncommunicativeness (Er 4747f., 4830-2).

Nevertheless, Gawein proceeds to reveal further obstacles to inner awareness which Erec has yet to overcome. His plan to bring Erec to court and his assessment of Erec's refusal establishes him as a perceptive character. His cunning is referred to significantly as 'schoene trügeheit' (Er 5034), a term which implies positive motivation, and echoes Enite's plan to outwit Galoain. It is this positive attitude which is emphasized in this encounter and which Erec is unable to

grasp despite his earlier recognition of Keii's negative intentions. Thus, Gawein's greeting of Erec openly demonstrates his friendly motives (Er 4896-904), and he tries to excuse his well-intentioned trickery, although Erec misunderstands him:

> 'wan sol ich iuch beswæret hân,
> daz hân ich doch durch guot getân.
> ouch rihtet selbe über mich.' (Er 5078-80)

However, Gawein is able to comprehend Erec's misperception and subsequently takes no offence at Erec's misplaced accusations (Er 5068-76). Gawein's total control of his perceptive faculties thus lends him an insight into those of others. Erec's own misunderstanding, however, is evidence of the progress he has yet to make, and likewise of the different focuses of the French and German versions regarding this episode. Thus, Chrétien's Erec displays no anger on realizing the deception, and merely acknowledges Gauvain's superior cunning (EeE 4149f.). Hartmann's Erec, however, initially accuses Gawein of malice, although he is subsequently reconciled with him on hearing his explanation (Er 5081f.).[298] Ultimately, therefore, Gawein acts as a catalyst for Erec's progression as he precipitates Erec's attainment of insight into the motives of others.

Another significant issue introduced by Gawein in this episode is the role of perception in fulfilling society's demands. This is apparent in Hartmann's emphasis on Erec's capacity to bring joy to Arthur's court which is revealed in the king's reaction to Keii's description of the combat (Er 4860-79) and in Gawein's entreaty to Erec to attend court (Er 4929-58). In Chrétien's version, by comparison, Gauvain merely informs Erec that his presence is required at court (EeE 4095-4101). As joy may be interpreted in social terms as indicating the proper functioning of a court through its sense of community,[299] Erec's negative reaction to the request appears to indicate that he is not yet ready to

fulfil his social obligations. At court, there is no evidence of Erec communicating with his hosts, which forms a contrast with Enite's open exchange of information with the queen (Er 5107-15). However, Erec's mind is indeed active, as he thinks only of renewing his journey (Er 5249-51, 5291f.). Furthermore, his rejection of the comforts at court indicates an improvement over his failure at Karnant. His desire for action and *arbeit*, coupled with indications of insight, demonstrates the gradual establishment of a balance between his thoughts and actions, as was propounded in *Die Klage*. Thus, Erec's encounter with Arthur's court reveals his progress in terms of rejecting comfort, but his unease and uncommunicativeness at court nevertheless imply that progress has yet to be made before he is able to fulfil his social obligations appropriately.

Cadoc

On leaving Arthur's court, therefore, Erec has already demonstrated considerable signs of progress in his ability to perceive. His subsequent encounter with Cadoc, however, constitutes his ultimate breakthrough as the glimmers of insight and communication which had previously begun to manifest themselves are here revealed with less ambiguity. Similarly, there is a gradual dissipation of the narrator's reluctance to provide access to the workings of Erec's mind since his crisis. Attention is therefore again drawn to Erec's thought processes, as was the case before his *verligen*. The re-emergence of Erec's powers of insight is thus emphasized by this reflection in the narrative perspective.

Additional confirmation of Erec's progress is apparent in the manifestation at this juncture of God's support (Er 5517, 5561-4). As Rodney Fisher states:

> Gott antwortet ... nicht auf die Stimme, sondern auf die Gerechtigkeit der Handelnden, oder - um es "mittelalterlich" auszudrücken - auf das Herz.[300]

From this stage onward, Erec's heart, his organ of perception, functions in harmony with his body, and is thus capable of acting virtuously with regard to both secular and Christian values. The appearance of such references to prayer and God's assistance thus attest to Erec's achievement of the self-awareness needed to carry out God's will.

The Cadoc episode confirms this progress through ample evidence of Erec's sensory awareness and inclination to communicate. This is evident in his ability to orientate himself in order to find Enite and Cadoc in the forest (Er 5586-8, 5710-5). Most significant, however, is Erec's response to an unknown woman's voice which triggers thoughts of curiosity in him:[301]

> als er daz rüefen vernam,
> michel wunder in des nam
> waz diu rede möhte sîn. (Er 5302-4)

Furthermore, he is subsequently guided to the woman by her voice (Er 5312-19). Once again, therefore, a woman's voice is able to penetrate Erec's disorientation. However, on this occasion his reactions are perceptive and stem from altruistic motives. Erec proceeds to ask Cadoc's lady about her plight (Er 5339-44, 5354, 5362). This questioning is greatly extended from the French source and given extra emphasis by being in direct speech. Similarly, Erec proceeds to communicate with the giants in an attempt to discover their identities and their motives for torturing Cadoc (Er 5435-45). These repeated requests for information demonstrate Erec's pursuit of a restrained approach to combat as he seeks to establish the facts of the situation before using force. Unlike his encounter with Guivreiz, there is no evidence that his hesitation here is due to

cowardice. When combat is inevitable, he immediately takes action. Hartmann's emphasis on the correct approach to combat stems from the premise that action must be based on sound powers of perception which permit an assessment of motives. Erec adheres to this premise by establishing that the giants are conscious of their cruelty, and by clearly announcing his opposition to their actions (Er 5460-75, 5489-5501). Once Erec is satisfied of their evil purposes, he needs no further justification to act.

This scene is also significant as the depiction of an encounter between the previously uncommunicative Erec and other characters who are unable or unwilling to communicate for various reasons. For example, Cadoc and his lady are incapable of speaking because of their emotional and physical suffering (Er 5417-20, 5345-9). Cadoc's lady finally makes a superhuman effort to overcome her grief in order to give Erec information. Thus, her love for her companion surmounts even this obstacle to her communication, as did Enite's loyalty in previous episodes. The giants, however, reject Erec's questions and scorn his attempts to help Cadoc (Er 5446-55, 5476-86).[302] As such, they represent the displaying of evil intent or lack of awareness by rejecting speech, as was the case with Maliclisier and indeed Erec on previous occasions.

Erec's questioning of the giants likewise signifies that he has regained the ability to conceal his purposes. In this case, he disguises his intent to save Cadoc by assuring the giants that he is merely curious (Er 5462-4). In fact, as the narrator reveals, Erec is attempting to delay them in an effort to protect Cadoc and gain himself time to assess the situation (Er 5458f.). All of these elements constitute additions by the German author. Erec's mental and linguistic nimbleness is subsequently matched by his physical dexterity in combat with the giants (Er 5529-33, 5546-8). They, like Maliclisier and Iders before them, fail to comprehend Erec's

cunning intentions, and consequently consider him foolish and cowardly (Er 5448, 5452, 5496f.). This mistaken belief condemns them to the ranks of those adversaries, including Iders and Keii, whose arrogance causes them to disregard Erec as a threat with disastrous consequences. The narrator highlights this lack of awareness by identifying it as the direct cause of the giants' defeat (Er 5506-11, 5524-7). The above evidence therefore links this episode in particular with the combat at Tulmein, as various factors are evident on both occasions. These include the aware and cunning approach to a justifiable combat and the folly which arrogance can cause. Erec's return to Tulmein in this manner likewise points to a return to his earlier pre-*verligen* perceptiveness.

Furthermore, this combat is linked to a network of themes in this work in another specific way. It forms the last of three occasions in the text on which the term 'list' specifically denotes cunning and is accorded significance by its repetition in a relatively short space (Er 5458, 5530, 5664). The other two occasions include Enite's deception of Galoain (Er 3842, 3907, 3940) and Gawain's scheme to trick Erec (Er 4998, 5010, 5028), both of which are positive displays of cunning.[303] Previously, Erec's own 'list' has only been mentioned in a more negative sense in referring to his skill in lovemaking at Karnant (Er 2929). Against the giants, however, the portrayal of Erec's perceptive abilities suggests that the repeated use of the term *list* here denotes Erec's attainment of the more positive skill of perceptive ingenuity.

Erec's ability to reflect likewise forms the basis of his compassion for Cadoc and his lady, which is heavily emphasized in Hartmann's text in contrast to his source. Whereas Chrétien's Erec merely registers astonishment and puzzlement on encountering Cadoc's lady (EeE 4336-8), Hartmann's Erec is nearly moved to tears by her suffering

(Er 5335-8). This concern is repeated when Erec witnesses the giants' treatment of Cadoc. In fact, Erec's pity is so great that he is moved to share the punishment:

> Als diz Êrec ersach,
> nû bewegete des ritters smerze
> sô sêre sîn herze
> daz er bî im ê wære erslagen
> ê er inz hæte vertragen
> und daz ez an sîner varwe schein. (Er 5429-34)

Although Chrétien's Erec is similarly affected (EeE 4401-4), there is no corresponding wish to suffer with the knight. Erec's pity is intensified by the giants' recommencement of their beating despite his pleas (Er 5489-5500). It is this renewed display of cruelty, rather than the giants' insults, which finally causes Hartmann's Erec to act.

Such pity for a stranger highlights the progress which Erec has made since his merciless treatment of his wife in the initial stages of their adventure. In particular, Erec's tears confirm that he is experiencing heartfelt sympathy on this occasion, as does the use of the term 'erbarmen' in reference to his reaction to Cadoc's lady (Er 5300, 5334) and the giants' lack of mercy (Er 5408). These indications suggest a deep level of concern for the suffering of another, such as Erec has not displayed previously. Even his earlier sympathy for Koralus is surpassed in this episode.

Erec's concern continues in his words of solace to the rescued but crestfallen Cadoc. This again constitutes an adaptation of Chrétien's narrative in which Cadoc merely expresses his thanks and Erec directs him to Arthur's court (EeE 4475-579). In Hartmann's version, Erec's sympathy is emphasized as he seeks to dispel Cadoc's discomfort by referring to his own shameful experiences:

> als Êrec hâte vernomen
> wie im sîn dinc was komen,
> durch schoenen list er sprach,

im ze benemen sîn ungemach:
'herre, missehabet iuch niht
umbe dise geschiht,
daz iu die risen hânt getân.
jâ enwirt es nieman erlân
swer sô manheit üeben wil,
in enbringe geschiht ûf daz zil
daz er sich schamen lîhte muoz:
dar nâch wirt im es buoz.
wie dicke ich wirs gehandelt bin!'
mit dirre rede trôste er in. (Er 5662-75)

The term 'schoener list' is familiar from Enite's trickery of Galoain, and also reminiscent of the concept of *schoene sinne* in *Die Klage* which was used to denote the positive and superior function of the perceptive heart. Erec's sympathetic treatment of Cadoc also echoes his earlier expression of consolation to Keii, which constitutes a further addition by Hartmann to his source (Er 4753-5). Both of these aspects thus point to a desire by the German author to emphasize the concepts of pity and humility as consequences of inner awareness and to portray this association through his main protagonist.

In the Cadoc episode, Erec is also demonstrating his recovery of the capacity to distinguish between subjective guilt and innocence. His generosity of heart stems from the perceptive ability to ascertain the genuineness of feelings of shame or regret, and subsequently from the desire to ease this discomfort out of a sense of sympathy and humility. Hartmann's Erec thus not only saves Cadoc, as in the French version, but displays an empathy for him which arises from his own recovery of his powers of inner awareness.

Hartmann's alteration of his source in this episode is further evident in the manner in which the characters identify themselves. At this point, a significant change is evident in Erec's powers of insight as he not only asks Cadoc for his identity (Er 5640-45), but also voluntarily states his own name (Er 5697f.). This stands in direct contrast to the French source in which Erec refuses to name

himself in response to Cadoc's enquiry (EeE 4519-25). Hartmann's alteration implies that he is using this issue to suggest a progression in Erec's relationship with himself. In the earlier episode with Guivreiz, Erec demonstrated the ability to reveal his identity on demand, and subsequently was able to ask Keii to reveal his name also. Now, however, Erec takes the final step of offering his own name. This recalls his earlier perceptiveness in identifying himself to Iders at Tulmein (Er 1089f.). By taking this step at this juncture, Erec reveals his restored confidence in his perceptive capacities which permits him not only to communicate with other people, but also with himself.

At this point in the narrative, Erec demonstrates his command of a full range of knightly attributes which require fully functioning powers of perception for their legitimate implementation. This awareness is evident in his sharp senses and desire for information in this episode, which fuel his ability to experience pity and sympathy for others, to understand their motivations, and to engage in restrained and justified action. The Cadoc episode thus constitutes a decisive stage in the depiction of Erec's somewhat uneven progress towards regaining his former awareness.

Enite's Lament

Erec's revelation of his newly-found awareness is succeeded by a period during which he lies unconscious which ultimately leads to his reconciliation with his wife. This episode likewise depicts Enite in a new light as a result of her monologue lament. The change in such a previously aware protagonist has caused controversy in scholarship.[304] However, it is important to take into account the context of emotional turmoil in which this monologue occurs, particularly when comparing it to Enite's earlier monologues. By doing so, one can view this lament as an arena for a

fascinating psychological portrait beyond that already achieved in relation to this protagonist.

Enite's lament reveals certain similarities with her earlier monologues. Thus, her previous deliberations concerning her faithfulness in the face of disobeying her husband find reflection here, as does her belief that she herself is dispensable. The pain of witnessing her husband's apparent death thus confirms her absolute loyalty to him. However, Enite's expression of devotion is nevertheless affected by the grief and disorientation which she experiences as a result of her despair. Her lament thus provides Hartmann with the opportunity to portray the effect of grief on a character possessing already proven powers of inner awareness. Her earlier role as foil to the imperceptive Erec has now become essentially redundant as a result of his improving insight, but Enite's former perceptiveness continues to be significant here as a yardstick against which the psychological effects of her sorrow can be gauged.

Unlike other characters who undertake an inner questioning of their previous motivation, such as Iders and Keii, Enite's grief-affected powers of perception lead her to display a dubious understanding of her guilt and motives at Karnant (Er 5940-59). Thus, she expresses regret at having voiced her concerns, and at having thereby destroyed her happiness and comfort. In a character whose inner deliberations have been revealed with such clarity, these regrets strike an ambiguous note. Enite now appears unable to comprehend the worthiness of her earlier motives. Instead, she considers her honour and comfort to have been of greater importance (Er 5955-9). Thus, the restriction of Enite's powers of perception has the same effect as Erec's, that is the limiting of her awareness of her obligations to her husband and society, and the tendency to place value on comfort and individual joy. Furthermore, Enite's inability to comprehend her own motives accurately even extends to a

misconception of God's powers of compassion (Er 5774-86). Similarly, she displays an unfounded regret for her parents' optimism on her departure with Erec (Er 5974-84). Her anguished appeals to Death, Erec's sword, and the forest animals likewise reveal the manner in which her pain has affected her sense of reality. Her emotional turmoil has such a profound effect that her normal clear-sightedness is lost. Her self-accusations therefore should only be considered against the background of this confusion, rather than be interpreted as confirmation of an earlier failure. As Tobin suggests:

> rather than seek the answer to the guilt question in these anguished laments, we would do better to see in them the confused and contradictory yet eloquent verbal expression of Enite's all-consuming love for Erec which she has already shown so often in deed.[305]

To this one might add that Enite's love for her husband has also previously been revealed in the thoughts which guided her deeds. By taking this altered perceptiveness into account, Enite's lament becomes less a vehicle for revealing previously concealed guilt, and more a platform for exploring the effects of despair on a character's ability to reason and the changed priorities which this limitation provokes.

Oringles

Enite's grief subsequently influences her encounter with Oringles. As a result, this episode forms a contrast with the corresponding earlier encounter with Galoain in the sense that Enite is not in total control of her perceptive faculties on her second meeting with a would-be suitor. In addition, this episode reflects aspects of the Cadoc and *verligen* episodes in a manner which particularly emphasizes the thought processes and motivation of the characters. It

thereby acts as a yardstick against which to judge Erec's regaining of his perceptive powers.

In reflection of the Cadoc episode, Oringles responds out of curiosity to the voice of an unknown woman in the forest (Er 6140-5 compared with 5302-4). However, despite the narrator's insistence that Oringles is a saviour sent by God (Er 6115-24), the count's apparently altruistic initial response vanishes on seeing Enite. Despite Enite's demonstration of anguish, Oringles does not display the pity experienced by Erec towards Cadoc's lady. Instead, Oringles' response to such sorrow is to demand repeatedly that Enite cease her inappropriate grieving (Er 6225-9, 6281, 6463-66). Such insensitivity immediately contrasts Oringles' attitude with Erec's earlier sympathy. Rather than being moved by Enite's grief, Oringles is instantly affected by her beauty:

> nû begunde der grâve ahten
> und bî im betrahten
> daz er bî sînen zîten
> nâhen noch wîten
> nie schoener wîp hete gesehen. (Er 6178-82)

Such a reaction recalls Galoain's change of heart on being affected by lust for Enite. In addition, Oringles holds a similar inner monologue to the earlier count, which, although only referred to indirectly, suggests that a profound change of motivation is occurring as the result of the influence of desire on his powers of perception.

The reduced ability to perceive which was apparent in Erec's former antagonists is thus also evident in Oringles. However, this issue is emphasized by means of repetition and the contrast between the two main characters in this episode. Thus, Oringles reveals his sensory awareness in his ability to hear and question Enite, and to interpret her actions (Er 6140-74). In addition, his conversation with his companions, which acts as a form of monologue echoing Galoain's earlier thoughts, is peppered with terms denoting

perception, either referring to his own thought processes (Er 6199 'mich dunket', 6201 'erkant', 6225 'dunket', 6242 'erkiesen', 6251 'wæne') or his heart's advice (Er 6197f., 6203f.). Likewise, Oringles calls on Enite to alter her own thinking (Er 6235, 6267-9). This emphasis on insight and understanding merely serves, however, to highlight the additional limitations of Oringles' own perception. Furthermore, the overall impression of Oringles as a man of shallow awareness is confirmed by the failure of Enite's repeated appeals to him to see or understand (Er 6168, 6291, 6301, 6571-5). Additional indications of this restriction of insight occur in the repeated references to Oringles' ability to see Enite's beauty, with the implication that his desire blinds him to anything beyond outward appearance (Er 6160-66, 6178-82, 6187-93). It is also notable that, like Galoain, Oringles refers to Enite as a child (Er 6451). He is thus unable to consider her capable of commanding a mature level of perception.

The limitations which Oringles' lust imposes on his awareness also affect his understanding of Enite's motives, particularly in her refusal to marry him. Hartmann highlights Oringles' misconception by having him learn the details of Enite's situation before leaving for Limors (Er 6175-7). In contrast, Chrétien's count does not enquire about the causes of Enite's predicament. This alteration suggests a greater concern in the German version to emphasize the interference of lust in the ability to appreciate the suffering of others. For her part, Enite demonstrates her loyalty to her husband by refusing Oringles' proposal despite being almost struck dumb by grief (Er 6167, 6282-5). Like Cadoc's lady, and in confirmation of her own earlier decisions to speak, Enite overcomes even this sizeable obstacle to speech. Moreover, the motivation behind her refusal is categorically stated, as she explicitly instructs Oringles to recognize her heartfelt resolution:

si sprach sô si daz herze twanc:
'lât, herre, die rede lanc:
herre, lât iuwern spot
mit mir armen durch got.
und sît ir rîche, deist iu guot.
erkennet, herre, mînen muot.
des wil ich iu kurze bejehen:
ez enmac nimmer geschehen
daz ich iuwer wîp werde
ode iemens ûf der erde
über kurz od über lanc:
ez geschæhe sunder mînen danc,
mir engebe got wider mînen man.' (Er 6286-98)

A comparison may be drawn here with her earlier rejection of Galoain (Er 3797-825). Despite this clear stating of intention, Oringles does not repeat Galoain's angry reaction to Enite's words, a response which indicates a degree of comprehension regarding Enite's purposes. Instead, Oringles reveals his total disregard for her suffering in his misogynistic dismissal of her statement which contrasts so starkly with her own appeal for his understanding (Er 6302-7). Furthermore, his refusal is subsequently compounded by his hypocritical prompting of Enite to act selflessly and to reflect on her supposed good fortune (Er 6219ff.).

On removing to Limors, the whole sequence of misunderstanding is repeated as the two characters clash over Enite's disobedience. Like Erec in the depths of his imperceptiveness, Oringles is incapable of comprehending Enite's motives (Er 6457-62). Furthermore, his perception remains so impaired that he continues to believe that he can change her mind (Er 6369-74, 6388-410, 6451ff.). His lustful intentions are made still more explicit by references to his thoughts of their wedding night (Er 6355f.). Unlike Galoain, however, Oringles does not degenerate into a comical figure. Instead, the effect of lust manifests itself in a more brutal way than even his earlier lack of pity could suggest. Oringles therefore demonstrates the blinding effects of lust to a degree beyond that portrayed by Erec and Galoain. His inability to understand Enite is likewise apparent in his

accusation of foolish and childish behaviour for which he appropriates the term 'tump' (Er 6491, 6505). Like the giants when referring to Erec, Oringles uses this term to accuse another of a child's incapacity to reason, but, in effect, merely reveals his own perceptive shortcomings.

A further comparison with the Galoain episode is apparent in the neglect by both counts of their duty of protection. In this way, they echo Erec's own laxity towards his social obligations by responding to their desires. In addition, Oringles, like Erec, becomes so desirous of Enite that he flouts his court's wishes in his haste to marry and in his brutish treatment. His lust therefore severely affects his personal credibility amongst his subjects. The blinding influence of love is thus shown to interfere in social and personal relations and duties to a devastating extent.

The intractability of Enite's and Oringles' positions reaches a climax at Limors where a total breakdown in communication occurs. This is evident in further references to sensory perception. Thus, Enite does not hear Oringles' messenger because her grief focuses all her perceptive faculties on Erec (Er 6375f.). In addition, Oringles refuses to hear criticism of his actions, enforcing silence on both his retainers and Enite, whom he symbolically hits on the mouth (Er 6549, 6518-23, 6577-9). He thereby joins the ranks of those characters (Maliclisier, the giants, Erec himself) who inappropriately reject the opinions of others by demanding silence. In her desperation, however, Enite recovers something of her former cunning by realizing that her insistent voice will aggravate Oringles to the point of murder:

> und als si den slac emphie,
> wan er von mannes krefte gie,
> dô hete si gedingen unde trôst
> si würde des lîbes belôst,
> und swaz si mêre gespræche
> daz erz mit slegen ræche

unz er si gar erslüege.
des wart vil ungevüege
ir klage, und schrê wider dem site,
und wânde den tôt gedienen mite. (Er 6560-9)

In contrast to the Galoain episode, Enite's grief-affected perceptive faculties prohibit her from achieving a complex deception of her adversary in this encounter. An understanding of the power of her voice, however, enables her to pursue the only plan of which her grief will allow her to conceive, by seeking death. Once again, in spite of an order to be silent, her voice acts as an instrument for emphasizing the need to be aware of others. Thus, Enite highlights Oringles' faults by mocking his commands, demanding that he himself be silent (Er 6508f.), and continuing to defy him with her cries.

Enite's capacity for speaking out at the appropriate moment is once again confirmed, as her voice, which precipitated Erec's earlier emergence from his state of non-perception, here awakens him from a physical state of unconsciousness. Erec's revival scene symbolizes a rebirth of his inner awareness. It has also undergone extensive alteration from the French source with the result that Erec's sight, hearing, initial bewilderment, and finally his comprehension of the situation are all emphasized:

er lac in einem twalme
und erschrihte von ir galme
als der dâ wirt erwecket,
von swærem troume erschrecket.
er vuor ûf von der bâre
in vremder gebâre
und begunde mit den ougen sehen.
in wunderte waz im wære geschehen,
und enweste wie er dar kam.
anderstunt er si vernam,
wande si vil dicke schrê:
'ouwê, lieber herre, ouwê!
dîner helfe ger ich âne nôt,
wan dû bist eht aber leider tôt.'
als si in dô nande,

zehant er si erkande
und vernam wol daz si wære
in etelîcher swære,
er enweste wie oder wâ.
er enlac niht langer dâ:
als er erkande ir stimme,
ûf spranc er mit grimme
und rûschte vaste under sî. (Er 6594-616)

The corresponding section of Chrétien's narrative describes the same processes, but in less detail:

Antre cez diz et cez tançons
Revint Erec de pasmeisons
Aussi con li hon qui s'esvoille.
S'il s'esbaï, ne fu mervoille,
Des janz qu'il vit anviron lui;
Mes grant duel ot et grant enui,
Quant la voiz sa fame antandi. (EeE 4853-9)

(In the middle of these arguments and disputes, Erec recovered consciousness like a man waking from sleep. It was no wonder if he was startled to see the people around him; but when he heard his wife's voice, he was troubled and filled with grief.)

Hartmann's tautological phrase 'begunde mit den ougen sehen' acts as an indication to the alert reader that Erec has achieved a breakthrough in insight, as does his emphasis on the perceptive processes which Erec experiences on awakening. Thus, just as Kalogrenant persuades his companions in *Iwein* to listen with their hearts, Erec's use of his eyes indicates here a perceptiveness which stems from the rational faculty. Similarly, Erec's ability to hear is portrayed in terms of the mental deductions which it inspires. Furthermore, Hartmann emphasizes Erec's recognition of his wife's voice by the repetition of the term 'erkande', and it is significant that Erec now responds to the note of suffering in this voice in the same manner in which he reacted to Cadoc's lady. His recovery of his sensory, rational, and compassionate faculties is therefore explicitly detailed in this passage.

Hartmann also draws a neater parallel than his source between the *verligen* scene and this episode. Thus, he states more clearly than Chrétien that it was Enite's voice which actually caused Erec to awake. Furthermore, Hartmann includes the actual content of Enite's cries, including her belief that Erec is dead, which corresponds to her belief at Karnant that he was asleep. In addition, Erec's reaction on both occasions is to act swiftly, but at Limors his action is expressly prompted by fears for his wife's safety.[306] Each of these points thus serves to create a contrast with the *verligen* scene in order to highlight Erec's more perceptive reactions at Limors.

In killing the lust-blinded Oringles, Erec is destroying a major component of his own earlier failure, an aspect termed by Schulze 'die letzte Objektivierung zwanghaft destruktiver Erotik'[307]. The confirmation that Erec's period of imperception has been overcome is subsequently implied by the couple's reconciliation. In addition, Erec's request to Enite for information and subsequently for forgiveness constitutes a significant alteration to the French source (Er 6792-803). The corresponding passage in Chrétien's narrative depicts Erec forgiving Enide for speaking out against him at Carnant (EeE 4919-31). The difference in focus of the German version thus confirms that both main protagonists were to blame for the *verligen* episode. However, Hartmann's version also stresses Erec's newly-acquired ability to appreciate Enite's loyalty (Er 6783-91). The ironic suggestion that Erec's treatment of his wife was justifiable implies that Enite's loyalty was apparent from a very early stage, and that Erec imposed this trial whilst still experiencing a limitation of his inner awareness. His request for forgiveness now confirms that he has regained the means to appreciate Enite's motives.

Erec's Second Encounter with Guivreiz

The second encounter with Guivreiz comprises a virtual mirror-image of the first. In so doing, it presents for further discussion the question of the proper mental attitude to combat. Erec's recently proven ability to recognize Enite's loyalty is therefore immediately followed by the need to demonstrate his appreciation of the restrained but active approach to knighthood which was so lacking at Karnant.

Alterations to the French source again reveal Hartmann's tendency to highlight issues relating to awareness. For example, Hartmann's Guivreiz is fully informed about the incident at Limors before setting out to help Erec, whereas Guivret receives earlier and incomplete news, and is consequently intent only on retrieving Erec's body (Er 6814-39, EeE 4939-64). In both versions, this character displays reasoning power by drawing conclusions about Erec's identity from the information he receives and feeling concern for him. Hartmann's adaptation additionally depicts Guivreiz reflecting on the consequences of his failure to help (Er 6837-51). By being fully informed of events, however, Hartmann's Guivreiz has less excuse for joining combat with Erec than his French counterpart, who believes Erec dead, and who therefore could not be expected to recognize his opponent. Hartmann is thus introducing the question of the culpability of both parties in the forthcoming combat, thereby establishing closer links with issues explored in their earlier encounter.

This second meeting also constitutes a direct contrast to Erec's earlier reluctance to join combat. Although he now hears and sees his adversaries for himself (Er 6873-7), he intends to engage the oncoming men in combat because, despite his weakened state, he fears being branded a coward:

er sprach ze vrouwen Ênîten:
'vrouwe, ich hoere rîten
engegen uns ein michel her.
nû enwil ich âne wer
alsô zagelîchen
ûzem wege niht entwîchen.' (Er 6878-83)

This echoes Guivreiz' earlier doubts about Erec's bravery. Although Erec is aware of his physical weakness, his fears of gaining a reputation for cowardice on this second occasion prevent him from establishing a more worthy basis for combat. His attitude to combat has therefore changed, but nevertheless remains inappropriate in the broader picture. In Chrétien's version, this incident is presented slightly but significantly differently in that Erec is more willing to assess the situation before engaging in combat:

'Remenez ci, dame!' fet il,
'Un petit delez cest sevil
Tant que cez janz trespassé soient.
Je n'ai cure que il vos voient;
Car je ne sai, queus janz ce sont,
Ne quel chose querant il vont;
Espoir nos n'avons d'aus regart.
Mes je ne voi de nule part,
Ou nos nos poïssiens refuire,
S'il nos voloient de rien nuire.
Ne sai, se maus m'an avandra;
Ja por peor ne remandra,
Que a l'ancontre ne lor aille.' (EeE 4977-89)

('Stay here, lady,' he says, 'next to this hedge for a little while until these people have gone by. I don't want them to see you, for I don't know what people they are, nor what they're after. Perhaps we have nothing to fear from them; but I don't see anywhere a way for us to escape if they wanted to cause us any trouble. I don't know if I shall come to any harm, but I'll not be stopped by fear from going to meet them.')

Thus, Chrétien's Erec is aware of the need to assess an opponent's intentions before engaging in combat, and to fight bravely once the cause has been considered worthy. Such concerns formed the conclusion of the first encounter with Guivreiz in Hartmann's version. At their second meeting, the same issues are reinvestigated and re-

emphasized. On this occasion, however, Erec's eagerness to join combat and his concern with cowardice resemble the earlier Guivreiz. Although Erec initiates the combat, Guivreiz himself displays little restraint in reacting to Erec's appearance despite his mission to search for his friend. Again, the avoidance of cowardice is posited in the narrative as underlying Guivreiz' actions here (Er 6902-7). This issue is given additional emphasis by Hartmann's alteration of the scene to include sufficient moonlight for the characters to recognize one another. Erec and Guivreiz must therefore blame themselves, rather than a natural cause, for failing to justify the combat (Er 6894f. compared with EeE 5000-2). In a further alteration, Guivreiz copies Erec's earlier unmotivated attack after overcoming him (Er 6937f.), and is only restrained by Enite's revival of her role as a voice of good sense to remind Guivreiz on this occasion of the need for restraint in combat (Er 6946-53). This has the desired effect as Guivreiz' insight resurfaces on hearing Enite's voice, and causes him to question her and realize his mistake (Er 6957-70). Subsequently, his initial intent to aid the couple is revealed, as is his relief and joy at seeing them (Er 6971-94).

As Guivreiz proceeds to express his regret for the hurt he believes he has caused, Erec interrupts him with a request for silence (Er 7003-7). Such demands previously denoted Erec's rejection of good advice. Here, however, he signifies his recovery of awareness by recognizing the correct moment to speak, whilst his less culpable friend is silent (Er 7007-9). Erec proceeds to apportion blame to himself for foolishly believing that the road belonged to him alone:

> 'sît daz ich tumber man
> ie von tumpheit muot gewan
> sô grôzer unmâze
> daz ich vremder strâze
> eine wolde walten
> unde vor behalten
> sô manegem guoten knehte,
> dô tâtet ir mir rehte.

mîn buoze wart ze kleine,
dô ich alters eine
iuwer aller êre wolde hân:
ich solde baz ze buoze stân.' (Er 7012-23)

Erec thus demonstrates his insight into the cause of his limited perception, that is the 'tumpheit' which led him to believe that he could defeat so many opponents single-handedly. He realizes here that an exaggerated belief in one's own strength is detrimental in combat and may lead to unjustified violence. He therefore considers his defeat to be justified, and muses on how he has escaped relatively lightly. The acceptance of his words suggests that his companions consider it uncourtly to demand further punishment for Erec. In effect, their lack of contradiction confirms the conclusions Erec himself has reached.

The concept of *tumpheit* links Erec's statement here with previous episodes. This was discussed earlier with reference to Iders' confession in which he blamed his foolish heart for advising him to act wrongfully, and also to the giants and Oringles, whose limited insight rendered them incapable of assessing the mature perceptiveness of others. Such self-judgement is also evident with regard to Keii. However, the shared term 'tumpheit' links Erec's statement here particularly with Iders' confession. This is likewise the case with the term 'buoze' with which Erec and Iders express their willingness to make reparation. This term only appears on these two occasions, thereby establishing a parallel between the two scenes. These scenes are thus distinguished as the two occasions on which protagonists undertake a consideration of their past actions and culpability, and, in a demonstration of contrition, offer themselves up for punishment. They therefore constitute the closest links between Hartmann's work and the steps of contrition, confession, and readiness to undertake satisfaction inherent in contemporary penitential practice.

The shared terminology between Iders' confession and Erec's statement also serves to highlight Erec's recovery of insight. A comparison with Chrétien's version likewise reveals Hartmann's emphasis on this statement. Its increased length and portrayal in direct speech also contrasts with the indirect mode of Guivreiz' self-blame and Erec and Enite's earlier reconciliation. Thus, Erec's own insight here constitutes a culmination of the signs of growing awareness which are evident throughout his later adventures. In addition, however, this speech also represents a specific parallel of the earlier Guivreiz encounter in stressing the importance of insight in terms of proper combat procedure.

As Martin Jones points out, Erec's speech has often been interpreted as a sudden turning-point in his understanding of his previous behaviour.[308] Such interpretations claim that at this juncture Erec finally realizes the foolishness of his pursuit of personal honour rather than the service of others. Jones justifiably questions whether Erec's words here can support such weight of meaning, particularly as Erec has already demonstrated an improvement in terms of his mental approach to combat since his previous encounter with Guivreiz. His words thus have no bearing on his previous behaviour because his inner progress has already been completed before this encounter.[309] As a result, Jones concludes that Erec's speech is a sign of courtesy towards Guivreiz which is intended to alleviate his opponent's sole guilt in joining combat on this occasion.

However, it is also possible to view Erec's speech here in terms of a concluding step in his uncompleted progress towards greater inner awareness. Erec's words therefore act as a *culmination* of all the aspects of his recovery of perception, but also as a further, specific reference to the proper approach to combat, which he has not adopted on this occasion. As previously demonstrated, Erec has performed acts of altruism stemming from the restitution of his powers

of insight already in the Cadoc episode. This earlier, gradual recovery of his inner awareness thus allows him to reflect on his behaviour at this juncture. Seen in these terms, therefore, Erec's speech does not constitute a sudden insight, but rather a confirmation of the progress he has already demonstrated, but which he has not yet completed. The last step of this journey pertains to the proper approach to combat, and therefore complements his initial encounter with Guivreiz. Erec's mental attitude to knightly activities is thus being specifically reinvestigated in this encounter. On this occasion, Erec has taken over Guivreiz' former belligerent role, and must accept a large share of the blame for inappropriately initiating combat. His speech therefore refers to a specific aspect of his identity and obligations which he has violated as a result of his incomplete progress. However, as his words demonstrate, it is his previous recovery of his perceptive powers which allows him to appreciate his fault and to take that final step towards achieving true insight into his obligations.

Erec's recovery of his insight subsequently receives further verification from Hartmann as Erec and Enite sleep together for the first time since Karnant, and significantly reside apart from Guivreiz' retinue (Er 7091-7101). Unlike Chrétien's couple who are reunited at Penefrec, Hartmann immediately demonstrates that his main protagonists are able to pursue the private side of their marriage without resorting to social isolation.[310] In a further note of contrast with the *verligen* episode, Erec is subsequently healed at Penefrec, a place which Hartmann depicts as symbolizing active and fruitful leisure, but is no longer satisfied to remain even here. Instead, he is preoccupied with leaving to resume his knightly pursuits (Er 7237-63). This restlessness is again an addition to Chrétien's text. It points towards a further adventure, but also confirms that Erec has achieved a balance of insight and desire which permits the active pursuit of his knightly lifestyle.

Joie de la curt

This concluding episode comprises a drawing together of disparate elements which have been apparent throughout the text. It allows Erec to demonstrate all the aspects of virtuous and responsible knighthood which his journey to self-awareness has enabled him to attain. Moreover, in Mabonagrin, Erec encounters a more complete image of his former self than any of his previous adversaries and a figure who causes him to reveal his new capacity to act in the best interests of society. Finally, this adventure forms a conclusion to the work as a whole by invoking aspects of Erec's first combat against Iders and the *verligen* episode in order to demonstrate the extent and nature of Erec's progress throughout the narrative.[311]

Erec's complete recovery of his powers of perception is evident in his curiosity and bravery in this episode, which are balanced by an awareness of the need to justify force, and by his pity for the victims of unnecessary violence. In particular, his powers of sensory perception are highlighted. Thus, on his approach to Brandigan, Erec is forced to press a reluctant Guivreiz for information (Er 7924ff.), and at first appears to be foolhardy in repeatedly disregarding Guivreiz' warnings (Er 8043-5, 8054f., 8147-53). The townsfolk are similarly confused by Erec's confidence and express their certainty of his impending defeat in a low murmur (Er 8086-8111, 8159-69). Erec proceeds to laugh and even sing in the face of these concerns (Er 8028f., 8154-8, 8442). However, this reaction acts as a demonstration of aware confidence rather than blindness on Erec's part. As Gertrud Höhler notes:

> man wird der Szene des 'Volksgemurmels' eher gerecht, wenn man sie als willkommenen Anlaß für den Dichter begreift, die Qualitäten des Hauptheldenen noch einmal in allen Schattierungen vorzuführen.[312]

Erec's display of sensory and reasoning powers subsequently continues in his repeated questioning of Ivreins, whom he also cunningly misleads in order to learn about the adventure (Er 8443ff.). Erec thus demonstrates his ability to obtain information by disguising his intentions.

A further dimension to Erec's awareness is revealed in this episode in the shape of his relationship with God (Er 8527f., 8855-9). This is expressed in Erec's inner prayer which is significantly portrayed in direct speech, a style which has not been employed to reveal Erec's thoughts since before his *verligen* (Er 8147-53). The depiction of a religious dimension at this juncture confirms that Erec is able to act in God's name as a result of his recovery of self-knowledge. Erec's expression of trust in his abilities and in God at this stage likewise recalls the teaching in *Die Klage* concerning the acquisition of virtue. Erec reveals a confidence that his actions, guided by his new awareness, will be accorded both God's blessing and the praise of secular society. The episode at Brandigan thus confirms the broader implications, both secular and spiritual, of the progress in insight which Erec has achieved.

It should be noted, however, that the devices employed earlier to depict awareness are affected in this episode by Hartmann's creation of suspense. Thus, the reluctance of Guivreiz, Ivreins, and the townspeople to speak of the adventure does not constitute criticism.[313] Instead, their actual motivation is to protect Erec (e.g. Er 8390-414), and their silence and timidity contrasts with Erec's self-confidence to create a sense of foreboding. Hartmann's addition of Guivreiz' mistaking the path and the descriptions of the night and morning before the combat also create an escalation of tension, as does the sorrow which the inhabitants of Brandigan and the widows feel for Erec and especially Enite. Their confidence in a negative outcome

reflects the risk Erec is taking, however, rather than calling into question his wisdom in pursuing this adventure.

Erec's own reasons for accepting the challenge are based on a combination of factors. The acquisition of booty is of no consequence to him, unlike the pursuit of honour. Thus, he sees an opportunity to bring aid to Brandigan, but also to re-establish his own knightly credentials by defeating an opponent with a fearsome reputation (Er 8540-62). However, Erec is not guided by a blind confidence in his abilities. As well as carefully establishing the facts of the situation, he also fears the task ahead. As the narrator indicates, however, this fear is not based on cowardice but is indicative of the natural reaction of a perceptive knight who is aware of the risks and who has listened to the advice of others (Er 8619-31). Thus, the inappropriate mental attitude towards combat which was demonstrated in his encounters with Guivreiz has been overcome. This is also highlighted by Ivreins' information that the knights who previously attempted the adventure disregarded all warnings on account of their foolish hearts. The knight in the garden has killed all those:

> 'die des niht wolden haben rât
> von tumbes herzen stiure,
> sine suochten âventiure.' (Er 8479-81)

Erec's contrasting approach thus confirms his own heart's mature perception.

Moreover, Erec's attitude is coloured by an altruistic desire to comfort the widows (Er 8334-42). Hartmann's addition of this aspect implies that he is again intent on highlighting pity as a major factor in Erec's undertaking of an adventure. This emphasis is apparent in Erec's two inner monologues on seeing the widows, firstly chiding God for depriving such women of their happiness (Er 8294-305), and secondly hoping that Enite will not join them (Er 8350-5).

His inner emotions of pity and reasonable fearfulness are thus again presented in the most direct form possible, in confirmation of his recovery of his perceptive faculties.

Having thus established that these faculties are again active, Erec proceeds to undertake the adventure. Parallels may be drawn between his own situation at Karnant and the seclusion in which Mabonagrin and his lady live. They too have established a love relationship apart from society to the detriment of their court. Nevertheless, contrasts may be drawn between Enite and Mabonagrin's lady, both in terms of their beauty (Er 8926-36), and also their attitudes towards their spouses. Furthermore, Mabonagrin brings sorrow to the court because his pursuit of love has caused his knightly activity to become channelled into pointless aggression. This contrasts with Erec's earlier knightly inactivity. The anti-social consequences of Mabonagrin's love relationship are described by Schulze as:

> eine epische Konkretisierung des lyrischen Minnedienstmotivs, das in dieser sinnlos perpetuierten Form ad absurdum geführt wird.[314]

Like Erec at Karnant, therefore, Mabonagrin experiences the negative effects of love which result in such social disruption.

At Brandigan, however, Erec's superior power of awareness over his adversary continues to reveal his progress since his *verligen*. Thus, for example, he sees the pavilion (Er 8901f.), the lady (Er 8926f.), and Mabonagrin (Er 9009f.), and also hears his voice (Er 8992-4). His approach is also careful and unaggressive. Despite some degree of sensory awareness being attributed to Mabonagrin, the limited scope of his perception nevertheless becomes evident. On seeing Erec talking with his lady, Mabonagrin immediately draws the wrong conclusions about his motives (Er 9003-6), and his abrupt address of Erec likewise demonstrates his absolute

intention of fighting, as is in keeping with his warlike inclinations:

> sîn wâpenroc alsam was,
> er selbe rôt, als ich ez las,
> gewâfent nâch sînem muote.
> ich wæne sîn herze bluote
> swenne er niht ze vehtenne vant:
> sô mordic was sîn hant. (Er 9018-23)

Mabonagrin's belligerence and love restrict his perceptive powers in the same manner in which Erec's earlier adversaries were influenced by lust or desire for combat. His address subsequently provides an opportunity for Erec's motivation and superior perception to be displayed as well as the Red Knight's own unfounded jealousy and aggressiveness. Erec, by contrast, seeks calmly and courteously to understand how he has insulted Mabonagrin and rejects his accusation as immoderate:

> er sprach: 'valschære, nû sage an,
> wer hiez iuch der vrouwen sô nâhen gân?'
> 'waz hân ich dar an missetân?'
> 'ez ist eht vil toerlich.'
> 'herre, wes scheltet ir mich?'
> 'dâ dunket ir mich der vrouwen ze balt.'
> 'herre, ir sprechet iuwern gewalt.'
> 'saget, wer brâhte iuch her?'
> 'guote vriunt.' 'nû saget doch, wer?'
> 'mîn herze und mîn selbes muot.'
> 'dâ enriet ez iu dehein guot.'
> 'ez hât mich noch gewîset wol.'
> 'daz endet sich hie.' 'ez ensol.' (Er 9027-39)

Furthermore, Erec's reference to his confidence in his heart's perception in guiding him to this adventure is met by Mabonagrin's incomprehension. Like the giants, Mabonagrin considers Erec to be foolish and to have limited awareness, but in so accusing him, Mabonagrin only reveals his own blindness. Furthermore, Mabonagrin's incapacity to evaluate the advice of Erec's heart is matched by his lady's comment on Erec's arrival in the garden:

'wes rât hât iuch her brâht?
oder habet ir iuz selbe erdâht
durch iuwers herzen gelust?
sô traget ir under iuwer brust
einen ungetriuwen râtgeben,
wan er hât verrâten iu daz leben.' (Er 8980-5)

Neither of them, therefore, has the insight to appreciate the solid advice of Erec's perceptive heart.

Mabonagrin's belligerence is further revealed in his inability to comprehend Erec's attempts to establish his opponent's intentions:

'wiltû vehten wider mich?'
'welt dan ir, sô wil ouch ich.'
'wes ist dir, tumber gouch, gedâht?'
'des werdet ir wol innen brâht.' (Er 9042-5)

Erec refuses to be intimidated by Mabonagrin, and in the image of the two mountains, demonstrates his assessment of his adversary's empty boasting (Er 9049-66). Erec's approach is therefore tempered by moderation, and guided by a concern to evaluate the situation in advance. In contrast, Mabonagrin's uncomprehending aggression and mockery serve to underline the soundness of Erec's careful approach.

The description of their ensuing combat incorporates the image of a love relationship, as if to stress that the two knights are defending their own definitions of this issue in the social context (Er 9106ff.). Both combatants also share an equal dedication to the fight (Er 9101). However, they reveal disparate motives and sources of strength. Mabonagrin's thoughts, for example, reveal a significant lack of mercy on his part:

dô gedâhte der grôze dar an:
'mirst zorn daz dirre kleine man
alsô lange vor mir wert.'
mit grimme begreif er daz swert
und gedâhte eht vellen
sînen kamphgesellen.

er warf ez umbe in der hant:
der vil michel vâlant
in kunde niht erbarmen:
sîn herze gap den armen
krefteclîcher sterke genuoc.
mit guotem willen er ez sluoc. (Er 9190-201)

His strength is thus drawn from his heart's desire for victory. However, the true significance of this statement is revealed by the ensuing ironical comment concerning Mabonagrin's good intentions. In contrast, the source of Erec's strength is made evident in his reaction to the pivotal moment when a blow on the head affects his sensory faculties:

dirre grimmeclîche slac
Êrecke in sîn houbet erschal,
daz er vil kûme meit den val.
sîniu ôren und diu ougen
begunden ir ambtes lougen,
daz er gehôrte noch gesach.
wan daz daz swert enzwei brach,
ez wære gewesen sîn ende.
vil schiere der ellende
sîne kraft herwider gewan,
daz er gesach und sich versan
und gehôrte alsam ouch ê. (Er 9211-22)

Erec's sensory confusion is reminiscent of his lack of perception in the *verligen* episode. However, his quick recovery at Brandigan confirms his recent reacquisition of those powers. Erec also proceeds to draw on his earlier proficiency as a wrestler, which suggests an element of cunning and innovation. Finally, he is fortified both before and during the combat by thoughts of Enite. From being the object of his destructive lust at Karnant, his wife now becomes a source of strength in his knightly activities (Er 8864-73, 9183-7, 9230f.). A parallel may be drawn here with his thoughts of Enite in his combat against Iders. However, whereas there was a sense of ambiguity on that occasion regarding whether Erec received greater inspiration from Enite or his sense of shame, there is no doubting the source of his strength at Brandigan. This implies that Erec and

Enite have now established a love relationship in which their mutual affection combines to act as an inspiration rather than an obstacle to Erec's activities as a perceptive knight. This is further demonstrated by the contrast with Mabonagrin's thoughts of his own lady. He is inspired by the actual sight of her beauty (Er 9174-9), whereas Erec's thoughts are of the love of his absent wife. Her absence emphasizes the inner bonds which have been forged between them from which Erec is able to draw strength:

> Êrec, ze swelhen zîten
> er gedâhte an vrouwen Ênîten,
> sô starcten im ir minne
> sîn herze und ouch die sinne,
> daz er ouch mit niuwer maht
> nâch manlîcher tiure vaht. (Er 9182-7)

Ultimately, Enite's love and Erec's own perception ('herze' and 'sinne'), which has been renewed by his wife's love, are the weapons with which Erec attains victory. It is also significant that these descriptions of the sources of the knights' inspiration are additions to the French narrative, thus indicating Hartmann's continuing emphasis of the issue of inner motivation in this concluding episode.

In the aftermath of the combat, Erec's perception is again confirmed, not least by his relaxed compliance with Mabonagrin's unusual request that Erec as victor identify himself first (Er 9325ff.). The humour of this strange reversal of roles underlines the significance of this moment. Obviously, Erec is now so comfortable with his identity that he is even capable of complying with such peculiar demands.

Erec subsequently questions and advises Mabonagrin, demonstrating his own insight by referring frequently to his knowledge and experience. Thus, Erec utilizes the information he gained from Ivreins (Er 9406-12), and displays curiosity regarding Mabonagrin's situation. In

fact, Mabonagrin's life story reflects Erec's own initial failure and his subsequent recovery. The ability of both knights to recognize their social identities has been impaired by the force of love. Erec now proceeds to confirm his progress by recommending the company of others as a pleasurable experience. It is noteworthy that Erec's advice does not directly include the issue of social obligation, although this is implied. Instead, his advice focuses on the happiness to be gained by living in a love relationship which exists positively within a community by limiting the time spent in isolation. His address could well have been directed towards himself at Karnant:

> 'saget, wie vertribet ir die zît,
> iu enwære mê der liute bî?
> swie wünneclîch eht hinne sî
> und swie deheiner slahte guot
> sô sêre ringe den muot
> sô dâ liep bî liebe lît,
> als ir und iuwer wîp sît,
> sô sol man wærlîchen
> den wîben doch entwîchen
> ze etelîcher stunde.' (Er 9415-24)

Such a positive existence is now so self-evident to Erec that he cannot contemplate Mabonagrin's ability to live in such a limited environment:

> 'wie ir mohtet belîben
> ein alsô wætlîcher man,
> wie mich des niht verwundern kan!
> wan bî den liuten ist sô guot.' (Er 9435-8)

Erec subsequently poses three questions which demonstrate the thoroughness of his own progress. He encourages Mabonagrin to consider his position in all its aspects, including its underlying causes, his relationship with God, and his future:

'nû weder habet ir disen muot
von iemannes gebote?
oder welt irs lôn haben von gote?
oder sult ir immer hinne sîn?' (Er 9439-42)

Finally, Erec's advice is confirmed by Mabonagrin's own confession that he loves the company of others and only remains in the garden under duress (Er 9445-8).

The question of motivation and loyalty which is also raised in their conversation invites further parallels with the *verligen* episode. The situation at Brandigan has its origins in Mabonagrin's youthful promises to his lady (Er 9462ff.). Such immaturity was similarly disastrous for Erec and Enite's earlier sense of social obligation, and the Brandigan couple's relationship is indeed affected by factors stemming from a lack of perception. Mabonagrin, for example, has become such a destructive figure partly as a result of his lady's fear of losing him (Er 9550-5). Any notions of wifely duties have been negated by this fear which reflects Enite's earlier preoccupations. In addition, the situation in the garden is the result of Mabonagrin developing a false sense of loyalty by misreading his lady's intentions. His blindness to her self-centredness is demonstrated by his agreement to make an unspecified promise.[315] This initial acquiescence is based on the trust that his lady would never impose unreasonable demands on him (Er 9499-9509). However, her request that he repay her loyalty by agreeing to her every wish is indeed fuelled by self-interest based on fear (Er 9491-8). Mabonagrin nevertheless remains unaware of any reason to doubt her motives as a result of the blinding influence of his love. This blindness is evident in his appraisal of their relationship (Er 9510ff.). Although he rejects building a love relationship on physical attraction alone, Mabonagrin's belief that he shares the same spiritual plane as his lady is ill-founded. Nevertheless, Mabonagrin continues to think the best of her and his loyalty remains firm (Er 9520-31).

Thus, the seeds exist for his blindness to continue. The rebuilding of his relationship on perceptive grounds depends on his ability to learn from Erec. However, the Red Knight's doubts about his situation, and obvious relief at the freedom that the saviour-like Erec has brought, which contrast so sharply with his earlier confidence, imply that Mabonagrin is already progressing towards comprehending and resolving his predicament (Er 9583-9).

A comparison between the loyalty demonstrated by Enite and by Mabonagrin and his lady is likewise revealing. Enite's proven ability to overcome her own self-centred thoughts after the *verligen* episode emphasizes the failure of Mabonagrin's lady to conquer her jealousy. Moreover, in contrast to Mabonagrin, Enite proves her loyalty by her decision to break her promise to her husband. Subsequently, her awareness of the true path of loyalty is the decisive factor in their survival during the initial stages of their adventure, whereas Mabonagrin's blind loyalty maintains the false security of the garden at Brandigan. In addition, neither Mabonagrin nor Erec can define the underlying causes of their female companion's loyalty. In effect, Erec rejects his wife's voice whilst Mabonagrin listens too well to his. Both lack the insight necessary to discern the motivation behind those voices.

Thus, the lady's jealousy and Mabonagrin's blindness have created a love relationship set apart from society which parallels the Karnant situation. Unlike at Karnant, however, this has provoked the use of prowess for destructive ends rather than the failure to use it as in Erec's case. Nevertheless, the socially-disruptive outcome is identical. Erec's defeat of Mabonagrin confirms his own reacquisition of inner awareness and highlights the need to use prowess in a socially-responsible manner. Moreover, it re-emphasizes the effects of love on a couple's awareness of their

extended obligations and on their comprehension of one another's motives.

Despite playing no further major role as a perceptive being, Enite undertakes one final important task by approaching Mabonagrin's lady in a spirit of pity, and by encouraging her to speak. Consequently, the discovery that they are related is news which they cannot contain (Er 9735-8). Once again, therefore, Enite uses her voice to return someone to the folds of society in the same manner in which she precipitated her own husband's recovery.[316]

Erec likewise has an important final task to accomplish, and one, moreover, which is not evident in the conclusion to Chrétien's work. Erec displays the compassion which the recovery of his insight has revived by arranging for the heads of Mabonagrin's victims to be buried (Er 9746-52). Furthermore, in the midst of the ensuing celebrations, Erec demonstrates conclusive evidence of his ability to feel concern for others and his sense of responsibility to them by being troubled by the continuing sorrow of the widows and arranging a better life for them at Arthur's court:

> doch was er âne vreude hie,
> alsô daz er sîn herze nie
> von swærem kumber brâhte.
> swenne er dar an gedâhte,
> sô entweich im aller sîn muot,
> als ez dem erbarmherzen tuot:
> dem ervollent dicke diu ougen
> offenlîch und tougen,
> swenne er iht des gesiht
> daz wol ze erbarmenne geschiht.
> ouch was diz genuoc erbarmeclîch:
> ez enwart nie man sô vreuden rîch,
> dem doch iht erbarmen sol,
> ich wizze daz benamen wol,
> hæte er die nôt ersehen,
> im wære ze weinenne geschehen. (Er 9782-97)

In particular, this passage emphasizes how deeply Erec is affected by the widows' plight. His pity and weeping reflect

the widows' own earlier sorrow for him as Mabonagrin's next victim (Er 8320, 8345). Erec's tears and the repetition of the term 'erbarmen' are likewise reminiscent of the way in which he was affected by the suffering of Cadoc and his lady. These therefore constitute the two occasions on which Erec's compassion is expressed. Erec's own pity is echoed by Ivreins in his selfless recognition that the widows can no longer find happiness at Brandigan (Er 9836-48). Furthermore, not only does Erec's thoughtfulness provide for the ladies, but it finds additional confirmation in the glory which his virtuous actions bring to Arthur's court (Er 9945-50).

Erec finally returns to Karnant having recovered those lost aspects of his awareness which precipitated his earlier failure in his *verligen*. This original problem was caused by the forces of love blocking the perceptiveness which Erec revealed in his youthful pre-*verligen* adventures, thereby rendering him incapable of acknowledging the expansion of his identity and obligations which occurred as a result of his marriage. Particular emphasis in this work is therefore placed on the dangers of bestowing social responsibilities on the young, no matter how successful or perceptive they may appear. Both Erec and Enite must learn to appreciate that a marriage can only have a positive social function if both partners are capable of perceiving their obligations beyond the narrow confines of their love relationship. Whereas Enite's failure is short-lived, however, Erec's persistent blindness continues to affect his credibility as a knight and lord, a failing compounded by his inability to judge his wife's loyalty. Erec's eventual recovery is prompted by contact with various characters, each embodying a different aspect of his own diminished perceptiveness. The recovery of each of these aspects as a result of these encounters enables Erec to engage in restrained and justified combat, to appreciate loyalty and experience pity, to judge motivation, avoid cowardice, and acknowledge social

responsibilities. Eventually, Erec returns to his kingdom fully aware of his obligations as knight, husband, and lord.

The major source of evidence which emphasizes the nature and extent of Hartmann's focus on insight in this work is to be found in a comparison with Chrétien's version. The wide-ranging alterations which Hartmann makes to his source suggest a desire to highlight specifically this area of interest.

Erec thus continues the emphasis on insight which Hartmann demonstrated in *Die Klage*. The recovery of a balance between perception and physical desire in the wake of love's disruptive influence in this work, however, is placed against the complex background of social responsibilities in which knighthood and lordship operate. The virtues to which perception accompanied by action can lead are therefore primarily social, but the Christian virtue of pity is likewise present in this model of a responsible knight and lord. *Erec* thus continues Hartmann's depiction of secular morality as a combination of clerical and lay moral guidelines which was introduced in *Die Klage*.

A comparison with *Die Klage* also confirms the existence of a psychological progression in *Erec*. By observing this text in the light of the themes of the disputation, it is possible to conclude that Erec is guilty of a subjective, ethical failing which has severe objective consequences and for which he must take responsibility. A comparison with this earlier work also puts Hartmann's interest in perception in *Erec* into the context of twelfth-century notions of self-knowledge. In particular, the influence of penitential practice is evident in the confessions of Iders and Erec which demonstrate regret and a willingness to undertake reparation. However, the secular concerns of the military aristocracy are also clearly evident in the emphasis which this work places on the secular obligations

of lordship and knighthood. All of these obligations are fulfilled in the same way, however, that is by the implementation of thought through action. By comparison, Hartmann's third work, *Gregorius*, takes the issue of perception into territory of a quite different kind.

CHAPTER FIVE

Gregorius

Hartmann's third narrative poem constitutes a further change in genre. As an overtly religious narrative, *Gregorius* offers Hartmann a different context in which to pursue the issue of perception. This chapter will seek to establish the extent to which Hartmann does so, and to catalogue any differences in emphasis or external influences which might set this narrative apart from its predecessors with regard to its depiction of insight. Furthermore, *Gregorius* is an extremely contentious work in terms of its ambiguous depiction of the main protagonist's guilt. An appraisal of inner deliberation in the narrative may also prove a useful means of re-evaluating the evidence regarding this issue.

The Prologue

The prologue to *Gregorius* is missing in three of the six complete manuscripts and all of the five fragments of this work.[317] This has caused some scholars to doubt its relevance to the main body of the text owing to its apparently disposable nature.[318] However, it has also been suggested that the prologue was excluded from some of the earlier manuscripts because of its more personal style, an aspect which prompted later scribes to preserve it for its original and antique value.[319] One might also argue that this apparent disposability implies that the prologue is absolutely consistent with the conceptual content of the main body of the text. Its position as overture, introducing themes which are investigated later in more detail, could thus be said to render it dispensable. An examination of the content of Hartmann's prologue with regard to its discussion of inner disposition and its function as a detailed introduction to this concept will therefore be undertaken at

this stage as its dispensability does not imply irrelevance to the rest of the narrative.

Hartmann's continuing concern with inwardness in this work becomes immediately apparent in the references of the author/narrator to his own self-awareness in the prologue. Such seemingly personal aspects are an inherent part of the literary device of the prologue which had infiltrated vernacular literature from the rhetorical tradition.[320] However, Hartmann's self-depiction here is not merely a component of this rhetoric.[321] His reference in the prologue to his own experiences can be compared with the strong authorial presence which Hartmann incorporates in his narratives, either by naming himself, taking part in audience discussion through his narrator, or creating the impression of authorial empathy for certain characters. The personal elements in his prologue thus increase the intimacy of the work, and this device functions as an opportunity for the author/narrator to portray his own achievement of insight into the nature of his mistakes:

> Mîn herze hât betwungen
> dicke mîne zungen
> daz si des vil gesprochen hât
> daz nâch der werlde lône stât:
> daz rieten im diu tumben jâr.
> nû weiz ich daz wol vür wâr:
> swer durch des helleschergen rât
> den trôst ze sîner jugent hât
> daz er dar ûf sündet,
> als in diu jugent schündet,
> und er gedenket dar an:
> 'dû bist noch ein junger man,
> aller dîner missetât
> der wirt noch vil guot rât:
> dû gebüezest si in dem alter wol',
> der gedenket anders danne er sol. (Gr 1-16)

Thus, Hartmann places the blame on his immature heart, which, encouraged by the Devil's machinations, fell into the trap of believing that it could enjoy the pleasures of this world whilst postponing atonement, a miscalculation

generally referred to as *præsumptio*.[322] Eventually, however, experience revealed the error of his ways, and his powers of insight prompted him to seek the remission of his sins by composing this exemplary work:

> Durch daz wære ich gerne bereit
> ze sprechenne die wârheit
> daz gotes wille wære
> und daz diu grôze swære
> der süntlîchen bürde
> ein teil ringer würde
> die ich durch mîne müezikeit
> ûf mich mit worten hân geleit. (Gr 35-42)

His experiences have made him aware of the danger of postponing penance, in particular the possibility of being unable to receive God's grace in the event of an untimely death (Gr 17-34). However, he has also learned that forgiveness is available to all on condition that they achieve sufficient regret in their hearts:

> wan dâ enzwîvel ich niht an:
> als uns got an einem man
> erzeiget und bewæret hât,
> so enwart nie mannes missetât
> ze dirre werlde sô grôz,
> er enwerde ir ledic unde blôz,
> ob si in von herzen riuwet
> und si niht wider niuwet. (Gr 43-50)

The leading role played by perception in achieving timely repentance and the dangers of immature thought are thus immediately introduced in the author/narrator's reference in the prologue to his own sinfulness. A direct connection with Hartmann's interest in subjectivity in his previous two narratives is therefore not only straightaway apparent in this work, but is accorded emphasis by being related to the author's personal experiences in this way.

In addition to the sin of *præsumptio*, the prologue offers particular advice on how the sin of despair can occur and can be avoided:

swer sich bedenket
houbethafter missetât
der er vil lîhte manige hât,
sô tuot er wider dem gebote,
und verzwîvelt er an gote,
daz er sîn niht enruoche
ob er genâde suoche,
und entriuwet niemer wider komen:
sô hât der zwîvel im benomen
den wuocher der riuwe.
daz ist diu wâre triuwe
die er ze gote solde hân:
buoze nâch bîhte bestân. (Gr 66-78)

The sins of *desperatio* and *præsumptio* are well documented in theology as the two most serious crimes against the Holy Spirit.[323] Here, Hartmann outlines the dangers presented by despair to a sinner, and highlights in particular the manner in which reflection on one's sinful condition can lead to such a destruction of hope. Although self-awareness is essential in combating sin, it is therefore not an approach which is completely devoid of dangers in itself. As Hartmann warns, the remorse achieved by reflection can result in despair, and, if this occurs, the means to achieve true contrition, namely the undertaking of confession and a form of satisfaction, are obstructed. Thus, Hartmann is describing the effect of despair on the achievement of true repentance in direct accordance with the steps portrayed in penitential teaching.[324]

The Parable in the Prologue

In his references to his own experiences, Hartmann thus presents a concise introduction to the issues at hand. Subsequently, these concepts of reflection, regret, faith, and sinfulness, coupled with confession and satisfaction as essential components of penance, are further examined in the parable of the man attacked by murderers. There is a reflection here of the parable of the Good Samaritan, which has itself been interpreted as symbolizing the Fall of

Humankind. Hartmann could have relied on his audience being acquainted with this parable because it was prescribed in the homilies for the thirteenth or fourteenth Sunday after Whitsun,[325] in addition to being widely used in the vernacular sermons and theological texts of his age.[326] Furthermore, frequent connections between the parable of the Good Samaritan and the Fall are to be found, for example, in the works of Origen, Ambrose, Augustine, and Bede.[327] The victim of sin is associated by these theologians with Adam, who is saved by Christ in the guise of the Samaritan, and brought to the shelter of the Church to be healed of his sin. Augustine's teaching on the Fall had the greatest influence in the Middle Ages. Most importantly, it was reproduced in Peter Lombard's *Libri quattuor sententiarum*, the works of Hugh of St Victor and Gilbert de la Porrée, and found its way into Latin and vernacular sermons.[328] Augustine taught that original sin was caused by humankind's disobedient use of free will.[329] The consequences of this disobedience include the loss of immortality, an eternal inclination towards Evil, and the entry of humankind into a state of concupiscence and ignorance. This inheritance from the Fall is of great importance for this chapter and will therefore be examined in greater detail.

The punishment inflicted by God in response to the disobedience of Adam's soul when it came under the influence of the Devil was to cause his body to become disobedient to his soul. The uncontrolled body is thus prone to concupiscence or carnal lust as part of the legacy of the Fall. Carnal sin was brought into existence as a result of Adam's transgression and is subsequently transmitted through the act of conception to each human being. Thus, humankind inherits the stain of original sin, for which all humans are answerable, through the act of procreation. As Augustine writes:

> For after man had broken the precept, he was first forsaken of God's grace and confounded with his own nakedness: and so with the fig leaves (the first perhaps that came to hand), he covered his nakedness and shame. His members were before as they were then, but they were not shameful before, whereas now he felt a new impulse of his disobedient flesh, as the reciprocal punishment of his disobedience. For the soul, being now delighted with perverse liberty and scorning to serve God, could not have the body as formerly at its command: and having willingly forsaken God its superior, it could not have its inferior so serviceable as it desired, nor could it have the flesh subject as it might have had always, had it remained itself God's subject. For then the flesh began to covet, and contend against the spirit; and with this contention are we all born, drawing death from our origin, and bearing nature's corruption, and contention or victory of the first transgression in our members.[330]

Augustine also claims that this overpowering lust inevitably effects the relationship between the body and the intellect:

> [Lust] holds sway in the whole body, moving the whole man, without and within, with such a mixture of mental emotion and carnal appetite that hence is the highest bodily pleasure of all produced: so that in the very moment of consummation, it overwhelms almost all the light and power of cogitation.[331]

As a legacy of original sin, therefore, every human is conceived with a predisposition towards physical desire and the consequent challenge to his or her powers of reasoning.

The imbalance between the rational and physical faculties is accompanied by an ignorance of God's demands and an inclination towards Evil. The free will of humankind thus undergoes a transformation from being able to avoid sin whilst in Paradise (*posse non peccare*), to being unable to avoid sin after the Fall (*non posse non peccare*). Augustine's rather incomplete thoughts on this matter were expanded by Hugh of St Victor:

> In [Adam], indeed, the spirit swelling with pride against the Creator did not keep obedience, and, therefore, the Creator to avenge His injury punished the spirit with ignorance indeed but the flesh with concupiscence, so that the spirit does not see in itself the good to be done but in its flesh desires to do evil. These two vices to punish man's pride are justly confirmed in him, ignorance, indeed, because the light of truth is taken from the mind, but concupiscence because the flesh is afflicted with the punishment of mortality. Therefore, nature, which was first vitiated, transfers this original corruption to posterity, furnishing ignorance to the soul but concupiscence to the flesh unto corruption.[332]

Furthermore, Hugh designated this inherited ignorance as culpable. In other words, he described it as the omission of something which one ought to know, rather than a purely innocent mistake:

> But those who say this do not consider carefully enough that not everyone who does not know something or knows something less perfectly should at once be said to possess ignorance or to be in ignorance, because the term ignorance is applied only when that which ought to have been known is not known. So such ignorance is understood to be present only through the punishment of sin, when the mind shut off from the light of truth is prevented by its own vice from being able to understand those things which it ought to know.[333]

As a result, all humankind inherits a measure of guilt from the Fall. Abelard's theory that ignorance cannot be culpable because of a lack of conscious intention caused him to create a subtly different theory of original sin, namely that the inheritance of humankind is a debt to be paid on account of the first sin rather than actual guilt, as Hugh argued, owing to the fact that infants cannot exercise the will or reason necessary to incur personal guilt.[334] Both approaches were recorded by Peter Lombard in his *Four Books of the Sentences*, but Hugh's approach on this subject had the most immediate impact. It is visible, for example, in the later work of William of Auxerre, who detached this

approach from the theory that sin derives only from a conscious intention by stating that every human has an innate God-given knowledge which guides his or her reason, and the inclination of humankind to ignore this knowledge, which is the legacy of the Fall, is therefore sinful.[335] Odon Lottin suggests that the views of Hugh were influential before circa 1215, whereas Abelard's theory really only took hold from circa 1220.[336] This would suggest that Hartmann's emphasis on ignorance, carnal sin, and the need to be aware of one's sinful inheritance reveals the influence of ideas similar to Hugh's and William's.

Thus, as a result of its inheritance from original sin, humankind is left in a state in which the powers of the intellect are overwhelmed by the powers of libido. This interference results in the inclination of the will to Evil, which is accompanied by an innate, culpable ignorance of God's will. The only recourse is to cause the powers of reason to regain control of the body and the will. This is achieved by a cleansing of the heart, which involves the recognition of one's ignorant state and the initiation of a search for God's truth in the self, a course of action which, as described in Chapter 2, appeared in Augustinian thought as a result of the influence of classical philosophy and Christian teaching. The following represents one of the frequent occasions in the Bible on which such an undertaking is called for:

> My son, if thou wilt receive my words, and hide my commandments with thee; So that thou incline thine ear unto wisdom, and apply thine heart to understanding; Yea, if thou criest after knowledge, and liftest up thy voice for understanding; If thou seekest her as silver, and searchest for her as for hid treasures; Then shalt thou understand the fear of the Lord, and find the knowledge of God. For the Lord giveth wisdom: out of his mouth cometh knowledge and understanding.
>
> (Proverbs, 2, 1-6)

Similarly, Hugh of St Victor stresses the need for humankind to recognize the need for help and counsel:

> [Man] was placed in this world in a place of repentance ... It remains, therefore, that while there is time he seek counsel and ask help for his correction and liberation. But, since he is found sufficient of himself for neither, it is necessary that He, who by His grace postpones judgment, by the same grace meanwhile show counsel for escaping, and after counsel bring help. And thus there is need that He, meanwhile, lay aside the character of the judge, and assume first the character of counselor, then that of the helper, at least in such a way that He first leave man entirely to himself, in order that man himself may both experience his own ignorance and realize that he is in need of counsel, then also feel his lack and recognize that he has need of help.[337]

It is therefore imperative that the state of ignorance which is the inheritance of humankind should be overcome. Each human being must use his or her perceptive powers to realize the consequences of this inherited ignorance and to act accordingly. Looked at positively, however, the recognition of this state by humankind can also be seen as the first step towards salvation. It is, however, only by reacting to this impairment of the rational faculty by desiring to gain knowledge of God that salvation can be achieved.

The parable in the prologue of *Gregorius* contains evidence to suggest that Hartmann is indeed depicting the interpretation of original sin described above. This may be seen in Hartmann's description of the effect of the robbers (or Devil) on the intellectual powers of the victim:

> Den selben wec geriet ein man:
> zer rehten zît er entran
> ûz der mordære gewalt.
> er was komen in ir walt,
> dâ hâten si in nider geslagen
> und im vrävellîche entragen
> aller sîner sinne kleit
> und hâten in an geleit
> vil marterlîche wunden. (Gr 97-105)[338]

It is instructive in interpreting this attack on the *sinne* to reconsider the symbolism of the heart in *Die Klage*. As was demonstrated, Hartmann's use of the heart symbol owes much to the works of Augustine, who attributes the potency of *mens* to the heart, but also describes it as the place through which God can enter a person. There is therefore a case for interpreting the term *sinne* in the *Gregorius* prologue in this way also. Anke Bennholdt-Thomsen, for example, interprets the term *sinne* here as *ratio* by referring to Hartmann's use of *sinne* in conjunction with *lîp* in *Die Klage*.[339] The symbol of 'aller sîner sinne kleit' has caused some controversy amongst scholars. *Sinne* has been variously described as '*imago gratuita*, die in der *cognitio* Gottes besteht'[340], 'alle leibgebundenen seelischen Kräfte'[341], and 'alle höheren Seelenkräfte'[342]. These scholars therefore argue that the loss of *sinne* indicates the loss of all the higher potencies of the soul, leaving only the baser physical functions. However, as will be demonstrated, it is also possible to interpret this image as symbolizing an attack on the powers of reason, but not necessarily their complete destruction, as these scholars maintain.

Bennholdt-Thomsen links Hartmann's text closely with Bede's teaching on the parable of the Good Samaritan. Bede states that the removal of the garments from the victim in the parable symbolizes the power of sin to deprive a victim of immortality and innocence, but also the incapacity of this power to destroy or steal his or her reason.[343] In order to equate this teaching with Hartmann's narrative, Bennholdt-Thomsen suggests reading the phrase 'alle sîner sinne kleit' as an objective genitive, denoting the garments which protected the victim's *sinne*, rather than a subjective genitive, denoting the garments which are synonymous with his *sinne*. This suggests that a layer of protection is lost but the rational capacity is not destroyed, even though it is laid bare to the machinations of the Devil. In this

exposed condition, the capacity for reflection no longer protects the will from straying towards Evil. Furthermore, Hartmann describes the sinner as being half-dead after the attack by sin (Gr 109), an image which corresponds to Bede's concept of *synderesis*. In his definition of this concept, Bede posits that the mortal part of the soul may be afflicted by sin, but the immortal part, which is a reflection of God on the soul, can never be destroyed. A spark of consciousness always remains, thus rendering it impossible for a sinner to be so afflicted that he or she is no longer able to recognize his or her relationship with God.[344] The influential teaching of Bede therefore implies that reason, despite being affected by sin, nevertheless plays a role in the recovery of the sinner.

The victim in Hartmann's parable is thus able to recover from this exposure to Evil (Gr 98f., 146), and is aided by the gifts of hope and fear which God bestows upon him. Here Hartmann is adding an extra dimension which concerns the recovery from sin to the basic parable of the Good Samaritan.[345] Used together, the gifts of hope and fear help to bring the sinner back from the edge of both *præsumptio* and *desperatio*.[346] These gifts find representation in Hartmann's parable as the two pieces of clothing which God sends to replace those stolen by sin:

> do enhâte im got niht verzigen
> sîner gewonlîchen erbarmekeit
> und sande im disiu zwei kleit,
> gedingen unde vorhte,
> diu got selbe worhte
> daz si im ein schirm wæren
> und allen sündæren:
> vorhte daz er erstürbe,
> gedinge daz er iht verdürbe. (Gr 110-18)[347]

However, the sinner's own faith and remorse are also required to play their part in strengthening and cleansing him:

dar zuo sô starcte in baz
diu geistlîche triuwe
gemischet mit der riuwe.
si tâten im vil guotes
und ervurpten in des bluotes. (Gr 124-8)

The recovery from sin is therefore described as a reciprocal process, requiring input from both God and the sinner. God's gifts of hope and fear encourage the process of recognition and self-knowledge which permits the sinner to achieve true remorse. Such remorse is composed of two elements, namely *riuwe* and *geistlîche triuwe*, or regret coupled with the intention to undertake penitential works and avoid committing the same sin in future.[348] The use of the terms *riuwe* and *geistlîche triuwe* in this work reveals an emphasis on the need for them to be employed together in this way. Similarly, their attributes indicate that they are to be interpreted in terms relating to penance. Thus, just as *triuwe* is distinguished in the narrative from its alternative definition of loyalty by the adjectives *geistlîche, wâre*, and *grôze*, so *riuwe* is distinguished from general grief by the same adjectives, as well as *herzlîche* and *ganze*.[349] The combination of the two terms also suggests that true contrition is being described on this occasion, as opposed to a more secular grief, or a regret which is not coupled with the intent to perform good works. Hildegard Nobel interprets the distinction in this work between *riuwe* when it is used without an attribute, and when it is used either with an attribute or with the suggestion of a willingness to do penance, as the distinction between *attritio* and *contritio*. Here she appears to be drawing on the definitions devised by Simon of Tournai which were discussed in Chapter 2. Herbert Kolb draws a similar conclusion by concentrating exclusively on the term *riuwe*. Thus, he describes how the attribute *wâre* transforms *riuwe* into a synonym of *buoze* in its widest sense, that is to say *poenitentia*. Without this attribute, *riuwe* merely denotes *cordis contritio,* that is the necessary sorrow in the heart but not the additional prerequisites of confession and

satisfaction.[350] In the prologue, these attributes pertaining to both *riuwe* and *triuwe* appear three times (Gr 49, 75f., 125f.), thus creating an awareness of the connections between this work and penitential practice which reappear at significant moments in the course of the narrative.

Despite the emphasis on these prerequisites for gaining the remission of sins, the parable nevertheless describes their role as only one stage of this reciprocal process. Together, regret and the intent to achieve reparation allow the sinner to reach a sitting position in Hartmann's parable, and subsequently act as the agents which permit the oil of grace and the wine of law to free the victim from his disease of sinfulness:

> si guzzen im in die wunden sîn
> beidiu öl unde wîn.
> diu salbe ist linde und tuot doch wê,
> daz öl diu gnâde, der wîn diu ê,
> die der sündære haben muoz:
> sô wirt im siechtuomes buoz. (Gr 129-34)

This reciprocal process therefore demands regret and willingness to perform reparation on the part of the sinner, but also additional gifts which are granted by God. The relationship of the components described here echoes the teaching of the heart in *Die Klage* that grace is bestowed only after remorse has been shown, and even then is not a foregone conclusion, but is dependent on the will of God.

Finally, the role of the prologue as an introduction to the relevant elements of the plot is apparent in the connection established between the spiritual distinction accorded the victim in the parable and Gregorius' later triumph (Gr 142f.). This introduction has thus primed the awareness of the audience regarding issues relating to the inheritance of humankind from the Fall, in particular ignorance and concupiscence. In addition, the means to escape this legacy

have also been demonstrated, namely hope and fear combined with repentance and faith. Particular emphasis is also given to the sins of despair and the presumption of forgiveness. This is repeated in the final lines of the prologue as the fatal power of despair to obstruct remorse is described (Gr 162-70). In addition to his re-emphasis of these issues, Hartmann further increases the intimacy of the prologue by directly confronting the audience with a call to learn from his tale (Gr 150-6).

A comparison with the French version of the prologue reveals how Hartmann sought to emphasize the main concerns of his work at an early stage. The French prologue similarly asserts that the text is concerned with presumption, despair, and penance. However, the personal bond between the narrator and the audience is not emphasized, and there is no use of an adapted parable to underline these specific concerns. Hartmann's use of this particular parable establishes a connection with original sin and its consequences far more clearly than the French text. Furthermore, his emphasis on the legacy of original sin is carried over into the main body of the narrative.[351]

The prologue thus reintroduces the concern with remorse and insight which was apparent in Hartmann's previous narratives, and this is subsequently reinforced in the epilogue. In addition, however, the different focus which this work places on these issues also becomes apparent at this initial stage. Whereas all three works considered in this study reflect the call for self-awareness inherent in a secular morality which reflected both secular and religious concerns, *Gregorius* focuses these concerns more specifically on the issue of spiritual inheritance and identity, rather than the notion of insight leading to secular and spiritual success as was the case in *Die Klage* and *Erec*. Whereas a lack of perception in these earlier works implies either a youthful imbalance of faculties, or

a reflection of humankind's inclination to follow Evil, *Gregorius* is concerned with the inherited ignorance of humankind, its consequences, and the means to overcome this taint through self-knowledge. Despite these differences in focus, however, it is apparent that the means to succeed remain the same, namely the achievement of insight into one's mistakes and obligations, whether they be secular or spiritual.

The Old Duke's Advice and the First Incest

In the first scene of the main body of the narrative, the old duke offers his son advice on how to care for his sister and become a successful ruler, earning both secular and heavenly reward. He recommends the virtues of humility, faithfulness, constancy, moderation, bravery, and uprightness (Gr 248-54). This may be seen as a typical example of *Fürstenspiegel* advice, along the lines of that given by Gurnemanz to Parzival, or by the heart to the body in *Die Klage*. In addition, the duke recommends:

> 'wis den wîsen gerne bî,
> vliuch den tumben swâ er sî.
> vor allen dingen minne got,
> rihte wol durch sîn gebot.' (Gr 255-8)

The boy should therefore learn to love wisdom, but above all to love God and rule according to his laws. By giving this advice, the old duke here plays the same role as God on leaving Adam and Eve in Paradise with a warning about the forbidden fruit. The duke similarly leaves sufficient instruction to enable his children to stay out of danger by pointing out to them the perils of folly and immaturity and the virtues of wisdom.

The contrast between this advice and the boy's later behaviour is striking and much detail is expended in

explaining the process of change. The prologue provides the main clue as to how to interpret this transformation, as it too echoes the story of the Fall.[352] Thus, the brother, once left alone, succumbs to the influence of the Devil. In particular, however, Hartmann displays his interest in the inner workings of the mind by describing the effect of the Devil on the brother's thoughts:

> sô riet er im ze verre
> unz daz der juncherre
> verkêrte sîne triuwe guot
> ûf einen valschen muot. (Gr 319-22)

The brother is thus overwhelmed with desire owing to the exposure of his reason to the Devil's temptation. His former exemplary care for his sister is thus perverted into carnal lust. *Minne* can here be interpreted as concupiscence as well as affection, thereby establishing a further connection with the Fall. Indeed, incest serves to exemplify the view that concupiscence is a desire which transgresses against natural law.[353] Once again, an accent is placed on the manner in which this desire affects the brother's ability to reason (Gr 323f.). However, there is also the sense of his free will being influenced as he is depicted making the final decision alone (Gr 329-31).[354] Hartmann expands the French version at this juncture by emphasizing the elements of love, beauty, and youth which also affect the brother. Love and beauty suggest the inheritance of concupiscence from the Fall. Youth, as in Hartmann's previous two narratives and in the prologue to this present work, can be understood to be a positive or negative element. It is negative particularly in the sense that it indicates a state of immature mental capacity. As Rodney Fisher notes, youthfulness is associated with sinfulness in the case of both the poet and characters in this work. He refers to youth as:

> the time of life when one is particularly prone to the blandishments of 'der hellescherge' (v.7). The interrelation of youth and the Devil working

> through secularism is the starting point for Hartmann's moral message.[355]

However, in contrast to Hartmann's earlier narratives, the equating of youthfulness with limited powers of thought has even deeper connotations in the case of Gregorius' father as his youthfulness also represents the innocence of Adam before the Fall which provided such fertile grounds for the Devil's schemes.

The sister's reaction to her brother's advances similarly points to the focus in this work on the characters' powers of perception. She is described significantly as 'diu reine tumbe' (Gr 347), which can be interpreted as indicating that she is similarly compromised in terms of her powers of reasoning owing to her youthfulness. Her young years likewise symbolize the innocence of the parents of humankind. However, the combination of *rein* with *tumb* in her case suggests that Hartmann is attempting to depict the sister's lesser culpability in this case. Her reaction is comprised of a sudden insight into the serious nature of her brother's actions, and a warning not to let the Devil influence his thoughts:

> hie verstuont si sich mite
> daz ez ein ernest solde sîn.
> si sprach: 'wie nû, bruoder mîn?
> wes wiltû beginnen?
> lâ dich von dînen sinnen
> den tiuvel niht bringen.
> waz diutet diz ringen?' (Gr 378-84)

Despite her innocence and youthfulness, the sister is aware of the danger of their situation. This again emphasizes the change which has occurred in her brother's powers of thought. However, her warning is subsequently delayed by an interior monologue in which she debates the outcome of her possible course of action. Hartmann's interest in the inner workings of the mind is again demonstrated by this addition to the French source (compare *La vie* 193-200). The sister

realizes that she has a choice between endangering their earthly or their spiritual honour:

> si gedâhte: 'swîge ich stille,
> so ergât des tiuvels wille
> und wirde mînes bruoder brût,
> unde wirde ich aber lût,
> so habe wir iemer mêre
> verlorn unser êre.' (Gr 385-90)

Her hesitation as she surveys her choices, a course of reflection to be admired in the context of *Erec* and *Die Klage*, is shown here to lead to disaster because it delays any active, spoken response.[356] Thus, the sister remains silent, not because she is incapable of reflecting, but in a demonstration of the failure to act:

> alsus versûmde si der gedanc,
> unz daz er mit ir geranc,
> wan er was starc und si ze kranc,
> daz erz âne der guoten danc
> brâhte ûf ein endespil. (Gr 391-5)

Thus, the dangers of immature reflection, but also of the lack of an effective implementation of reasoning are demonstrated by the characters in this episode. In addition, the sister subsequently becomes further implicated in the sin by losing her initial scruples (Gr 400-3). Her perceptiveness therefore becomes ultimately affected by desire.

This encounter results in the conception of Gregorius. On discovering the pregnancy, the siblings realize how they have jeopardized both their worldly honour and salvation. Their reaction is one of shock and helplessness, which re-emphasizes their youthfulness. The attitude of the siblings towards their secular and spiritual well-being has received differing interpretations. The brother and sister indeed demonstrate concern for their worldly honour at this juncture. However, it is not so much a question of their

choosing secular above spiritual honour, nor of the sister being exclusively concerned with secular honour.[357] Instead, the need to comply with the demands of both types of honour is simply introduced at this stage. It subsequently receives further discussion in the debate between Gregorius and the abbot.

Furthermore, the sister demands that they attempt to assess the situation in terms of the effect on their child:

> si sprach:'gehabe dich als ein man,
> lâ dîn wîplich weinen stân
> (ez enmac uns leider niht vervân)
> und vint uns etelîchen rât,
> ob wir durch unser missetât
> âne gotes hulde müezen sîn,
> daz doch unser kindelîn
> mit uns iht verlorn sî,
> daz der valle iht werden drî.
> ouch ist uns ofte vor geseit
> daz ein kint niene treit
> sînes vater schulde.
> ja ensol ez gotes hulde
> niht dâ mite hân verlorn,
> ob wir zer helle sîn geborn,
> wande ez an unser missetât
> deheiner slahte schulde hât.' (Gr 466-82)

Thus, the sister comforts herself with the teaching of the Church according to which their child will not be tainted with their personal sin. This forms a direct contrast to the French version which appears to follow the teaching of a more secular morality and in which the tablet consequently states that the child will inherit his parents' guilt (*La vie* 542f.). However, in addition to the depiction of the Church's teaching on the inheritance of personal sin in Hartmann's version, on the symbolic level at which Gregorius' parents represent the parents of humankind, the sister's words recall from the prologue the notion that the sin of the first parents only left a stain on the souls of humankind rather than the full weight of guilt. In this way, the discrepancy between the inheritance of personal and of original sin is made apparent. Gregorius' inheritance from

his parents thus symbolizes the inheritance of all humankind of the sin of the Fall. As such, Gregorius is indeed innocent of a personal sin, but is nevertheless stained by humankind's inclination towards sinfulness which he must acknowledge. Running parallel to the theme of spiritual inheritance, however, is the notion of the stain of infamy which children of incest inherit in the social sphere.[358] Gregorius' parents are fearful of the damage done to their secular position as well as to their chances of salvation. In this sense, incest serves to reflect the notion of a lingering taint, despite the absence of inherited personal sin. One might add that the consanguinity laws made incest a very topical subject amongst the secular aristocracy in this period. As Elizabeth Archibald suggests, the topic of incest therefore becomes an ideal vehicle to provide education regarding sin and penance.[359]

The brother turns for aid to their father's adviser, who is significantly referred to several times as 'wîs' (Gr 491, 554, 566, 657, 832), creating a contrast with the insufficient capacity to reflect on the part of the children, particularly as the boy is described as 'unwîse' (Gr 357). It is instructive at this juncture to recall the old duke's advice to his son to be fond of the company of wise men and to avoid the foolish. The son and daughter have neglected to follow these guidelines by acting foolishly themselves as a result of their immaturity, and calling on the advice of the wise only after the sin has been committed.

The adviser provides the children with sound guidance on how to solve their predicament in the secular sphere, as well as how to absolve themselves spiritually through penance.[360] The demands of both spheres are therefore accounted for in his advice without there being any indication that secular considerations are given a disproportionate emphasis. Thus, there is no implication that, on their part, the siblings'

concern for worldly honour diminishes their ability to feel true contrition in any sense. Nevertheless, doubt has been expressed in some quarters with regard to the attitude of the parents to their enforced penance.[361] The ambiguity of the situation is further increased by Hartmann's continued depiction of the parents and their love for one another in a positive light. In this way, Hartmann employs a psychological tactic to retain the sympathy and identification of the reader in a case in which the severity of the crime could perhaps have a repellent effect. In addition, the siblings' fear of God is described as greater than their fear of worldly dishonour (Gr 639-41). Subsequently, the brother dies of a broken heart whilst endeavouring on pilgrimage to rectify the damage he has caused to both his worldly position and his chances of heavenly salvation. A lack of detail in the narrative only permits one to speculate as to the genuineness of his regret.[362] The mother's case is less ambiguous, however. She remains in the secular world, but adopts an ascetic lifestyle in order to achieve penance. Her attitude towards her penance is stated clearly as 'wâre riuwe' (Gr 897f.), which is inspired by her heart, the seat of her reason (Gr 883). In addition, her performance of penance, be it through prayer, fasting, giving of alms, or avoidance of comfort is described in great detail (Gr 886-98). Her heartfelt regret and also her penitential actions are thus made explicit. She therefore fulfils the criteria for forgiveness, even to the extent that she injures her secular position. There can be little doubt, therefore, that she has done her utmost to make reparation for her sin.[363]

Gregorius' Debate with the Abbot

This debate forms one of the most contentious parts of the narrative. However, it is possible to develop an interpretation and an appreciation of this part of the work by

paying particular attention to the portrayal of the characters' powers of reasoning.

In the German version, Gregorius' childhood developments are indeed described primarily in terms of his intellectual faculties. This contrasts with the French version's concentration on his beauty and gentle nature (*La vie* 951-74). As a child, Hartmann's Gregorius demonstrates an active curiosity (Gr 1169-72), and surprises his master with a degree of intellect out of keeping with his youthfulness:

> Diu kint diu vor drin jâren
> zuo gesetzet wâren,
> mit kunst ez diu sô schiere ervuor
> daz der meister selbe swuor,
> er gesæhe von aller hande tugent
> nie sô sinnerîche jugent.
> er was (dâ enliuge ich iu niht an)
> der jâre ein kint, der witze ein man. (Gr 1173-80)

His intelligence permits him not only to master one academic subject after another (Gr 1181-97), but, once he has reached his fifteenth year, we are informed that Gregorius' intellectual qualities have enabled him to acquire great virtue. In addition, his patient and gentle attitude are stressed, which combine with his intellectual abilities to permit him to achieve moderation in himself and to act as moderator amongst others:

> er was schoene unde starc,
> er was getriuwe unde guot
> und hete geduldigen muot.
> er hete künste gnuoge,
> zuht unde vuoge.
> er hete unredelîchen zorn
> mit senftem muote verkorn. (Gr 1238-44)

Gregorius' balance and self-control, which are based on his intelligence, thus make him the master of any situation. He is able, for example, to avoid impetuous action and shame by employing careful thought, and, in addition, is depicted

keeping his thoughts turned to God, for which he is rewarded:

> ern tete niht âne vürgedanc,
> als im diu wîsheit gebôt:
> des enwart er nie schamerôt
> von deheiner sîner getât.
> er suochte gnâde unde rât
> zallen zîten an got
> und behielt starke sîn gebot.
> Got erloubte dem Wunsche über in
> daz er lîp unde sin
> meisterte nâch sîm werde. (Gr 1256-65)

Gregorius' equal mastery over his body and his mind, a balance which was extolled in both of Hartmann's previous narratives, thus shows him here to be a virtuous individual.

However, this extensive description of Gregorius' intelligence and virtue also includes the possible inference that his perfection is not absolute. This can be observed in the portrayal of the issues of youth and wisdom, issues which were similarly depicted in the prologue and the first incest. On those occasions, youth and wisdom were considered to be mutually exclusive. The suggestion that they exist in combination in Gregorius, despite superficially implying Gregorius' unique nature, thus hints at the possibility of a negative undercurrent to this praise. In addition, the image of the path to wisdom, despite its chequered appearance in the manuscripts, increases this ambiguity in its implication that progress along this path has yet to be made (Gr 1254). Thus, the positive description of Gregorius' virtues is accompanied by these various notes of ambiguity. In a direct parallel to the experience of Erec, therefore, Gregorius has displayed admirable powers of intellect early in life. On the one hand, this is to be admired, but, on the other hand, like Erec, this early success contains within it a seed of doubt concerning the future. Thus, it remains to be seen whether Gregorius' perceptive capabilities will

later prove sufficient to guide him through more complex experiences.

These more negative inferences further come to light when, directly after being described as wise and virtuous, Gregorius suddenly injures his foster brother. We are emphatically informed, however, in a double aside by the narrator, that Gregorius did not intend to cause harm and that this was the first occasion on which he had acted in this manner:

> nu gevuocte ein wunderlich geschiht
> (ez enkam von sînem willen niht):
> er tet (daz geschach im nie mê)
> des vischæres kinde alsô wê
> daz ez weinen began. (Gr 1289-93)

The narrator's insistence on Gregorius' subjective innocence suggests that Hartmann is concerned to deflect any blame for this action away from his main protagonist. Consequently, one might speculate that Hartmann is constrained by the demands of the plot and is therefore making a concerted effort to prevent the audience from focusing on Gregorius' actions here and drawing conclusions which might predetermine their reactions to issues addressed in the later debate. However, it is also possible to see in this behaviour the suggestion of an irrational element in Gregorius' nature which even his intelligence cannot deter, or, more specifically, an initial sign of the inclination to sin which is the result of Gregorius' inheritance of the Fall.

The fact that there has been an undisclosed side to Gregorius' nature is further demonstrated by his revelation of his knightly instincts on learning the truth of his noble parentage. His conversation with the abbot also establishes the fact that Gregorius has the rational capacity and the appreciation of action which will bring him success as a

knight. However, this is only one level of his identity which is revealed to him at this juncture.

This part of the narrative has undergone extensive expansion and reconstruction in Hartmann's hands, transforming it from a short and untidy argument into a balanced and courtly exchange of views.[364] This allows Hartmann to include additional elements of complexity and to reveal the reasoning and motives of the two characters in detail. Unlike in the French version, therefore, Gregorius does not merely block the abbot's attempts to dissuade him from leaving the abbey.[365] Instead of baldly stating his intention to depart, Hartmann's Gregorius offers valid reasons for his choice. Furthermore, the French version makes an unambiguous judgement on the sinfulness of the secular world which can only lead Grégoire into further sin (*La vie* 1127f., 1207f.). The increased complexity which Hartmann has accorded his version causes the unequivocalness of this statement, which is repeated by the abbot in the German version, to be called into question. In fact, Hartmann creates a more ambiguous scene overall in which the intentions and the attitudes of the characters are of major consequence, and in which the dangers of the secular world are debated, rather than broadly dismissed.

In the course of the debate, it becomes evident that Gregorius' desire to leave the abbey is based on several factors, including his shame of being known as a foundling, his longing to become a knight, and his desire to find his parents. The first two reasons have been seen by certain scholars as demonstrating arrogance on Gregorius' part.[366] In other words, in response to feelings of pride, he is wilfully turning his back on the clerical world for which he had been destined through God's guidance of the casket and his mother's request on the tablet, and is instead driven by dreams of glory to establish himself as a knight in the sinful, secular world. However, Gregorius' aims are not

necessarily to be interpreted in such a negative fashion. In a work in which the secular world is not unequivocally rejected in favour of the clerical world, Gregorius' fear of dishonour and his noble instincts can be viewed as valid reasons in themselves for leaving the monastery. This is in keeping with the notion which was raised in *Erec* that the knightly lifestyle can be pleasing to God.[367] Hartmann is thus continuing his depiction of secular, as opposed to specifically clerical morality, even in this more overtly religious narrative. The validity of Gregorius' choice is further strengthened by the fact that the abbot does not unequivocally cite the evils of the secular world as a reason for Gregorius to stay in the monastery. The abbot's rejection of the secular world (Gr 1517-29) is indeed followed by an immediate shift in his argument as he suggests arranging a marriage for Gregorius in order to tempt him to stay nearby. Moreover, Gregorius' decision to leave is never referred to as a sin in itself. Instead, the terms *sünde* and *missetât* are used to refer solely to the two occurrences of incest and the fisherman's arrogance.[368] Furthermore, in reply to Gregorius' defence of knighthood as a lifestyle pleasing to God, the abbot concentrates on the practical problems of becoming a knight, rather than condemning the knightly lifestyle as morally deficient (Gr 1530-42).[369] Similarly, his reasoning is based on his own personal desire that Gregorius should remain at the monastery.

Gregorius' desire to leave is a reaction to an inherent and valid part of his identity. His noble instincts and his later success imply that he is indeed of noble origins and that his desire to flee on learning that he is a foundling is justified. There is no suggestion in the narrative that Gregorius is arrogantly seeking to reject the humbleness of his situation. Instead, he desires to respond to his noble instincts now that he has confirmation of their validity. Gregorius' reaction can likewise be justified in the light

of Hartmann's previous explorations of this issue in *Erec*. The inherent distinction and nobility which accompany high birth was of serious issue to the secular aristocracy and would have been acceptable to such an audience as a legitimate reason for Gregorius to depart his old life.[370]

Gregorius' reasoning behind his desire to leave thus appears to be well founded. Furthermore, there is no mention of his being obliged to remain in the monastery beyond the abbot's warnings of the outside world. On the one hand, the tablet merely requests that Gregorius do penance, giving no indication that he is an oblate,[371] and on the other hand, there is no evidence in the text to suggest that God's directing of the casket to the monastery denotes an obligation on Gregorius' part to stay there.[372] The only textual evidence to support the claim that God intends Gregorius to remain a monk is to be found in the words of the abbot who describes the unsuitability of the secular world for Gregorius' penance (Gr 1785-98). However, the abbot's personal desire for his ward to remain casts doubt on the true objectivity of his advice.[373] In this light, Gregorius' counter-argument that the secular world will provide him with a similar opportunity to serve God receives further justification:

> Grêgôrius antwurte im dô:
> 'ritterschaft daz ist ein leben,
> der im die mâze kan gegeben,
> sô enmac nieman baz genesen.
> er mac gotes ritter gerner wesen
> danne ein betrogen klôsterman.' (Gr 1530-5)

As Walter Ohly comments, Gregorius' entrance into the secular world is not necessarily to be interpreted as a step towards sin:

> Mit dem Eintritt des Klosterzöglings in die Welt ist keineswegs alles verloren, ist Gregorius nicht einfach aus dem Stand der Gnade getreten, der Weg

zum zweiten Inzest oder allgemeiner zur Sünde noch nicht unausweichlich festgelegt.[374]

In addition, Gregorius displays the insight in this debate which will enable him to succeed outside the monastery.[375] He is acutely aware of the disadvantages of his position in terms of material wealth and experience, and yet he is perceptive enough to realize that these can be overcome by enthusiasm and striving. In fact, Gregorius' point of view may be considered morally superior to that of the abbot in this way, because he himself is advocating an active lifestyle in the outside world, rather than a life of ease in the monastery. This point is given an emphatic triple repetition in one of Gregorius' addresses to the abbot (Gr 1677-80, 1697-1706, 1714-21). Furthermore, a direct parallel may be drawn between Gregorius' words in this part of the debate and the advice of the heart in *Die Klage*, which likewise advocates action in order to achieve love and virtue. This is particularly apparent if the lines Gr 1697-1706 are compared with a corresponding passage in *Die Klage*:

'sît ez mir nû sô geziuhet
daz mich diu Sælde vliuhet
und ich niuwan ir gruoz
mit vrümikeit gedienen muoz,
dêswâr ich kan si wol erjagen,
si enwelle sich mir mê versagen
dan si sich noch ieman versagete
der si ze rehte jagete.
sus sol man si erloufen,
mit kumber sælde koufen.' (Gr 1697-1706)

'man sol ez ze notstrebe
ginendeclichen erloufen
mit kumber sælde koufen.' (DK 752-4)

'Von diu swem ez so geziuhet
daz im daz heil vor fliuhet
unde er niwan sinen gruoz
mit tugenden verdienen muoz,
als ez dir, lip, ist gewant,
dem muoz werden erkant
wes er die liute dunket wert.
erwirbet er iht des er gert,
der mac im selben danc sagen
und den muot wol hohe tragen.

Ja enwæne ie dehein man
ane kumber liep gewan.' (DK 781-92)

The similarity between the terminology and the rhyme scheme (Gr 1697-1700/DK 781-4; Gr 1705f./DK 753f.) in these two passages supports the claim that there is a correspondence of theme here. Consequently, one can surmise that Gregorius is displaying his superior powers of thought in this debate in conjunction with his recognition of the need to utilize those powers actively to achieve *sælde*. In addition, the moral ambiguity of the abbot's fears for Gregorius becomes further evident by drawing such comparisons with Hartmann's concerns in his earlier narratives. The abbot's argument in persuading Gregorius to remain at the monastery is in part based on the comfortable life he can expect to lead there, as Gregorius' reaction indicates (Gr 1675ff.). This advocacy of comfort corresponds to the body's laziness in *Die Klage* and Erec's sloth. It is hardly an option to be recommended, therefore, and instead serves to highlight the perceptiveness of Gregorius' reasoning by equating him by association with the heart and with the mature Erec in these previous narratives. It is also significant in the light of this evidence that, unlike the adviser to Gregorius' parents, the abbot is not described as *wîs*. His role as a source of wisdom is therefore less unequivocal and this particularly serves to highlight Gregorius' own sound reasoning behind his desire for knighthood.

However, it is also noteworthy in terms of a study into perception in this work, that Gregorius' description of his instinctive desire to be a knight is expressed particularly and repeatedly in terms of the effect on his thoughts:

'ouch hân ich ez gelernet wol
von kinde in mînem muote hie:
ez enkam ûz mînem sinne nie.
ich sage iu, sît der stunde
daz ich bedenken kunde
beidiu übel unde guot,
sô stuont ze ritterschaft mîn muot.' (Gr 1566-72)

In fact, this reflection on knighthood occurred to the extent that Gregorius claims to be a more experienced knight in his imagination than the best knights in reality (Gr 1575-8). Furthermore, his dreams have been so powerful that his studies at the monastery proved little competition, despite his success as a scholar:

> 'iedoch sô man mich sêre
> ie unz her ze den buochen twanc,
> sô turnierte mîn gedanc.
> sô man mich buoche wente,
> wie sich mîn herze sente
> und mîn gedanc spilte
> gegen einem schilte!' (Gr 1582-8)

He likewise confesses that it has always been his intention to become a knight if he discovers that he has the birthright and the means (Gr 1501-3). Thus, the power and long-standing nature of Gregorius' thoughts on this subject are emphatically revealed.

However, in spite of the evidence that Gregorius' perceptive faculties are functioning well in terms of this justifiable goal, the very power of these thoughts and drives gives rise to the suspicion that Gregorius' passion is too great for complete rationality on this issue. Here we have again the suggestion of an imbalance between the passionate and rational capacities as was described in *Die Klage* and *Erec*. In addition, the very suddenness of Gregorius' revelation has an undermining effect on the image created of him earlier as a perfect scholar. Similarly, further and more specific suggestions of an undercurrent of impetuosity occur.[376] Thus, Gregorius describes the drive which persuades him by employing terms which suggest an element of irrationality ('gir' Gr 1622, 1800; 'wân' Gr 1514) or a youthful yearning which is so intense that he even describes it as a form of rage ('erbolgen' Gr 1484-6).[377] The appearance of this reference soon after the abbot's accusation of 'tumber zorn' (Gr 1454) emphasizes the dubious nature of

these yearnings. On the one hand, therefore, the powerful instinct for nobility and knighthood which Gregorius is experiencing may be understood as positive, irresistible, and well-defended by Gregorius' perceptive reasoning. However, the descriptions of additional compulsions behind this instinct imply that not all of Gregorius' intention to become a knight is based on reasoned thought. Of course, this is the very nature of instinct, but the disadvantages of acting on instinct alone, without the added dimension of reason, are also made evident in the text. The earlier emphasis on Gregorius' restraint and thoughtfulness contrasts sharply with the signs of impetuosity which he now reveals in this debate.

It is also significant that, from this point onwards, Gregorius temporarily ceases to be referred to as *wîs*. Instead, references to his *tumpheit* appear at this juncture, as do further descriptions of his youthfulness. Thus, in the debate with the abbot, Gregorius is twice referred to as 'junc' (Gr 1457, 1543) and his youthfulness is similarly emphasized by the abbot addressing him as 'kint' (Gr 1432, 1462) and 'sun' (Gr 1515, 1625). The term 'kint' also occurs in the abbot's description of Gregorius as a child of God (Gr 1526f.) and Gregorius' denial of the fact that he is the child of the fisherman (Gr 1494f.). In addition to these references to Gregorius' youth we have those which describe his 'tumpheit' (Gr 1454, 1484), a term which implies the negative aspects of youthfulness, signifying an undeveloped capacity to reflect adequately. Therefore, despite the abbot's familiar way of addressing the young man, coupled with Gregorius' boyish enthusiasm for a knightly lifestyle, both of which imply the positive side of youth, the use of a more unambiguously negative term also points to its disadvantages. However, the narrative context suggests that the dangers of youthfulness do not only comprise the creation of an imbalance between the heart and the body as in *Die Klage*, or inadequate perception as in the case of

Erec. Instead, as was evident in the case of Gregorius' parents in committing the first incest, these references likewise imply the fundamental inherited ignorance of humankind.

By concentrating on Gregorius' thoughts and reasoning, it also becomes possible to interpret his decision to leave the monastery as symbolic of his employment of free will. This is supported by the emphasis which is placed on the relevance of this choice by Hartmann's abbot (Gr 1432-61).[378] The gift of free will can be the means to achieve virtue if it is exercised with the guidance of the mature and unaffected intellect. However, there is the suggestion in this debate that Gregorius' reasoning is not entirely sound in all aspects. The emotional undercurrents lurking in the background thus point to the possibility that Gregorius will not succeed in achieving virtuous action, and thereby recall the legacy from the Fall of the uncontrollable will.

A closer study of the terms used by the characters also reveals the illusory nature of Gregorius' success in the debate. Although both parties discuss the nature of honour and success, they in fact talk at cross-purposes. A gradual association of Gregorius' name with the term 'sælic' occurs during the description of his childhood, thus implying that he is a child blessed by God (Gr 1142, 1172, 1235f., 1277, 1457). Gregorius' definitions of *êre*, *sælde*, and *heil* in the debate, however, specifically pertain to the notion of worldly success and renown. In itself, this is a legitimate interpretation. However, the abbot's broader definition incorporates the spiritual dimensions of these terms also.[379] Gregorius' restricted comprehension of these terms in the debate thus points to the possibility of future spiritual shortcomings. Admittedly, Gregorius reveals himself to be aware of the means to earn honour and salvation. Just as is recommended by the heart in *Die Klage*, Gregorius understands the need for striving and the

avoidance of ease. However, he shows no sign of comprehending the further dimension to honour and blessedness which was also revealed in *Die Klage* by means of the symbol of the magic herbs, namely that true spiritual honour and blessedness can only be dispensed by God and not earned entirely by one's own efforts. Striving to become a knight, like striving to become a lover, may demand the acquisition of virtue, but it is no guarantee that spiritual honour will later be bestowed.[380] In this way, knighthood is revealed to be a worthy lifestyle if conducted in the appropriate manner, but it nevertheless has certain limitations.[381] Although its successful and virtuous pursuit is achieved by following the same moral path which will earn heavenly reward, it does not comprise the whole path in itself. Gregorius' use of the terms *êre* and *sælde* suggests that he is only focusing on winning worldly honour for himself. If this indeed proves to be the case, and Gregorius fails to comprehend the further dimensions of these terms, his otherwise creditable desire for worldly honour could lead to disaster, as Schottmann comments:

> ohne das Hartmann häufig angekreidete Moralisieren und Kommentieren wird nur in der Handlung von Anfang an deutlich, daß sein Weg der falsche, daß seine innere Voraussetzung nicht die richtige ist - und daß die ritterlich-höfischen Werte, die er in so vorbildlicher Weise verkörpert, keine absolute Geltung besitzen, daß gerade sie das Unheil befördern können, wenn der Mensch blind ist.[382]

In this sense, it is possible to identify ambiguity in the motives of both characters in the debate. On the one hand, they both reveal an intellectual and an intuitive side to their arguments. Thus, the abbot is able to discern the wider connotations of honour, but Gregorius is able to outargue the abbot's request that he remain in comfort in the monastery. On the other hand, however, both characters are also driven by emotion. This is apparent in the abbot's desire for Gregorius to remain at his side and in Gregorius'

youthful dreams of glory. Neither character therefore has a monopoly on reasonable argument in the debate which is free from the interference of powerful emotions. This ambiguity allows both perspectives to be equally expressed, and creates a complexity regarding this issue which can be said to invite curiosity and awareness on the part of the audience.

Further exploration of the attitudes of these two characters occurs after Gregorius is presented with the tablet. His immediate reaction is to recognize the sin of his birth and to falter at the thought of ever being able to receive God's grace:

> Des antwurte im Grêgôrius
> vil sêre weinende sus:
> 'ouwê, lieber herre,
> ich bin vervallen verre
> âne alle mîne schulde.
> wie sol ich gotes hulde
> gewinnen nâch der missetât
> diu hie vor mir geschriben stât?' (Gr 1777-84)

There is no question here that Gregorius is uncertain about whether he has inherited an aspect of his parents' sin. It is clear from his reaction that he believes that he has been left with some kind of legacy. It is likewise apparent that his concerns do not relate to his worldly honour. Neither does he express an awareness of having inherited a personal sin, stating instead that he is free of such subjective guilt (Gr 1781). The legacy of which he speaks can therefore be interpreted as being symbolic of the stain of original sin. The abbot proceeds to repeat his warning of the dangers of knightly life at this juncture (Gr 1785-98). He has played his trump card here, and his reaction implies that he senses the opportunity to turn Gregorius' mind from his desire for knighthood. However, Gregorius rejects the abbot's final advice and in doing so confirms the notion that the secular world is a fit arena for the pursuit of salvation. Nevertheless, Gregorius' reaction to the tablet

is of a dual nature in response to the duality of the news about his origins. The information on the tablet reflects both his worldly and spiritual identities. It therefore presents Gregorius with a means to free himself completely from his ignorance of both by acting upon the information he is given.[383] However, although the tablet offers Gregorius this chance, one can also assume that, in keeping with the description of the culpable nature of humankind's inherited ignorance in contemporary theological works concerned with original sin, Gregorius' failure to acknowledge his legacy will constitute a personal sin. Gregorius thus discovers that he is indeed entitled to take his place in the world of knighthood, but he is also obliged to accept that he has been spiritually tainted by the sin of his birth, and to display his acknowledgement of this inheritance by doing penance for his parents as his mother requests. In symbolic terms, therefore, Gregorius, along with the rest of humankind, has to acknowledge this stain of infamy freely, particularly now that the tablet, acting in the role of the scriptures, has given him the opportunity to overcome his ignorance of his origins.[384] Gregorius' sorrow over the circumstances of his birth is countered, however, by his joy at being able to fulfil his instinctive desire to pursue knighthood. On the surface, both reactions are understandable.[385] However, Gregorius only makes a very general statement of his intentions in his final contribution to the debate, a statement which does not include evidence of his unequivocal determination to fulfil both aspects of his identity:

> 'ich engeruowe niemer mê
> und wil iemer varnde sîn,
> mir entuo noch gotes gnâde schîn
> von wanne ich sî oder wer.' (Gr 1802-5)

Likewise, at this juncture, Gregorius' earlier descriptions of his powerful drive to become a knight cast some measure of doubt on this pledge to discover his true identity. This

ambiguity is emphasized by the repetition of the term 'gir' at this stage:

> 'Ouwê, lieber herre,
> jâ ist mîn gir noch merre
> zuo der verte dan ê.' (Gr 1799-1801)

The suspicion that Gregorius' powers of perception, which are required to guide the will in his pursuit of his goal, are being affected by his emotions is also supported by Hartmann's rearrangement of this whole scene. Thus, Hartmann's abbot reveals the truth of Gregorius' origins on the tablet only after realizing that his powers of persuasion have been overwhelmed by Gregorius' arguments. As a result, Hartmann is able to portray the sincerity and extent of Gregorius' dreams of knighthood, even when he believes he is barred from those ranks by birth. In the French version, there is no such long discussion of the merits of knighthood, and the tablet is presented to Grégoire in direct response to his desire to know his origins (*La vie* 1111ff.).[386] The expansion of the German debate and the abbot's delay in producing the tablet thus increase the dramatic irony of the episode and emphasize the abbot's desperation, and therefore his rather selfish motives, to keep Gregorius at his side. However, this delay also creates the suspicion that Gregorius' mind has become so intent on fulfilling his dreams of knighthood before he sees the tablet, that he will not be able to appreciate his spiritual inheritance fully, even if his initial reaction does not rule this out entirely. Such ambiguity is not apparent in the French version. Similarly, there is no expansive attempt at dissuasion on the part of the French abbot, nor any lengthy revelation of the depth of Grégoire's knightly instincts. The entry of Grégoire into the secular world and his reasoning behind this desire is therefore far less of an ambiguous issue in Hartmann's source. Likewise, Grégoire's only reaction to the tablet is one of sadness in view of the personal sin he has inherited (*La vie* 1203f.).

There is no implication in the French text, therefore, that Grégoire's inheritance represents the legacy of the Fall. Hartmann's alteration of his source at this juncture is therefore far-reaching, and focuses the debate on the role of perception and the danger of excessive emotion in acknowledging one's spiritual and secular inheritance.

On the surface, therefore, Gregorius' decision to leave the monastery to discover his identity is acceptable. However, the question remains as to whether he will truly accept the dual nature of his identity. Acceptance incorporates not only the mental recognition of both the worldly and spiritual dimensions to his identity, but also their active acknowledgement in some form, just as a sinner is required to feel regret and also perform penance for a sin. On reading the tablet, Gregorius' words do not unequivocally indicate that he accepts both dimensions of his inheritance and is willing to act on both.[387] Instead, his stated desire to discover his origins is expressed very generally (Gr 1805). However, on leaving the monastery, Gregorius is described as being guided by God and acting in his name (Gr 1825-41, 2241), which suggests that he has not forfeited God's favour.[388] Nevertheless, despite these initially positive signs, the debate with the abbot has illuminated Gregorius' forceful instinctive drive and youthful longings. Such ambiguity is also evident in the irony inherent in Gregorius' comment concerning his inheritance (Gr 1695f.),[389] and there is a further warning implicit in the discussion between the abbot and Gregorius concerning recognition (Gr 1670, 1692). Both of their comments, namely that Gregorius will not be recognized (the abbot), and that his knightly deeds will cause him to be recognized (Gregorius), anticipate the future restriction of the powers of recognition of Gregorius' mother to the knightly deeds of her son. Gregorius enters the secular world, therefore, with generally positive intentions, but it still remains to be

seen whether his emotions and instincts will affect the actual fulfilment of his obligations.

It is instructive to draw comparisons here with the main protagonist of *Erec*. Erec similarly proves his powers of reasoning in his youth, but on marrying and becoming lord, he acquires a new identity which demands his acknowledgement. His failure to acknowledge all aspects of his new identity, owing to his inadequate inner awareness of his obligations, leads to social disaster. Gregorius has likewise proven himself an aware and intelligent individual in his youth. It remains to be seen, however, whether his reaction to the revelation of all aspects of his origins will be adequate, either in terms of perception or the active fulfilment of his obligations.

The debate between Gregorius and the abbot therefore provides ample evidence of the possibility of disaster ahead in the ambiguity of the intentions expressed by the main protagonist. By not taking the element of wilfulness in Gregorius' motivation into account, one is left to conclude that his sinful liaison with his mother occurs in spite of his best intentions. Rodney Fisher claims, for example, that Gregorius' career is:

> a continued paradoxical frustration of his essential goodness.[390]

Marianne Kalinke draws similar conclusions:

> Before leaving the monastery, Gregorius places himself in the hands of God; thus, although his decision is perhaps unwise and imprudent, his intention is unmistakably good.[391]

Both of these scholars subsequently maintain that Hartmann is portraying the frailty of the human condition in the face of objective sin. They argue that objective sin is depicted as arbitrary in its choice of victim, and that the

difficulties in correctly interpreting God's will are being described in this work. In these terms, Gregorius' extraordinary sin, which is committed unconsciously and despite good intent, coupled with his extraordinary degree of penance, is used primarily to display the greatness of God's mercy. Gregorius' avoidance of despair in such circumstances is thus emphasized, causing Fisher to draw comparisons with Job.[392] However, the conclusions of these scholars can only be reached by disregarding the prerequisite needed for the development of good intentions or the virtuous use of free will, namely sound reasoning. By taking this factor into account, the faultlines in Gregorius' attitude on leaving the monastery become apparent, and the issue at stake in this work is revealed to be the inherent culpable ignorance which taints humankind.

The Second Incest

On leaving the monastery, Gregorius places himself in God's hands with the prayer that he be guided to the place in which he might pursue his aim:

> Nû bôt der ellende
> herze unde hende
> ze himele und bat vil verre
> daz in unser herre
> sande in etelîchez lant
> dâ sîn vart wære bewant. (Gr 1825-30)

His plea from the heart implies that his intentions are admirable and, indeed, God responds by granting him his wish, which Gregorius acknowledges (Gr 1867-76). Such divine intervention stands in stark contrast to the French version in which Grégoire's ship is guided by the Devil to his mother's land, a development which reflects the French version's condemnation of the secular world of knighthood as inherently sinful (*La vie* 1235-40). God's guidance, coupled with Gregorius' aplomb and shrewdness in battle, confirms

that the world of secular knighthood is not being fundamentally criticized in the German version. Gregorius is undoubtedly an overwhelming success in this world, despite his lack of training. Significantly, his sound powers of thought in this sphere are given particular emphasis in a monologue, unique to Hartmann's version, which occurs immediately before his success against the besieging duke.[393] In this monologue, Gregorius considers his position as an untried knight and carefully employs great insight to estimate the advantages and disadvantages of combat with the duke:

> 'ich wil benamen diz arme guot
> wâgen ûf disem spil.
> man klaget mich niht ze vil,
> ob ich von im tôt gelige:
> ist aber daz ich im an gesige,
> sô bin ich êren rîche
> iemer êwiclîche.
> daz wizze man unde wîp,
> mir ist lieber daz mîn lîp
> bescheidenlîche ein ende gebe
> dan daz ich lasterlichen lebe.' (Gr 2056-66)

Gregorius demonstrates here his clear awareness of his position in the knightly sphere. He has yet to gain honour by an act of bravery or skill, and has nothing to lose by failing at present. He likewise displays belief in himself (Gr 2054f.), but this potentially blinding confidence is balanced by a recognition of his situation and an ability to assess his chances. There is no sense here on Gregorius' part, therefore, of an unreflective lust for action and honour amongst his peers. Instead, this monologue displays Gregorius' capacity for humility and self-evaluation, and confirms the positive portrayal of secular honour in the debate with the abbot. Gregorius also attends mass before taking the field, and is described as 'der guote' (Gr 2091), 'der getühtige'(Gr 2142), and 'der sælige' (Gr 2165). Furthermore, his self-awareness is coupled with the capacity to carry out his plans. This is demonstrated in his general success on the field, but also, more specifically, in his

cunning trickery of the besieging duke in separating him from his own troops (Gr 2103-11).

This combat scene is reminiscent in many respects of Erec's first tournament. Erec similarly displays the enthusiasm coupled with intellectual and physical skill required for gaining secular honour. He likewise attends mass before the tournament, acts with humility and great awareness of his position, and establishes himself amongst his peers by his exploits. However, a further point of similarity between the two scenes occurs in the references to the protagonists' youthfulness (Gr 1872, 2116). Although this aspect is positive in the sense that these young men should achieve such remarkable success, a comparison with Erec suggests that the negative side of youthfulness, which manifests itself as a deficiency in the power of thought, will subsequently come to the fore in Gregorius' experience once a more demanding situation presents itself. A further indication of possible future failure is evident in the use of the ambiguous terms *êre* and *sælde* in Gregorius' monologue, which appeared earlier in the debate with the abbot. Although Gregorius claims on both occasions that his mind is set on winning eternal honour and carrying out God's will, his youthful enthusiasm leaves a question mark over his capability of progressing beyond his achievement of secular honour.

It could be argued that this is particularly the case in the light of the initial encounter between Gregorius and his mother. Thus, although Hartmann appears later to emphasize Gregorius' thoughtfulness and acumen with regard to the combat, particularly by means of his inner monologue, the juxtaposition of this monologue with the recent meeting with his mother underlines the fact that Gregorius' obligations to his spiritual and secular identities are distinct. This is evident in Gregorius' failure to enquire about his mother's identity on encountering her. However, it is also

possible to argue that his neglecting to question his mother, like the striking of his foster brother, is essential to the plot, and has therefore only limited significance as evidence by which to judge Gregorius' actions and attitudes. Certainly, such a crucial issue as the reaction of Gregorius to his identity in this work requires more concrete evidence for its confirmation, evidence which indeed is more reliably apparent in Gregorius' actions after his marriage.

In superficial terms, Gregorius and his mother have a legitimate right to marry. He has saved her land and she requires a protector, as the narrator confirms (Gr 2211-24). Similarly, the mother's vassals ask her to marry and approve of her choice of husband (Gr 2185-2250). However, this legitimacy is overshadowed by the limited insight of the couple which is expressed by references to sight and hearing at this point. Both Gregorius and his mother are described as hearing about or catching sight of one another at several points in this part of the text. Although in Hartmann's previous narratives the functioning of the sensory organs often indicated perception, here these visual and aural actions are the spurs to love and the obscuring of the reflective faculty (Gr 1882f., 1895-1910, 1922-31). Such indirect communication thus causes the result of the future meeting between Gregorius and his mother to be predetermined by desire. Significantly, upon meeting, his heart is described as blind, in contrast to his awakened desire:

> vür einen gast enphie si ir kint:
> ouch was sîn herze dar an blint
> und im unkunt genuoc
> daz in diu selbe vrouwe truoc. (Gr 1935-8)

The references to sight continue in the description of the mother's close appraisal of Gregorius which is prompted by the familiar material of his clothes (Gr 1939-54). Despite her recognition of the cloth, she is only reminded of her

past suffering and is not prompted by curiosity to enquire about Gregorius' identity. The love and desire his mother feels, which are described in her glimpses of him before they actually meet, thus limit her powers of thought on this occasion, so that she is prompted to grieve over her past guilt, but not to formulate the question which could save them from sin. Her desire thus restricts her perceptive powers to the extent that they are prevented from precipitating action in the form of a question.[394] This neglect does not call into question the validity of her earlier contrition and acts of penance, however. Indeed, positive references to the mother continue at this stage (Gr 2235).[395] One may conclude, therefore, that she previously achieved satisfaction, and therefore has the right to and indeed the need for a new husband. However, by falling in love, her reasoning powers are obscured by desire, and, as a result, the danger of personal sin arises. A contrast to the corresponding scene in the French version is evident here. In the French text, blame is deflected from the mother by the narrator's comment regarding the ease by which it is possible to confuse different materials (*La vie* 1315-22). The German version, however, appears to emphasize the restriction of the mother's thoughts on this occasion. In addition, there is no indication of any earlier failure on the mother's part or any illegitimacy in her plans to marry for which she might otherwise be blamed. As W. Ohly comments:

> Nicht die Heirat als solche widerspricht ihrer Buße und ist ihre Schuld, wohl aber, daß sie der Sinnlichkeit den Vorzug vor der Stimme des Gewissens gibt.[396]

In this manner, the momentary chance of recognition is quickly obliterated by the emotion of love.

In addition to the characters' restricted perception, the reappearance of the Devil at this juncture, and on their

marriage, is indicative of the symbolism inherent in the two occurrences of incest (Gr 1960-2, 2246). The second incest thus echoes the first in representing the decision of the parents of humankind to listen to the voice of Evil at the Fall. In the first case of incest, the Devil was able to influence the impressionable mind of the brother in order to lead him into sin. However, as discussed earlier, the brother also condemns himself by acquiescing to the Devil's suggestions and his own desires. The Devil's reappearance on the eve of the second incest is therefore not an indication that Gregorius and his mother are helplessly subjected to an onslaught of objective sin, as has been claimed,[397] but rather implies a combination of the incitement to Evil aided by a lack of insight and an inclination towards desire which reflect original sin and thus represent the continuation of the legacy of the Fall. Unlike the youthful innocence of the brother in the first incest, therefore, Gregorius and his mother have no excuse of subjective innocence on which they might rely. Instead, their failure is a depiction of the culpable sin of neglecting to acknowledge the consequences of the Fall.

The controversy regarding the culpability of the characters involved in the second incest is particularly the result of the absence of narratorial comments, unambiguous statements by the characters, or direct insights into their minds to provide guidance at this juncture. This was also the case with Gregorius' decision to leave the monastery. This narrative strategy corresponds with the high level of thematic response which Hartmann appears to demand from his audience in this text in particular. However, the theme of insight in all its aspects is discernible throughout the narrative. The ambiguity of presentation is not, therefore, matched by an ambiguity of theme. Nevertheless, at crucial stages in the narrative, namely Gregorius' initial reaction to the tablet, and the meeting between Gregorius and his mother, the audience is required to follow events with a

minimum of guidance. This absence of clear signposts, however, occurs at stages in *Gregorius* at which the characters themselves display a restricted ability to perceive, either as a result of youthful enthusiasm or love. Therefore, just as the narrator in *Erec* became conspicuously absent during Erec's period of least perception in the wake of his *verligen*, so there is a lack of guidance within the narrative structure in *Gregorius* at these junctures in particular. The lack of clarity in the characters' perception is thus matched by an obscured narrative structure. It might also be postulated that the narrator's apparent retreat at the second incest is caused by a reluctance on the part of the author to investigate in greater detail an occurrence for which there is no redeeming psychological explanation such as is provided by the youthfulness of Gregorius' parents in the first incest. For whatever reason, the narrator's retreat at this juncture is particularly apparent when compared with the narrator's guidance and the insight into the characters' minds in Gregorius' later encounter with the fisherman.

In the wake of the second incest, the effect of such a restriction in awareness soon becomes further apparent in Gregorius. This manifests itself through his abandonment of his search for his parents. However, his inheritance is not totally disregarded, and he dutifully reads the tablet every day and prays for his parents as his mother requested:

> Die tavel hâte er alle wege
> in sîner heimlîchen phlege
> verborgen ûf sîner veste,
> dâ die niemen weste,
> diu dâ bî im vunden was.
> an der er tägelichen las
> sîn sündeclîche sache
> den ougen ze ungemache,
> wie er geborn würde
> und die süntlîche bürde
> sîner muoter und sînes vater.
> unsern herren got bater
> in beiden umbe hulde
> und erkande niht der schulde

diu ûf sîn selbes rücke lac,
die er naht unde tac
mit sîner muoter uopte,
dâ mite er got betruopte. (Gr 2277-94)

Gregorius' grief and tears reveal that his prayers are indeed heartfelt. In this sense, Gregorius appears to demonstrate exemplary powers of insight. Such constant reflection on his birth, and his apparent compliance with his mother's request on the tablet that he pray for her and his father, has prompted some scholars to claim that Gregorius does in fact achieve sufficient penance for his parents. As a consequence, they assume that, on marrying his mother, he is affected by sin as an objective force.[398] However, in terms of the prerequisites for true repentance or virtue which are to be found in the penitential system and in the works of the theologians discussed in Chapter 2, and indeed in the prologue to this work, Gregorius reveals a significant failing here by neglecting to take action. Significantly, despite his tears and prayers which suggest a degree of suffering on Gregorius' part, his feelings of regret are only termed 'riuwe' (Gr 2307). Thus, in accordance with the discussion of true repentance in the prologue, no attribute is employed to accompany this term which might suggest true contrition rather than the implication of grief but not the intent to perform satisfaction. This would suggest in turn a restriction of Gregorius' perceptive faculty. Thus, he does not fully acknowledge the taint he inherited from his parents and his obligation to do penance for them, because of his failure to act on his reflections. As Walter Ohly states:

> die [Unterlassungs-] Sünde des Gregorius besteht in der Beschränkung auf die Herzensreue ohne Bekenntnis und ohne Tat.[399]

Although Gregorius diligently reads the tablet every day, thereby reminding himself of his inheritance, he limits this time of prayer, hides the tablet in the wall, and makes no

further attempts to locate his family.[400] His ignorance of his birth may have been lifted from its shroud of silence in the debate with the abbot, but another suppressive silence has been imposed upon it by Gregorius' incomplete acknowledgement. Walter Ohly denotes this behaviour as a kind of spiritual *verligen*.[401] One must assume therefore that Gregorius' tears, although heartfelt and repeatedly emphasized at this juncture,[402] are more the result of *attritio* than *contritio* because they are not accompanied by an intention to carry out meaningful and appropriate satisfaction. The achievement of action in undertaking penance which depends on unobscured powers of perception thus forms the basis of Hartmann's emphasis here. The result of this inadequate penance is that Gregorius inevitably and unwittingly commits a sin himself. The verb *erkennen* here indicates the perpetuation of blindness caused by Gregorius' failure to utilize his powers of self-knowledge fully (Gr 2290f.). Any interference in the process of acknowledging one's inherited spiritual taint, in this case as a result of love, is therefore revealed in this work to lead directly to the committing of a personal sin. Both mother and son therefore retain sufficient insight to recall their past sin or their sinful inheritance and to experience the pain of grief. Despite the genuine nature of their suffering, however, neither is able to acknowledge that inheritance completely by asking questions and taking action.

Gregorius and his mother thus reveal the manner in which the inheritance of humankind from original sin ultimately results in personal sin unless it is appropriately acknowledged by sufficient perception and action.[403] The literary depiction of this issue is not confined to Hartmann's works. Alois Haas uses this theory to explain Trevrizent's reference to Parzival's killing of his mother and Ither, which occurs as a result of his ignorance, as his two great sins (P 499, 20-25). Although, Parzival appears subjectively innocent of these crimes in terms of personal

responsibility, these sins stem from his inherited and symbolic subjective guilt which requires acknowledgement. Gregorius himself has received information about his inheritance, but fails to fulfil his obligations by neglecting his search for his parents. In terms of Abelard's theory that culpability stems only from a conscious intention, Gregorius cannot be considered guilty as there is no indication of a conscious decision to abandon his search. As will be shortly demonstrated, this has prompted many critics to claim that Gregorius is innocent of any culpable offence. However, this theory is not the yardstick by which to measure this issue. Gregorius' sin is representative of the inheritance of humankind from the Fall. As is described in the prologue to this work, it is the shared inheritance of humankind to live in a state of culpable ignorance which must be overcome by recognition and active countermeasures. Even though Gregorius' tablet reveals to him the means to escape that culpable ignorance, he does not fully respond to his obligation to acknowledge its message. As a result of this failure, Gregorius commits a culpable sin and perpetuates a sequence of related sins. In this way, Gregorius acts as a symbolic figure who eventually performs a miraculous penance, but also as an ordinary mortal, who commits a personal sin as a result of disregarding his own sinful inheritance.[404] Like Oedipus, therefore, Gregorius commits a serious mistake and provokes a personal tragedy by failing to take his identity fully into account on a fundamental level.[405]

At this juncture, it would be useful to conduct a brief survey of the interpretations of other scholars regarding Gregorius' guilt before discussing the issue of culpable ignorance any further. The approaches of Wolfgang Dittmann and Christoph Cormeau resemble those of scholars mentioned earlier with regard to *Erec*. Both scholars argue that Gregorius is an innocent man afflicted by objective sin. Gregorius' act of penance thus represents the exposure of

humankind to sin as a result of the Fall, but these scholars do not accept that this state is one of culpable ignorance which involves a dimension of personal responsibility.[406] Instead, they consider sin to attack in an arbitrary manner which has no reflection on the personal guilt of its victims. In addition, neither Dittmann nor Cormeau takes Gregorius' inner motivations sufficiently into account. Thus, they maintain that as Gregorius commits the second incest unwittingly, but nevertheless considers himself guilty, Hartmann is rejecting any connection with the teaching of twelfth-century scholastic and monastic masters on the issue of the culpability of conscious or unconscious sin.[407] Instead, Hartmann registers his lack of interest in creating a psychological dimension in his work by the fact that no insight into the characters' thoughts is provided at this crucial juncture of the text. In addition, they deny that Gregorius' unwitting sin could have been the direct and culpable result of an earlier negligence, as they can find no evidence of a previous flaw in Gregorius' inner motivation. In conclusion, they claim that the significant issue in this narrative lies in the reaction of Gregorius and his mother to the revelation of the incest. Thus, it is the couple's own belief that they are guilty despite a lack of conscious sin, a reaction which points to the objective nature of their crime.

In contrast, other scholars take account of the twelfth-century discussion of the subjective nature of sin in their interpretations of this work. As Hartmann, in keeping with twelfth-century scholastic and monastic notions, appears to be depicting in the second incest that unconscious sin is inculpable, these scholars claim that Gregorius' act of penance must denote the committing of a conscious sin before the second incest. Hildegard Nobel, for example, argues that this sin is apparent in Gregorius' arrogant desire to free himself from the shame of his foundling status.[408] Peter Wapnewski extends this interpretation by suggesting that

Gregorius disobeys his mother's request on the tablet that he remain in the monastery in order to do representative penance for his parents.[409] Although no restrictions are in fact placed on the location of Gregorius' penance, Wapnewski's further interpretation of this point nevertheless resembles that of the present study. Thus, he considers that Gregorius' failure comprises the sinful state of mind described by Augustine as *reatus*, that is an unwillingness to do penance and a blindness of heart which is the bequest of the Fall and which inevitably leads to greater sin.[410]

An alternative explanation is offered by Volker Mertens and K. Dieter Goebel, who claim that the question of conscious or unconscious sin is not at issue here, because of Gregorius' special status as a figure of legend.[411] Their approaches are somewhat diverse, however. On the one hand, Mertens argues that Gregorius exiles himself despite his subjective innocence in the same manner in which saints and hermits in the legends go willingly into exile without having committed a culpable sin. On the other hand, Goebel is of the opinion that Gregorius' unwitting second incest is culpable because Hartmann is not reflecting early scholastic theology in this narrative and therefore does not differentiate between the culpability of conscious and unconscious sin. Instead, Goebel argues, Hartmann is reflecting the legends of the Bible and vernacular sermons in which both types of sin are considered culpable.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, however, there is evidence in the narrative to suggest that Hartmann is indeed reflecting notions of the subjective nature of sin which were discussed in the twelfth century, and that Gregorius' sin represents the subjective sin of culpable ignorance. This is revealed if both dimensions of Gregorius' obligations are taken into account, namely to find his parents and establish himself as a knight. Gregorius is made

directly and sufficiently aware by the tablet of his secular and spiritual identities. He is therefore given the opportunity to overcome the ignorance of his inheritance. However, as he responds fully only to part of his identity owing to the effect of love on his thoughts, he is guilty of consciously neglecting the remaining spiritual dimension, a sin which subsequently manifests itself in the second incest. Such culpable ignorance, which can be described as a negligence in knowing or accepting knowledge, was of great import in theology in the second half of the twelfth century as stated earlier with regard to the prologue of *Gregorius*. In a further example of this phenomenon, Kolb cites Alan of Lille on the differences between *ignorantia vincibilis* and *ignorantia invincibilis*:

> Si autem ignorantia sit vincibilis, crassa et supina et affectata, non excusat.[412]

Similarly, the works of the canon lawyers display an interest in this concept:

> Ignorantia ex impossibilitate: nulla culpa, ex difficultate: levis culpa, ex negligentia: gravis culpa, ex voluntate: mortalis culpa.[413]

Gregorius could therefore be accused on the above evidence of a grave culpable sin. He suppresses the knowledge of his origins by contemplating and grieving for them in secret and by failing to acknowledge them actively. This sin could also be considered a form of *præsumptio* as described in the prologue.[414] Such a sin requires the knowledge that one is acting wrongfully, coupled with the arrogant assumption that one will nonetheless be forgiven. Gregorius has gained knowledge of his spiritual inheritance but fails to act upon it. This could be interpreted as a postponement of penance, although this is difficult to ascertain fully owing to the limited depiction of Gregorius' thoughts at this juncture.

Further revelation of Gregorius' negligence occurs in his reaction to the truth as it emerges. This reaction exposes the extent to which he has failed to accept his identity in full. The catalyst in bringing the truth to light is the inquisitive maid, whose determination and talent for spying (Gr 2309-28, 2380-403) allow her to discover the reason for Gregorius' strange behaviour. She exhibits all the sharp awareness and initiative which Enite demonstrated in extracting herself from Count Galoain's clutches in *Erec*. In this way, she contrasts with the blindness and inactivity of Gregorius and his mother, just as Enite's sharp wits exposed Erec's temporarily dulled mind. This contrast is particularly stressed by the abundance of terms relating to sight, hearing, speaking, and remaining silent in the exchange between the mother and the maid (Gr 2329ff.).[415] Again, a comparison can be drawn with *Erec*, in which these terms were seen to denote either an action based on sound perception, or else the lack of the same in the case of silence. Thus, the maid sees, hears, speaks of, and realizes the gravity of the situation. The mother, however, attempts to silence her, believing her to be untruthful, and misinterpreting her intentions (Gr 2349-55). She thus displays her limited insight into her own situation, and reveals how silence is a means of suppressing the truth.

The shrewd insight of both the maid and Enite is thus required to free the powers of perception in their fellow protagonists from obstruction. The mother's reaction is initially passive in contrast to the maid's active part. This is particularly apparent in the manner in which she rejects the maid's information as a mistake (Gr 2344), and reveals her own lack of awareness of her husband's unhappiness (Gr 2406f.). Her initial rejection thus corresponds to her earlier inaction in terms of establishing the truth about the material. Furthermore, once she has accepted the maid's story, the mother nevertheless attempts to explain it away and thereby avoid the truth (Gr 2408ff.).

This again reveals her blindness with regard to her sinful situation. She sees no reason for Gregorius to be unhappy as he is powerful, rich, young, healthy, and has a loving and obedient wife. Her reasoning thus only extends to Gregorius' superficial and secular advantages. The shallowness of her reflection is similarly indicated by the note of irony in her speech through which reference is made to all the failings which have brought about this situation, for example her belief that Gregorius' unhappiness stems from an event in his childhood (Gr 2422-4), and that he is the best husband she could have wished for (Gr 2414-6). Furthermore, the mother's desire to know the cause of Gregorius' misery is based on her hope that she can be of aid to him when, in fact, she is a partner in his sin (Gr 2435-42). Her puzzlement over his silence, and her belief that he would not keep a secret from her unless he could not bear to reveal it, again point back to the restricted insight which the couple displayed upon meeting (Gr 2431-4, 2443-7). Similarly, the mother's comment that she would not like to force Gregorius to tell her anything against his will ironically underlines both her own inability to perceive the evidence for herself and also Gregorius' blind obedience to his love-affected will in not continuing his search for his spiritual identity.

The maid finally offers a practical solution based on her cunning observation of the tablet's whereabouts and her knowledge of Gregorius' absence (Gr 2448ff.). Thus, the maid's actions and leadership cause the mother to recognize the real nature of her situation:

> 'die selben stat die marhte ich.
> muget ir des erbîten
> (er wil doch birsen rîten),
> vrouwe, sô vüere ich iuch dar
> und zeige ez iu: sô nemet ir war
> waz dar an geschriben sî,
> dâ erkennet ir ez bî.' (Gr 2460-6)

Unlike the French version, in which the mother instantly appears to accept her guilt on reading the tablet (*La vie* 1709-17), however, the mother in the German text falls into despair. She concludes that God has rejected her earlier heartfelt penance and has therefore permitted the Devil to lead her again into sin (Gr 2488-98). In addition, the mother clings to the forlorn hope that this tablet does not belong to Gregorius (Gr 2501-15). Even with hard evidence before her, therefore, she seeks to prolong the silence which surrounds the truth of her marriage. Her despair and her desperate hope both indicate that the mother is blind to the possibility of God's forgiveness for this sin, and is even led to question the forgiveness she received for her earlier penance.

Gregorius' reaction to his mother's revelation demonstrates the state of mind which has come to dominate him. On returning from the hunt, his mother demands to be told the truth of his origins:

> 'herre, ir sult mir des verjehen
> von wannen ir geborn sît.
> ez wære ê gewesen zît
> der vrâge die ich nû begân:
> ich wæne ich si verspætet hân.' (Gr 2570-4)

An indication is apparent here of the mother's culpability in failing to ask this question at their original meeting. Likewise, Gregorius' response to this demand for information about his identity is telling:

> 'Vrouwe, ich weiz wol waz ir klaget:
> iu hât etewer gesaget
> daz ich sî ein ungeborn man.
> weste ich wer iuch dar an
> alsus geleidet hæte,
> ezn gelægen mîne ræte
> niemer unz ûf sînen tôt:
> nû hel sich wol, des ist im nôt.
> swer er ist, er hât gelogen:
> ich bin von einem herzogen
> vil endelichen geborn.

ir sult mir volgen âne zorn
daz wir der rede hie gedagen:
ich enmac iu vürbaz niht gesagen.' (Gr 2575-88)

Gregorius' suppression of his spiritual identity and his overwhelming concern for his worldly honour is thus revealed. Unlike the French version in which Grégoire only refuses to reveal his origins (*La vie* 1787-1802), Hartmann emphasizes the focusing of Gregorius' mind on his secular interests in his aggressive pledge to defend his worldly reputation. Furthermore, Gregorius confirms his suppression of his vow to seek out his parents by his unwillingness to free the truth about his spiritual inheritance from the silence which he has imposed upon it.

Once the tablet and the truth are revealed, Gregorius' immediate reaction is to defend himself further by blaming God for abusing his well-intentioned desire to be reunited with his parents on leaving the monastery:

er sprach: 'diz ist des ich ie bat,
daz mich got bræhte ûf die stat
daz mir sô wol geschæhe
daz ich mit vreuden sæhe
mîne liebe muoter.
rîcher got vil guoter,
des hâstû anders mich gewert
danne ichs an dich hân gegert.
ich gertes in mînem muote
nâch liebe und nâch guote:
nû hân ich si gesehen sô
daz ich des niemer wirde vrô,
wande ich si baz verbære
danne ich ir sus heimlich wære.' (Gr 2609-22)

Gregorius' anger at his supposedly unfair treatment indicates his blindness towards his own failure to fulfil his vow. His intent may indeed have been sound on departing from the monastery, but the cessation of his search for his parents demonstrated his neglect of the spiritual aspect of his inheritance. His sorrowful claim that he would rather have never seen his mother points to his own failure to see,

that is to know his true identity. Gregorius and his mother therefore display similar responses to the revelation of the truth. Their reactions are based on horror and regret, but also on the angry conviction that they have been mistreated. In fact, God has dealt fairly with both of them, but their lingering blindness renders them unable to recognize this. As a result of this blindness, they both approach the brink of despair, even to the extent that they are compared to Judas (Gr 2623-6).[416] Furthermore, the mother actually proceeds to trace the steps to this sin in her conviction that she has been forsaken by God with regard to her earlier penance. Thus, she believes that she will remain unforgiven and be condemned to Hell (Gr 2684-94).

The apparent inevitability of their slide into despair is subtly countered, however, by the figure of David, who, despite experiencing great sorrow, never actually lost his faith in God (Gr 2627). This comparison suggests that an alternative to despair exists even in the most difficult of circumstances, and this is subsequently confirmed by the second stage of Gregorius' reaction. His initial self-pity and anger are overtaken by an awareness of his sin.[417] By relying on his clerical training, Gregorius is able to instruct his mother that God forgives any sin for which true penitence, accompanied by the flow of tears, is shown:

> 'jâ hân ich einen trôst gelesen
> daz got die wâren riuwe hât
> ze buoze über alle missetât.
> iuwer sêle ist nie sô ungesunt,
> wirt iu daz ouge ze einer stunt
> von herzelîcher riuwe naz,
> ir sît genesen, geloubet daz.' (Gr 2700-6)

As described earlier with regard to the prologue, the attributes employed here in conjunction with *riuwe* indicate the full measure of *poenitentia*, namely regret and the intent to perform satisfaction. Gregorius' reaction and advice to his mother reveal his insight into and final

acceptance of all aspects of his identity, even though the actual process of realization is not described in itself. In this sense, Gregorius' final insight resembles that of Erec, in that no direct description of the inner process is given, its occurrence instead being indicated by the subsequent behaviour of the protagonist. Thus, Gregorius' reaction demonstrates that he has gained recognition of the fundamental nature of his identity. He has acquired true self-knowledge, that is an acceptance of his weakness before God.[418] He proposes now to remedy the situation by devoting himself entirely to the humble embracing of his spiritual identity as a child of original sin, and by achieving penance for his personal guilt in committing the second incest.[419] For this purpose, as the narrator indicates, it is necessary to reject all bodily pleasures and comforts (Gr 2655-62). Gregorius' instructions to his mother regarding her penance are clear and concise, showing that at last he is eager to take the prompt action with regard to his spiritual inheritance which he previously neglected with such serious consequences. He joyfully turns his back on the world, therefore, and seeks the ignominy from which he earlier fled (Gr 2745-7, 2963-5).[420] Thus, Gregorius' embracing of his true identity manifests itself in his desire to act, his acceptance of shame, and his avoidance of despair.

The Fisherman

The final section of the narrative concerns Gregorius' repentance and also provides, in the figure of the fisherman, an example of a repentant sinner with whom it is perhaps easier for the audience to associate than with the semi-symbolic figure of the main protagonist. Hartmann's extensive alteration of the fisherman in the French version likewise reveals that this character plays an important role in the scheme of the German narrative. As well as represent-

ing a figure to whom the audience might relate, the fisherman also provides Hartmann with the opportunity to demonstrate clearly the moral message of his narrative, in view of the moral ambiguity and existential complexity of Gregorius' own sin. Through this figure, therefore, the audience is provided with a clear model of sinfulness and regret, and of the procedure for gaining forgiveness.

Gregorius himself is distinguished from this point onwards by his recognition of his need to demonstrate repentance as an inheritor of original sin. The fruits of this achievement are made apparent in the wake of Gregorius' penance by such attributes as 'gotes trût' (Gr 3418, 3466, 3722), but also in the repeated use of the terms 'sælde' and 'heil' (Gr 3241, 3565, 3739, 3871), which were of such consequence in the debate with the abbot. Whereas Gregorius previously comprehended only the secular dimension of these terms, here they signify his acceptance of his spiritual obligations.

The figure of the fisherman represents the disbelief and limited awareness of the unrepentant sinner in contrast to the progress which Gregorius has made. He also provides an opportunity for the role of perception in the processes of sin and repentance to be demonstrated. In addition, the fisherman clearly portrays the Church's prescribed acts of penance by showing contrition and a willingness to do penance, and by confessing.[421] The lack of confession on Gregorius' part, and the lack of priests in the work in general, has caused critics, most notably Dittmann,[422] to reject any direct connection between this work and penitential teaching. However, both the mother and the fisherman act as intermediaries on this issue, by demonstrating the need for confession whilst the more symbolic figure of Gregorius emphasizes the basic prerequisite of true contrition.[423]

The fisherman also serves a further purpose, however. Gregorius' own humility and purity of intention receive confirmation when challenged by the fisherman's mockery. Furthermore, his appreciation of Gregorius, and the reasoning behind his rejection of him, is based entirely upon Gregorius' outer appearance:

> als im der vischære
> sînen schoenen lîp gesach,
> er wegete daz houbet unde sprach:
> 'jâ dû starker trügenære!' (Gr 2784-7)

His vision is thus limited to superficial qualities as he lacks the insight to recognize Gregorius' true nature (Gr 2901-3). As a result, the fisherman draws false conclusions as to Gregorius' reasons for asking for lodging, believing him to be intent on murder and robbery (Gr 2788-95). He likewise serves to reintroduce the ambiguous issue of honour by commenting that, in his (limited) opinion, Gregorius has never gained spiritual honour. In fact, Gregorius has achieved an awareness of the difference between spiritual honour and the knightly renown which he previously pursued so vehemently. The fisherman's wife, in contrast, has the insight to appreciate Gregorius' true intent, causing her to disagree with her husband's rejection of him, and to weep with compassion for him:

> Des übelen vischæres wîp
> erbarmte sich über sînen lîp.
> si bedûhte des daz er wære
> niht ein trügenære.
> des scheltens des in der man tete
> umbe sîn dürfticlîche bete,
> des ervolleten ir diu ougen.
> si sprach: 'des ist unlougen
> er ensî ein guot man:
> zewâre ich sihe ez im wol an.' (Gr 2835-44)

Her tears in particular, in combination with the description of her compassion, signify the sincerity of her feelings of pity, and recall both Erec's breakthrough in the Cadoc

episode when he is moved to tears at the sight of the knight's lady (Er 5335-8), and his later sorrow for the widows at Brandigan (Er 9785-91).

The fisherwife proceeds to remind her husband to be aware of his Christian duties and, in addition, of his reliance on God's bounty for his living from the sea:

> 'dû hâst getân ein schelten
> daz dînem heile nâhen gât.
> dû weist wol daz dîn hûs stât
> den liuten alsô verre.
> swenne dich unser herre
> dîner sælden ermande
> und dir sînen boten sande,
> den soldestû emphâhen baz
> und vil wol bedenken daz: (Gr 2846-54)
>
> swelh man sich alle tage
> begân muoz von bejage,
> als dû mit zwîvel hâst getân,
> der solde got vor ougen hân.' (Gr 2859-62)

Her reminder of the issues which her husband needs to bear in mind has sufficient effect upon him to allow Gregorius to stay the night. However, the fisherman demonstrates a limited appreciation of *sælde* which corresponds to the ambiguity of Gregorius' earlier restricted definition of this term. His mockery therefore soon resurfaces in his hypocritical offer of assistance to Gregorius in his pursuit of penance. The fisherman's ridicule again implies that he does not trust Gregorius' intentions, nor the sincerity of his regret:

> 'wart des ie dehein bilde
> daz dîn muot ze riuwe stât,
> sô tuon ich dir einen ganzen rât.
> ich hân ein îsenhalten
> nû lange her behalten:
> die wil ich dir ze stiure geben,
> daz dû bestætest dîn leben
> ûf dem selben steine.

die sliuz ze dînem beine.
geriuwet dich danne der wanc,
sô muostû under dînen danc
doch dar ûfe bestân.' (Gr 2986-97)

Thus, he claims that the regret Gregorius purports to feel will soon turn into the regret for having undertaken this penance. It is also ironical that the fisherman who mocks Gregorius' intent should himself provide the instruments and location of Gregorius' penance. Gregorius' humility in the face of this mockery is particularly revealed in the manner in which he receives the fisherman's words with thankfulness and joyful laughter (Gr 2815, 2821, 2946). Thus, Gregorius' confidence that he has chosen the correct path and his absolute trust in his actions is revealed. As a result, he is referred to as 'der wîse' (Gr 2890), a term which signifies his overcoming of his inherited ignorance. This reaction is also reminiscent of Erec's confident laughter on defeating Keii (Er 4744f.), and on his arrival in Brandigan (Er 8028f., 8154-8, 8442). Thus, both Erec and Gregorius laugh once they have achieved a deep insight into themselves.

Further revelation of the fisherman's inner life occurs on the arrival of the Romans. Their obvious wealth causes him to welcome them, just as Gregorius' outer appearance fuelled his rejection. The greedy intentions behind the fisherman's hospitality are confirmed by the narrator (Gr 3269f.). This portrayal of his selfishness subsequently serves to contrast starkly with the revelation he experiences on finding the key in the fish:

dô er in in dem vische vant,
dô erkande er sich zehant
wie er getobet hâte
und vie sich alsô drâte
mit beiden handen in daz hâr. (Gr 3305-9)

A significant contrast is apparent here between the fisherman's immediate insight and recognition of his sin in

Hartmann's version, and the muted response of the fisherman in the French version (*La vie* 2425-44). Furthermore, even on revealing the key to the Romans, the fisherman does not demonstrate any remorse in the French text (*La vie* 2456-80). The contrast between these two reactions thus reveals the emphasis which Hartmann is placing on inner insight and regret in his adaptation, and the importance of the fisherman in this portrayal.

The significance of this character is likewise evident in his series of confessions which repeatedly demonstrate his contrition and willingness to satisfy any penance imposed upon him (Gr 3318-45, 3624-52, 3665-73). In the first confession, it is merely stated that the fisherman reveals the circumstances of his sin and asks the Romans for guidance. Nevertheless, the purity of his regret and willingness to do penance is stressed by the terms 'grôze riuwen' and 'geistliche triuwen' (Gr 3337f.), which the Romans are able to appreciate, and which allow them to feel compassion for him. The fisherman thus demonstrates his complete acknowledgement of his sin, which is likewise signified by the tears of sorrow prompted by his belief that they will not be able to save Gregorius (Gr 3347-9).

The indirect speech of the fisherman's first confession also serves to highlight and to hasten the narrative towards the depiction of Gregorius on the rock. There, the powers of insight of the legates are revealed in the adjective 'wîs' (Gr 3167) and in their tears of pity at the sight of Gregorius (Gr 3476-82). However, he himself displays an excessive humility at their news which appears to border on despair (Gr 3499ff.). Initially, therefore, Gregorius' penance does not seem to have produced the desired results. He misunderstands the legates' intentions in their message, believing instead that he has earned God's hatred and that he is unworthy of such honour. It appears by this reaction that Gregorius' humility has led him to conclude that he is

unworthy of forgiveness.[424] Furthermore, Gregorius demonstrates feelings of shame in his desire to flee from the legates, a reaction which recalls the distress of Adam and Eve at their nakedness in the Garden of Eden. This parallel is rendered particularly explicit by Gregorius' attempts to cover himself with leaves (Gr 3408-17). This shame might be thought to imply a possible regression on Gregorius' part to his earlier concern for his worldly honour. However, this reaction is actually an indication of the extent of his progression. The connection between Gregorius' initial response to the legates and the Fall recalls the issues discussed in the prologue, particularly regarding the inclination towards Evil and the distraction of the reflective capacity which is Gregorius' inheritance from original sin. This parallel therefore serves to stimulate the audience's assessment of Gregorius' progress.

Such an appraisal is likewise made possible by the narrator's trickery in falsely describing Gregorius as unscathed. The initial amazement of the audience at the supposed miracle prompts a subsequent awareness of the perfection of Gregorius' inner rather than his outer qualities once the truth is revealed. His progress is likewise confirmed in a description of the contrast between his heavenly honour and his secular poverty:

> sus vunden si den gotes trût,
> einen dürftigen ûf der erde,
> ze gote in hôhem werde,
> den liuten widerzæme,
> ze himele vil genæme. (Gr 3418-22)

Similarly, a contrast can be drawn between Gregorius' apparently excessive humility and his actual reaction once he has heard all the facts. Gregorius thus proceeds to restate his earlier assertion that no sin is beyond forgiveness. On this occasion, however, he addresses this remark to himself, thereby confirming his complete acceptance of his sinfulness (Gr 3596-611). His subsequent

need for a sign from God finally serves to demonstrate the manner in which grace is bestowed independently, and thus confirms the forgiveness which Gregorius has earned.[425]

On returning to the mainland, Gregorius thinks of his tablet, as he did constantly whilst on the rock, and seeks it out (Gr 3684-6). The fact that the tablet is still intact, indeed in miraculously good condition, implies that, despite Gregorius' penance, the facts of his sinful inheritance remain the same. On the rock, the absence of the tablet indicated that Gregorius was able to acknowledge his inheritance without any external stimulus. Thus, when he was parted from it, he proved himself better able to acknowledge his inheritance than when he kept the tablet close, but hidden away.

On rediscovering Gregorius on the rock, the fisherman is prompted to make a second confession. In contrast to the first, this is delivered in direct speech and therefore clearly reveals his attitude towards his sin (Gr 3624ff.). In this way, the fisherman expresses his regret for his earlier mockery of Gregorius and for his own guilt in postponing his penance for this sinful behaviour:

> Nû viel der vischære an diu knie
> mit manigen trahen vür in,
> er sprach: 'vil lieber herre, ich bin
> der selbe sündige man
> der sich verworhte dar an.
> ich arme verlorne
> ich emphie iuch mit zorne.
> diz was diu wirtschaft die ich iu bôt:
> ich gap iu schelten vür daz brôt,
> ich schancte iu ze vlîze
> mit manigem itewîze.
> sus behielt ich iuch ennaht
> mit unwirde und mit grôzem braht.
> alsus bin ich worden alt
> daz ich der sünde nie engalt.' (Gr 3624-38)

In contrast to Gregorius' constant contemplation of his sin, the fisherman confesses to have put Gregorius out of his

thoughts (Gr 3648-50). However, his insight into his long-overdue penance and his feelings of remorse are now confirmed by his tears.

The third confession takes place back on the mainland (Gr 3662-73). As with the first, it is in indirect speech, and the fisherman's own expression of true repentance is confirmed by the narrator's insistence that he is experiencing 'ganze riuwe' coupled with 'grôze triuwe' (Gr 3669f.). The fisherman subsequently seeks advice on achieving penance and restates his recognition of his sin of mockery. Once again, therefore, the fisherman's true repentance is revealed in his own and the narrator's words, as well as in his tears of contrition:

> nû wuosch diu grôze triuwe
> und diu ganze riuwe
> und der ougen ünde
> den vlecken sîner sünde,
> daz im diu sêle genas. (Gr 3669-73)

The fisherman's insight into his sin, and his consequent need to confess as a result of his true repentance thus provide a guide to the issues at stake in this work, namely perception as a means to recognizing sinfulness, and the ability to apply that perception to achieve true contrition. These issues are presented through the figure of the fisherman as a means of expressing the insight required of an ordinary mortal. By extending the French version's single statement by the fisherman into a detailed triple confession, Hartmann removes the possibility that Gregorius' legendary and symbolic status should be a barrier to the reader's application of the issues in the narrative to his or her own life.

The Papacy

On his elevation to the papacy, Gregorius comes to represent both the worldly and spiritual spheres which he inhabits, and which he has had to learn to embrace equally. He therefore becomes that praiseworthy individual who is beloved of both God and Man, such as was prescribed in the heart's teaching in *Die Klage*. He is portrayed as ruling with humility, and as being guided in his moderation by the Holy Spirit (Gr 3793ff.). As such, Gregorius is able to impose fair judgement on sinners, using harsh means only when necessary, in order to encourage their repentance. This description of Gregorius' justice thus extends Hartmann's discussion of the penitential system from the penitent (fisherman, mother) to the confessor, who similarly needs acute insight in order to assess the sincerity of penitence in those seeking forgiveness.

The final scene with the mother contains many notes of re-emphasis of the need to achieve self-knowledge. In a humorous repetition of their earlier inability to recognize one another, Gregorius and his mother are able on this occasion to demonstrate how they have progressed. This is particularly apparent in the terms relating to sight and recognition in this exchange. Initially, Gregorius does not recognize his mother (Gr 3847-61). Similarly, just as the mother looked carefully at the material on their first meeting, but did not fully acknowledge her acquaintance with it, here Gregorius teases her inability to recognize her son even though she sees him physically:

> er sprach: 'ob daz von gotes gebe
> iemer möhte geschehen
> daz man in iuch lieze sehen,
> nû saget wie: getriuwet ir doch
> ob ir in erkandet noch?'
> si sprach: 'mich entriege mîn sin,
> ich erkande in wol, und sæhe ich in.' (Gr 3890-6)[426]

Furthermore, Gregorius is himself able to assess the sincerity of his mother's penance (Gr 3866f.), as is subsequently confirmed by the narrator (Gr 3942-8). His mother has both concentrated her mind and striven physically to achieve penance (Gr 3847-9, 3902-5). This is particularly expressed by the use of the term 'rehte buoze' (Gr 3867), which reflects the sincere *contritio* in the mother's first penance which was indicated by the term 'wâre riuwe' (Gr 897). 'Rehte buoze' appears only twice in this work, with both occurrences at the end of the narrative (Gr 3867, 3988). Thus, Gregorius' observation receives further approval in the narrator's reminder in the epilogue of how true penance can earn forgiveness for any sinner. The achievement of *rehte buoze* which has been investigated throughout the course of the narrative is therefore finally confirmed:

> dâ sol der sündige man
> ein sælic bilde nemen an,
> swie vil er gesündet hât,
> daz sîn doch wirt guot rât,
> ob er die riuwe begât
> und rehte buoze bestât. (Gr 3983-8)

Hartmann reveals a continuing interest in inner thought processes in this work which may be interpreted against the background of the penitential teaching of the Church. This connection is not to be taken for granted. However, the evidence adduced in this chapter suggests that Hartmann's concern with true contrition as a display of regret which is precipitated by insight and coupled with the determination to act indeed reveals the influence of the thinking of twelfth-century masters on penance. A similar background may also be claimed for the presentation of Gregorius' sin in this work as an example of culpable negligence in failing to act on the taint of original sin which he inherits. In particular, Gregorius' inclination towards desire interferes with his true acknowledgment of this inheritance. In this

sense, the social stain of incest symbolizes the subjective and unavoidable nature of his sin. Although a child of incest is innocent of the personal sin of his or her parents, the stain is nevertheless present. Similarly, all generations of humankind are branded with the stigma of subjective sin from the Fall, and are required to overcome their inherited ignorance and restricted insight in order to acknowledge this guilt and achieve reparation.

As in Hartmann's previous two narratives, the role of reflection in sin and redemption is stressed in *Gregorius*. In this work, however, Hartmann goes beyond the dimensions of the love relationship and the lifestyle of a knight and lord to a more fundamentally religious level. The prerequisites for sin, virtue, and penance are nevertheless the same as on a more secular level, namely a failure to reflect or act owing to an obstruction of the mental faculty in the first case, or the combination of reflection and action necessary for true repentance or virtue. Although Gregorius demonstrates the mental ability to recognize and regret his sinful state, he initially fails to act to acknowledge that taint. In this way, he achieves fulfilment of the secular part of his identity, but his culpable neglect of his inherited spiritual sinfulness leads ultimately to his committing a personal sin.

CONCLUDING POINTS

This study was conceived as an attempt to establish whether Hartmann's earliest narratives contain evidence of an inner life in the main protagonists and additional characters, to consider the development of the portrayal of this element, and to appraise its significance within a broad moral tradition which reflects Hartmann's situation as an educated knight. The ample evidence relating to the protagonists' inner thought processes and the manner in which Hartmann has adapted his sources on numerous occasions in relation to this aspect of his narratives, both of which have become apparent during the course of this investigation, suggest that not only does Hartmann display an awareness of the importance of the inner life in terms of ethical issues, but that this awareness constitutes a vital aspect of his narratives.

The essential part played by this element in Hartmann's works and the author's portrayal of a progression in the inner lives of Erec and Gregorius only becomes evident, however, by the adoption of a holistic approach which takes into account events in the narrative which occur both before and after the periods of failure encountered by the protagonists. By assessing the frequency and content of the thought processes of the protagonists and secondary characters throughout the entire narrative in this way, it is possible to reveal the extent to which the relative ability of each character to perceive is associated by Hartmann with the problems they encounter or the mistakes they make. Similarly, the narrative structure and the figure of the narrator are employed to highlight the issue of self-knowledge. Although the detailed focus of this present study on the inner thought processes of the characters themselves prevented a similarly detailed consideration of this sizeable area of investigation, its significance must nevertheless be acknowledged.

The objections of the three scholars who challenged the generally accepted notion of a psychological depth and progression in Hartmann's protagonists are the result of not taking this notion of perception in Hartmann's works sufficiently into account. Nevertheless, these scholars have usefully focused attention away from the view that the psychological element in Hartmann's works is based on an exclusively theological code of morality. The present study has thus attempted to embrace this justifiable criticism and to investigate evidence to suggest a more general awareness of the importance of perception amongst a secular audience and to an educated secular poet. Such an awareness draws on a variety of influences which combine to create a lay concept of morality. The theological notion of the search for the self as a means to achieving salvation and communion with God is relevant here in terms of its influence on the secular community in general through homilies, private devotional guides, and in particular the penitential system. In addition, however, inner awareness was an element demanded by secular codes of honour, knighthood, and nobility, and by the feudal structure of society. In combination, these universal influences appear to have caused essential importance to become attached to the notion of perception within a secular concept of morality. This is the broad ethical background which Hartmann reflects in his portrayal of perception in his early narratives.

Hartmann's interest in inner awareness is evident throughout the three narratives considered in this study, although the differences in genre cause the focus and the circumstances of this portrayal to vary. In general, however, all three portray inner awareness as a prerequisite for the fulfilment of obligations and virtuous behaviour, reflecting a variety of secular moral traditions and thought. Thus, *Die Klage*, as a disputation in which the heart as the intellectual power discusses its relationship with the physical body in the light of a failed love suit, explores the association

between perception and the acquisition of both secular and spiritual virtues and consequently between success in a love relationship and heavenly salvation. Moreover, this work reveals that Hartmann's interest in perception was already becoming established in his earliest surviving narrative.

In *Erec*, the association between perception, action, and the achievement of virtue and success is likewise evident. Similarly, the perceptive disruption caused by desire is again presented in this work. However, despite this correspondence with *Die Klage* in the portrayal of the prerequisites of virtue, the accent in *Erec* falls particularly on the connection between perception and the acknowledgement of social obligations. Thus, Erec is required not only to restore his love-afflicted perceptive faculty, but also to adapt it in order to fulfil his extended and mature social duties. In addition, the role of inner awareness in the establishment of a socially-beneficial marriage relationship is highlighted in this work. Both Erec and Enite must learn to combine their respective capabilities in order to rectify and avoid a repetition of the damaging objective consequences which their love-blindness precipitates.

The relationship between the combined forces of perception and action is similarly depicted in *Gregorius*, although the role of action is accorded greater emphasis in this work. Nevertheless, the power of love or the inclination towards desire is still highlighted as a force of disruption in this relationship. However, the overtly religious dimension in this work again alters its focus. Thus, although this work resembles *Erec* in its emphasis on the need to acknowledge obligations, the duties it portrays are spiritual rather than social. In addition, the balanced faculties of perception and action are presented as the prerequisites for achieving true spiritual insight and contrition. In this way, *Gregorius* demonstrates a close affinity with the notion

of the inherited culpable sinfulness of humankind and with the achievement of true repentance as prescribed in the penitential system.

Although the detailed approach of this study rendered it necessary to limit the number of texts considered, a brief and speculative interpretation of Hartmann's two later narratives should be attempted in the light of the conclusions reached. Both later works reveal similar evidence of a limited insight in the characters which affects a multiplicity of obligations. In *Der arme Heinrich*, the emphasis on Heinrich's dual spiritual and secular duties resembles the situation faced by Gregorius. However, whereas Gregorius fails to act on his spiritual duties, Heinrich initially refuses even to consider this aspect of his identity. Although after several years of his affliction, he achieves a deeper understanding of the cause of his leprosy, he nevertheless takes no action to rectify his shortcomings. For her part, the maiden shows a limited awareness of her role in her destiny, seeking, as a result of youthful, religious fervour and selfish desires, to engineer her own salvation. Finally, Heinrich achieves an insight into his spiritual obligations on witnessing the near fulfilment of the maiden's ill-motivated desire to act on his behalf. Ultimately, these two protagonists together establish an equilibrium between the insight and action required to fulfil their spiritual obligations.

Like Erec, Iwein displays a tendency towards impetuosity in his initial adventures. In terms of the secular honour ethic, this constitutes the only negative aspect of Iwein's behaviour here. Otherwise, he is aware and active as a knight in pursuit of a justifiable cause. However, like Erec, Iwein acquires additional facets to his identity upon getting married, but fails to respond to all of them. Thus, although he is justified in leaving for the tournament circuit, his laxity with regard to his new roles as lord and

husband has serious social consequences. Subsequently, Iwein's rehabilitation involves the demonstration of his ability to be aware of his obligations by defending justifiable causes of other women as he should have defended his wife, and by being mindful of promises and deadlines. Thus, Iwein, like Erec, finally proves himself able to acknowledge the new dimensions of his identity which he previously neglected.

Hartmann's disputation and his alterations to his sources in his later narratives provide abundant evidence that this author was concerned with the issue of perception. As this present study has attempted to demonstrate, however, this interest does not necessarily stem from one source, but reflects the social, cultural, and theological concern with the inner life and its relationship with virtue or salvation in whatever form, which would have been familiar to Hartmann and his audience. In conclusion, therefore, attention should again be drawn to the fact that Hartmann, as an educated knight, straddled and would have been influenced by all of these sources. He cannot therefore usefully be pigeonholed as an author who is specifically concerned with secular honour or with the minutiae of theological developments. Instead, he represents a secular awareness of perception as it relates in general to these various sources. It was by using these broadly familiar concepts that Hartmann sought to discuss in his works the rapidly changing moral climate of his age.

NOTES

1. G. Ehrismann, *Geschichte der deutschen Literatur bis zum Ausgang des Mittelalters. 2. Teil: Die Mittelhochdeutsche Literatur. II: Blütezeit*. Other major scholars include: Julius Schwietering, *Die deutsche Dichtung des Mittelalters*; W. Ohly, 'Die heilsgeschichtliche Struktur der Epen Hartmanns von Aue'; H.B. Willson, 'Sin and Redemption in Hartmann's Erec'; Helmut de Boor, *Geschichte der deutschen Literatur von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart. II: Die höfische Literatur. Vorbereitung, Blüte, Ausklang 1170-1250*; Kurt Ruh, *Höfische Epik des deutschen Mittelalters. I: Von den Anfängen bis zu Hartmann von Aue*; Ludwig Wolff, 'Hartmann von Aue. Vom Büchlein und Erec bis zum Iwein'; Peter Wapnewski, *Hartmann von Aue*; Hugo Kuhn, *'Erec'*; Antonín Hrubý, 'Moralphilosophie und Moraltheologie in Hartmanns *Erec*'; Christoph Cormeau/Wilhelm Störmer, *Hartmann von Aue. Epoche-Werk-Wirkung*; Rodney Fisher, 'Erecs Schuld und Enitens Unschuld bei Hartmann'; id., 'Räuber, Riesen und die Stimme der Vernunft in Hartmanns und Chrétiens *Erec*'; David Duckworth, *Gregorius. A Medieval Man's Discovery of his True Self*. Other works will be discussed in the course of this present study.

2. Voß, pp. 84-7, criticizes the work of Sparnaay, Wapnewski, Putz, Witte, Kuhn, Ruh, Wiehl, and Hrubý. Voß provides detailed reference to further scholars whose works reflect ethical considerations in endnote 102.

3. For a full discussion of this point, see below, Chapter 5.

4. For a full discussion of this point, see below, Chapter 3.

5. Cormeau/Störmer, *Hartmann von Aue: Epoche-Werk-Wirkung*, p. 248.

6. Ranawake, review of Voß, p. 144.

7. Peter of Blois, *Liber de confessione sacramentali*, PL 207, 1088f. Quoted by Fischer, pp. 17f.

8. Schweikle, 'Zum *Iwein* Hartmanns von Aue. Strukturale Korrespondenzen und Oppositionen'. See Fischer, pp. 52ff.

9. Timothy McFarland, 'Narrative Structure and the Renewal of the Hero's Identity in *Iwein*', p. 144, compares Iwein's concept of honour as the renown to be gained in knightly pursuits which he displays in his monologue after awakening from his madness, with his later perception of honour as being bound up with his duties to Laudine and her land.

10. See Alan Robertshaw, 'Ambiguity and Morality in *Iwein*', pp. 124-6.

11. Hansjürgen Linke, *Epische Strukturen in der Dichtung Hartmanns von Aue. Untersuchungen zur Formkritik, Werkstruktur und Vortragsgliederung*. See Fischer, pp. 61ff.

12. Wenzel (ed.), *Typus und Individualität im Mittelalter*, p. 7. See O. Ehrismann, 'Höfisches Leben', p. 101.

13. For further discussion of this point, see below, Chapter 5.

14. See G.F. Benecke and K. Lachmann (eds), *Iwein*, rev. L. Wolff, vol. 2, note to l. 8121.

15. See entry for *suone* in A. Erler and E. Kaufmann, *Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte*.

16. Dinzelbacher, 'Gefühl und Gesellschaft im Mittelalter. Vorschläge zu einer emotionsgeschichtlichen Darstellung des hochmittelalterlichen Umbruchs', p. 236.

17. Radding, 'Evolution of Medieval Mentalities: A Cognitive-Structural Approach', p. 585.

18. A similar approach is adopted by Corinna Dahlgrün, *Hoc fac et vives (Lk. 10,28) - 'vor allen dingen minne got'. Theologische Reflexionen eines Laien im 'Gregorius' und in 'Der arme Heinrich' Hartmanns von Aue*. She likewise proposes that Hartmann's secular status and audience would make it more likely that his works reflect general and broadly familiar religious notions, such as were to be found in sermons and the liturgy, rather than specific aspects of theological thought. As she does not concentrate on self-awareness, penance is only one of the elements of religious life which she investigates. She then considers the occurrence of biblical imagery and language and also aspects of religious thought in Hartmann's religious narratives, and concludes that Hartmann is indeed employing for the most part those devices and images which would have been familiar to his audience, and in such a way which reveals him to have been generally representative of new developments in theology. See particularly pp. III-IV, 99-101, p. 138, pp. 151-7, 213-22.

19. For a discussion of the phenomenon of the twelfth-century cultural renaissance, see Morris, *The Discovery of the Individual 1050-1200*, pp. 6f. and often; Walter Ullmann, *The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages*, pp. 104-112; G.B. Ladner, 'Terms and Ideas of Renewal'; Christopher Brooke, *The Twelfth Century Renaissance*; Michael Seidlmayer, *Currents of Medieval Thought With Special Reference to Germany*.

20. R.W. Southern, *The Making of the Middle Ages*, pp. 234-6; Seidlmayer, pp. 65-72; Morris, pp. 10-13; Dahlgrün, pp. 10-12.

21. Morris, p. 23; Brooke, pp. 42-9, including plates 25, 30, and 31; Southern, pp. 237-40, including plates I-IV; Karl Bertau, *'Regina lactans*. Versuch über den dichterischen Ursprung der Pietà bei Wolfram von Eschenbach', pp. 266-85, notes the influence of this new mode of depiction in Wolfram's work.

22. Morris, pp. 86-95, including plates 1-4.

23. Morris, pp. 7-9.

24. Morris, pp. 79-86.

25. Brooke, pp. 117-23, on the sculptor Gilbert at Autun.

26. Walker Bynum, 'Did the Twelfth Century Discover the Individual?', pp. 2-4. Walker Bynum proceeds to underline the role played by greater corporate and communal feeling in the shaping of individual awareness in this age.

27. Ullmann, pp. 3-50.

28. Ullmann, pp. 53-98. Also Morris, p. 26.

29. Ullmann, pp. 54-62.

30. Ullmann, p. 65.

31. Ullmann, p. 98, quoting Sidney Painter.

32. Dominique Barthélemy, 'Kinship', in Georges Duby (ed.), *A History of Private Life: II. Revelations of the Medieval World*, pp. 85-155, especially pp. 112-7.

33. Morris, pp. 37-48, pp. 121f.; Radding, pp. 590f.; Joachim Bumke, *Höfische Kultur: Literatur und Gesellschaft im hohen Mittelalter*, I, pp. 55-9; Horst Fuhrmann, *Germany in the High Middle Ages c.1050-1200*, pp. 25-7, pp. 77-81; Dinzelbacher, pp. 220f.

34. Cormeau/Störmer, pp. 46-57.

35. John B. Freed, *The Counts of Falkenstein: Noble Self-Consciousness in Twelfth-Century Germany*, pp. 65-7. Freed (pp. 1f.) also refers to the work of K. Schmid on the development of this tendency, which can be traced back to the tenth and eleventh centuries in the German empire when office-holding became increasingly hereditary along paternal lines. See also Jeffrey Ashcroft, *'Als ein wilder valk erzogen*: Minnesang und höfische Sozialisation', pp. 60f.

36. Bumke, pp. 47f.

37. Cormeau/Störmer, pp. 57f.

38. Benjamin Arnold, *German Knighthood 1050-1300*, pp. 9-13; Geoffrey Barraclough, *The Origins of Modern Germany*, pp. 135-47.

39. Duby, *History of Private Life*, pp. 75-7; Duby, 'Dans la France du Nord-Ouest au XIIe siècle: les "Jeunes" dans la société aristocratique', pp. 836-41; Ashcroft, pp. 60-3.

40. W.H. Jackson, *Chivalry in Twelfth-Century Germany: The Works of Hartmann von Aue*, pp. 85-92.

41. Arnold, pp. 15f.

42. Jackson, pp. 68f., describes how it became unlawful after 1186 for the sons of priests, deacons, and peasants to become knights. This marked the start of knighthood's development into a socially distinct and noble social class. See also Karl Heinz Borck, 'Adel, Tugend und Geblüt. Thesen und Beobachtungen zur Vorstellung des Tugendadels in der deutschen Literatur des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts', p. 453.

43. Maurice Keen, *Chivalry*, pp. 143-161; Borck, pp. 427f.

44. Cormeau/Störmer, p. 60.

45. WG 4496-8, 4559-62.

46. Bumke, pp. 421f.

47. Keen, pp. 159-61.

48. Borck, pp. 440-6, lists *Der Winsbecke*, Der Stricker's *Beide Knechte*, and Wernher der Gartenaere's *Meier Helmbrecht*. Siegfried Große, 'wis den wisen gerne bi!: Die höfischen Lehren in Hartmanns Gregorius und Wolframs Parzival', p. 62, points to Gurnemanz' accentuation of the discrepancies between Parzival's noble birth and his boorish behaviour (P 164,12; 166,16; 168,25; 170,22f.).

49. Horst Wenzel, *Frauendienst und Gottesdienst. Studien zur Minneideologie*, pp. 25-32.

50. This is not to say that knighthood was not associated with Christian ethics before this, as Keen (pp. 51-55) points out in his references to the *chansons de geste* and Old High German literature.

51. Bumke, pp. 385-9.

52. Jackson, pp. 86-8; Bumke, pp. 399ff.

53. G. Ehrismann, 'Die Grundlagen des ritterlichen Tugendsystems', in G. Eifler (ed.), *Ritterliches Tugendsystem*. See also E.R. Curtius, 'Das "ritterliche Tugendsystem"', and

Daniel Rocher, 'Lateinische Tradition und ritterliche Ethik: Zum "Ritterlichen Tugendsystem"', in the same Eifler edition.

54. Bumke, p. 416.

55. See C. Stephen Jaeger, *The Origins of Courtliness. Civilizing Trends and the Formation of Courtly Ideals 939-1210*. One hesitates to embrace Jaeger's conclusions completely that educated courtiers were uniquely instrumental in the development of courtly behaviour amongst knights, but he has identified a major area of influence. Jackson, pp. 92-6, points out that Jaeger's reliance on Thomasin does not take into account Thomasin's recommendation that knights as well as clerics should be regarded as examples of proper behaviour.

56. Keen, pp. 4-6. See also Klaus Schreiner, '"Hof" (*curia*) und "höfische Lebensführung" (*vita curialis*) als Herausforderung an die christliche Theologie und Frömmigkeit', pp. 123ff., who notes that clerical authors did not only express criticism of the courtly way of life, but also attempted by means of this kind of literature to improve and influence the Christian morality of the courts.

57. Wenzel, *Frauendienst und Gottesdienst*, pp. 93-5.

58. Wenzel, *Frauendienst und Gottesdienst*, pp. 96-8; Volker Honemann, 'Herger'.

59. Ottokar Fischer, 'Die sogenannten *Ratschläge für Liebende*', p. 423. See also Wenzel, *Frauendienst und Gottesdienst*, pp. 126-33.

60. Keen, pp. 6-23.

61. Duby, 'Les "Jeunes"', esp. p. 844, argues that didactic courtly literature specifically reflects the real-life tensions between different generations of the military aristocracy, and is aimed at controlling the anarchic approach to life of the younger sons, as well as mirroring their dreams and aspirations. Ursula Peters, 'Artusroman und Fürstenhof. Darstellung und Kritik neuerer sozialgeschichtlicher Untersuchungen zu Hartmanns *Erec*', esp. pp. 435f., and 'Höfische Liebe. Ein Forschungsproblem der Mentalitätsgeschichte', pp. 7-10, recentres Duby's claims in pointing out that they are based on the evidence of works of ideology, rather than reflecting historical reality. Courtly literature does not necessarily reflect real tensions between the *iuvenes* and *seniores*, but instead includes the role of younger knights within the general discussion of the problems of lordship and knighthood. Peters' adjustment is valid, but she perhaps goes too far in diminishing the possibility that these works reflect a very real social phenomenon.

62. Morris, pp. 43f.

63. Bumke, pp. 522-9; Wenzel, *Frauendienst und Gottesdienst*, pp. 134-40.

64. Bumke, p. 13; Jackson, p. 108.

65. Southern, p. 243.

66. Southern, p. 246.

67. Hildegard Nobel, 'Schuld und Sühne in Hartmanns *Gregorius* und in der frühscholastischen Theologie', pp. 42-4; Wenzel, 'Der *Gregorius* Hartmanns von Aue. Überlegungen zur zeitgenössischen Rezeption des Werkes', p. 326; W. Ohly, *Die heilsgeschichtliche Struktur der Epen Hartmanns von Aue*, pp. 10f.; Cormeau, *Hartmanns von Aue 'Armer Heinrich' und 'Gregorius'. Studien zur Interpretation mit dem Blick auf die Theologie zur Zeit Hartmanns*, pp. 77-83.

68. Frank Tobin, 'Fallen Man and Hartmann's *Gregorius*', p. 86; Wolfgang Dittmann, *Hartmanns Gregorius. Untersuchungen zur Überlieferung, zum Aufbau und Gehalt*, p. 188, pp. 195-7; Tobin, *'Gregorius' and 'Der arme Heinrich'. Hartmann's Dualistic and Gradualistic Views of Reality*, pp. 24f.; K. Dieter Goebel, *Untersuchungen zu Aufbau und Schuldproblem in Hartmanns 'Gregorius'*, pp. 107f.

69. M.-D. Chenu, *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century: Essays on New Theological Perspectives in the Latin West*, pp. 246-9.

70. Morris, p. 67. Shari Holmer, 'Popular Religion and the Romances of Hartmann von Aue', also investigates the influence of popular theology on Hartmann, in particular the link between Hartmann's imagery and popular images used in vernacular homilies. See also Dahlgrün, pp. 92-4.

71. Aron Gurevich, *Medieval Popular Culture: Problems of Belief and Perception*, pp. 1-24. Southern, pp. 246-257, also points to Miracles of the Virgin stories as popular forms of religion. See also Dahlgrün, pp. 95-7.

72. Gurevich, pp. 31-3, pp. 153-75.

73. Gurevich, p. 2.

74. Gurevich, p. 6.

75. Southern, pp. 160-9, pp. 223-6; G. Constable, 'Renewal and Reform in Religious Life: Concepts and Realities'; Duby, *History of Private Life*, pp. 514-17.

76. Southern, pp. 156-160; Duby, *History of Private Life*, pp. 528-30.

77. David Knowles, *The Evolution of Medieval Thought*, pp. 7-11.

78. Wolf Gewehr, 'Zu den Begriffen *anima* und *cor* im frühmittelalterlichen Denken', pp. 40-2.

79. Knowles, pp. 18ff.

80. Knowles, pp. 29-45; Michael Haren, *Medieval Thought. The Western Intellectual Tradition from Antiquity to the Thirteenth Century*, pp. 44-50.

81. St Augustine, *Soliloquies*, I, 2, 7. Translation in Knowles, p. 33.

82. St Augustine, *Soliloquies*, II, 1, 1. Translation in Knowles, p. 33.

83. Wolf Gewehr, *Hartmanns 'Klage-Büchlein' im Lichte der Frühscholastik*, pp. 54f.

84. Gewehr, *Frühscholastik*, pp. 43f.

85. St Augustine, *Confessions*, X, 6. See Gewehr, *Frühscholastik*, pp. 50f., p. 55.

86. Xenja von Ertzdorff, 'Das *Herz* in der lateinisch-theologischen und frühen volkssprachigen religiösen Literatur', p. 253.

87. St Augustine, *De Diversis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum*, I, 62. (PL 40, 54). See von Ertzdorff, 'Das *Herz*', p. 255, p. 261. Also Gewehr, *Frühscholastik*, pp. 55-7.

88. Gewehr, *Frühscholastik*, pp. 50f.

89. St Augustine, *Confessions*, X, 3.

90. Chenu, pp. 72-9.

91. Morris, pp. 60-3.

92. Knowles, pp. 86f.

93. Southern, p. 226. The first quotation is to be found in the *Meditatio*, XI, (PL 158, 763). The second is in the *Proslogion*, Chap. 1.

94. Benedicta Ward in Anselm's *Prayers and Meditations*, pp. 53f.

95. Ward in Anselm's *Prayers and Meditations*, p. 36, pp. 275-7.

96. Southern, p. 227. The text is to be found in *Similitudines*, Chap. C-CIX, (PL 159, 665-9).

97. Southern, pp. 229-31; Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, pp. 164-6.

98. Morris, p. 76.

99. Southern, p. 231.

100. Justin McCann's introduction to the *Epistola*, pp. xviff.

101. PL 180, 695. Translated in Morris, p. 64.

102. William of St Thierry, *Epistola*, XVI, 69. Translation by Shewring.

103. William of St Thierry, *Epistola*, XVI, 60. Translation by Shewring.

104. William of St Thierry, *Epistola*, XV, 49. Translation by Shewring.

105. William of St Thierry, *Epistola*, XV, 54. Translation by Shewring.

106. Duckworth, *Gregorius. A Medieval Man's Discovery of his True Self*, pp. 75-82.

107. Knowles, p. 130; Friedrich Heer, *The Medieval World. Europe 1100-1350*, p. 107; Deferrari's introduction to *De sacramentis*, p. ix.

108. McGinn, *The Presence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism. I: The Foundations of Mysticism*, pp. xvi-xx.

109. Haren, p. 114.

110. Richard of St Victor, *De Trinitate*, Prologue, 890D. Quoted in Haren, p. 113.

111. Peter Abelard, *Didascalion*, I, 1 and 3. See D.E. Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard. The Influence of Abelard's Thought in the Early Scholastic Period*, pp. 188f.

112. Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis*, II, 13, 2. Translation by Deferrari.

113. Abelard is a scholastic thinker as opposed to a monastic thinker in the sense that he operated as a peripatetic teacher at cathedral schools. Jean Leclerq, 'Renewal of Theology', describes the different audiences, subject matter, and approaches of the scholastic or speculative and monastic or contemplative theologians. However, he also emphasizes the many points of 'cross-fertilization' between the two approaches, for example their use of dialectic and their emphasis on greater personal

piety. In addition, Leclerq describes the broad influence of both approaches, particularly on questions of penance and intention. Chenu, pp. 273f., pp. 300-9, likewise draws the same distinctions and conclusions. I have thus attempted to distinguish between the two approaches in a similar way, in an effort to avoid above all the tendency to employ the term *scholastic* as a catch-all for twelfth-century thought.

114. Luscombe, *School of Peter Abelard*, pp. 1-5 and often.

115. Peter Abelard, *Ethica*, XIV, (PL 178, 654A). Translated in Luscombe, *Peter Abelard's 'Ethics'*, p. 57.

116. Peter Abelard, *Ethica*, III, (PL 178, 639B-C). Translated in Luscombe, *Peter Abelard's 'Ethics'*, p. 15.

117. Peter Abelard, *Ethica*, XII-XIII, (PL 178, 652f.). Translated in Luscombe, *Peter Abelard's 'Ethics'*, p. 55, p. 57.

118. Haren, p. 108.

119. See Chapter 1 of this present study.

120. Chenu, p. 277.

121. G.D. Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, XXII, 1007-10. Translated in John T. MacNeill and Helena M. Gamer, *Medieval Handbooks of Penance*, p. 413.

122. Morris, p. 73.

123. Mark 1. 15; Luke 15. 20ff.; John 20. 21-3; 1 John 1. 9; 2 Corinthians 7. 10f. See B. Poschmann, *Penance and the Anointing of the Sick*, pp. 6-19.

124. From the second epistle of St Clement, 9, 7f. See Poschmann, p. 22.

125. Hermas, *Similitudo*, VIII, 6, 2. See Poschmann, pp. 29f., note 38.

126. Origen, Commentary in John 19. 13. See Poschmann, pp. 67f.

127. Origen, Commentary in John 36. 4, 2. See Poschmann, p. 68.

128. 'Non tam consideranda est mensura temporis quam doloris.' St Augustine, *Enchiridion*, XVII, 65. English translation from Poschmann, p. 94.

129. This was the case after the Council of Nicaea in A.D. 325. Prior to this, carnal sins were held to be beyond the powers of priestly absolution. See Andrea Hopkins, *The Sinful Knights. A Study of Middle English Penitential*

Romance, p. 38.

130. Hopkins, pp. 39f.; MacNeill and Gamer, pp. 20-2.

131. Poschmann, pp. 106f.

132. Hermas, *Similitudo*, VIII, 10, 2; *Mandatum*, IV, 3, 6. See Poschmann, pp. 30f., including note 39.

133. O.D. Watkins, *A History of Penance*, I, pp. 330-61, pp. 475f.; Hopkins, p. 39.

134. PL 49, 263 and 284-93; Watkins, I, pp. 304-7, pp. 336-40.

135. Pierre J. Payer, 'Penance and Penitentials', p. 488; MacNeill and Gamer, pp. 24f.

136. *Penitential of Cummean*, XI. MacNeill and Gamer, p. 116.

137. *Penitential of Columbanus*, 30. MacNeill and Gamer, p. 257.

138. Payer, pp. 490f.; MacNeill and Gamer, pp. 47-9.

139. Payer, p. 489; Hopkins, p. 43.

140. MacNeill and Gamer, pp. 46f. See also Hopkins, p. 43.

141. MacNeill and Gamer, pp. 26f. Also Gurevich, pp. 24-31, pp. 78-103, who investigates the manner in which the penitentials encouraged self-analysis and other elements of the theology of penance which were incorporated into the popular religious consciousness.

142. Watkins, II, p. 759.

143. MacNeill and Gamer, p. 402.

144. Watkins, II, p. 768.

145. Watkins, II, pp. 735f.

146. Payer, pp. 488f.

147. Poschmann, pp. 139f.

148. Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum*, XXII, 678. See Watkins, II, p. 748.

149. Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum*, XXII, 715. See Watkins, II, p. 748.

150. Poschmann, p. 138.

151. Paul Anciaux, *La Théologie du Sacrement de Pénitence au XIIe siècle*, p. 10. Anciaux, pp. 8-20, also lists Ivo of Chartres' *Decretum* (circa 1094), Bonizo of Sutri's *Liber de vita christiana* (1089-95), and Lanfranc's *Libellus de celanda confessione* (pre 1089) as displaying movement towards and desire for systematization in the treatment of penance.

152. Anciaux, pp. 15f., p. 608.

153. Anciaux, pp. 54f.

154. Anciaux, p. 392, p. 605.

155. Poschmann, p. 157.

156. Luscombe, *Peter Abelard's 'Ethics'*, pp. xxxiif.; Luscombe, 'The *Ethics* of Abelard: Some Further Considerations', pp. 82-4.

157. Anciaux, pp. 64-7, p. 178.

158. Peter Abelard, *Ethica*, XIX, (PL 178, 664C-D). Translated in Luscombe, *Peter Abelard's 'Ethics'*, p. 89. See also Anciaux, pp. 155-7.

159. Peter Abelard, *Ethica*, XXIV, (PL 178, 668C-D). Translated in Luscombe, *Peter Abelard's 'Ethics'*, p. 99.

160. Peter Abelard, *Ethica*, XXIV and XXV, (PL 178, 668-73). See Luscombe, *Peter Abelard's 'Ethics'*, pp. 98-111. Also Anciaux, pp. 178-81, p. 208, p. 352.

161. Peter Abelard, *Ethica*, XXV, (PL 178, 671f.). Translated in Luscombe, *Peter Abelard's 'Ethics'*, p. 107, p. 109.

162. Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis*, II, 14, 8. Translated by Deferrari, p. 420. See also Anciaux, pp. 186-94, p. 208.

163. Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis*, II, 14, 8. Translated by Deferrari, p. 421.

164. Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis*, II, 14, 8. Translated by Deferrari, pp. 418f.

165. Anciaux, pp. 196-201, comments on Gratian's discussion of this problem.

166. Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis*, II, 14, 1. Translated by Deferrari, p. 403.

167. Anciaux, pp. 79f., p. 100, p. 223.

168. Peter Lombard, *Liber quattuor sententiarum*, IV, 17, 1, (PL 192, 880). English translation in Watkins, II, p. 745.

169. Peter Lombard, *Liber quattuor sententiarum*, IV, 17, 2, (PL 192, 881). English translation in Watkins, II, p. 745.

170. Anciaux, pp. 352f.

171. Anciaux, pp. 330f., p. 353.

172. Anciaux, pp. 86-9, p. 464.

173. Anciaux, pp. 400-2, pp. 473-80.

174. Alan of Lille, *Liber poenitentialis*, (PL 210, 299). Translation from Watkins, II, p. 747.

175. Anciaux, pp. 502-8.

176. Anciaux, pp. 121-31, p. 490.

177. Anciaux, p. 134. See also Holmer, pp. 7-12.

178. Anciaux, p. 461.

179. Ursula Schulze, *'Bamberger Glaube und Beichte'*, p. 1402.

180. Schulze, *'Bamberger Beichte'*, pp. 1402f.; David McLintock, *'Bamberger und Erster Wessobrunner Glaube und Beichte'*, p. 595.

181. K. Müllenhoff and W. Scherer, *Denkmäler deutscher Poesie und Prosa aus dem VIII-XII Jahrhundert*, vol. I, pp. 305f.

182. Wenzel, *Frauendienst und Gottesdienst*, pp. 132f.

183. Thomasin also describes the control of the intellect over the physical senses (WG 10193-6).

184. Groß, *Hartmanns Büchlein dargestellt in seiner psychologischen, ethischen und theologischen Bezogenheit auf das Gesamtwerk des Dichters*, p. 75.

185. Leslie Seiffert, 'On the Language of Sovereignty, Deference and Solidarity: The Surrender of the Accusing Lover in Hartmann's *Klage*', refers to the heart as neutral and to the body as both masculine and neutral. I have elected to refer to both the body and heart as neutral entities in order to distinguish the body from the lover as a whole.

186. See also Wenzel, *Frauendienst und Gottesdienst*, pp. 163f.

187. Seiffert, 'On the Language of Sovereignty', p. 28.

188. Roy Boggs, *Hartmann von Aue. Lemmatisierte Konkordanz zum Gesamtwerk*, I, pp. 314f., lists the following occurrences of 'rât, râten'-DK 147, 180, 535, 561, 565, 570, 573, 580, 582, 588, 598, 647, 661, 672, 902, 928, 999, 1003, 1010, 1056, 1122, 1136, 1139, 1141, 1157, 1266, 1294, 1334, 1349, 1487, 1490.

189. See also DK 646-9, 926-8, 941f.

190. Gewehr, *Frühscholastik*, pp. 83-7.

191. Gewehr, *Frühscholastik*, p. 241, p. 243.

192. See also DK 112-4, 144-6, 178f.

193. See also DK 75-86, 391-410, 432f.

194. See also DK 1069-98.

195. G. Ehrismann, 'Die Grundlagen des ritterlichen Tugendsystems', p. 42, note 68.

196. Gewehr, *Frühscholastik*, pp. 30f. Also Groß, p. 1. Note that Gewehr uses the term *early scholastic* as a catch-all for twelfth-century scholastic and monastic thinkers.

197. Gewehr, *Frühscholastik*, pp. 80-7.

198. Gewehr, *Frühscholastik*, pp. 43f., pp. 93-5.

199. Gewehr, *Frühscholastik*, pp. 95-8, cites examples from scholastic writers, and criticizes Schönbach for misunderstanding these distinct terms.

200. Gewehr, *Frühscholastik*, p. 100.

201. Michel-André Bossy, 'Medieval Debates of Body and Soul', notes the substitution of the heart for the soul in the early thirteenth-century *Altercatio cordis et oculi* of Philip the Chancellor and the third body/soul debate of Bonvesin. However, these works depict the heart as a reprobate, afflicted by the forces of love and ignoring its responsibilities by leading the body astray. In this way, these works reflect the fragmentary *Trost in Verzweiflung* which has been dated as a near contemporary to *Die Klage*, but which represents the heart as unreliable and requiring chastisement from the body. See F. Maurer, *Die religiösen Dichtungen des 11. und 12. Jahrhunderts*, vol. 2, pp. 342-5. Also E. Papp, *'Trost in Verzweiflung'*. The depiction of the heart as the organ of reason in such a debate, however, is evident in the thirteenth-century *Débat du cuer et du corps* by Villon (Bossy, pp. 155f.) and Philip the Chancellor's *Disputatio membrorum* (Bossy, p. 160).

202. Wisniewski, 'Hartmanns *Klage-Büchlein*', p. 243.

203. Wisniewski, p. 241.

204. Von Ertzdorff, 'Das *Herz*', p. 288, notes 4, 5, and 6.

205. LJ 2385ff. Von Ertzdorff, 'Das *Herz*', p. 288.

206. DJG 203ff., 372ff. Von Ertzdorff, 'Das *Herz*', p. 289. Also Wenzel, *Frauendienst und Gottesdienst*, pp. 159f.

207. RVG 3154ff. Von Ertzdorff, 'Das *Herz*', pp. 290f. Also Wenzel, *Frauendienst und Gottesdienst*, pp. 160f.

208. VTG 202ff., 216ff., 444ff., 911ff. Von Ertzdorff, 'Das *Herz*', p. 290.

209. Cormeau/Störmer, p. 107; Gewehr, 'Hartmanns *Klage-Büchlein* als Gattungsproblem', p. 11; Wenzel, *Frauendienst und Gottesdienst*, p. 162.

210. Von Ertzdorff, 'Das *Herz*', p. 252, pp. 258f.

211. For example, these influences appear to have contributed to the development of the motif of 'dumbe herte' in Veldeke's work (MF 56,7; 56,23-7). See also Dietmar von Eist (MF 33,12).

212. Von Ertzdorff, 'Die Dame im Herzen und das Herz bei der Dame. Zur Verwendung des Begriffs *Herz* in der höfischen Liebeslyrik des 11. und 12. Jahrhunderts', pp. 6-8, pp. 45f.

213. Gewehr, 'Gattungsproblem', pp. 9-11, condemns Gustav Ehrismann, Piquet, and Wapnewski for considering *Die Klage* to be merely a secular variation of the theological concerns in the body/soul disputations.

214. R.C.J. Endres, 'Minne in the Prologue of Hartmann's *Klage*', pp. 71-8.

215. See also Thomas L. Keller (ed.), *Hartmann von Aue. Klagebüchlein*, p. xvii. Groß, p. 3, makes the same point, proposing the connection between love and virtue as evidence of Hartmann's gradualistic views.

216. Mertens, *'Factus est per clericum miles cythereus*: Überlegungen zu Entstehungs- und Wirkungsbedingungen von Hartmanns *Klage-Büchlein*', p. 10.

217. Hrubý, 'Moralphilosophie und Moraltheologie in Hartmanns *Erec*', p. 196.

218. Hrubý, 'Moralphilosophie', pp. 209f.

219. Hrubý, 'Moralphilosophie', pp. 200-3.

220. Hrubý, 'Moralphilosophie', pp. 212f. Cormeau, 'Joie de la curt. Bedeutungssetzung und ethische Erkenntnis', pp. 200-4, esp. note 26, rejects Hrubý's proposal, and concludes instead that Hartmann was creating a balance of objective and subjective aspects of lay ethical behaviour, based on social norms and the teaching on subjective guilt of twelfth-century scholars. In a later work, Hrubý, 'Hartmann als artifex, philosophus und praeceptor der Gesellschaft', pp. 262-4, himself tones down his earlier conclusions by recognizing that Hartmann was attempting to reflect Christian morality in a secular setting. Hrubý is content to conclude that secular virtues earn a degree of moral value because they demand the same criteria as Christian virtues.

221. Mertens, *'Factus est per clericum'*, p. 14.

222. Gewehr, *Frühscholastik*, pp. 247f.

223. Seiffert, 'On the Language of Sovereignty', pp. 49f.

224. Seiffert, 'On the Language of Sovereignty', p. 51.

225. Gewehr, *Frühscholastik*, p. 243.

226. Clarence E. Butler, 'Hartmann von Aue als Übersetzer und Pädagoge. Eine Untersuchung zur Erhellung pädagogischer Absichten in den höfischen Epen', pp. 73-83, describes Hartmann's version as a translation, but highlights the extra dimensions which Hartmann adds to clarify Chrétien's inner textual meaning. Butler does not investigate the volatile *adaptation courtoise* debate. The scope of this present study also prohibits such an investigation in detail. Suffice to say that Hartmann freely expands on issues apparent in the French text. In this sense, he creates his own dimension of meaning through the emphasis of existing elements. On the *adaptation courtoise* debate, see: Michel Huby, *L'adaptation des romans courtois en Allemagne au XIIe et au XIIIe siècles*; René Pérennec, 'Adaptation et société: l'adaptation par Hartmann d'Aue du roman de Chrétien de Troyes *Erec et Enide*'; Alois Wolf, 'Die "Adaptation courtoise". Kritische Anmerkungen zu einem neuen Dogma'; Jill Pamela McDonald, 'Hartmann von Aue's *Erec* and Chrétien de Troyes' *Erec et Enide*: The Extent and Logic of Hartmann's Transformations of Chrétien's Romance'.

227. See above, Chapter 1.

228. English translation in Chrétien de Troyes, *Arthurian Romances*, translated by D.D.R. Owen.

229. Lexer, *Mittelhochdeutsches Handwörterbuch*, lists *tump* as denoting 'schwach von sinnen od. verstande, dumm, töricht, unbesonnen, einfältig, unklug; klares verstandes geraubt; unerfahren, jung; ungelehrt; stumm.' Thus, this term covers all manner of not-knowing, including conscious and unconscious ignorance. Alois Haas, *Parzivals 'tumpheit'*

bei Wolfram von Eschenbach, pp. 234-47, considers *tumpheit* to denote the new inwardness of twelfth-century thought, but also humankind's inheritance of original sin and its state of childlike belief before the Fall. However, these more specifically religious interpretations have a greater resonance for works such as *Gregorius* which shares *Parzival*'s spiritual scope. In *Erec*, this term has greater secular connotations, although it reflects the concern with perception in twelfth-century scholastic and monastic thought.

230. According to Lexer, *Mittelhochdeutsches Handwörterbuch*, *buoze* denotes 'geistl. und rechtl. busse: besserung, heilmittel, vergütung, strafe.' *Buoz*, however, is more generally 'besserung, abhülfe' or used in conjunction with the verbs *tuon*, *machen*, and *werden*. This use is listed in Benecke/Müller/Zarncke as denoting the making good of a mistake or evil by the perpetrator. The examples of its use in *Erec* (Er 1474, 4355, 4788, 5673) support this, even though *buoz* may often actually denote *buoze*, which is often used in the phrase *ze buoze stân*, and denotes a more reciprocal arrangement between the perpetrator of the evil and the victim. *Buoz* will therefore not be included in the investigations of the present study as the connotation of contrition is not visible in this term.

231. Lexer, *Mittelhochdeutsches Handwörterbuch* lists *riuwe* as indicating 'betrübnis über getanes, reue; betrübnis über etwas geschehenes (verlust), schmerz, kummer, trauer, leid, mitleid'. A distinction is made, therefore, between pain experienced as a result of acknowledging one's guilt (regret), or of suffering an objective loss or injury.

232. See above, Chapter 2. This connection contrasts with Werner Schröder's reading of *Erec* in which he sees the term *riuwe* used in a courtly rather than in a spiritual sense like in *Gregorius*. See Schröder, 'Zum Wortgebrauch von *riuwe* bei Hartmann und Wolfram', pp. 229f.

233. Yeandle, '*Schame* in the works of Hartmann von Aue', pp. 198f. and often.

234. Yeandle, p. 221.

235. Er 18, 145, 150, 708, 757, 930, 1138, 1264, 2255, 2285, 2324, 2331. In addition, Erec's combat with Iders is described as his first (Er 1266), and he is praised at the wedding tournament as the best knight ever of his age (Er 2480-2).

236. Boggs, 'Hartmann's Erec', pp. 51f.

237. For example, Er 309, 316, 331, 1318, 1325, 1457, 1462, 9467, 9470.

238. Ranawake, 'Erec's *verligen* and the Sin of Sloth', p. 103, note 32.

239. Geoffrey See, 'An Examination of the Hero in Hartmann's *Erec*', pp. 39-45; Heimo Reinitzer, 'Über Beispielfiguren im *Erec*', pp. 605-11; Robert E. Lewis, 'Erec's Knightly Imperfections', pp. 152-7; Roy Boggs, 'Hartmann's Erec', pp. 51-5; Dennis Green, 'Hartmann's Ironic Praise of Erec', pp. 797-804.

240. Clark, *Landscapes of Mind*, p. 83.

241. Clark, *Landscapes of Mind*, p. 55.

242. See Green, 'Ironic Praise', pp. 799-802; Jackson, p. 107; Reinitzer, pp. 599-604. Reinitzer also remarks that these comparisons imply Enite's culpability (pp. 610-12). This point is dismissed by Ursula Schulze, *'Âmîs unde man*: Die zentrale Problematik in Hartmanns *Erec*', p. 22, note 25, who maintains that erotic love is to blame rather than Enite's objective guilt as a woman.

243. On the importance of this transition in aristocratic society, see Duby, 'Les "Jeunes"', p. 836.

244. Schnell, 'Gesinnungsethik', pp. 33-5, concludes that the issue of reflection in *Iwein* is evident in Iwein's moving from a state of non-reflection to reflection. However, the issue appears to be more complex. Both Iwein and Erec are shown to be capable of reflecting before their crises. The question remains as to what degree Hartmann's protagonists are still able to reflect once their identities have expanded, and to the social effects of that inadequate perception. In contrast to *Iwein*, however, the issue of immaturity receives greater emphasis in *Erec*.

245. See above, Chapter 2.

246. Jackson, p. 220.

247. Schulze, *'Âmîs unde man'*, pp. 17-23.

248. Ranawake, 'Sin of Sloth', pp. 98-100.

249. Martin Jones, 'Chrétien, Hartmann, and the Knight as Fighting Man: On Hartmann's Chivalric Adaptation of *Erec et Enide*', p. 87.

250. See also Hrubý, 'Die Problemstellung in Chrétiens und Hartmanns *Erec*', pp. 361-3, who describes Enide as representing the lady of the courtly love lyric who haughtily disdains her lover. Enide has to discover that such an approach does not comply with a marriage relationship. Hartmann, in contrast, includes fewer terms relating to the courtly love convention, and portrays Enite instead as a loyal wife.

251. Ranawake, 'Sin of Sloth', p. 103.

252. Kuhn, *'Erec'*, pp. 46f. Kuhn, pp. 44-8, also claims that a process of development exists in these works which is linked with penitential practice. However, Kuhn argues that Erec consciously chooses to follow a path of penitence. Voß, *Artusepik*, pp. 85f., rejects this interpretation, claiming that by allowing any sense of development to exist, Kuhn is contradicting his own earlier rejection of subjective causality.

253. Ranawake, 'Sin of Sloth', p. 115; Ranawake, *'verligen* und *versitzen*: Das Versäumnis des Helden und die Sünde der Trägheit in den Artusromanen Hartmanns von Aue', p. 34.

254. See below, Chapter 5.

255. Uwe Ruberg, *Beredtes Schweigen in lehrhafter und erzählender deutscher Literatur des Mittelalters*, pp. 19-138, considers the concept of silence in classical, biblical, and patristic sources. He concludes that silence indicates patience, restraint, and the ability to listen properly, especially to God. He also argues that silence and speech should be controlled by thought and points to a common image which is also found in secular literature depicting the tongue as an instrument of evil which is imprisoned in the mouth and restrained by the heart. In *Erec*, as Ruberg states, speech and other sensory functions are indeed associated with the powers of the intellect. However, silence is employed primarily in this text to denote uncourtliness or the absence of thought processes.

256. Clark, 'Hartmann's *Êrec*: Language, Perception, and Transformation', pp. 84f., suggests that Enite intends Erec to hear her words. However, there is little textual evidence to support any hidden motives on Enite's part. Peter Kern, 'Reflexe des literarischen Gesprächs über Hartmanns *Erec* in der deutschen Dichtung des Mittelalters', pp. 132f., maintains that Enite's fear of losing Erec is ambiguous and can be interpreted as either altruistic or egoistic. Admittedly, her selflessness soon becomes apparent against the robbers, as Kern states, but at Karnant her fears are more singularly egotistical than Kern claims. The change in this motivation is subsequently emphasized by the robbers episodes.

257. Evelyn Jacobson, 'The Unity of *wort* and *sinn*: Language as Theme and Structural Element in Hartmann's *Erec*', pp. 124f., also considers Erec to recognize the words but not the meaning. However, she discusses this phenomenon in terms of Erec's linguistic disorder reflecting the objective fall from grace of humankind and the chaos caused by human weakness. Once Erec has regained the ability to communicate unambiguously, his ordered linguistic abilities bring a social harmony which reflects the Divine Order. Jacobson employs discourse analysis techniques to demonstrate that

Hartmann is depicting his protagonists schematically, i.e. using the audience's conventional knowledge structure of the Divine Order which prompts certain expectations (p. 122). Jacobson's use of discourse analysis is illuminating. However, one might also suggest that the conventional knowledge structure of Hartmann's audience would have included notions of penance and self-awareness.

258. Clark, 'Language, Perception, Transformation', p. 85.

259. Kuhn, pp. 44f.

260. Cormeau/Störmer, p. 183.

261. Boggs, 'Hartmann's Erec', p. 56.

262. Fisher, 'Erecs Schuld und Enitens Unschuld bei Hartmann', p. 162. However, Fisher makes no connection with the issue of penance and self-knowledge.

263. Fisher, 'Räuber, Riesen und die Stimme der Vernunft in Hartmanns und Chrétiens *Erec*', p. 365.

264. Heine, 'Shifting Perspectives: The Narrative Strategy in Hartmann's *Erec*'.

265. Heine, p. 103.

266. See Holmer, 'Popular Religion', p. 7. She also notes that this process stems from the concept of sin as a sickness. Curing like with like was originally a medical principle, generally attributed to Themison of Laodicea (circa. 50BC). See also Ranawake, 'Sin of Sloth', pp. 105f.

267. Her only thoughts are those of longing for each other and for their wedding night which she shares with Erec (Er 1840-56, 1872-5) and her fears that Erec has been killed by Iders (Er 853f.). Her only example of speech is in answer to her father's command to care for Erec's horse (Er 322).

268. Clark, *Landscapes of Mind*, p. 63.

269. For example, Reinitzer, pp. 610-12; O. Ehrismann, 'Höfisches Leben', pp. 113f.

270. For example, Barbara Thoran, 'Diu ir man verrâten hât - Zum Problem von Enîtens Schuld im *Erec* Hartmanns von Aue', pp. 257-9; Thomas Cramer, 'Soziale Motivation in der Schuld-Sühne-Problematik von Hartmanns *Erec*', pp. 106f.

271. For example, Hugo Kuhn, *'Erec'*, p. 48; Fisher, 'Erecs Schuld', pp. 163-5 and often; Kurt Ruh, *Höfische Epik des deutschen Mittelalters*, I, p. 118.

272. Schnell, 'Literarische Beziehungen zwischen Hartmanns *Erec* und Wolframs *Parzival*', pp. 315-21; Kathryn Smits, 'Enite als christliche Ehefrau', pp. 13f. and often; id., 'Die Schönheit der Frau in Hartmanns *Erec*', pp. 1f. and often; Schulze, *'Âmîs unde man'*, pp. 27-9.

273. Wendy Sterba, 'The Question of Enite's Transgression: Female Voice and Male Gaze as Determining Factors in Hartmann's *Erec*', pp. 58-60, pp. 67f.

274. Tobin, 'Hartmann's *Erec*: The Perils of Young Love', pp. 5f.

275. Sterba, p. 62.

276. Karen Pratt, 'Adapting Enide: Chrétien, Hartmann, and the Female Reader', pp. 80-4, argues that women's speech is of less consequence in Hartmann's text than in his source. This is particularly evident in Hartmann's reduction of Enide's speaking out at Karnant, which removes the challenge of the female voice and serves to focus the narrative on Erec. Such a conclusion, however, does not take account of the contrast between the heroines' monologues in the robbers episodes in which Enite's thoughts and speech receive greater emphasis than her French counterpart.

277. McConeghy, 'Women's Speech and Silence in Hartmann von Aue's *Erec*', p. 775.

278. McConeghy, p. 781.

279. Prudence Allen, *The Concept of Woman. The Aristotelian Revolution 750BC - AD 1250*, pp. 262-315; Joan Ferrante, *Woman as Image in Medieval Literature. From the Twelfth Century to Dante*, pp. 1f., pp. 23-35, pp. 63f.

280. Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis*, I, 6, 35. See Ferrante, p. 32.

281. Hanning, *The Individual in Twelfth-Century Romance*, p. 61, p. 79.

282. Dinzelbacher, pp. 221f.

283. Stielstra, 'The Portrayal of Consciousness in Medieval Romance', pp. 1-15, pp. 29-37.

284. Stielstra, pp. 56-9.

285. Peter Wiehl, *Die Redeszene als episches Strukturelement in den Erec- und Iwein-Dichtungen Hartmanns von Aue und Chrestiens de Troyes*, pp. 19-37, compares the effects of direct and indirect speech and their use in classical and medieval literature.

286. Schulze, *'Âmîs unde man'*, p. 31, argues that Hartmann's nameless count represents the depersonalizing effect of love. One may add that the count's anonymity associates him with the robbers as opposed to Guivreiz, and emphasizes the difference between the threat posed by him and later by Oringles. However, it should not be overlooked that, in the French source, Galoain's name is mentioned on only one occasion (EeE 3129). In addition, this reference occurs in the manuscript used by Foerster (B.N. fr. 1450), but not in the one used by Roques (B.N. 794).

287. See Jackson, pp. 116-8, who compares Hartmann's depiction of the failure of Galoain and Oringles to protect their guests and to keep the peace with judicial and social concerns in the German empire in which counts in particular enjoyed great autonomy and played an important role in the local administration of justice.

288. Jones, 'Knight as Fighting Man', p. 104.

289. It is significant that Hartmann only discusses the issue of cowardice on an occasion on which Erec faces an opponent of equal status. Chrétien investigates this issue in Enide's expectations of her husband. However, in Hartmann's version, only Guivreiz doubts Erec's courage. The issue is thereby presented as a legitimate concern in terms of knighthood, rather than of a wife's pride in and loyalty to her husband.

290. Jackson, p. 124.

291. See above, Chapter 2.

292. Jones, 'Knight as Fighting Man', p. 108.

293. See also Er 4778-806, 4836-45.

294. Clark, *Landscapes of Mind*, p. 72.

295. The didactic nature of humour distinguishes it from comedy. Comedy can be universally appreciated and is created by an unexpected deviation from the norm. Humour utilizes this element of comedy, but incorporates not only a recognition of the disproportion, but also a desire to overcome it and an awareness of the contradictions of life and imperfections of all earthly beings. Humour therefore places comedy into the perspective of human existence. As such, it requires a degree of insight on the audience's part, as well as experience of the world. See Hans Fromm, 'Komik und Humor in der Dichtung des deutschen Mittelalters'; Green, *Irony in the Medieval Romance*; Theo Vater, 'Das Komische und der Humor'.

296. Salmon, 'Ignorance and Awareness of Identity in Hartmann and Wolfram: An Element of Dramatic Irony', p. 95.

297. Fisher, 'Räuber, Riesen', pp. 367f.

298. This point is overlooked by Clark, *Landscapes of Mind*, pp. 74f., who argues that Erec undergoes an apparent regression at this stage.

299. Jackson, pp. 127f.

300. Fisher, 'Räuber, Riesen', p. 363.

301. Elena Offstein, 'Hartmann's Value System as Reflected in his Treatment of the Decision-Making Process', pp. 47-80, argues that Hartmann distinguishes throughout this text between decisions which are informed by calculation or by instinct. She further maintains that instinctive decisions are always crucial and beneficial for the positive characters and disastrous for the negative characters. An appraisal of inner awareness reveals, however, that an apparently instinctive decision is actually based on perceptive thought processes, such as Erec demonstrates in this episode.

302. Geoffrey See, p. 48, argues that Erec's questioning of the giants reveals a continuation of his inappropriate and uncourtly behaviour, as only direct action is effective against such uncourtly enemies. However, one could also argue that Erec's communicative breakthrough at this juncture is heightened by such uncommunicative opponents. Furthermore, Erec's questions emphasize his careful assessment of the need for combat before taking action.

303. This term is used by both the protagonists in *Die Klage* (Body:48, 151, 221, 307, 1743; Heart:712, 749, 1418, 1615). In Erec, it appears in these three particular groupings, but also occurs on single occasions when it most frequently denotes good craftsmanship, such as in the trappings on Enite's horse (Er 7599), Feimurgan's plaster (Er 5159, 5240), and the magic fence at Brandigan (Er 8749).

304. Cormeau/Störmer, pp. 186f.

305. Tobin, 'Perils of Young Love', p. 9.

306. Geoffrey See, pp. 39-45, traces the sudden reactions of the hero throughout the text. In the pre-*verligen* episode, he interprets Erec's swift reactions as demonstrating excessive enthusiasm and obsessiveness. This constitutes a heavy reading of a point which might simply indicate positive youthful eagerness. However, See does recognize that Erec develops the ability to react swiftly to the needs of others, such as Enite on this occasion (p. 49).

307. Schulze, *'Âmîs unde man'*, p. 36.

308. Jones, 'Changing Tack or Showing Tact?: Erec's Self-Criticism in the Second Encounter with Guivreiz in Hartmann von Aue's *Erec'*, pp. 231f. Jones cites Harms, p. 127; G. Ehrismann, *Geschichte der deutschen Literatur*, II, p. 169; Petrus Tax, 'Studien zum Symbolischen in Hartmanns *Erec'*, p. 291; Peter Wapnewski, *Hartmann von Aue*, p. 57; H.-C. Graf von Nayhauss-Cormons-Holub, 'Die Bedeutung und Funktion der Kampfszenen für den Abenteuerweg der Helden im *Erec* und *Iwein* Hartmanns von Aue', p. 109; Helmut de Boor, p. 72; Ruh, p. 136; and J. Schwietering, 'Zur Autorschaft von Seuses Vita', p. 119.

309. Jones, 'Changing Tack', pp. 239-41.

310. Schulze, *'Âmîs unde man'*, p. 39.

311. Jackson, pp. 129f.

312. Höhler, 'Der Kampf im Garten. Studien zur Brandigan-Episode in Hartmanns *Erec'*, p. 380.

313. Clark, *Landscapes of Mind*, pp. 84f., however, considers that Guivreiz demonstrates a lack of perception in this reluctance to communicate.

314. Schulze, *'Âmîs unde man'*, p. 42.

315. Similar motifs are to be found in Hartmann's *Iwein* in the promise of Laudine to Iwein (Iw 2913-23), and of Arthur to Meljaganz (Iw 4536-46).

316. Mabonagrin's lady and the count 'Galoain' are significant as noble figures who remain nameless. Both characters have dubious motives and are defeated in their selfish aims. Unlike Oringles, however, they live to make possible amends. Their namelessness therefore implies that defeat will force them to recreate their identities as more noble characters.

317. The prologue is missing in MSS. A, B, and E, and appears in G, J, and K. See H. Paul (ed.), *Gregorius*, pp. VII-XIV.

318. For example, Christoph Cormeau in Cormeau/Störmer, pp. 129f.; Wolfgang Dittmann, *Hartmanns Gregorius. Untersuchungen zur Überlieferung, zum Aufbau und Gehalt*, pp. 197-9.

319. Volker Mertens, *Gregorius Eremita. Eine Lebensform des Adels bei Hartmann von Aue in ihrer Problematik und ihrer Wandlung in der Rezeption*, p. 80.

320. Cormeau/Störmer, p. 128.

321. For a discussion of the prologue in *Gregorius* functioning as a rhetorical or autobiographical device, see Julius Schwietering, 'The Origins of the Medieval Humility Formula', p. 1288; Mertens, pp. 76-83; Walter Haug, *Literaturtheorie im deutschen Mittelalter. Von den Anfängen bis zum Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts. Eine Einführung*, chap. 8.

322. David Duckworth, *Gregorius. A Medieval Man's Discovery of his True Self*, p. 384, comments on the wide theological implications which this term carries, which he argues are not appropriate to this work. However, he notes that the term is nevertheless indispensable to *Gregorius* scholarship.

323. Cormeau/Störmer, p. 128; Hildegard Nobel, 'Schuld und Sühne in Hartmanns *Gregorius* und in der frühscholastischen Theologie', pp. 57-61, points to Hrabanus Maurus, Peter Lombard, and Bernard of Clairvaux.

324. Gabriele Schieb, 'Schuld und Sühne in Hartmanns Gregorius', p. 53. See also above, Chapter 2.

325. Hans-Jörg Spitz, 'Zwischen Furcht und Hoffnung. Zum Samaritergleichnis in Hartmanns von Aue *Gregorius*-Prolog', p. 174.

326. Mertens, p. 90. W. Ohly, 'Die heilsgeschichtliche Struktur der Epen Hartmanns von Aue', pp. 19f., also points to Hugh of St Victor's *Allegoriae*, IV, 12, and Peter Lombard's *Liber quattuor sententiarum*, II, 22, 707, for the utilization of the same parable in their works.

327. Anton Schönbach, *Über Hartmann von Aue. Drei Bücher Untersuchungen*, pp. 121-5, lists the references as follows: Origen PL 26, 316ff.; Augustine PL 35, 1340f.; Ambrose PL 65, 931f.; Bede PL 92, 468ff.

328. Frank Tobin, *'Gregorius' and 'Der arme Heinrich'. Hartmann's Dualistic and Gradualistic Views of Reality*, pp. 19-23.

329. St Augustine, *The City of God*, XIV, 13.

330. St Augustine, *The City of God*, XIII, 13.

331. St Augustine, *The City of God*, XIV, 16.

332. Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis*, I, 7, 27.

333. Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis*, I, 6, 26.

334. Luscombe, *School of Peter Abelard*, p. 151, p. 227 and often.

335. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, vol. III, part 2/1, pp. 23-5.

336. Lottin, vol. III, part 2/1, p. 12.

337. Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis*, I, 8, 3.

338. In Friedrich Neumann (ed.), *Hartmann von Aue, 'Gregorius der gute Sünder'*, this element is emphasized by the repetition of the term 'sinne' in line 108 ('sus liezen si in sinne blôz').

339. Anke Bennholdt-Thomsen, 'Die allegorischen *kleit* im *Gregorius*-Prolog', p. 206, note 33. In contrast, Spitz, pp. 178-81, by drawing on the works of Bruno of Segni, Caesarius of Arles, and the *Rhitmus pape Leonis IX*, sees a parallel interpretation of this parable in exegesis which denotes the loss of the garments as the loss of virtue. Once again, *Die Klage* provides evidence to suggest that Spitz's concern with virtue and Bennholdt-Thomsen's concern with rationality are in effect the same, as the achievement of virtue is connected with the process of reasoning. Spitz himself points to this close link by stating that *kleit* is synonymous with *sinne* on a literal level, but also with *tugende* on a spiritual level (pp. 181f.).

340. Mertens, p. 170. Mertens, pp. 168-171, concludes with justification that the sinner loses his habitual grace and is therefore reliant on God to supply him with actual grace. However, Mertens associates with this loss the similar disappearance of all the higher potencies of the soul including reason.

341. F. Neumann, note to line 103.

342. Herbert Kolb, 'Der wuocher der riuwe. Studien zu Hartmanns *Gregorius*', p. 53.

343. Anke Bennholdt-Thomsen, pp. 203-8. An overview of interpretations of this issue is provided by Duckworth, pp. 397-403.

344. 'Semivivum reliquerunt, quia beatudinem vitae immortalitatis exuere, sed non sensum rationis abolere valuerunt. Ex qua enim parte sapere et cognoscere Deum potest, vivus est homo'. Bede, *In Lucae Evangelium expositio*, PL 92, 468f., quoted in Duckworth, p. 400, who proceeds to cite such twelfth-century masters as Peter Lombard and Hugh of St Victor whose works reveal the influence of Bede regarding this point (pp. 400-2).

345. Spitz, pp. 184f., sees no tradition of these elements in the exegesis concerned with this parable. He concludes that Hartmann himself connects the clothes of hope and fear with the dangers of presumption and despair. Nobel, p. 48, notes that Schönbach ungenerously concludes that this addition was the result of a misunderstanding on Hartmann's part.

346. Friedrich Ohly, 'Desperatio und Praesumptio. Zur theologischen Verzweiflung und Vermessenheit', pp. 526f., notes that Hartmann is here drawing on a common link made in medieval theology between presumption and despair, on the one hand, and fear and hope, on the other. He cites Gaufredus Babion of Angers as saying 'Spes sine timore praesumptio est; timor sine spe desperatio est' (*Sermones de tempore*, I, PL 171, 346 B). See also Duckworth, pp. 387f., and Spitz, p. 184.

347. Bennholdt-Thomsen, pp. 200-4, attributes these pieces of clothing to the influence of the parable of the Prodigal Son in which the father bestows the *prima stola* signifying forgiveness upon his remorseful son (Luke 15, 20-2). Through the image of the stolen and presented clothes, Hartmann is thus combining the parables of the Good Samaritan with the Prodigal Son, which prompts Bennholdt-Thomsen (p. 203) to deduce that Hartmann is reflecting Bede's teaching. However, she also notes that whereas Bede does not differentiate between the two sets of clothes, calling both *immortalitas* and *innocentia*, Hartmann adapts his interpretation to highlight the role of reflection in the remission of sins by referring to the first set of clothes as 'sîner sinne kleit' and the second as 'gedinge unde vorhte' (p. 204).

348. Although *geistlîche triuwe* is a difficult term to translate accurately, its association here with *riuwe* suggests that Hartmann is subscribing to contemporary penitential thought which would denote this component of penance as the intent to undertake confession and satisfaction and the determination to improve. See Nobel, pp. 50-2.

349. Adjectives used with *triuwe*: 'wâre'- Gr 76; 'geistlîche'- Gr 125, 3338; 'guote'- Gr 321; 'grôze'- Gr 2255, 3669. Adjectives used with *riuwe*: 'wâre'- Gr 897, 2701; 'herzelîche'- Gr 2705, 2491; 'grôze'- Gr 226, 3337; 'ganze'- Gr 3670; also adverb 'von herzen'- Gr 49. *Triuwe* and *riuwe* combinations: Gr 75f., 125f., 2255f., 3337f., 3669f.

350. Kolb, pp. 12-16. Schröder, 'Zum Wortgebrauch von *riuwe*', pp. 229-234, also discusses this term but without referring to the attributes employed. He concludes that *Gregorius* is the only one of Hartmann's narratives to use this term to indicate the concept of contrition as Christian repentance. Otherwise, he claims, this term, even in Wolfram's *Parzival*, only suggests a deep suffering in the soul. There seems little reason to make such a sweeping distinction between the narratives in this way. The use of this term with reference to Iders in *Erec*, for example, appears also to imply the notion of Christian repentance in a secular context.

351. One might emphasize the impact of Hartmann's extension of the French prologue far more than Brigitte Herlem-Prey, 'Schuld oder nicht Schuld, das ist oft die Frage. Kritisches zur Diskussion der Schuld in Hartmanns *Gregorius* und in der *Vie du Pape Saint Grégoire*', pp. 11-13.

352. Contrast Cormeau, *Hartmanns von Aue 'Armer Heinrich' und 'Gregorius'. Studien zur Interpretation mit dem Blick auf die Theologie zur Zeit Hartmanns*, p. 50, who claims that the themes of the prologue are not intended to be applied to this scene, which merely fills in the background of Gregorius' life history. Brian Murdoch, 'Hartmann's *Gregorius* and the Quest of Life', however, draws this parallel between Gregorius' parents and Adam and Eve. Both parties are 'of one flesh', inexperienced and placed in situations of great responsibility in which they are extremely vulnerable to the Devil's jealousy (pp. 84f.). Murdoch proceeds to describe how Gregorius displays aspects of Adam and Christ, and how his experience represents humankind's inheritance of original sin and its attempt to regain paradise. Murdoch thus perceives a link between this work and Adam's penance in the *Vita Adae*. No mention is made, however, of the effect of sin on the intellect, nor of the manner in which Gregorius' experience highlights the necessary response of humankind to their inherited sinfulness.

353. Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis*, I, 7, 31.

354. Werner Schwarz, 'Free Will in Hartmann's *Gregorius*', pp. 134f. In contrast, Oliver Hallich, *Poetologisches, Theologisches. Studien zum 'Gregorius' Hartmanns von Aue*, pp. 62-4, points to terms denoting passivity on the brother's part and concludes that he does not make a free choice here.

355. Fisher, *Studies in the Demonic in Selected Middle High German Epics*, p. 218.

356. Contrast with Cormeau, *'Armer Heinrich' und 'Gregorius'*, pp. 50f., who states that the sister's hesitation should not be seen as an indication that she is implicated in the sin.

357. W. Ohly, pp. 23f.; Stephen L. Wailes, 'Hartmann von Aue's Stories of Incest', p. 71; Siegfried Christoph, 'Guilt, Shame, Atonement, and Hartmann's *Gregorius*', p. 210. The narrator's and the brother's references to their honour reveal a concern for the full extent of this honour, thereby suggesting its secular but also its spiritual aspects (Gr 461, 531). These aspects are subsequently re-examined in the debate between Gregorius and the abbot.

358. Cormeau, *'Armer Heinrich' und 'Gregorius'*, pp. 53f., states that Gregorius' inheritance is the objective consequence of his parents' sin, rather than an aspect of

subjective guilt. Cormeau subsequently concludes that this is the reason why Gregorius' parents are so concerned with preserving his worldly honour, because this is the area in which he is most affected by their sin.

359. Elizabeth Archibald, 'Incest in Medieval Literature and Society', pp. 3-11.

360. Christoph, p. 210, states that the adviser has to remind the siblings of the need to repair the damage to their spiritual honour also. Without his advice, they would not have been capable of appreciating this need. The statements of the parents before they seek his advice do, however, indicate their concern on both levels.

361. See Duckworth, pp. 348-50, who claims that the positive comments made by the narrator with regard to the mother's penance should be considered ironical as she is guilty of desiring to maintain her honourable status in secular society, a move which, according to Duckworth, undermines her feelings of repentance.

362. Wailes, p. 71, nevertheless claims that doubt must be cast on the brother's experience of genuine regret. However, the brother's death appears to exemplify Hartmann's concern to portray the relationship of Gregorius' parents as based on real affection, in order, one presumes, to avoid alienating the audience because of the nature of their sin. No comment is made concerning the brother's feelings of regret, because they are not at issue here. Instead, this aspect is focused upon in the sister's reaction.

363. This interpretation contrasts with Duckworth's claim that the mother's penance is based on weak foundations which crumble as soon as she is attracted to Gregorius (pp. 350-61). In supporting his interpretation, Duckworth disregards *wâre riuwe* as a statement of true regret (p. 50).

364. W.J. McCann, 'Gregorius's Interview with the Abbot: A Comparative Study', p. 88.

365. Hans Schottmann, '*Gregorius* und *Grégoire*', pp. 382-4; McCann, p. 89.

366. Kolb, pp. 33-42; Nobel, pp. 74-6; Wapnewski, *Hartmann von Aue*, pp. 98-100; Duckworth, pp. 147-56; Grosse, 'wis den wisen', pp. 58f.; H.B. Willson, 'Weiteres zur Schuldfrage im *Gregorius* Hartmanns von Aue', pp. 38-42.

367. See, for example, W. Ohly, pp. 28-30; Christoph, pp. 211-13; Jackson, pp. 152f.; Günther Zuntz, 'Ödipus und Gregorius: Tragödie und Legende', p. 95; Cormeau/Störmer, pp. 119f.; Fisher, *Demonic*, p. 201; Dittmann, pp. 226f.; Wenzel, 'Der *Gregorius* Hartmanns von Aue. Überlegungen zur zeitgenössischen Rezeption des Werkes', pp. 351f.; also Schieb, pp. 56f., who does not consider Gregorius to be at

fault in wanting to be a knight, but does consider him guilty of arrogance in his disregard of his mother's request for him to do penance for his parents.

368. Hans Seigfried, 'Der Schuldbegriff im *Gregorius* und im *Armen Heinrich* Hartmanns von Aue', p. 167.

369. Jackson, pp. 153-8. Jackson also refers to the fact that in the French version of this work, the abbot condemns knighthood and is not contradicted by Grégoire. Such condemnation is also present in other works of German literature of this period (Heinrich von Melk's *Erinnerung an den Tod*, Heinrich von Veldeke's *Servatius*). Hartmann's failure to add his own voice to this condemnation is therefore all the more remarkable (pp. 151f.).

370. Kolb, pp. 34f., maintains that this concept creates an air of ambiguity in terms of Gregorius' responsibility for his sin of pride (as Kolb sees it) in leaving the monastery. An instinctive choice suggests that no conscious decision to leave has been made.

371. K. Dieter Goebel, *Untersuchungen zu Aufbau und Schuldproblem in Hartmanns 'Gregorius'*, pp. 52-65, argues that it was only at the end of the twelfth century that the rule concerning oblation began to be less rigorously enforced. At the time *Gregorius* was being composed, the issue would therefore have been unclear. However, Goebel further maintains that the abbot's argument is not based on legal obligation, but rather on Gregorius' spiritual obligation to remain in the monastery.

372. W. Ohly, p. 30. In contrast, Kolb, p. 41, and Willson, p. 37, maintain that God's direction of the casket implies just such an obligation.

373. In contrast, see Nobel, pp. 74-6; Duckworth, p. 146, pp. 170f. As a result, the debate between the abbot and Gregorius does not fall exactly into the pattern of wise adviser and inexperienced youth which Grosse, pp. 52-9, observes in *Gregorius* and *Parzival*.

374. W. Ohly, p. 30.

375. Jackson, p. 159.

376. McCann, pp. 92-4; Jackson, p. 162.

377. W. Ohly and Cormeau do not mention this aspect; Dahlgrün, p. 170; Seigfried, pp. 181f.; Kolb, p. 35, note 58; Dittmann, p. 225, note 50, do not consider these terms to be negative; Voß, pp. 66f., claims that these terms lose their negative content when compared with earlier descriptions of Gregorius' goodness and self-control.

378. McCann, p. 85. In contrast, Hallich, pp. 113-7, looks at terms suggesting that Gregorius feels not only a desire but also a compulsion to leave the monastery. Hallich then concludes that this combination of elements implies the portrayal of predestination in which free will plays its part. Gregorius' departure from the monastery is therefore part of God's plan.

379. Schottmann, pp. 383f.; Tobin, *Dualistic and Gradualistic*, p. 45; Duckworth, p. 146, p. 159; H. Groß, pp. 60f.

380. Ingrid Hahn, 'Hartmanns Büchlein-Zitat im *Gregorius*', pp. 104f., does not give this element from *Die Klage* enough credit when she claims that *Gregorius* surpasses Hartmann's previous narratives by depicting the manner in which grace is only bestowed by God.

381. Jackson, p. 166; Mertens, pp. 94f.

382. Schottmann, p. 397.

383. Clark, *Landscapes of Mind*, pp. 94f., maintains that the information on the tablet is incomplete, thereby reflecting the difficulty of passing on knowledge from one generation to the next. However, the tablet contains all the information a person can ever hope to receive about his or her origins, both spiritual and secular. It is the response to that information and its acknowledgement which Hartmann is emphasizing in this work.

384. Wenzel, 'Der *Gregorius*', pp. 335f. Wenzel, however, proceeds to conclude that Gregorius is mistaken in leaving the monastery where he has been brought by God to do penance for his parents (pp. 344-7).

385. Schieb, p. 57 and Nobel, pp. 76f., do not agree, and instead claim that Gregorius is displaying pride in following his free will after the tablet has ostensibly removed any alternative to his remaining in the monastery to do penance.

386. Schottmann, p. 384.

387. Compare Duckworth, pp. 149f., pp. 163f., who maintains that Gregorius completely rejects the information about his spiritual inheritance and seeks only to establish himself as a knight.

388. W. Ohly, p. 30.

389. Tobin, 'Fallen Man and Hartmann's *Gregorius*', p. 93.

390. Fisher, 'Paradox', p. 2.

391. Kalinke, 'Hartmann's *Gregorius*: A Lesson in the Inscrutability of God's Will', p. 491.

392. Fisher, 'Paradox', p. 13.

393. Wiehl, pp. 79f., suggests that the relatively few monologues in this narrative indicate that Hartmann is not interested in depicting a subjective level in a work influenced by the legend genre. However, it could be argued that monologues, though important in themselves, are not the only means Hartmann uses to investigate the inner lives of the characters. The addition of this particular monologue is of particular import, however, in terms of revealing Hartmann's support for the pursuit of secular honour.

394. Hallich does not take note of these elements of desire and concludes that the mother is unable to recognize the cloth because of her own inherited ignorance (pp. 92-4).

395. In contrast, Goebel, pp. 66-85, argues that the mother, like Dido, commits a sin by abandoning her penance in order to marry Gregorius. Seigfried, p. 181, comments that Gregorius' arrival may have been considered by the mother as a sign that her penance is complete, just as the fish provides a sign for Gregorius on the rock. This suggestion is valid in so far as it supports the notion that the mother's penance itself is valid. However, there is no specific evidence to support this interpretation in the text.

396. W. Ohly, p. 32.

397. See, for example, Voß, p. 71; Fisher, *Demonic*, p. 202.

398. Cormeau, *'Armer Heinrich' und 'Gregorius'*, pp. 64f.

399. W. Ohly, p. 31.

400. Duckworth, pp. 187f.

401. W. Ohly, p. 31.

402. This is particularly so in the report and observations of the maid (Gr 2308, 2322, 2343, 2396, 2401, 2403, 2423, 2455).

403. Haas, pp. 268f., and Lottin, vol. 3, part 2/1, pp. 14f., cite the works of Stephen Langton with regard to this theory.

404. Tobin, *Dualistic and Gradualistic*, p. 51.

405. Tobin, *Dualistic and Gradualistic*, p. 73.

406. Dittmann, pp. 240-3; Cormeau, *'Armer Heinrich' und 'Gregorius'*, p. 70. See also Mertens, pp. 69f.; Zuntz, p. 93.

407. Cormeau, *'Armer Heinrich' und 'Gregorius'*, pp. 77ff. Herlem-Prey, pp. 19-22, similarly claims that Hartmann does not consider the ignorance surrounding the second incest to be exculpatory, because he states unequivocally that the incest is a sin. Herlem-Prey then concludes that Hartmann's approach is the result of his close reflection of the early eleventh-century ideas inherent in the French version, which do not distinguish between objective and subjective guilt. See also Voß, pp. 81f., who claims that the main theological opinion at the end of the twelfth century was to regard all sins committed in ignorance as culpable because they are all imbued with a modicum of subjective guilt as a result of original sin.

408. Nobel, pp. 73f.

409. Wapnewski, 'Der Gregorius', pp. 236f.

410. Wapnewski, 'Der Gregorius', pp. 240-4. A further interpretation is offered by Hallich, pp. 110f., who claims that Gregorius is indeed subjectively innocent of the second incest, but that he still incurs objective guilt from the perpetration of the crime. In this, Hallich sees Hartmann as combining two opposing theological viewpoints.

411. Mertens, pp. 67-9 and often; Goebel, pp. 118-20. See also Dahlgrün, pp. 171f.

412. Alan of Lille, *Liber poenitentialis*, I, 37. See Kolb, p. 28. Hallich, pp. 109f., rightly criticizes Kolb for pointing to Gregorius' failure to press his mother's vassals for more information on arriving in her land as evidence of vincible ignorance. However, Hallich does not look at other pieces of more substantial evidence for this phenomenon in the text.

413. *Summa Gallicana-Bambergensis*. See Kolb, p. 31.

414. Such a claim is rejected by Nobel, p. 62. However, W. Ohly, p. 31, note 52, claims that *præsumptio* is not only a form of obstinacy, but also a sin of carelessness and lassitude.

415. Ruberg, pp. 163f.

416. However, the fact that they do not actually fall into despair does not indicate, as Dittmann maintains, that this concept is not a major theme of this work. Dittmann, pp. 235f.

417. Christoph, pp. 214-21, interprets Gregorius' entire reaction and decision to go into the wilderness as based on secular shame and a belief in the implacability of God, rather than an insight into his guilt. Thus, Gregorius does penance, but without a clear notion of his guilt. His excessive penance is therefore to be understood as a reaction to secular shame from which he cannot escape. His reluctance to re-enter the world as pope is likewise evidence of this shame. Christoph further maintains that an appreciation of guilt alone, rather than shame, would have caused Gregorius to realize that forgiveness was attainable and that such excessive penance was unnecessary. However, as God cannot alleviate secular infamy, Gregorius is forced to suffer in this way.

418. Zuntz, pp. 97f.

419. Cormeau, *'Armer Heinrich' und 'Gregorius'*, p. 75, denies that Gregorius is guilty of any personal sin in the case of the second incest, and proceeds to claim that such a lack of a personal sin makes Gregorius' avoidance of despair even more remarkable. However, one could postulate that, in view of such a heinous personal sin, Gregorius' avoidance of despair is similarly remarkable.

420. Schwarz, p. 147.

421. See also Nobel, p. 47.

422. Dittmann, pp. 172-6, claims that the absence of confession to priests in this work connects Hartmann more closely with the older form of public penance than the developments in the subjective aspects of penitential practice which arose in the work of late eleventh and twelfth-century scholastic and monastic theologians.

423. Schieb, pp. 61-4. In her study of fourteenth-century Middle English penitential romances, Andrea Hopkins, pp. 196-9, concludes that the penance undertaken by the main protagonists resembles the rite of solemn penance as a unrepeatable, public event, rather than penitential procedure in general. This is due to the fact that the protagonists do not confess to priests or undergo minute self-examination as demanded by confessional manuals but are nevertheless prompted by contrition to make amends for their failings. In Hartmann's works, written some two centuries previously, however, self-examination does indeed take place despite the absence of confession to a priest. The existence of self-examination, contrition and acts of satisfaction imply a closer connection between Hartmann's works and the prescribed approach to general penitential practice than the later works considered by Hopkins.

424. Duckworth, pp. 297-311.

425. Hrubý, 'Hartmann als artifex', p. 260, discusses the fact that both Gregorius and Armer Heinrich demonstrate that God's grace is bestowed but cannot directly be earned, as is stated in *Die Klage*. Both protagonists only accept that God has blessed them when they see a physical manifestation of his intervention.

426. See also Gr 3897-926.

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Abbreviations

ATB	Althochdeutsche Textbibliothek
DA	Dissertation Abstracts
DU	*Der Deutschunterricht*
DVLG	*Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*
GAG	Göppinger Arbeiten zur Germanistik
GLL	*German Life and Letters*
GR	*Germanic Review*
GRM	*Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift*
JEGP	*Journal of English and Germanic Philology*
MF	*Des Minnesangs Frühling*
MLR	*Modern Language Review*
PBB	*Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur* (Halle and Tübingen)
PMLA	*Publications of the Modern Language Association of America*
PL	*Patrologia Latina*, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris, 1844ff.)
VL	*Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon*, 2nd edn, ed. K. Ruh, G. Keil et al, vols 1ff. (Berlin/New York, 1978ff.)
WdF	Wege der Forschung
WW	*Wirkendes Wort*
ZfdA	*Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur*
ZfdPh	*Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie*

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